Mar 17, 2011

Transitioning to Democracy in Haiti, North Africa and the Middle East

University of Central Florida/Orlando, UCF Global Perspectives & Haiti Speaker Series and Orlando Rotary Club

Georges Fauriol

Introduction

I thank the organizers for having the foresight to schedule this program eight months ago, not knowing that there would be Haitian elections in three days – and not knowing that the world of democratic developments would be turned on its head in the Middle East and North Africa.

I work for an organization that promotes the practice of democracy – the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – we do this through small grants to civil society groups, and we also work through four affiliate institutions of the NED. In a great moment of consensus and multi-partisanship in Washington, when the NED was created in the 1980s it did so with the active support of leaderships from both national political parties – democrats and republicans, as well as the AFL-CIO, and the US Chamber of Commerce.  As a result, the NED also funds programs run by four non-profit organizations that have varying levels of associations with these four pillars of the America political process. No support is given directly to political parties. We only work overseas.

For us at the NED and anyone engaged in supporting democratic development you can imagine that these are exciting as well as tense times. Whatever plans and visions of international developments you might have had six months ago – let alone expectations of democratic development – all of this now has to be dramatically recast.

Democratic Transitions

In both Haiti and the Middle East/North African region, the stakes in the success of these transitions is considerable. The United States does have influence with the different governments of the region -- in some cases quite significant indeed– and it certainly so also in the Haitian context.  Haiti has been a particularly frustrating experience with several failed or aborted transitions creating the conditions of instability that enable anti-democratic forces to take the upper hand.

So, what are the ingredients necessary for a democratic transition?

Many have opined on this and let me draw your attention to some thoughts from the NED itself – a recent talk at New York University by our president, Carl Gershman.

It is a lot to expect but he notes that in all cases democratic transitions have a better chance of success if: first, the process is open and fair; second, if new political forces are given time to organize; third, if electoral laws are crafted to encourage inclusive representation, and then in turn administered with transparency and skill; and fourth, if elections are free and fair and become routine, then it is unlikely that undemocratic forces can effectively compete.

But much of the democracy community also subscribes to the notion that political reform by itself is not enough. If democracy does not deliver for the people, public disillusionment will resurface quickly and generate more pressures. The answer to this is not economic populism which usually produces neither jobs nor sustainable opportunities – look at Venezuela today for example. The better approach lies in fundamental institutional reform and transparency of process. And that takes time and patience.

In other words, democratic government has to be both fair and effective to be successful in the eyes of the individual citizen.

So -- what are we witnessing in the popular eruptions in Egypt and elsewhere? Carl Gershman, most recently in the New Republic, described this trend as possibly representing the beginning of a Fourth Wave of democratization. – a wave that could also extend democracy’s reach into other regions of the world.  (Burma, China, Central Asia)

He is referring to terminology developed by political scientist Samuel Huntington, that there is a historical process composed of waves of democracy.

The First Wave began with our own revolution in 1776, which was quickly followed by the French Revolution. The Second Wave followed the victory of the Allies in World War II.

The Third Wave, according to Huntington, was a global process that began in 1974 with the fall of the military government in Portugal and the death in 1975 of Francisco Franco in Spain, followed in both countries by successful democratic transitions. It then spread to Latin America, Central Europe – highlighted by the collapse of the Soviet Union -- and in the nineties the wave spread to Africa – southern Africa notably, and Asia – Indonesia, the most populous Muslim majority democracy in the world.

The number of countries judged to be democracies in the Freedom House annual surveys more than tripling from 39 in 1974 to a high of 123 in 2005.

Interestingly, Huntington also added the idea of “reverse waves,” or reactions against democratic progress.

In recent years the consensus among democracy specialists is that we experienced a democratic “recession.”  This could be seen with the crackdown on civil society organizations and much more robust responses by autocracies such as Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and China, whose rising power has itself been a factor in the challenge to democracies.

The severe impact of the global economic crisis touched off  by the market collapse of 2008 further weakened perceptions of democratic governance.

The breakthroughs

And then -- democratic protests breaks out in Tunisia, spread to Egypt, Libya, and across the rest of the Middle East.

I am not going to try to draw what would be premature conclusions but there are several lessons that deserve highlighting.

A first lesson applicable to the Middle East as well as Haiti is that these events underscore that while support to democracy activists is welcomed from the outside, the real work of democratic development is undertaken by the domestic reformers themselves. The spark toward an opening against autocratic regimes was lit by the actions of Tunisians and Egyptians, not outsiders.

A second lesson highlights further the role played in democratic transitions by modern information communications, and particularly social media. This allowed activists to plan, mobilize, outflank responses from the regimes, portray a popular momentum to a broader world, and control the message – with a significant multiplier effect on the movement itself and with impact on a government feeling increasingly outpaced by events. The ability to convey this through social media also almost instantaneously meant that events in Tunis and Cairo and elsewhere went global very quickly.

