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Promoting Democracy in the Muslim World
Presentation to the World Conference of Democracy-Support Foundations
Carl Gershman, President
The National Endowment for Democracy

Paris, France
March 21, 2003

Let me begin by thanking Axel Poniatowski for his kind words. I was delighted to meet him in Washington last month at the launching of the International Movement of Parliamentarians for Democracy, and I look forward to working with him on this and other initiatives. It's obviously a difficult moment in relations between the United States and Europe, and especially between the United States and France. Finding ways to work together to advance common democratic principles is not the solution to the problem, but it could be an important part of the solution. Nowhere is such common work more needed than in the Muslim world, the Middle East in particular.

It happened that the events of September 11 occurred right about the time that the NED was revising and updating its five-year strategic plan, which was due to be presented to the NED Board in January 2002. Obviously, the overwhelming concern in that period was to absorb the impact of September 11 and to integrate the priorities that flowed from this transforming event into a global strategy.

What emerged from this process was a new emphasis on the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world that built upon the four core objectives of the NED's global strategy these being the liberalization of dictatorial systems, the democratization of semi-authoritarian countries, the consolidation of new democracies, and the healing and democratic rebirth of societies torn apart by devastating civil conflict.

The Muslim world, which stretches 10,000 miles from Morocco to Mindanao, consists of countries that fall into all of these four categories: Dictatorships like Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan; semi-authoritarian countries like Pakistan, and Egypt; electoral or emerging democracies like Turkey, Mali, Indonesia, and Bangladesh; and war-torn countries like Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

What argued for a special emphasis on the Muslim world were three factors. The first is the democracy gap separating the Muslim world as a whole from the rest of the world. In this regard, the NED's new Strategy Document referenced the survey data developed by Freedom House, according to which only 11 of 47 countries with a Muslim majority are electoral democracies, or 23 %; as against 110 of the remaining 145 countries, or 76%. Of the 16 Arab states of the Middle East, not one is classified as an electoral democracy. This democracy deficit in the Arab world was subsequently the subject of a major report issued by the United Nations Development Program and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, which spoke of a lag in human freedom, women's empowerment, and economic and social development.

The other two factors that called for a special emphasis on the Muslim world were the political and ideological challenge to democracy posed by intolerant and rigidly theocratic Islamist movements, and the association of such movements with political violence.

Not only did the events of September 11 thrust the issue of Islamic radicalism onto the international agenda, but they also seemed to confirm for some people the thesis of Samuel Huntington that the world is now riven by a terrible clash of civilizations. The temptation to see the world in these terms is perhaps understandable, but it is also misleading to do so and potentially very dangerous. The real clash that was both high-lighted and sharpened by September 11 is the clash within the Muslim world between elements that are at war with modernity and that use Islam as a mobilizing tool against democratic civilization; and those who want to build an open society with democratic institutions and a productive economy. The important thing to understand is that the Islamic radicals seek to sharpen the clash between civilizations in order to consolidate control within their own societies or spheres of political activity. Polarization is an instrument used in a revolutionary struggle, a means for broadening the political base for Islamic revolution, squeezing out the democratic alternative, and ultimately seizing power and imposing a theocratic dictatorship.

The strategy of the Islamists poses a difficult challenge for the democratic world, which must take whatever steps are necessary to defend itself against terrorism without falling into the trap of seeing the conflict as a clash of civilizations, or even allowing the conflict to be seen as such. To do this, the democrats must stay focused on the basic clash within the Muslim world, and also look for ways to connect with the advocates of reform in these societies and to help them grow and achieve their objectives. The stronger the bonds that exist with moderates and democrats in the Muslim world, the more the conflict against the extremists will be seen for what it is not a culture clash but a defense of common democratic values. Since these values can only be securely defended if the Muslim world becomes more democratic, and since democracy cannot progress in Muslim countries without the efforts and sacrifices of Muslim democrats, the emergence of forces within the Muslim world that seek to advance democracy becomes a critical factor in building a new foundation for stability and peace.

The practitioners, activists, and intellectuals who seek to strengthen democracy in the Muslim world face four inter-related challenges. The first is to liberalize the political system, which involves defending human rights, strengthening free media and civil society, and conducting regular elections that are free and fair. The second is to modernize and tame the state by institutionalizing the basic mechanisms that prevent the arbitrary exercise of power the subordination of the executive authority to the legislature; the accountability of the parliament to a constitutional structure overseen by a jurisdictional court; the autonomy of local government; and the independence of the judiciary from political authority. The third challenge is to control corruption and build a productive economy that provides opportunity for meaningful work and self-advancement a precondition for addressing the problem of massive youth unemployment high-lighted in the Arab Human Development Report. And finally the fourth challenge is ending the abuse of religion by reconciling Islam with modern concepts of pluralism, citizenship, and individual rights. The prospects for meeting this last challenge have actually never been brighter with the exhaustion and growing de-legitimation of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the failure of Islamic regimes in Afghanistan and Sudan.

