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Asian Center for Democratic Governance >> Freedom of Information for Good Governance
A Report by the Asian Center for Democratic Governance 6 - 8 August 2001 New Delhi, India |
Session I - An Overview of the Legal-Political Environment in Regard to Freedom of InformationOPENING REMARKSSatish Kaura Chair Distinguished participants of this international workshop, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to the international conference on Freedom of Information for Good Governance, organized by the Asian Center for Democratic Governance (ACDG), a collaborative venture of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in Washington DC. A very special welcome to all our participants who have traveled from different parts of the world today, and may I also warmly welcome our guests from India. I am very happy to mention that the Asian Center for Democratic Governance is now firmly in place. As you know, we had the inaugural conference in January this year, here in Delhi, where the subject for discussion was Making Democracy Work: Accountability and Transparency. I should add that the Center is at present based at CII, and we are in the process of setting up the constitution. Today's subject is an overview of the legal, political environment in regard to freedom of information-a very pertinent subject in today's era of globalization. There are some countries which already have the freedom of information act in place, and there are other countries, like India, which are working on it. The point is that all of us, the citizens of any country, want more and more information. One of the pillars of democracy, as we all know, is the media, and in India we are fortunate to have a very free press. The question for debate is to what extent can information be provided to the common man, who has every right to ask for information from the government and other sources. What type of information cannot be given, and who should decide on what can be given? We have had in the past even Ministers very willing to show their files to the public. I think that, except for specific areas-such as security, safety of persons, information which would encroach upon the right of privacy, et cetera-a citizen should be eligible to obtain information of interest to him. We at CII have been talking about the need to even put all of our programs of community development and social welfare on the website, so that citizens across the country can see these programs and the sponsors of these programs. This kind of thing would go a long way in improving the administrative hurdles that exist as of now in these areas. I would like to mention that CII has come out with a corporate governance code, which would give greater comfort to all stakeholders. We at CII are also talking about transparency and openness in different fields of our activity. We are looking forward to hearing the experiences of other countries today. GAUTAM ADHIKARI The Asian Center for Democratic Governance is an idea that came initially out of a major partnership between the NED and CII in February 1999, when we had in Delhi, right here in this hotel, an international conference-the first of its kind I believe. This collection of democracy activists, practitioners, and other professionals concerned about the functioning of democracy gathered together to start the World Movement for Democracy. One of the ideas that came out of that particular conference was to start a project here in India, the world's largest functioning democracy, in collaboration with the United States, the world's oldest modern democracy with a written constitution, to explore the question of what to do after countries have achieved democracy. We decided to call the inaugural conference of this series "Making Democracy Work," because we believe that ultimately, in the medium as well as the long term, it is democracy, through a process of transparency and accountability, which holds people to their responsibilities, and that can make sustainable development possible. In March of 2000, former U.S. president Bill Clinton visited India and took it upon himself to announce this joint Indo-U.S. venture, called the Asian Center for Democratic Governance. Initially, the idea was to have essentially a series of dialogues between the United States and India, on the issues of how to make democracy work and to share the experiences of these two longstanding democracies, at different ends of the economic spectrum, to share their experiences for mutual advantage as well as for the benefit of other countries. In the course of these discussions, the concept expanded to create a center where the problems of democratic functioning in the entire Asian region could be examined. Participants in the January 2001 inaugural conference came from 12 Asian countries. The second conference in South Korea, in June of 2001, was on campaign and political funding in general-a major issue affecting the smoother functioning of the democratic system in developing and developed countries. Political financing often not only leads to a kind of opaque behavior on the part of the politicians, but is also considered to be a major source of corruption in a functioning democracy. The objectives of the Asian Center are to understand the great variety of experiences of democracy and the market economy, and to learn from scholarship and research about how to deepen and improve democracy. The Asian Center seeks to advance knowledge of the general conditions for consolidating democracy at a time of economic globalization and volatility. It serves as a forum for people from Asian countries to exchange information about their specific experiences in order to build a shared understanding of transparent and accountable governance. This is the central message that I would like to convey before the start of this conference: The idea is to provide an informal forum where people can get together and talk. ADDRESS Pranab Mukherjee As all of us are aware, we are yet to formally enact the Freedom of Information Act, though in India, when the Constitution was adopted on the 26th of January 1950, it included Article 19, Sub Clause B, on freedom of speech and expression, which has been expounded and interpreted on umpteen number of times, and which covers a very wide range. But subsequently, over the years, in one particular judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out that freedom of speech and expression is incomplete without the "right to have information." They also pointed out that even the right to life and livelihood would also remain incomplete without the right to information. In that context, it was thought that formal legislation should get enacted. Two committees or expert groups were appointed in 1997. One, led by H.D. Shourie, made some major recommendations. The government accepted some of those recommendations and a draft bill was enacted, which was further scrutinized by another group. They also made some recommendations, and finally the bill, as drafted, was introduced in Lok Sabha in December of 2000. As chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee, dealing with Home, Justice and Company Affairs, it ultimately came to my committee, and today I can speak because I have already submitted the report to the Parliament. In the course of our deliberations, the first question that arose was about the legislative competence. As you are fully aware, in our Constitution, items of legislation are divided between the federal, state government, and thirdly, the Concurrent List, with 47 items, on which both state and central government can make legislation, provided that the state legislation is not in contradiction with the federal legislation. The question arose as to who would be the competent body-parliament or state-to make laws in this respect. Ultimately, it was decided that the residual powers of the federal list entrusted the federal parliament to be the competent legislation-making body. The recommendations have to be accepted by the government; after that, this bill will have to be again brought before the house for consideration-which could be in the current session of parliament-to be scrutinized by the Parliamentary Standing Committee. And the report was unanimous. Normal practice is that most of the recommendations, if it is not totally unacceptable to the government, will be incorporated. Another question that arose was whether the right should be confined only to the citizens, or to all persons who are in India at the particular point of time-relevant here because our fundamental rights are the rights of the citizens, not of aliens. The recommendation to the committee was that these rights be extended to both citizens and aliens, so that everybody has access. Secondly, in regard to the right to life, and especially with regard to preventative detention, there are certain enactments whereby persons can be detained for some time, and information about such detention will have to be given within 24 hours. As per the constitutional practice, a detained person will have to be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours. To synchronize with that, this provision has been made. The third important aspect that we are recommending is that the information is provided