These are not entirely new developments – we saw this during the messy aftermath of the Iranian elections last year, and several years back with the revolt of the monks in Burma – but events in Tunisia and Egypt have consolidated the role of information technology as a tool in democratic transitions.

A third lesson from recent events underscores the need to support democratic transitions with careful, timely, measured global responses. The early stages of democratic transitions are fragile and there is uncertainty among the actors themselves as to which path might ultimately be taken.

This is where the pre-existing networks of activists, the identification of institutional mechanisms and the sequencing necessary to move forward, and the cultivation of consensus-building actors to deepen the foundations of the democratic transitions provide in each case opportunities for international engagement – done carefully and in the appropriate order of magnitude.

Governments and international agencies play a broad role here but the actual street-level dimension of this work rests on a community of non-governmental actors who actually can interact directly and comfortably with domestic reformers.

Haiti's next transition

In three days a second round of elections will be held, an exercise built on the uncertainties left after the first round last November that almost went off the rails, and some might still argue has not been fixed properly.

So, what about Haiti’s path toward democracy?

This has been an active subject of attention for policy makers, for the media, for scholars, let alone Haitians themselves, for the past three decades. Actually, Haiti is always in the news, sometimes with the country itself almost overshadowed by international interventions on a grand scale.

Let me start with some of the broader realities that make up the backdrop to the elections: I think many fall under the rubric –perhaps a bit harsh – of transitions to nowhere.

What is the evidence?

First, there has been a propensity for inconclusive electoral exercises since the late 1980s – no certified electoral results have come out of Haitian elections, since in one form or another each have generated controversy. Or to put it differently, Haitian elections have been preceded generally by political crisis, to be in turn followed eventually by more political crisis.

Second, and related to the first issue, there have been repeated political, security, and humanitarian interventions by the international community since Jean-Claude Duvalier’s ouster in early 1986, and ending with last year’s earthquake.

I count at least seven transitions and ensuing forms of interventions by the international community in approximately 25 years.  Regardless of your analysis of the facts, and I am sure there different opinions on these events right here in this room, that’s a lot of attention to one country’s affairs. In this regard Haiti is quite unique.

What is arguably the more significant point here is how unsuccessful this interaction between Haiti and the international community’s interventions have been in propelling the country toward a better future.

A third backdrop factor relates to a political environment whose cast of characters has not fundamentally changed in some 20 years – these can easily be called the Aristide-Rene Preval years, -- Preval, the current outgoing president-  each with two terms. This is why next Sunday’s 2nd round elections could be a significant event in setting the nation on a different course. But there are many uncertainties.

Strategic challenges

I see four strategic challenges for whoever wins the contest:

First, there is the aftermath of last year’s earthquake, and the rebuilding of the Port-au-Prince region as a better place than it was before January 2010.  I think you all know the facts:

• 220,000 reported lost lives, probably more than that in reality, and some 300,000 injured.
• after one year, more than a million people living in camps.
• a devastated capital area, hitting hard the country’s already weak and ineffective infrastructure – it is reported that all but one major government ministry building was destroyed. Schools, medical facilities, the national university, several of the UN’s own headquarters – name it, it was hit.
• Fortunately, the international response was immediate and has been extensive and sustained, anchored to a series of new multinational administrative vehicles that are attempting to parcel out the resources according to sometimes conflicting priorities. Key among these is the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, created last April, co-chaired by the Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive and former president Bill Clinton. It has an 18-month mandate and $11 billion in long term pledges, including a little over $5 billion for the 2010-11 period.

The second challenge relates to the aftershocks of a fragile electoral system that did not demonstrate much success in managing the first round back in November, and has not really demonstrated any clear indication that next Sunday’s effort will be technically above reproach.

• Here also, I think you all know the basic facts. Regardless of your individual assessment of what transpired last November during the first round, the outcome was hardly reassuring, with voter fraud charges being declared even before the polls had closed, followed but a somewhat unseemly and then a confusing dance by the presidential candidates depending on whether the preliminary numbers being issued would favor their standing in the run-off.

The dispute as to who was 2nd and 3rd in the standings lasted well into January – Jude Celestin and presumed heir apparent to President Preval, or Michel Martelli, the popular musician.

The dispute nearly derailed the entire process and was resolved politically through the intervention of the Organization of American States, helped along by various analyses suggesting fraud probably across the entire vote count. New numbers were produced.

Celestin’s quiet exit from the scene was a helpful development, some suggesting that he did so to avoid a deep crisis even though he did not actually accept the revised results.  He was not alone. Some of the other top contenders have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the 2nd round altogether.

A third challenge is the continuing uncertainty and mystery regarding the intentions of Haiti’s past and controversial presidents, Jean Claude Duvalier and Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

One is already in-country and the other has the passport to do so and is likely to arrive in Haiti at any moment. [ed. note: he did so the day after this talk]

That former president Aristide has been itching to return is well known and has led to varying opinions on the logic and impact of such a return – let alone its timing, before or after March 20?  Objectively, his return is potentially a game changer.

