Feb 11, 2011

A Victory for Peace and Independence?

Dave Peterson

This article was originially published on the Think Africa Press website.

Although a justifiable occasion for jubilation, the official announcement on February 7 of the results of Sudan’s historic referendum on self-determination for the south was unsurprising. Since the first day of balloting on January 9, and indeed, for many years before the voting began, the outcome was obvious. Nearly 99 percent of southerners voted in favor of some form of independence from the north, a stunning margin.

Yet there can be little doubt the results are accurate, not only due to the domestic and international observers that sanctioned them. Despite the national government’s efforts to “make unity attractive;” despite the vision of the south’s late leader, John Garang, for a united, new Sudan; despite the official policy of the United States and the African Union – any casual observer of Sudan would have predicted this outcome. However else it may have been framed, the last 50 years of on again, off again civil war; the loss of perhaps two million lives; the negotiations, advocacy, debate; the overwhelming expressions of opinion by the average southerner – have all pointed to the same conclusion, that the south would vote for independence.

In the north, there was sadness and joy, relief and casting of blame. The government’s measures to mitigate the likely economic fallout were met by grumbling and some protest. Southern independence will be politically destabilizing, the oil revenues will become more tentative, even if they will continue. The regime may strive to consolidate power, re-invoke Sharia law and become more authoritarian.

Yet the modest political liberalization that has been achieved since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) six years ago could prove to be a genie that will not easily be returned to its bottle. Protests that broke out on January 30 have emulated those in Tunisia and Egypt, including the use of Facebook, especially by youth. The government reacted harshly, and scores of students and other protesters have been arrested, but the willingness to take to the streets again suggests a new generation of activism.

The constitution will need to be re-written, and one might hope that Sudan’s gradual return to international acceptability will encourage political moderation rather than repression. After all, the government, in the person of President Omar Bashir himself, acquiesced in the decision of Sudan’s southern brothers and sisters; and contrary to the predictions of many, the referendum concluded with little violence or glaring irregularities. The writing was on the wall. Important issues remain to be resolved, including the dispositions of Darfur and Abyei, wealth-sharing and citizenship. The south has already experienced some violent consequences of the separation as former southern militia allies of the north are compelled to disarm. But on the whole, the process and its aftermath have gone far better than anyone could have anticipated.

Sudan has long been a divided society, whether along the North-South axis, the center versus the periphery, Arabs versus blacks, or Muslims versus Christians. Yet there has also been an enormous amount of mixing and cross-cutting at both the political level and in the daily lives of people. Although the first war, the Anyanya revolt, was sparked over political issues, the war that reignited in 1983 was due to the promulgation of the September Laws by President Gaafer Nimeiri that imposed Sharia on the entire country. The democratically-elected government of Sadiq el Madhi that followed Nimeiri’s fall failed to rescind the laws or end the war, although it came close, but the coup that brought Omar Bashir to power in 1989 ensured that a rigid interpretation of Sharia law would hold sway.

The resentment of the non-Muslim majority in the south, from both Christians and followers of traditional religions, cannot be underestimated. Even for Muslim southerners, and many northerners more accustomed to tolerant Sufi versions of Islam than the Wahabi style imported from Saudi Arabia, the resentment and feelings of marginalization were much the same. There were many grievances southerners had, and many differences among them that persist, but it was mainly Sharia that drove the war, and that ultimately made it impossible for 99 percent of them to accept what they felt was a second-class citizenship.

A particular irony in the immediate aftermath of the referendum has been the opposition of the Popular Congress Party led by the charismatic Hassan al Turabi, and his arrest along with some of his followers. Turabi, of course, was the ideological spirit behind the  September Laws, the balance of power during the democratic interregnum, and the presumed mastermind of the 1989 coup led by Bashir. Although they may derive some satisfaction from Turabi’s opposition to the government, and insist on his and his followers’ constitutional rights, my liberal friends in the North all agree that Turabi would be a much worse leader than Bashir, not just because of his Islamic ideology, but because of his Machiavellian unscrupulousness.

In the US, no other African issue has had such resonance since the anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s, and credit is due not only to the organizing abilities of the Save Darfur campaign, the religious organizations, and many other determined advocates. Their relentless pressure made a difference, as did the indictment of President Bashir by the ICC. The Sudan conflict lent itself to over-simplification - oppressive Muslim Arab north against defenseless black Christian south - much easier to raise awareness around than the more complicated problems in Congo, Liberia, or even Rwanda. But for southern Sudanese as well, although some might maintain a very sophisticated analysis of the conflict, the majority also found the choice quite as stark and simple as their Western sympathizers. Praise is due to the people of South Sudan who have expressed their will democratically, peacefully, and with great dignity.

Diplomacy is also due homage. The CPA is often regarded as one of the Bush administration’s most significant foreign policy accomplishments, and the Obama administration had the good sense to follow this through with determined vigor and congressional support. The US invested great diplomatic resources, as well as generous financial aid, in cajoling and facilitating the peace process and the referendum. There were some who predicted and advocated war, but diplomatic persistence has undoubtedly saved thousands of lives and billions of dollars.

Finally, credit must be given to the political leadership of both the North and the South, including Omar Bashir and Salva Kiir, despite the derision often directed at them. Perhaps under duress from the many “carrot-like sticks”, as one friend described them, they nevertheless rose to the statesmanlike requirement that both would have to take risks and make concessions, but that the alternative of war could no longer be tolerated. Pressure will need to be maintained, of course, both by Sudanese civil society and political leaders, as well as the international community, to continue democratic reforms in both the north and the south. But if there is one lesson of the referendum, it is that, however imperfectly, even a problem as daunting as that of Sudan can be managed successfully.