only to me, if there is a lapse and accountability is to be placed, and also a penalty should be provided in case of a deliberate avoidance of duty or refusal to provide the information. In two areas we have made our recommendations, but the government has yet to formulate its views. One is that certain information has to be considered classified, specially relating to national security. We have provided certain safeguards, and at the same time exemptions-for instance, information collected by the military intelligence or research and analytical wing of the government, in the case of having unlawful gains. We are trying to ensure that the exceptions made be as small as possible, and wherever information will be denied, that there be some sort of "spoken order" (i.e. a reasoned order for the refusal of information, which can be challenged by the appropriate authority). The second question is a provision by which courts are barred to have interference or jurisdiction over these matters, so far as this act is concerned. I am talking about the subordinate courts, not the Supreme Court or High Court which are almost omnipotent, under the writ jurisdiction of Article 32. We have recommended that there must a practical reason if one wishes to aver the judiciary: A great many court cases are pending in almost all the courts, including subordinate courts. It was thought that if the objective is to provide information expeditiously, if the request then goes to the court and the court takes an unusually long time, then the whole purpose will not be served. What we have suggested is to establish two appellate authorities, one would be within the department and the administrative set up, and the second need not necessarily be a court, but a competent authority that will have quasi-judicial power, so that they can take independent actions (as do many of our institutions, especially the administrative tribunals). Another important provision we have made is that at reasonably high levels, the officers who will be entrusted to provide this information should be picked from a reasonably high level, and though they are primarily responsible, the head of the institution and the head of the department would also be made accountable. If there are any lapses, an appropriate penalty should be made, and for that we have provided that the government should come out with certain radical recommendations in the conduct of the civil service rules. These are some of the important recommendations we have made. So far as our legislative experiences are concerned, this is the first time we are going to have federal legislation in some states. Karnataka has issued an ordinance to provide freedom of information. Maharashtra government has also issued an ordinance. In Rajasthan, I am told that the process is almost completed and will introduce the legislation in the state legislature, and in certain other states (Tamil Nadu and Haryana), they have already provided the necessary legislations. With the introduction and passage of freedom of information, there has been a big debate-whether it should be freedom of information, or (to synchronize with the fundamental rights) whether the nomenclature of the bill should be the right of the citizen to information. So, of course, we have left it. Let us not bother about the nomenclature; this is for the legal pundits in the Ministry of Law. But the purpose and contents of the legislation should be to provide that each and every citizen have the right of information. That right is to be complied without any delay and without any harassment. And if, in any case, there is any dereliction, that should be made accountable, and an appropriate penalty should be provided to them. This is the current state of affairs, so far as my Parliamentary Committee is concerned and the Freedom of Information Bill is concerned. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. REGIONAL REPORTS Zohra Yusuf Before going into the implications of the laws-and there are many-that determine the scope of freedom of information and expression in Pakistan, I would like to share with you a little bit of unknown history that was indicative of the shape of things to come. On 11 August 1947, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, addressing the country's first constituent assembly, made an impassioned plea for what was interpreted as his endorsement of a secular state. After assuring the non-Muslims that they were free to practice their religion, he went on to say that religion had nothing to do with the business of state, adding that "Pakistan was not a theocracy." And it was that early in the history of Pakistan that the bureaucracy showed its effectiveness in controlling freedom of information. Newspapers were "advised" not to publish this section of Mr. Jinnah's speech, and with the exception of one newspaper, DAWN, all complied. The people of Pakistan were prevented from knowing what the founder of Pakistan himself thought should be the nature of the constitution the country should have. In fact, their right to freedom of information was violated. From its inception, Pakistan has been largely under the control of the military bureaucracy. Suppression of information is an obsession that the bureaucracy inherited from its colonial masters, and marking files "Top Secret" comes naturally to them. The military, as the master of the country, has deemed it beneath its dignity to share information with the civilians it has ruled over for long spans of time. Defense spending, details of military contracts for hardware, and such are not debated in Parliament even when there is one. When a former Naval or Air Force chief is exposed for corrupt practices in the Pakistani press, the discerning reader knows that it is a planned exposé, timed to suit certain quarters. This is not to denigrate the role of the press in pursuing investigative journalism. Journalists in Pakistan have fought valiantly for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, but in the highly secretive environment of the military establishment, an investigative story on the armed forces becomes suspect. Unlike Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of Pakistan's Constitution states: "Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security, or defense of Pakistan, or any part thereof. The constitution of Pakistan, itself, does not guarantee freedom of information, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, or incitement to an offense." The mass media in Pakistan is also subject to other laws of Pakistan, and to various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code of 1860 (amended from time to time). Section 499, for example. relates specifically to defamation. Sections 295A-C to what in Pakistan have commonly come to be known as the "blasphemy laws." And, of course, we have the all-encompassing Official Secrets Act of 1923 with classifications such as "Top Secret," "Secret," "Classified," and "Restricted." Although not all these statutes stand in the way of freedom of expression, and some are not even applicable today, the sheer presence of such a vast number of statutes, rules, and regulations indicate a desire to control and suppress rather than help in the process of creating informed public opinion. Most of the media laws are inherited from the British colonial government and reflect an authoritarian mindset. They institutionalize lack of tolerance and dissent. From the early days of Pakistan, publications critical of the government in power have been banned. In 1959, Progressive Papers Ltd.-of which The Pakistan Times (edited by Faiz Ahmed Faiz) was respected for its independent views-was taken over by the country's first military government. In 1961, the government took over the independent news agency, Associated Press of Pakistan. Television was introduced in Pakistan in 1964 as an election tool for President Ayub Khan, and to date it continues to project the views of those in power. There is no space for plurality on the medium. Apart from intolerance of dissent, the other factor confronting Pakistan's rulers is the feeling of insecurity. The suppression of information in the case of the liberation movement in then-East Pakistan, the army action, and subsequent surrender, is an example of an extreme sense of insecurity. Created as two "wings" and separated by 1,000 miles of what was perceived as "hostile" Indian territory, Pakistan was conscious of its vulnerability. The rulers in West Pakistan restricted-and manipulated-the flow of information to such an extent that the surrender by the Pakistani armed forces came as a total shock to the people. There was only a cryptic, brief announcement in the media. When the new government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto showed the news clip of the surrender on television, there was a massive uproar prompting his information minister to call Pakistanis "a nation of ostriches." The report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, set up to investigate the events leading up to the surrender, was itself kept under wraps for three decades, in spite of frequent demands for its release. It was only last year, when India Today published large excerpts, that the government of Pakistan finally made the report public-restricting, however, those