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Asian Center for Democratic Governance >> Strengthening Democratic Governance
A Report by the Asian Center for Democratic Governance 17 - 18 March 2002 Dhaka, Bangladesh |
Session 1 - An Overview of the Functioning of Democracy in the RegionModerator: Moudud AhmedDENNIS KUX South Asia is an interesting laboratory for democracy. Except in Bhutan and Nepal, British rule over the subcontinent provided something of a common political base. So how have the countries in the region developed politically since independence? Comparing India and Pakistan, two very different traditions have evolved: the viceregal and the popular traditions. In 1947, India began with some important advantages-it inherited the administrative machinery and the capital, [with which] it could start functioning-whereas Pakistan started from scratch, and had to create a central government in Karachi and a provincial capital in Dhaka from nothing. India also had a large pool of very capable political leaders (Nehru, Sardar, Patel, and others), who had worked together for years. Pakistan, in contrast, had only two comparable leaders at its birth (Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan). Sadly for Pakistan, both were dead within a few short years of independence. After this, a gradual change came about in Pakistan, with power flowing from the Muslim League politicians to the civil service and the military. These latter had been servants of the Raj and leaned to the viceregal, authoritarian, "top-down" political tradition rather than the popular, democratic, "bottom-up" approach. Key figures like Ghulam Mohammed and Ayub Khan stated frankly that Pakistan was not ready for democracy. Another difference was in the party structures. In India, the Congress was not just a nationalist movement, but a fully functioning and structured political party with some programmatic goals even before independence, whereas the Muslim League's sole aim, as a mass movement from the late 1930s, was to establish Pakistan. Once this was achieved, the League began to unravel. The constituent assembly in Pakistan, which ran until 1955, failed to agree on a constitution during that time. India however adopted a constitution in 1950 and held the first general elections in 1952. Consider the contrasting role of the military in the two countries. In India, Nehru ensured from the start that the military was under total civilian control, whereas Ayub Khan's martial rule was a throwback to the viceregal rule of the Raj. Pakistan, in its short history, has had three periods of civilian and three of military rule (not including the present). India, apart from a few periods of authoritarian rule, is more or less established now as a democracy, warts and all. In Pakistan today we again have military rule and the destabilizing antidemocratic influence of the ISI. Musharraf faces some difficult issues: a stable political role for the army, deciding on the constitution, the possible revival of the eighth amendment, and resolving his own future. He could issue directives as his predecessors have, but if he hopes to gain political legitimacy he must allow the elected national assembly to decide these questions in order to move Pakistan toward genuinely popular government and away from the viceregal tradition. MANOHAR SINGH GILL We are fortunate in India that for 52 years there has been a more or less continuous democratic process, with 13 parliamentary elections, and notwithstanding our population growing from 300 million to 1 billion. Today, the voter list is 630 million, with 800,000 polling stations and 5 million staff at the last national election. Of course there are imperfections in our system. But it is easy to talk of perfect democracy when the per capita income is $20,000. Try practicing perfect democracy when it is only $300. And that is what all of our countries in the region face. In those terms, how did we in India manage to form a democracy at all? Certainly the swift framing of a constitution was key. Also, we are perhaps the only country in the world with a separate chapter of the constitution dealing with the Election Commission of India, a body almost equally powerful and independent in status as the body of Supreme Court judges, for supervising, organizing, and controlling elections. For many years it was a one-man commission. But with a growing population and such diversity needing to be represented, since 1995, we are a three-member commission of equal powers with about 300 staff. Men pass on, systems live on; we have over the last 6-7 years tried to create effective and efficient systems. India now has electronic voting. The next election in India will be totally electronic. We use a simple machine, made in India. Crucially, there can be no misvoting with it. We have computerized electoral roles and compulsory identification is being introduced; no Indian will be allowed to vote unless he has an electronic voter ID card with a unique India number. But for fair elections, you have to further deepen systems. Three years ago we started to give free and equal allotted time to all recognized parties, defined according to the Commission's formula, on state radio and television. In a historic judgment, we insisted that all parties follow their constitution, which they have to register with the Commission. There can no democracy if a political party becomes a property rather than a party. We have problems in the region-the three M's: money, muscle, and mastaans (hoodlums). They attack the spirit and essence of democracy. It is a complex issue. We use what is available to us through parliamentary law to combat these problems. But it continues to be difficult. I.A. REHMAN When I was invited to participate in a conference on "strengthening