Before considering whether it's time for a plan B on democracy promotion in the Middle East, it probably makes sense to be clear about what Plan A actually is. The most authoritative statement of this policy was given three years ago in an address by President Bush delivered on the occasion of the National Endowment for Democracy's 20th anniversary. The President made two fundamental points in this address. First, he repudiated the doctrine of Arab exceptionalism, which held that democracy – for reasons of culture, politics, and religion -- could not progress in the Arab Middle East, as it had over the course of the Third Wave in every other major region of the world, from Latin America and the post-communist countries to sub-Saharan Africa and East and South Asia, including such non-Arab Muslim-majority countries as Indonesia, Turkey, and Bangladesh. Second, linking terrorism with political stagnation and failure and saying that "it would be reckless to accept the status quo," he called for "a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East."

The new policy has certainly run into extraordinary difficulties with the sectarian violence in Iraq and the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, among other setbacks and crises. But if adopting a Plan B means consigning Plan A to the dustbin of history, I think this would be extremely short-sighted. The President was right to say that democracy is possible in the Middle East, and while we can debate the link between Islamic extremism and political authoritarianism, there is no question, in my view, that the core conflict in the Arab Middle East is between those who accept modernity and those who violently reject it; and that becoming a successful modern society involves the development of institutions and values that promote the rule of law, representative and accountable government, human rights, including the rights of women and minorities, an independent media and civil society, and a market economy – in a word, democracy.

The real issue before us, I believe, is not whether we should support democrats in the region who want to carry this process forward – there is, I think, broad if not universal support in the Congress and the country for the view that this is a worthy objective -- but how we can effectively do so over the long haul, for a long haul it will certainly be. I'm prepared to concede that Plan A doesn't address this question and has probably raised a lot of unrealistic expectations. So if by Plan B we mean spelling out how the new policy might be carried out in a manner that is practical and effective, and can be sustained over the long-run, then yes, I think it's time for a Plan B.

Let me first offer a few observations about the Middle East and why it presents such a difficult challenge to any effort to promote democracy there. First, throughout the region, the democratic opposition, where it exists at all, is far weaker than what existed in Central Europe and Latin America during the political transitions of the 1980s. In the pivotal country of Egypt, for example, there is more of an opposition today than there was at that time, but it is still very weak, and parties like Al Wafd and El Ghad – hobbled by a highly restrictive political party law – have been unable to expand beyond their traditional elite base of intellectuals and professionals.

Second, the political space in the region is dominated by two large blocs -- the existing regimes, ranging mostly from traditional to modernizing autocracies, the latter serviced by stagnant ruling parties that face no real opposition; and Islamist groups that use religion and the provision of services to mobilize among poor, marginalized, and rural constituencies. The relationship between these two blocs is symbiotic in this sense that the regimes justify their rule as a defense against the Islamists, while the mosque offers the Islamists a political space unavailable to the democratic opposition. The current situation is not frozen. It is possible to envision an opening of the political process and an evolution of the Islamists in the direction of greater pragmatism, pluralism, and tolerance. Something like that has already begun to take place in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen. But this is a long-term proposition that doesn't lend itself to what we have come to think of as sudden democratic breakthroughs.

Third, the possibility of democratic change in the Middle East is linked more than in other regions to geopolitical and security issues that are beyond the scope of normal democracy-promotion work. To the degree that national, sectarian and religious passions are inflamed by regional conflicts, above all the Israel-Palestine conflict and the sharpening clash between Shia and Sunni Muslims, democratic progress will be made more difficult. Moderates will be isolated, extremists will be emboldened, and issues will become polarized around national grievance, empowering militants and reducing the pressure on regimes to make internal reforms. And as we know all too well, this is the rule, not the exception, in the Middle East, more so than in any other region; and the problem is being exacerbated today by the rising influence of the Islamist regime in Iran.

Finally, and this is perhaps a more subtle and subjective point, there is a tendency in the Arab Middle East – for reasons having to do with history and many other factors – to hold the United States and other Western powers to blame for problems and, ironically, to look to them for solutions. This is not a healthy mindset for democratic development. Outsiders may not be blameless, and they can surely help. But progress only comes when people take responsibility for their own fate, since democracy has to come from within, or it will not come at all. It follows that while the U.S. needs to be forceful in trying to advance its democracy agenda in the Middle East, it must avoid presenting itself as the principal agent of change, for this will only undermine self-reliance, raise expectations, and arouse resentment when change is stymied and setbacks occur, as they inevitably will.