sections considered sensitive to foreign relations. The government of General Ziaul Haq, Pakistan's third military regime, was repressive to the point of brutality. Journalists were whipped and imprisoned. Before an audience of newspaper editors and publishers, the General arrogantly claimed he could shut down all newspapers for a week and not allow any protest. Censorship took extreme forms. When newspapers began to leave blank space to indicate that an item had been censored, that action itself became a punishable offense under martial law. Freedom of information and expression were restricted in other ways as well: Each day, the Press Information Departments would, after consultations with the military authorities, decide which story could go above the fold or below. Any reference to the political alliance formed against the military government-the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy-was to be prefixed with "so-called." And, in a bizarre action, Section 499 of the PPC, which deals with matters of defamation, was amended to make the publication of all defamatory material-even if true-a cognizable, criminal offense. Surprisingly, it is the interim governments in Pakistan that have initiated, although in a limited way, the process of ensuring greater freedom of information. In September 1988, following the death of General Ziaul Haq in an air crash, the caretaker government amended Pakistan's notorious Press and Publications Ordinance 1963 to ease the process of acquiring a declaration for a publication. The interim government formed after the removal of the government of Benazir Bhutto promulgated the Freedom of Information Ordinance of 1997. This was-and remains-the first and only effort to make official records accessible to people, although it placed certain restrictions as well, such as annotations on documents, banking company records, documents of a personal nature, and, more significantly, any other document the government chose to categorize as "classified." An appeal, however, could be made to the Federal Ombudsman. The other ordinance promulgated during the same period was the Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (EMRA), which would have allowed electronic media to broadcast news bulletins other than those officially produced by PTV/PBC. Both these ordinances were allowed to lapse by the government of Nawaz Sharif that came into power following the general elections. In his first public broadcast after overthrowing the Sharif government, General Parvez Musharraf surprised many by laying a great emphasis-and spending a disproportionate part of his speech-on the proposed media policy. He promised that this would be an open one, ending the monopoly of the government-owned and controlled Pakistan Television Corporation. Soon after, the framework for setting up the Regulatory Authority for Media Broadcasting Organisations (RAMBO) was announced and a process of public consultations began. However, the information minister piloting RAMBO left the government and RAMBO was later reincarnated as PREMA. In practical terms, apart from playing around with acronyms and terminology, little has been done to open up the electronic media. Several companies still await the issuance of licenses. A few that have started transmitting privately produced programs are not allowed to broadcast programs on current affairs or independently produced news. And in May of 2000, the government legalized the cable system by issuing licenses to operators. This, at least, made entertainment and information accessible to far more people-those who could not afford the cost of installing satellite dishes. The issue of freedom of information should also be seen in the economic context. Illiteracy and growing poverty make the mass media inaccessible to the majority of Pakistanis. There are, for example, only 21 newspaper copies per 1,000 people; 65 television sets per l,000 people; 92 radio sets per 1,000 people and 2.2 cable connections per 1,000 people. It should be noted that the electronic media, which have a wider reach, remains state-controlled. There are only 1.2 personal computers, 19 phone lines, and 0.15 Internet hosts per 1,000 people. Only 8 percent of urban dwellers read English newspapers, which by and large project and support liberal opinions; 51 percent read Urdu newspapers, which are generally known to be conservative and chauvinistic. Apart from economic aspects, the other reason for sharing this data with you is to bring into focus the kind of information, accessible to most, which is shaping minds and public opinion. The Urdu press and the state-controlled electronic media see their roles as crusaders, upholders of what they term the "ideology of Pakistan." In their zeal, they see all liberal opinion as being "anti-Pakistan." The Urdu press, in particular, tends to whip up emotions-often with dangerous consequences. For example, after the destruction of the Babri mosque, almost all Urdu newspapers appeared with black borders on the front pages, reporting the occurrence in a highly emotional tone, which, many observers believe, led to mob violence against the places of worship of non-Muslims in Pakistan. I had earlier referred to some provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code that have a negative bearing on freedom of information and expression. Among these are what I referred to as the "blasphemy laws." This code has made the death sentence mandatory for those convicted of saying or writing anything blasphemous against the Prophet Muhammad. Apart from leading to widespread abuse, where people have used the law to settle personal scores, there have been occasions when newspapers and journalists have been targeted for allegedly writing or publishing material considered to be blasphemous. Again, in all cases, mob frenzy has taken over and the law enforcers have acted against the publication or journalists rather than those guilty of violence. The government is reportedly considering issuing the Freedom of Information Ordinance, in some amended form, again for which talks have been held with representatives of the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors. At the same time, there have been efforts to set up a Press Complaints Council. The proposed composition excludes working journalists from being its members and has, therefore, met resistance from professional associations of journalists. Those in power continue to see the issue of "freedom of information" as a gift from the state. They fail to realize the irrelevance of secrecy and the restrictions they impose in an age when satellite and Internet technology is breaking the barriers of communication and information. I believe there is reason to hope. The resilience and culture of resistance developed during the Zia years, needs to be revived. There are new challenges to freedom of information and expression. The battle is often on the streets. The threats are real, as barricaded newspaper offices testify. However, it is significant that newspaper offices have chosen to protect themselves rather than cave in to mob pressure. The battle of ideas is going on in Pakistan, and we hope that forces of fundamental freedoms emerge victorious. Kavi Chongkittavorn Thailand has been an independent country throughout its 700-year history. It is the only country never colonized by the Western powers. As such, it has been able to adopt and adapt foreign political systems and institutions to its traditions and social environments at particular junctures. Thailand's democratic development is akin to a crook street winding up a hilly mountain. Since 1932, Thailand has traveled through this road and promulgated a total of 16 constitutions, one every four years-a world record! It showed that political development has been very bumpy. These constitutions were promulgated by the military coup-makers in order to legitimize their power seizure. The military elite did frequently intervene in the political process, which transformed into a vicious cycle for more than 50 years between 1932 and 1991. Whenever the military leaders felt insecure, they staged a coup or counter-coup, and every time they replaced the existing constitution with a new one. Then came the infamous Black May massacre of 1992, when the soldiers gunned down hundreds of pro-democracy demonstrators in what was later labeled as "a mobile-phone revolution." It was the third bloody revolution, following two previous massacres in 1973 and 1976, when the hundreds of thousands of students took to the streets and fought military dictatorship. But it was not until the promulgation of the new constitution that Thailand really has the potential to become a full-fledged democracy. In the past, Thai political development has been dubbed a "half-baked" or "half-leaf" democracy. So, when the new charter was finished, the drafters, media, and lawmakers immediately nicknamed it "the People's Constitution." Nearly one million people from all the 76 provinces gave their inputs during the 240-day drafting process. They attended numerous public hearings held throughout the country. After 69 years of dilly-dallying with democracy, Thailand finally got a real constitution that reflected the aspirations of the Thai people. It is not a bad one. Overall, the new charter has become the pillar of Thai political and legal reforms and burgeoning democracy. The constitution was designed to promote a wide range of political, administrative, and human rights reforms. The pivotal elements of the reform movement are citizen participation in governance, rule of law under constitutional supremacy, and constitutional mechanism to promote and enforce accountability and transparency. Some other salient points:
Finally, the new charter also guarantees the rights of the local people and communities to protect the environment and to participate in the decision-making process related to the use of natural resources. Conflicts over the use of natural resources and environmental protection have increased that demand for the government's full attention. With regard to the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s and its effect on democratization, political pundits always believe that economic prosperity is a condition for democratization. If that is the case, then an economic crisis or downturn should have negative impacts on the democratic development. But what happened in Thailand was quite unique, because the 1997 economic crisis, popularly known as Tomyam Disease, did not lead to a military takeover. Instead, it propelled the democratization force even further. How can this be explained? One main reason is that the Thais, especially the middle strata in urban areas, believed that further democratic reforms and the development of good governance both in the public and private sectors can overcome the economic crisis. Although democracy remained fragile due to a weak party system and widespread corruption, the Thais did not want to go back to military rule. They want those problems to be settled through democratic means. This showed that democratic reforms had started taking root in Thai society. The fact that the new charter was approved after the economic crisis also reaffirmed the public's commitment to political reform. The Thai government at the time launched several bills to reform the financial sector and state enterprises and to enforce debt restructuring in the private sector. These painful reform measures have inevitably led to conflicts between the government and local business and political leaders. Then again, nobody wanted to see the military return to politics. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendment Bill and the State Enterprise Capital Bill are the case in point. Several lawmakers, in the lower and upper houses, were unhappy. They believed that these measures were not the best prescription for recovery. They wanted Thailand to stand on its own feet and rely less on foreign investors and assistance. They said that these measures would help foreigners to take over Thai business and industries, that these bills would facilitate the takeover of the state enterprises by foreign investors. At the moment, the conflict still rages on. Some credit should be given to the de-politicized Thai military. After the pro-democracy uprising in May 1992, the military officials adopted new attitudes and were supportive of democracy. A survey on articles and research papers published in the military's journals between 1992-2000 showed that the military has come to accept development and political roles. These articles explained the new impetus of Thai political systems and the latest developments in the electoral process. When Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai took over power in 1997, he became the first civilian to become a defense minister. Earlier, it was tradition that this portfolio must be reserved for a retired military officer only. Since the Official Information Act (OIA) was promulgated in 1997, more than half a million Thai people have used it one way or another. During the first two years, the public was not well aware of the new law, what it did, and what kinds of impact it could have on Thai society. But several scandals helped publicize the information law, especially Sumalee's quest and the Public Health Ministry's scandal. Sumalee Limpa-ovart spent two-and-a-half years struggling with the administrators of Kasetsart Demonstrative School-who denied her daughter's admission to its first grade class-to find out the reasons why the school did not accept her daughter. As it turned out, she uncovered that the school admitted children of privileged families and donors. After several court battles with the school's lawyers and administrators, the constitutional court passed a verdict supporting her, and ruled that the school acted unconstitutionally and in bad faith, ordering the school to abolish the discriminatory system. Consequently, other state-run demonstrative schools have adopted the same system. The 1999 scandal, which involved the procurement of medical supplies worth US$35 million (1.4 billion baht), led to the resignation of Deputy Public Health Minister Rakkiart Sukthana and two senior officials. Relying on tip-offs and information given by an alliance of nongovernmental organizations and grass-roots groups including rural doctors, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) was able to dig deep into illegal procurement networks that jacked up prices of medical supplies to rural health stations. Through the information act, advocacy groups and journalists successfully obtained the records of the NCCC investigation, after several appeals, but the names of eyewitnesses were blackened to protect their identities. With Sumalee's victory, the public started to appreciate the access act. More and more people now know that they have the right to have full access to government information. In the past, all official data and information were considered confidential and not for any disclosure, except in exceptional circumstances. Now the pendulum has swung back: all official data and information should be released for public perusal, with minimal exceptions. Beyond the right for all citizens to access official information and the erosion of the culture of secrecy, it also has wider implications in various ways: 1) it supports the right for all citizens to participate effectively in the decision-making processes of government; 2) it increases the efficiency of the workings of government by making the various government agencies accountable to public scrutiny; 3) it reduces corruption in government by making all dealings more transparent; 4) it weakens the long tradition of patron-client relations, which rely on connections and nepotism; 5) it lessens the possibility of social conflicts between groups of citizens and government agencies; and 6) it empowers ordinary citizens, especially those in rural areas. According to the access law, some information is not subject to disclosure, especially that related to the Royal Institution and that which will jeopardize national security, international relations, or national economic and financial security. For those who want to access information related to the Royal Institution, it can be done under the category of historical data, which takes 75 years to be declassified. If need be, an additional but final extension of 75 years can be added before a full disclosure. The information tribunal commission can also consider appeals for disclosure on all these prohibited information. At issue, the tribunal commission dare to do it. Any Thai citizen can request official information, by filing a simple form. In theory, all requests must be fulfilled within a "reasonable period of time." Failure to do so could bring jail terms and fines. In reality, the ambivalence of the law has allowed the authorities to prolong the requests. There is no specific timeframe for the so-called reasonable period of time-it could be one week, one month or one year. This has become one of the biggest loopholes. For instance, a request was made on 25 October 1998 related to paper procurement by the Finance Ministry's Tobacco Bureau took two-and-a-half months before an official response was made. In another case, it took three months to process a request to examine the agreement made by the Bank of Thailand in selling off a state-owned bank. For the time being, there is a seven-day time frame. After that, an appeal could be send to the Office of Official Information Commission (OIC). Generally, it does not cost money to ask for information, even though it can involve thousands and thousands of pages of documents like the request made by a Ph.D. student doing research on Thailand's economic crisis. He wanted to scrutinize the minutes of discussions of the Bank of Thailand going back some three decades to find the cause of the economic crisis in 1997. It was a time-consuming process that requires patience. After several months of foot-dragging and bureaucratic red-tape, the student got the documents he wanted. Most of the requests concerned official information related to concessions, contracts, projects, and the budget. Documents demanded by investigative journalists ranked second. The statistics provided by the OIC showed that only six of the 100 cases judged by the five Information Disclosure Tribunals from 1998-2000 were dealing with economic and financial matters. Five cases were made by the Prachachart Thurajit newspaper and involved the details of purchasing contracts related to the bid for sales of the financial sector debts. The tribunal