democracy," I seriously considered whether I should come. Because, we do not strengthen democracy in Pakistan, we do not establish democracy in Pakistan, we only "restore" it every few years. Which is why the title of my paper is "Restoring Democracy Without Allowing its Practice." It is not only the military rulers who have tried restoring democracy in Pakistan; some non-military governments have also attempted it. However, the problem with the latter is that the usual subcontinental disease takes over and the government spends all its time demolishing the opposition rather than establishing truly democratic institutions. Which is why the military once again takes over, and so on. We began restoring democracy in 1959, with "basic" democracy. Now, once again we have the military, this time wanting to restore "real" democracy, in order to ensure that the military will not intervene again. Our villagers say that they will not need to intervene because they will never be out of power. But there is in fact considerable confusion over the present government's actions. They claim that they will restore the joint electorate, that they have increased women's seats and will employ retired technocrats in political roles. These actions are being welcomed everywhere. However, we must be careful; after all, the British laid railway lines, but that did not absolve them of colonial exploitation. The real point is the long impact of frequent military intervention: First, the people never have real exposure to democratic practice; they have no experience, knowledge, or understanding of democracy; second, the military establishments' systems are acquired by their non-military successors. The authoritarian tendencies take root until the people have a choice, not between authoritarian and democratic, but between more authoritarian and less authoritarian rule. So at the present moment democracy is not on the agenda. But the question may be asked why have democracy, if it cannot succeed? Well, why do people face bullets in the streets every few years in defense of democracy? Because only democracy can work in a federation; Pakistan, a "multinational state," cannot be managed without democracy. Moreover, Pakistan may have started from scratch at independence, but the people did not. They had some democratic experience, they had some democratic traditions, and these must at all cost be allowed to continue. HENRY SHELTON WANASINGHE The Sri Lankan people have very high expectations of their government in the present social environment: They want a democratic way of life, economic and social equity, the availability of goods and services that can contribute to a modern standard of living. However, our society is also structured with old, deep-rooted antagonisms based on religious and ethnic considerations. Several decades of increasing conflict and utter lawlessness provide the social context in which we have to look at strengthening democratic governance in Sri Lanka today. The economic context changed in 1978 when we moved away from an administered economy to a market-led economy. But government, either at the political or bureaucratic level, has not realized this yet, because, for the market to lead the economy means that individuals lose the perks of office they may have once had. Similarly, in the political context in 1987, we moved toward devolution. We set up the institutions to support this. But the central government again remains as it was, refusing to relinquish power. What is the impact on governance? Over the past few decades, I have seen our political institutions declining in quality-our parliament, the executive, and the representative bodies at the local level. This is one of the biggest impediments to sound political governance. There has also been a rapid proliferation of political parties, 51 at the last count in a country of only 19 million people, all with hardly any difference in political agenda except that they are led by different personalities. Political confrontation is the only outcome. The third impact is unprecedented corruption in the polity and bureaucracy. Also political violence has grown-from confrontation to violence-there is never an election without thousands of cases of electoral violence reported, many leading to deaths. Unfortunately, the participation of civil society organizations in governance remains marginal. Their origins in Sri Lanka are very recent and they are unable to participate effectively in governance. The two outcomes of the erosion of governance are: first, the erosion of investor confidence, with the resulting lack of foreign investment in turn impeding economic growth. The second is the growing disenchantment of citizens with governance. The youth, ethnic minorities, trade unions, and farmers' organizations have less and less confidence in effective governance. Governance has become marginalized in our lives. Its strengthening becomes imperative. But what should government, the private sector, or civil society do? Where do they start? A separation of the roles of the political institutions is required. Public policy-making has to become participatory. Furthermore, whatever can be done at the local level must be done at the local level. Our local communities are capable and resourceful. We have 90 percent literacy in the country. People know what they want and what should be done at the local level. They should be allowed to do it. We need the strengthening of corporate governance in the private sector. It can be an effective instrument, but it must become credible in the eyes of the citizens. REHMAN SOBHAN The title of my paper, "Moving from Confrontational Politics Towards Sustainable Democracy in Bangladesh," might be regarded by some as a triumph of hope over experience. However, if a visitor, preferably