It goes without saying that the responsibility for building new democratic institutions and a democratic culture falls to the people within the Muslim world, for democracy can only be built from within. But there are critical ways in which international democracy foundations can help.

The work of the NED's core institutes, for example, address many aspects of the first three challenges of political liberalization, state reform, and promoting transparency and the rule of law. We heard yesterday from representatives of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), the NED's party institutes, which work with moderate political leaders, legislators, and parties in Muslim countries to improve party communications and outreach, encourage women's participation in politics, and promote contacts and exchange among Muslim parties and between them and the major international bodies representing parties around the world. An example of this work is taking place tomorrow in Frankfurt, where NDI is organizing a planning meeting for a Congress of Democrats of the Islamic World, which will be held in June. Among those participating in the meeting will be Zlatko Lagumdzija, the former Prime Minster of Bosnia; Dr. Muhaimin Iskandar, the Deputy Speaker of the DPR in Indonesia; and Mehmet Aydin, the Minister of State for Religious Affairs of Turkey, as well as representatives of the Socialist International, the Liberal International, and the Christian Democrat and People's Party International. The Congress itself will bring together political leaders from nearly 15 predominantly Muslim nations to consider fundamental issues such as transparency in government administration, the empowerment of women and youth, organizing elections that meet international democratic standards, and finding the right balance between religion and politics within a context of pluralism and tolerance.

We heard also from the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) that fosters good governance and economic reform by strengthening private voluntary business associations and think tanks; promotes legal and regulatory reform, transparency and sound corporate governance; providing legal protection to small entrepreneurs in the informal sector; and strengthening the role for women in the economy. The NED also has a trade union institute, the Solidarity Center, that trains union organizers to defend the rights of workers and the poor and counters efforts by Islamists to gain control of trade unions.

The fourth challenge, which is to promote the liberalization of Muslim culture and end the political abuse of religion, is possibly the most difficult and complex of all. Here it may be helpful to recall the work of two nineteenth century French political philosophers, Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville, who saw a tension between democracy and liberalism, and worried that majority rule might threaten individual liberty. Western societies have largely resolved this tension by building protections for individual and minority rights into democratic constitutional systems. But this tension persists in the Muslim world, where Islamist movements opposed to freedom of conscience and choice could come to power in some countries through free elections, and more pervasively on issues related to gender equality and the role of women.

An article by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris in the current issue of the U.S. journal Foreign Policy is pertinent on this issue of gender equality. It notes that the fault line dividing the Muslim world from the West is not the commitment to democracy, which is favored by equally large majorities in both cultures. "The true clash of civilizations," they write, is most evident when it comes to attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and gender equality, with Western societies being far more liberal than their Muslim counterparts. This conclusion is consistent with the observation of the scholar Bernard Lewis in his book What Went Wrong that the status of women is "probably the most profound single difference between the two civilizations."

The consequences of this difference are enormous. Before the revolution in gender rights in the West, John Stuart Mill wrote that "the subjection of women" not only undermined social justice and economic productivity, but also perverted "the whole manner of existence of the man, both as an individual and as a social being." It continues to do so today in many parts of the Muslim world, to the detriment of the whole society. Moreover, since a society's commitment to gender equality and sexual liberalization is, according to Inglehart and Norris, "the most reliable indicator of how strongly that society supports principles of tolerance and egalitarianism." the continued subjection of women in the Muslim world raises questions about the sustainability of democracy there. Thus, efforts to promote the participation and empowerment of women in the political system and in society should be accorded a very high priority in the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world.