ruled that all details must be disclosure. The sixth case dealt with the disclosure of a series of confidential letters written by the Bank of Thailand to the International Monetary Fund. The tribunal rejected the request. After four years of implementation, there are few problems. First, both the government officials and the public have to understand key element of the information law. Officials are still afraid to give out even the most basic information. The longstanding culture of secrecy has cowed them all. In a similar vein, the public do not know how to use the law in compliance with their demand to have access to state information. Both sides need to know more about the nature of access and law and its implications. So far, the disclosures have been done in an arbitrary nature depending on the goodwill of officials. Given the nature of committee, which is under the Prime Minister's Office, it has little mandate to order the ministries and other state enterprises to provide sensitive information requested by the public. Therefore, the committee needs to be beefed up, both in terms of mandate and staff. At the moment, the committee cannot overrule the newly established mechanisms such as the National Counter Corruption Commission and the Election Commission, to name but a few. Although it has been four years since the promulgation of information law, the public still does not understand key elements of the access law, nor do they realize their rights. Most people do not know how to use the law in compliance with their demand to have access to state information. Therefore, people cannot exercise their rights, as they do not know the procedures. Among the government agencies, high-ranking officials do not understand the law and do not know how to implement it. Furthermore, they lack adequate knowledge of the law. Since the whole exercise is new, they have little skill in exercising discretion. Worse, some of these officials do not consider public requests for information as part of the government's service; they view the access act as a burden on them. Lack of coordination among various ministries has made cross-references almost impossible whenever a request has to deal with additional government agencies. Furthermore, members of disclosure tribunals serve on a voluntary, not a permanent basis, which could affect their decisions because they have other jobs and responsibilities. The lack of serious provisions of punishment has hampered access to information. Officials still do not treat the new law seriously. While persons who fail to respond to information requests are punished with a three-month imprisonment and a fine of 5000 baht (US$116), those who disclosed information by mistake are reprimanded with a one-year imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 baht (US$465). This contradiction has discouraged the authorities to act promptly, and they tend to drag on with the requests. They prefer to pass the requests to the OIC for further deliberations. Finally, the operating fund and staff are insufficient; the current 19-member OIC has to handle a workload submitted by 8,775 state and local agencies around the country. More money and staff are required to smooth out the operation. Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that has a separate law on access to information. Although the Philippine Constitution guarantees public access to government-held information in general, there are ongoing discussions among lawmakers, civil society leaders, and journalists whether a separate information law is needed to promote open and accountable government. Indonesia is currently drafting a similar law, which will be taken up by the Parliament in the near future. The Indonesian version is more liberal than the Thai version, as it has very few limitations. (For example, foreigners are eligible to use it.) Beyond Southeast Asia, India promulgated an information law last year. Japan's national information law is effective in April 2001. South Korea enacted a similar law, known as Act on Information Disclosure of and by Public Agencies, in 1996. Nepal has its own draft ready to be vetted by the lawmakers. Since Nepal and Thailand are constitutional monarchies, their access laws have many similar features. The Manila-based Philippine Center for Investigative Journalists (PCIJ) has done a comparative study on access to information in eight countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia), which will be completed in June. The working definition of "access to information" used in this project is the ability of citizens to obtain information in possession of the state. The studies did a survey of the availability of over 40 public records, such as macroeconomic data, social data (literacy, poverty, infant mortality rates), data on government budgets and contracts, information on parliamentary meetings and inquiries, court proceedings, official investigations, and financial disclosures by officials and companies. The survey asked whether these records available to the public. For the "yes" answer, the Philippines ranks as first (68 percent) as the country which allows access to all these records, while Cambodia (50 percent) and Thailand (49 percent) rank second and third, respectively. Singapore ranks fifth (44 percent), Malaysia ranks sixth (36 percent), and Vietnam ranks seventh (21 percent), followed by Indonesia (19 percent). Burma is at the bottom (5 percent). For the "no" answer, Singapore ranks first (56 percent), followed by Burma (56 percent) and Vietnam (49 percent). Cambodia ranks fourth (43 percent), while Malaysia ranks fifth (38 percent), followed by Indonesia (36 percent). Thailand and the Philippines score 18 percent and 11 percent, respectively. These preliminary findings indicate that there is no correlation between level of development and access to information. The main determinants appear to be a democratic and pluralistic polity, plurality of media ownership, and a culture of discussion, inquiry, and political participation. For instance, although Singapore is considered an open society, access to certain information is extremely difficult. According to James Gomez of the Think Center, records concerning government officials, military personnel, and alien information are difficult, as they are deemed too confidential. Burma ranks the lowest in the region in all categories, while the Philippines is considered the most accessible country. Quite a few newspapers, including Prachachart Thurakit and Krungthep Thurakit, have set up investigative report desks. The Nation has made it a policy to file a request as frequently as possible on issues of public interest. Groups of journalists, especially at Prachachart Thurakit, are assigned to follow new topics as well as go through old headlines to uncover further information. These desks will also prepare letters and other necessary steps to use the information act. Journalists who have used the access act have a better opportunity to get a high salary. Meanwhile, the universities and colleges throughout Thailand are now offering classes related to information act and investigative reports their communication courses. Numerous workshops are also geared toward helping Thai journalists to improve their reporting and investigative skills. Judging from the newspaper articles submitted for top journalism prizes (the Thai version of Pulitzer Prizes)-which has been administrated by Thai Journalists Association (TJA) for the past four decades-most of the winning articles focused on scandals and corruption, culled from leaks given by political opponents or whistleblowers. These reports were part of the daily follow-ups of stories in progress, so they were done on an ad-hoc basis. Prior, there was no systematic or long-term planning to investigative news, or for that matter to use the access law in a sustained and comprehensive way. However, after the information act was put in place, the investigative reports into government malfeasance has increased. As a result, these reports using the access law have occupied the top winning slots three years in a row (1998-2000). The article by Prachachart Thurakit that exposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's fraudulent asset declaration was awarded the best report of the year 2000. The paper uncovered evidence that Thaksin, who was serving as a deputy prime minister in 1996, had illegally hidden US$53 million worth of shares in his telecommunications company through a false stock transfer to one of his maids and a family driver. In its annual accounting of press freedom conditions in Thailand, the Committee to Protection Journalists had this to say about the Thai press and the impacts of information act: "The Thaksin case showed how aggressive local journalists have been using a reform Constitution passed in 1997, an Access to Information Act passed the same year, and a new official anti-corruption body to check the malfeasance of officials at all levels of government. A similar case earlier in the year resulted in a leading ruling party politician being barred from office following newspaper revelations about his hidden assets." On June 18, 2001, the constitutional court wrapped up the eight-month deliberation. Unfortunately, on August 3, 2001 the constitutional court voted 8-7 to acquit