from sub-Saharan Africa, came to Bangladesh, he or she might be reasonably impressed with the workings of our democracy and even some elements of our development: We've had three general elections in the course of a decade, in which the ruling parties have alternated. We have developed a two-party system, which is a rarity in many third world countries and some first world countries. Despite ethnic and other divisions in the country, there exists a relatively homogeneous society. At least, neither religion nor ethnicity defines political identity, which is quite distinct from the politics of the region in general. You will find the provision of a neutral caretaker government constitutionally empowered to organize elections, which could be a possible role model for other countries. We have a relatively effective working print media, which can and does take governments to task. We even have some independent television channels. We have a moderately active civil society, which, particularly at the level of gender issues, can be articulate and effective and has been successful, among other things, in bringing as many women as men out to vote. We have reasonably good social indicators, not of absolute levels of human development, but Bangladesh at least has one of the best rates of progress in the course of the last 10-15 years. By many third world standards, macroeconomic performance has not been bad. In these circumstances, it would appear that the glass is half full. But Bangladesh has a unique capacity for converting its assets into its liabilities. So let's have a look at the other half of the glass. In particular, the processes of governance are under severe criticism. Our democratic process is becoming dysfunctional. One of the major concerns is the highly confrontational aspect of our politics. What should be one of our strengths, our two-party system, has created instead an extreme bipolar politics, a kind of political "duopoly," even though there is little real difference between party policies. The highly polarized nature of the political process denies any meaningful choices to the electorate or even the parties' own supporters. Instead, it creates "captive constituencies"; it leads to the growing insensitivity of political parties and engenders a climate of retaliatory politics. A "winner-takes-all" attitude results in the triumphal and completely exclusionary attitude of the ruling party to the opposition. The opposition, in turn, has a history of irresponsible and disruptive behavior, mainly out a sense of victim hood. They boycott parliament, which therefore becomes a totally non-functioning entity, and spend all their time calling for hartals, which today are nothing more than gestures of political impotence. These extreme forms of political discourse have caused deep structural weaknesses within the political parties themselves, and a growing loss of faith in parliamentary culture. It is leading us instead toward a plebiscite culture, where in an election you vote for a "democratic dictatorship," which will rule with absolute power, while the opposition simply make noises on the street and the sidelines. We have moved into a depoliticized politics with only rhetoric in the place of beliefs and policies. Party workers, instead of being the conduits between the people and the politicians, have become business intermediaries. We have all seen the emergence of mastaans as a political force, and the growing co-modification of the political process. While there is nothing wrong with businessmen wanting to go into politics, it is quite another thing to see politics as an instrument of business and the pursuit of a political career as business by another means. The emergence of endemic corruption is unavoidable, with the result that the thousands of small farmers and small businessmen, the millions of micro-credit borrowers, and the poor and dispossessed have no room in the political arena. How can we move from confrontation to dialogue? The opposition must be engaged in forming policy. Our opposition today represents 41 percent of the population. There must be a culture of dialogue and compromise. We must finance politics and elections through budgetary support so we can dilute the power of money, particularly invisible money, in party finances and the guiding of elections. There must be more professionalism, more diversity, and more accountability in the conduct and organization of political parties. We must bring the excluded into the political process, where those with limited means as well as women can reflect their voting strengths. Finally, the role of civil society-unfortunately civil society is as divided and polarized as the political parties. But they must be willing to face the challenges and risks of involving themselves in the political process, and holding the leadership accountable. DISCUSSION » It has been the experience in the United States that accountability is in fact hardest to achieve at the local level. Financial corruption at least tends to be worse at that level. Therefore we should not accept uncritically that increasing local government is a means of ensuring accountability and transparency. » Bangladesh may have achieved free, fair, and participatory elections but democracy is also about the accommodation of power. And the country has failed to inculcate constitutional liberalism, which is all about the limitation of power. Checks and balances are also necessary between the branches of government. » In this part of the world the populations are so enormous that the management of law and order is held hostage to political interests. There is an increasing criminalization and commercialization of society, which prevents us from achieving true democracy. |
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