To say the least, it is not easy to fashion an effective democracy strategy for this region. But let me offer a few thoughts on what some of its key elements might be.

First, it is necessary to engage elements in all three of the camps I have described – the democratic opposition, the established parties, and the Islamist movements. Most of the work will go to helping the democratic parties and actors become genuine players in the political arena as well as in society generally. This will involve working with the emerging civil society leaders and groups that have formed the base of popular movements for change, such as Kifaya in Egypt, and which have organized successful domestic election monitoring efforts in Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Palestine. The activists that led these efforts are potential future leaders of centrist political parties, but they will need to develop a new social discourse and agenda that addresses basic issues of health, employment, education, and economic opportunity if they are to take the initiative away from the radical ideologues and develop broad political appeal. Work with them should be complemented by help to the growing number of civic and professional groups that promote human rights and the participation of women and youth, foster an open economy with protections for the rights of workers, monitor government agencies, influence public policy, strengthen independent media, combat corruption, educate about democracy, and support the rule of law.

It is also necessary to engage with and support, where possible, serious reformers within the ruling parties as well as moderate Islamists who are advocates of democratic reform. The Islamists should be encouraged to develop a code of conduct for political participation that goes beyond a readiness to participate in elections and to respect their results and includes such principles as the renunciation of violence, acceptance of women's and minority rights, support for internal party democracy, and acceptance of pluralism not just in politics but also in interpreting Islamic law. The evolution of a form of "Muslim Democracy" in the Middle East is more likely to take place if Islamists are able to participate in regular elections, since this will encourage them to become more pragmatic political players, formulating policies that respond to real needs of citizens and being held accountable by voters for their performance.

While there is an important role for the U.S. government to play in facilitating such an approach, the principal work of democracy promotion should occur at the non-governmental level. The kind of work with civil and political groups that I have just described will have to be undertaken over the long term by people and organizations that can develop enduring relationships of trust and partnership with local actors, based upon shared political values. Democracy support has to be driven by the needs and vision of local democrats, not by the immediate imperatives of policy, which is why it is best carried out at arms-length from the complex pressures of diplomacy. Governments have too many other priorities that will inevitably interfere with and compromise such work; and they are simply not the natural partners of non-governmental activists, whose independence from government is vital to their work and must often be defended at a price.

That said, there are three important areas where support by the U.S. and other democratic governments is useful and, indeed, essential. Governments can provide assistance to official and semi-official institutions to professionalize their performance and improve their ability to deliver services. They can create through effective security and diplomatic policies a stable political environment that limits the opportunities for demagogues to exploit political passions and improves the chances for moderates to seize the high ground. And they can use their leverage to encourage governments in the Middle East to open political space to opposition parties and minorities, and to defend democratic activists when they are victims of harassment and repression. The imprisonment of Ayman Nour in Egypt is an obvious instance when strong and relentless pressure is needed, both to secure his release and to reverse the backsliding on democratic reform.

The U.S. and other democracies will also have to reconsider their support for elections involving parties that have armed militias and use violence to advance their goals. There has been the desire to involve parties like Hamas and Hezbollah in elections because they represent broad social forces that need to be integrated into the political process. But even in these cases the principle of separating democratic political participation from the use of violence should not be sacrificed. Requiring parties to choose between the ballot and the bullet should be a precondition for legitimating the elections in which they participate.

The Middle East is now passing through a period of tumultuous and violent change when it will be difficult, though not impossible, to achieve democratic gains. Ironically, it is this very upheaval, brought about by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein and empowerment of the Shia majority in Iraq, that has put democracy on the agenda. And it will stay there. There is no going back to the old order, and a new order will not emerge in the absence of the development of more inclusive political systems that give voice, representation, and power to previously excluded groups. If we stay engaged with this process, there is a chance that such systems will also be more liberal and friendly to the United States. If Plan A was a ringing call for a "forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East," Plan B would emphasize what the President subsequently said would require "the concentrated work of generations." That's a realistic perspective on the basis of which we should press ahead.