Thaksin. The eight judges said he had no intention to hide his asset. It was a big set back for Thai democracy and rule of law. A day after, the Upper House ordered the National Counter Corruption Commission to conduct an investigation of all the constitution court's members to check if they received any bribes from Thaksin. Melinda Quintos de Jesus Endnotes Good evening, fellow panelists. I would speak now of the Philippines experience with regard to freedom of information, in the context of the political culture prevailing in the Philippines. And this will take some history and some current events. While the Philippines has long been set apart in Southeast Asia for its commitment to press freedom, it remains among the countries in the region without a Freedom of Information Act. It is Thailand that holds the distinction for being the first Southeast Asian country to pass such progressive legislation. Interestingly enough, this lack does not seem to have affected the ability of journalists in the Philippines to exercise their rights of access so as to reveal what corrupt leaders would wish to keep hidden from the public eye. Even during periods of strict government control, under foreign ruler or native dictator, Filipinos have successfully carved out space for alternative news, testing the limits of official tolerance and risking penalties. In the democratic space of the post-Marcos era, Filipino journalists routinely seek out vital information about public misconduct. As the so-called "mosquito" press galvanized national protest against Ferdinand Marcos, investigative journalists once again played a critical role in bringing down President Joseph Estrada with revelations of his and his family's "hidden wealth." This paper will discuss the legal and political landscape of freedom of information in the Philippines, a country that continues to provide a wide range of case studies on press freedom and development. The paper will attempt to show how legal and political traditions have evolved to create a sufficiently strong framework to support access to information for the press, as well as for civil society. From 1946 when the Philippines gained its independence from America, the Philippines served as a showcase of democracy and press freedom in Asia. Newspapers made up a distinctive feature of national life, with a lively and irreverent tone that seemed out of sync with other aspects of its society. The law upheld the role of the press. In the first democratic constitution in Asia, drafted and approved by the Philippine revolutionary government at the end of the 19th century, the Malolos Constitution guaranteed the protection of freedom of expression through the use of the press and other means. Following this brief interlude of sovereignty, the American colonial period transplanted the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution into the Philippine legal system. This development made the application of American jurisprudence to the Philippines appropriate and relevant. The same protection was carried over in the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution. In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed Martial Law, extending himself in power for around 20 years and using the mainstream press for his purposes. The infamous 1973 Constitution was an attempt to legitimize his grab for power. Ironically, the 1973 Charter was the first to include "access to information." But Marcosian decrees to control and regulate the flow of news and information exposed the legal provision as mere rhetoric. The 1986 People Power revolution toppled the dictatorship and restored democratic institutions. But change reveals freedom and democracy as a work in progress. In the ensuing decades, the world has gone through waves of dramatic change. Technological advances in mass media and telecommunication, democratization, and globalization have combined to enlarge the field of activism and advocacy for greater freedom. In retrospect, the scope of practice and understanding in the past appears quite constricted in comparison to current realities. Freedom of information and access are relatively new concepts in law, which have raised new paradigms of engagement among constituent groups of Philippine society. While there are enabling and empowering factors that favor freedom of information, Philippine jurisprudence has not yet had to address the kinds of conflicts raised by freedom of information in other developed democracies. And so we are looking at a rather undeveloped field when we examine the Philippine experience of freedom of information in terms of law. Colonized by the United States, the Philippines adapted the republican form of government under a presidential system, where the functions of government are divided into three distinct branches with separate powers: the executive, legislative, and judicial departments. The three departments are co-equal, exercising autonomous power by themselves but in coordination with the two other branches of government. The system is designed to affect checks and balances to prevent excess or abuse of power by any branch. The Philippine legal system derives from custom and practice, from Roman civil law, and from English, American, and Spanish common law systems. Law sources include the Constitution, the statutes, treaties and conventions approved by Congress, as well as court case decisions-although only the Supreme Court decisions are established as part of Philippine jurisprudence.1 The tradition of free expression and press freedom is rooted in the country's revolutionary past. In this sense, freedom of information as a concept has been embedded in long-established custom and mores. The environment for access is favored by the political culture. The press is seen as part of the political infrastructure, and so politicians and public officials are all oriented in the constant and free-wheeling interaction with journalists looking for sources. Public officials are more often than not available for comment and interviews. Journalists proudly claim that they can get any information they want, using various means at their disposal. It is difficult to keep anything secret in a place where talk, official or unofficial, is loose; where meetings, formal or informal, can occasion inquiry and disclosure; and where numerous newspapers and broadcast programs trade generously in useful information or idle gossip. The public support that the press enjoys is another factor favoring openness and transparency. For all the faults and failures of the Philippine news media, Filipinos also realize that press controls are a worse option. For a generation of Filipinos, the experience of dictatorship is too recent for them to take too cavalier an attitude about government attempts to curtail press freedom. There are currently 11 broadsheets based in Manila and claiming national distribution. In addition, there are 17 Manila-based tabloids and five Chinese language dailies. The press in the provinces, which is referred to as the community press, are now around 400 in number, most of which are weekly news publications. These numbers change as publications close and others open. Filipinos tend to depend more on broadcast media (radio and television) for their news. There are more than 500 radio stations, of which 283 are AM stations. There are radio and TV news programs, but the radio chat or talk shows enjoy the highest ratings. Three television stations are privately owned; three others are operated by the government or government-appointed boards. The numerous media enhance the historic role of the press as a "watchdog" of those in power. Journalistic media can also rely on enabling mechanisms that guarantee information access. The Philippines may not have any freedom of information legislation, but the Philippine Constitution is one of the few countries around the world that enshrines this in the citizens' Bill of Rights. The 1987 Constitution, ratified after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, articulates the right of the people to "information on matters of public concern." Section 7 of the Bill of Rights details such rights as including "access to public records, and documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as a basis for policy development." Further, Article VI, Sec. 16(4) of the same document instructs the Congress to keep journals of proceedings, of "yea" and "nay" votes at the request of one-fifth of the members present, as well as records and books of accounts-and to make these available to the public. Still further, in Article II, Sec. 8 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the same 1987 Constitution adopts full disclosure as state policy: "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the state adopts and implements a policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." It has been argued that the right to information is self-executing and that no further legislation is required for its implementation. This was affirmed in a Supreme Court decision penned by then-Justice Irene Cortes, who ordered that the Civil Service Commission provide information to certain sanitary officers of the Health Department of Cebu province about their civil service eligibilities. Cortes wrote: "Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of