But Duvalier’s return in January in the middle of the electoral crisis was a bigger surprise and added further pressures on an already fragile political environment. Although some would like to see him in a court of law, this is likely an issue to face the next government. And the same political, legal, and moral dilemma might emerge in the aftermath of Aristide’s return.

I add a fourth challenge: a mix of environmental concerns, the outcome of the cholera epidemic, tied with the upcoming storm season which in recent years has had direct hits on Haiti with very damaging effects – in Haiti’s present socio-economic predicament, the impact could be worse than normal. The country has been unfortunate: at least five major natural disasters since 2004 – tropical storms, hurricanes, and the 2010 earthquake.

Sunday's elections

Finally, this brings us to this coming Sunday, and the run-off between Mirlande Manigat and Michel Martelly. Both have made the rounds of their overseas constituencies, including Florida and Quebec -- even if supporters cannot vote directly for them. Manigat and Martelly are likely known to most of you here today – so in closing let me give you some of my observations:

We should first note that although overshadowed by the presidential contest, there are also run-offs for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The next president will face a parliament with an alphabet soup of parties and unstable coalitions – and if it is Martelly, with no real party links of his own, which will have to be remedied through shifting allegiances.  The largest bloc will most likely be from the outgoing government’s INITE party.

• Manigat has a party – the RDNP (Progressive Democratic National Party – Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux Progressites) who she inherits from her husband Leslie. The party has been around since the 1970s and has historically been associated with Latin America’s Christian Democratic party community.
• For his part, Martelly has had to create an electoral vehicle, the Repons Peyizan, by inclination and necessity a somewhat populist party movement, addressing – at least stylistically - the need for action and results.
• A notable characteristic attributable to both candidates is that they started off with instant name recognition – an appealing feature point for any political effort. Manigat was initially perceived as the underdog even though she outvoted everyone else in the 1st round.
• Martelly began with little real political experience while Madame Manigat has been a high profile actor in her husband’s decades of RDNP political party activities and his brief presidential experience in 1988.  She was also briefly a senate candidate in the 1990 elections, and was also elected in 2006 to a senate seat but essentially walked from it because of a broader dispute involving her husband’s presidential race that year. Arguably, she may have been underestimated in this campaign against the high visibility of Martelly.
• What Martelly lacks in political experience he makes up for it in his gift as an entertainer capable of holding forth before large crowds. He focuses on the big themes and generalities.
• Manigat is slower paced, more methodical, more prone to the constitutional lawyer’s structured arguments, perhaps does better on the policy details.
• Both claim to represent a break from the past and there is some truth in that although it may be more evident with Martelly than Manigat. Some of this is generational. Martelly is the younger man in this race (50) and his base appeal is quite different. If only young people voted, Martelly – or more accurately – Sweet Mickey -- would have it made but campaigns and elections also have other factors at play. Manigat may appeal to women voters, approximately 51% of the electorate.
• Both candidates are essentially mainstream politically, some argue they are in fact both “rightists”, a loaded term in the Haitian political context. All of this is difficult to judge as they both highlight more or less the same priority needs  – education, economic development and decentralization or regional development, security and various approaches to reforming police and even addressing the hot button issue of some form of militarized national capacity (the army was disbanded  by Aristide after his return in 1994 in a politically audacious move but one that has not resolved Haiti’s chronic political bouts with force), health and the environment,  and both want to energize the post-earthquake multinational reconstruction effort to make it deliver more effectively.

The real challenge is not an absence of ideas but an ability to turn ideas into reality.

• Martelly’s appeal to youth and notions of change has been energizing and something of a virtue. The cross-country campaign caravans have reinforced the somewhat populist character of the campaign. He rallied some big-names early on – notably musician Wyclef Jean. The major names from the 1st round have not committed themselves openly to either of the two candidates. Late in the race the current government’s minister of information was openly supporting Manigat and there is a perception that the current president’s INITE party is titling its machinery to favor her. In the context of Haiti’s endless rumors, there is no clear evidence of what is actually happening on that score.

Hopefully, this resides more with the individual Haitian voter and their decision to participate in a democratic process on Sunday.

Outcomes

The voter turnout for the 1st round was estimated to be about 23% and I suspect that’s bit high – but for the upcoming round that’s the beginning threshold.  Anything lower might be prone to political complications; approximately 40 percent might be a more respectable threshold but difficult to achieve in part because of the weakness of the entire electoral process.  This is barring any political or other surprises.

To attenuate these uncertainties the United Nations’ police capability will be out in full force. Somewhat disappointingly, aside from a combined OAS-Caribbean Community observer mission, none of the usual international participants in this process will have a robust presence or any at all. The National Democratic Institute has been training domestic observers – one of its strong points – but with 10,000+ voting stations this will be a challenge.

I have gone on long enough so let me stop here and take your questions.

Thank you.