Fortunately, there are many non-governmental organizations working to promote women's rights in the Middle East. Here are just some of the groups that the NED is aiding:

The Bahrain Women Society, which provides training for professional women on their legal and political rights;
In Jordan, the Women's Organization to Combat Illiteracy, which trains young women in disenfranchised villages and refugee camps on the importance of democratic political participation; the Women's Union in Jordan, which provides a legal hotline service that helps rural women defend their rights, especially on the question of domestic violence; the Arab Women's Media Center, which works to strengthen women's communication skills; and the Sisterhood is Global Institute Jordan, which provides training on human and citizenship rights;
In Lebanon, the Philanthropic Amlieh Association, which educates Shi'ite Muslim women and girls about their rights within Islam; and the Rene Moawad Foundation, named after the assassinated Prime Minister, whose widow is a leading campaigner for women's rights and democracy;
In Palestine, the Women's Affairs Technical Committee, that provides training in the Jenin refugee camps and surrounding villages in preparation for the legislative elections scheduled for 2003; and the Jerusalem Center for Women, which provides leadership training for future election candidates;
The Committee of the Families of the Disappeared in Algeria, which collects data on victims of Algeria's civil conflict and trains women in advocacy techniques and networking;
The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights, a partner of NDI, which provides training in political advocacy and election campaigning;
The Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, which promotes women's leadership and their participation in political and public affairs;
In Yemen, the Sisters Arabic Forum, which provides technical training to women's groups working to raise the awareness of women's rights; and
The Women's Learning Partnership, which has created a Cyber Institute for Women's Empowerment and Leadership (CIWEL) that provides culture-specific education tools for individuals and organizations in the Global South.

Complementing programs that promote women's rights is support for liberal Muslim intellectuals meaning individuals who work within the tradition of Islam and who are fighting for democracy and against the political abuse of religion. One such programs is conducted by the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue, which publishes a newsletter called Islam 21 and is in the process of producing an Educational Guide on Islam and Public Life, a generic civic education manual that will be adapted to different Muslim societies. Another program promoting a public discourse on Islam and public life is the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, a U.S. group under the leadership of Arab Americans which has conducted workshops in Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen on the theme of "Who Speaks for Islam and Democracy" and is building a network of democrats in the Middle East. Other programs include journals, such as Prologues, which is published by the Magrebian Circle for Studies and Publications, civic education activities, and the promotion of collaboration between devout and secular Muslim democrats.

While the Muslim world faces difficult challenges, one should not overlook the important democratic gains that have been made recently. The September parliamentary elections in Morocco were the freest elections in that country's history; and in October Bahrain voted to elect a parliament for the first time in 30 years, an election in which women ran for national office for the first time. The November parliamentary elections in Turkey brought to power the moderate Justice and Development Party (AKP), a development that might foreshadow the emergence of a Muslim version of Christian Democracy. Turkey's new Prime Minister Abdullah Gul seemed to imply as much when he said that "We want to prove that a Muslim identity can be democratic, can be transparent and can be compatible with the modern world." Even in Afghanistan some twenty parties have come together in a broad coalition called the National Democratic Front that will provide a strong democratic alternative to the warlords and fundamentalists in the elections scheduled for June 2004.

Other encouraging developments have been the release just this week of Saad Iddin Ibrahim and his colleagues at the Ibn-Khaldoun Center, signaling what could be a new opening for civil society in Egypt; and the appointment by the Palestinian Legislative Council of a Prime Minister. I should note in this context that despite the conflict that has raged in the West Bank and Gaza over the past two-and-a-half years, the NED has been able to maintain and even to expand its support for civil-society groups which, though weak for now, could emerge as a stronger democratic force under the right conditions. Finally, it's important to emphasize the extent to which the Islamic regime in Iran has lost the support of youth, women, intellectuals, and even a significant portion of the clergy. Given the regime's loss of ideological legitimacy, which is reminiscent of the communist regimes of Central Europe in the 1980s, I believe that a transition in Iran is only a matter of time.

There is, of course, the matter of Iraq, where the war has now begun. I thought we had a good discussion yesterday about the impact of the Iraq crisis on the European Union and on transatlantic relations. Clearly there are large, fundamental issues separating the United States and some of the major countries of Europe, which have only been sharpened by the events of September 11 and their aftermath. Americans have been at war since the lethal attack of September 11, and that shapes their thinking about the world. There is no equivalent mentality in Europe. There are no clear rules or road maps upon which we can all agree for dealing with the new threats posed by the interaction of terrorists cells, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction. It is a new world that is taking shape as we speak.