the said agencies. . . . The constitutional duty not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case." Another case was also discussed by the same justice in the case of media petitioners seeking information about clean loans given by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to selected members of the Legislative Assembly during Marcos time. Once again, she ruled for the right of access.2 Right to access may be invoked by the press as well as other citizens. The right to information on matters of public concern also includes the corollary right of access to official records and documents. To facilitate implementation, a Supreme Court decision in 1985 mandated the publication of laws, providing for the laws' taking effect one year after such publication in the Official Gazette. With this, the High Court put an end to the "days of secret laws and the unpublished decrees," a practice during the Martial period.3 Post-Marcos, executive and administrative orders have also supported access. First, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 200 to permit alternative publication of laws and rules in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In addition, Aquino's administrative code of 1987 also requires every agency to file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule or regulation adopted by the agency. President Fidel Ramos, the second president elected after Marcos was forced out of office, issued Executive Order No. 89 mandating government agencies to formulate procedures for the handling of requests for information and data in their custody. Also during the Ramos term, Congress passed Republic Act 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which requires all government employees to respond to requests by the public within 15 days from receipt of such. Unfortunately, not all government offices and agencies have taken to these legal mechanisms with energy and commitment. A culture of confidentiality and secrecy prevails in some sectors of the bureaucracy, a hang-over from the long years of Martial Law, when a regulated press and the rule of nondisclosure provided supplementary mechanisms of state control. There is little public awareness of these enabling laws, and so many citizens do not take advantage of the legal provisions for access. Even journalists do not necessarily know the procedures in certain offices that have already established them. A lively press and a strong civil society lead other groups in forcing information that is hidden but should be public, out into the open where it belongs. The press cannot attend to its function without its quick access to news. Civil society organizations rely on information access for their effectiveness as lobbyists and advocates for change. Government recognizes the participation of civil society in policy-making. Elected officials and bureaucrats cannot but do their part to keep up with their demand for information. The role that civil society played to pressure the Estrada administration on charges of corruption will have lasting impact in terms of encouraging others to use information as a tool of mass organization and advocacy. The recent political crisis has sharpened the public sense to the dangers of not knowing. The issues of impeachment which brought down President Joseph Estrada have demonstrated once again the need for awareness about public issues. Developments in the field of telecommunication in the last decade have also changed the dynamic of political dialogue. The Internet, the cellular telephone, and the mechanism of "texting" have all facilitated the speed of public communication. Every individual with a cellular phone or access to Internet can be a veritable news center, passing on information and instruction to a circle of correspondents. This technology has broken the traditional public apathy about political engagement. In the past, apart from the periodic election, citizens have taken on a passive role in public affairs. People always looked for news, but generally behaved as though they were un-involved, watching the show from the outside. After the dramatic People Power events in February 1986, Filipinos quickly eventually slipped into noninvolvement, leaving the discussion of national affairs to those in power. Communication tools seem to have changed that. The projected advancement of communication infrastructure will push citizens to play an even more active role in the future. At present, the Court has received petitions for "access" without the benefit of an enabling law. The argument of the late Justice Cortes notwithstanding, lawmakers have in fact filed bills in both the Senate and House of Representatives to provide for the procedures of access. None of these have flourished into law. One reason is that the press community itself does not feel the necessity of such a law, given their ability to search out and acquire whatever information they feel they need. There is also a fear that legislation may limit access and broaden prohibitions. However, the experience in other countries has shown the great benefit of such a law to private individuals and other organized groups. Such a law may better publicize the right and make it more a genuine reality for greater numbers of people. In the end, though, one can only legislate further protection for the rights of citizens. Citizens themselves must learn to exercise their rights for the law to have real meaning. Matiur Rahman Honorable Chairman, distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen, I feel honored and fortunate to be invited in this important event, and I would like to express my gratitude to the organizers of this workshop. To begin with, I have come to attend this forum with a hope to enlighten myself with your experience, thinking, views, and opinions. As you already know, I am editing a Bangia language daily newspaper, Prothom Alo (The First Light), published in Dhaka and circulated all over Bangladesh. Started in November 1998, Prothom Alo is presently the highest circulated newspaper in Bangladesh, with a circulation number of more than 200,000. This remarkable success within a very short period of time explains, with other factors, that people in Bangladesh have a strong demand for objective and unbiased information. Prothom Alo, from the very first day of its publication, has been striving and struggling to maintain objectivity and independence. But it seems very difficult to do so in Bangladesh, where democratic practices are yet to take deep root. Although Bangladesh has a long history of struggle for democracy and freedom, it has to achieve much more in its legal, political, social, and cultural systems. Hundreds of thousands of people have dedicated their lives to liberate their country from foreign autocratic rulers, with a view to build up a free, democratic, and prosperous nation. But soon after liberation, the country fell under autocratic and military rule, and we have had to fight against autocratic, military, and pseudo-military regimes for about 15 years in the 30 years of independence in Bangladesh. Finally, the autocratic regime was thrown off by a massive popular uprising in 1990, and a parliamentary democratic system was re-established. Then happened the most significant development in print media. It should be mentioned that we have a Special Powers Act (1974) and a Press and Publication Act (1973), promulgated during the rule of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Special Powers Act contained several sections that gave the government the right to prohibit publication of newspapers and periodicals, and the Press and Publication Act also contained several sections that caused difficulties in getting permission to publish newspapers. In 1991, the first non-party Caretaker Government in Bangladesh deleted three related sections in the Special Powers Act. The result is that the government cannot ban or prohibit any newspaper. The repeal of press and publication related sections in the Special Powers Act caused some automatic changes in the Press and Publication Act of 1973 to ensure more press freedom. Earlier, the government, on the basis of any subjective reasons, could refuse permission of newspaper publication and ban any newspaper whenever it wished to do so. Although the Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees freedom of speech and expression to all of its citizens, the government could violate the right of the people, and often did so through the related laws. So when such the acts were amended to ensure the right to publish newspapers and its legal formalities became easier, the country experienced a boom in its newspaper industry. Hundreds of daily newspapers and weekly newsmagazines were published in the 1990s in the cities and district towns. Readership of the newspapers also increased substantially over the last decade. It is true that Constitution of Bangladesh ensures the right of freedom of speech and expression. The related articles in our Constitution are not different in principle with those of the American, Indian, or the other democratic countries. But unlike Great Britain, Canada, South Africa, and other democratic countries, we have no legislation like the "Access to Information Act." In fact, "access to information," "right to information," or "freedom of information" are new concepts in Bangladeshi society. Citizens do not know that they have right to ask for information about public affairs and government activities. Our people are accustomed to hear the officials saying: "this is confidential," "this is an official secret," "you should not know this," and even "who are you to inquire into?" and so forth. This is an old part of our culture, which has developed from laws promulgated in British colonial period and Pakistani period-the Evidence Act of 1872, the Official Secrets Act of 1923, and the Government Servants' Conduct Rules of 1964, for example. According to the Evidence Act, section 124, "No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interest would suffer by this disclosure." According to the Official Secrets Act, if a public servant feels this or that information should not be disclosed for public interest, he or she should not be compelled to disclose it. These are old but active weapons with which government officials violate people's right to information in the name of so-called essential secrecy. In fact, the government officials use these rules to avoid accountability and transparency. With these rules still in active practice, our reporters face tremendous difficulties in gathering information. They often have to work like detectives and try to take advantages of the internal quarrels among the officials. They have to build up unofficial "sources" among the officials and try to maintain good personal relations with them, which is not always pleasant or ethical to do for a journalist. While there exist numerous legal restrictions and inconvenient situations in the way to access information, on the other hand, there are several sections in the penal code of Bangladesh that are frequently used to harass the journalists, such as:
Further, our state-owned television and radio are fully controlled by the government. Recently, a private TV channel has started operation, but there is also partial interference into it. There is strong public opinion for autonomy of TV and radio. Political parties also promised to do it. The successive two elected governments did not fulfill the wishes of the people, which they committed to do before elections. The last government has declared a policy of autonomy of TV and radio in the last day of its tenure, but it will hardly make any substantial change, because after autonomy, TV and radio will remain under the Ministry of Information. As to the political environment in Bangladesh, we work under tremendous pressure from the political parties. Ours is a practically twoparty political system, but the two parties are very intolerant of each other. At times they do not even care to negotiate or maintain social relations. The distrust that exists between the parties brought about the system of non-party Caretaker Government to hold free and fair elections. Even then, election results are questioned by the losing party, and the new government faces non-cooperation on the very first day. A newly elected national assembly starts with walkouts and prolonged boycotts by the opposition. Long before half the term of an elected government is over, the opposition calls general strikes and holds demonstrations with a vowed purpose of throwing out the government. Within a party also, democratic practices are not followed, and factions become intolerant of each other. Thus, the two major political parties-with their intolerance for each other and penchant for arbitrary exercise of power-consider themselves virtually omnipotent. There is hardly any sphere in our society that might stay away from their influence. Social and professional groups and organizations are divided in two party lines. Even the intelligentsia, including the journalist community, is divided. There is hardly a civil society organization with an independent face. The political parties have no registration. They have no organized system of public relations. They do not have official spokesmen to communicate with the press. The political parties of Bangladesh are not really eager to have an independent press in the country, although they give eloquent lip service about freedom of the press. The two major political parties identify the newspapers of the country as their friends or enemies, and seek to influence the newspapers in various ways. In fact, they want to get the newspapers beside themselves as propaganda instruments. To them, reporting on their misdeeds amounts to political hostility. They do not like objective news about themselves. They cannot tolerate any criticism. If and when criticized, they react violently. Over the last few years, several journalists have been killed, and many were attacked physically by politically powerful criminals. Shamsur Rahman, a special correspondent of a national daily, was shot to death at his office at Jessor last year. He was allegedly killed for writing some investigative reports on corruption, terrorism, political violence, etc. Another reporter named Prabir Sikdar was also brutally attacked. The attackers shot him, beat him, and chopped his body with sharp weapons. Doctors had to cut off his right leg to save his life. He is now having his treatment in Singapore. Another young journalist, Tipu Sultan, a district correspondent of a national news agency, was attacked by the musclemen of a parliament member of the last ruling-party. He was beaten up severely and was chopped with sharp weapons. He reportedly annoyed the MP with his journalistic activism against political hooliganism. After the attack, the wounded and invalid journalist and his family had to flee their native town fearing farther attacks. His family could not even file a case, because the local police station did not register any case against the local ruling-party MP. However, they were compelled to register it later with an order from the High Court. Even while lying with broken hands and legs in an orthopedic hospital in Dhaka, the journalist got death threats. And when we, the Prothom Alo, made a drive for fundraising for his medical treatment, the ruling party MP and his colleagues dubbed us as anti-government. Not only that, the aforesaid MP abused the Prothom Alo and its editor viciously on the floor of the parliament. But the people came forward to support the repressed journalist. We raised a fund of 2.2 million Taka, sufficient for his treatment in a sophisticated hospital in Bangkok. He is now getting treatment there. Several reporters and district correspondents of Prothom Alo were also victimized. Recently, journalists in the district towns and periphery cannot do their job properly because of threats and pressure from the local political leaders and politically powerful criminals, who maintain armed gangs. We have to send staff reporters from Dhaka to such places. Recently, all correspondents of the national daily newspapers of Gaurnadi, a small town in southern division of Barisal, had to flee from the town and go in hiding from the local political gangs to save their lives. Some ruling party musclemen attacked one of our correspondents there; they pushed poison into his vein and abused his wife and daughter. Political violence against journalists is increasing in Bangladesh. Notwithstanding this entirely dismal feature, compared to past situations, substantial freedom has been achieved for the press over the years. Now newspapers cannot be banned at the whim of the government. Editors do not get midnight telephone calls from military cantonments or from the Home or Information Departments. In the past, there were many things about which the press could not say anything. They were our "out of bounds" subjects: defense, insurgency, personal life of the head of state or government, etc. But now these subjects are openly discussed in the press. Moreover, the press is setting up various new agendas. For example, human rights violations, violence against women, pollution controls and natural environment conservation, social evils like Fatwa (unlawful ruling in the name of religion), acid throwing on girls and women, etc. Some newspapers like Prothom Alo organize roundtable discussions, policy dialogues, and open public discussions on contemporary issues to mobilize public opinions, not only in the capital city, but we organize various discussion meetings also in the divisional and district towns to organize and strengthen public opinion against corruption, terrorism, human rights violations, state sponsored violence, etc. There is a slow but steady process of emergence of an independent civil society, the strongest supporter of a free and independent mass media. We are trying to develop a democratic culture that can make our democracy more effective. It is a long process and it demands uninterrupted, continuous motion forward. With the peaceful transfer of power through free and fair elections, Bangladesh is advancing forward to create a truly free, open, democratic society. Thank you all for your kind attention. KEY DISCUSSION POINTS
Melinda Quintos de Jesus Endnotes
1. Teodoro, Luis V., Jr., and Rosalinda V. Kabatay. (1998). Mass media laws and regulations in the Philippines. Quezon City: AMIC. 499 pp. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. |
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