I caution that the NED is not a policy organization. Given our bi-partisan structure and our mission which is limited to aiding non-governmental democratic initiatives, we do not take positions on matters of policy, especially where there are sharp divisions. But we have felt it appropriate for us to speak out on how democracy might be built in Iraq after the war, and we have already laid a foundation for such efforts with programs that we have been supporting for years now in Northern Iraq. These include support for:

The Badlisy Cultural Center that trains teachers and Imams on human rights and produces a monthly newsletter in Arabic and Kurdish on civic initiatives and volunteerism;
The Iraq Institute for Democracy that conducts a public civic education campaign in democracy and produces a biweekly newspapers that contains translations of articles on democracy from the international press;
The Kurdish Institute for Elections that translates literature on elections, trains election monitors, conducts a civic education program in high schools, and counters deeply-rooted ethnic cleavages through dialogue on tolerance and democracy;
The ASUDA Organization for Combating Violence Against Women, that raises public awareness about women's rights and establishes a permanent mechanism to monitor such rights;
The American Society for Kurds, that works for legislative reform of press laws and municipal administration; and
The MARE Foundation, that trains Iraqi journalists and is assisting the formation of a professional journalists association.

The NED has also participated in discussions in the United States and abroad about the need to establish an inclusive transitional authority that is broadly representative of all the political and tribal groups that wish to participate in a future democratic Iraq; and that can assume administrative and governing responsibility as quickly as possible. We have argued against any attempt to impose particular groups or individuals as leaders of the Iraqi transitional government, and in favor of establishing a process that will lead over a reasonable period of time to the establishment of a representative democratic government.

The possibility that the United States and its coalition allies would have to rebuild an Iraqi governing authority and system of rule would not exist had Saddam Hussein agreed to surrender power to avoid military defeat, or if he had been overthrown by elements within his regime. The resistance and the resort to war have clearly opened the way for a more drastic process of democratic reconstruction that might otherwise have been the case. There is a possible historic precedent for such a process in the post-war reconstruction of Japan, a story told in the award-winning book by John W. Dower called Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. Dower writes that the refusal of the emperor to surrender in early 1945, as he had been urged to do by some intimate advisers, not only prolonged the conflict, leading to the deaths of over one million people. It also led to the adoption by the United States of "a more radical occupation policy." Such a policy did not even exist in early1945, and it would have been opposed by Japan specialists in the U.S. government who argued throughout the immediate post-war period that Japan was not ready for democracy. But resistance led to "the occupation's revolution from above," just as it might also do in Iraq today.

As horrible as war is, we know that it can also produce historic changes for the good, not just disasters. If this war goes well and it becomes possible to build a new democratic system in Iraq, the need to come to the assistance of Iraq could offer an opportunity for Europeans and Americans to rebuild their own strained relationship. I think we should take advantage of this opportunity, if it presents itself. It will take more than formal discussions to re-establish confidence and trust across the Atlantic. It will take practical cooperation in helping democracy take root in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. It would serve our common interest if we could work together in this way, and it would also give hope to the Iraqi people.

The promotion of democracy in the Middle East is now on the Western agenda. It was always there, as we know. Now that it is, it is critical that we look for new ways to help this process go forward. Democracy promotion is not just the "bottom up" work of democracy foundations. It is also a process by which governmental structures are reformed, often as a condition for qualifying for membership in associations of productive economies and multi-lateral organizations of democratic governments. Such a process has already begun whereby Turkey may join the European Union in the foreseeable future. Should this occur, it would be a momentous development that would have enormous ramifications in the countries bordering Turkey and beyond.

Yesterday we heard our Polish colleagues, Piotr Nowina-Konopka, make a concrete proposal of cooperation among the democracy foundations, toward the end of training a new generation of leaders from the autocratic countries to Poland's east. Poland has pioneered in what we call "cross-border work," meaning democracy promotion undertaken by groups in new democracies to strengthen democratic institutions and values in neighboring countries. If an initiative such as the one he proposed were to proceed, or other similar initiatives for that matter, could not a few of the places be reserved for young people from the Middle East, which is only a little further away from Central Europe than Ukraine and Belarus? And if Turkey were to join the European Union, is it far-fetched to imagine that it might engage in cross-border work at some future time in countries to its south and east. Were this to occur, it could eventually develop into closer economic and social cooperation between the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean and the European Union, perhaps also including the United States and Canada in the manner that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki process) helped democratize Central and Eastern Europe. As a Polish friend once said to me, given the history of Poland in Central Europe, it had a powerful incentive in improving its immediate neighborhood by promoting democratization in its region. The same incentive exists for Europe and the United States to find new ways to advance democracy in the Middle East.

This is a process that can take place through our work with parties, civil society organizations, workers, and entrepreneurs. And it can also be driven by new mechanisms of political and economic integration, of which the European Union is today the most important. We need to understand the dynamics and the potential of these mechanisms much better than we do now. But they point us in a direction that is hopeful, and that may help us develop practical initiatives on which we can collaborate in strengthening our common democratic values in the Middle East and beyond.