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Asian Center for Democratic Governance >> Strengthening Democratic Governance
A Report by the Asian Center for Democratic Governance 17 - 18 March 2002 Dhaka, Bangladesh |
Session II - Conflict Management Through Democratic InstitutionsModerator: Jane CoonSELIG HARRISON If we look at the alternating cycle of civilian government and military dictatorship in Pakistan, and how it has affected the management of conflict both within Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbors, we see that conflict has been most successfully managed when democratic checks and balances have restrained arbitrary military power. This conclusion has important ramifications for my country, since American policy has reinforced the indigenous factors in Pakistan responsible for periodic military rule. The first case I want to present is the rise of the Bangladesh freedom movement as a direct response to the suppression of democracy by Ayub Khan. Military rule was imposed because a democratic Pakistan would have meant domination by the Bangladeshi (East Pakistani) majority. Like the Bangladeshis, the three minority ethnic groups-the Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Baluchis-were also opposed to military rule. And when the Bangladesh freedom movement led to war with India, ethnic conflict resulted in what was left of Pakistan. Pakistan's military defeat in 1971 also led directly to the continuing problems we see in Kashmir today. There seems a bitter determination to get even with India over Kashmir because of events in 1971. In contrast, my second case is perhaps the most successful example of conflict management in the history of South Asia: the UN mediation that led to the Geneva Accords of 1988, under which the Russians withdrew from Afghanistan. General Ziaul Haq was forced to go along by a civilian prime minister who outmaneuvered him by mobilizing mass public opinion in Pakistan. Ultimately faced with both domestic and foreign pressures, Zia dropped his opposition to the accords. Democratic checks and balances restrained a powerful military leader. Though Zia was killed very soon after this, he left a legacy in the form of the ISI. We cannot deny that the CIA provided the money and the weapons that allowed the ISI to become "a state within a state." But it was Zia who used it to manipulate domestic politics, and filled it with hard-line anti-Indian nationalists with links to militant Islamic groups who wanted Kashmir in order to get even for India's support of Bangladesh. I.A. Rehman correctly noted in his speech that the increasing interference of the military in politics and administration is one of the key reasons why past democratic governments in Pakistan have been so flawed. In the years ahead, the best hope for any Pakistani government is to respect the sovereignty of Afghanistan, stop feeding the flames of war in Kashmir, and talk peace with India. It does not lie in continued military rule. RAMIN JAHANBEGLOO The past half-century has witnessed an unprecedented flowering of nonviolent experiences around the world. According to these movements, the successful provision of democratic governance must include new attitudes and approaches to the problem of power. Following the examples set by Buddha, Ashoka, and Gandhi, self-discipline and nonviolence can be seen as an essential tradition in South Asia for challenging unjust and inappropriate power. "Nonviolence" itself is a translation of the Sanskrit word ahimsa. Centuries before Gandhi adopted it, Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism presented the doctrine of non-harm. Buddhism is also being considered today as a specific Asian solution to the problems of democratic governance. Ashoka comprehended that good governance could not be achieved by force. His social and political revolution changed violent governance into a politics of humanism. But it was Gandhi's experiment in the first half of the twentieth century that proved nonviolence could be used on a large scale and redirected towards democratic governance. Nonviolence for Gandhi was more than the renunciation of bullets or replacing British domination with Indian domination: "A nonviolent evolution is not a programme for the seizure of power." The problem involved a change in the character of governance; democratic decentralization was crucial to Gandhi's nonviolent society. All those whose interests were affected by a decision ought to take part in the governance process. Today, nonviolent campaigns around the world are seen as an institutionalized form of struggle for democratic invention and governance, where once armed struggle was seen as the only path to freedom. The terrorist attack of 11 September, while directed toward the U.S., was also an attack on all Muslim nations that are committed to tolerance, pluralism, and democracy. The challenge for the Muslim community is to advance democratic change and modernization inside the Muslim world by exploring nonviolent alternatives to global violence in the present era. The proximity between Islam and nonviolence can be illustrated with the figure of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Badshah Khan). His belief in the truth and effectiveness of nonviolence came from his faith. He was a Muslim voice for toleration and democracy, and proved they were compatible with the highest religious values of Islam, in his struggle for the rights of the Pathans for almost 80 years. Unfortunately much of the current wave of democratization of Muslim countries focuses almost solely on the presumed democratizing potential of market mechanisms. More than market mechanisms are required for the democratic transition of Muslim societies. The necessary degree of autonomy of a nonviolent civil society must be embedded in the rule of law. Democratic governance requires that habituation to the norms and procedures of democratic conflict resolution be developed. The legacy of nonviolence in South Asia is an important milestone in the history of democracy. What Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan achieved in South Asia continues to be important and relevant to the world in order to achieve nonviolent democracy through nonviolent means. FARUQ ACHIKZAD Economic development is not possible unless there is good governance. This involves primarily peace and security through the rule of law and conflict resolution through nonviolence. In our region at present, the most serious conflict is between the two nuclear countries, India and Pakistan. Religious in nature, it also has a strong political dimension. Also, an unstable Afghanistan in the midst of the politically fragile states of the CIS, Iran, and Pakistan contribute to regional volatility. The Soviet invasion of 1979 completely destroyed the social fabric of Afghanistan. A savage civil war among the Mujahideen factions, and the creation of a "kalashnikov generation" of refugees and foreign mercenaries (35,000 from 43 countries), finally led to the rise of the Taliban in 1996. Supported by al Qaeda, they took control of 90 percent of Afghanistan in a short time. Some of the warlords found it convenient to form the northern alliance (NA). Intermittent fighting continued between the NA and the Taliban until the 9/11 tragedy. A month later, the U.S. and its coalition, under the banner of the UN, began bombing. The major cities soon fell to the NA, whose forces were armed by the U.S. and UN. While the military campaign continued, however, the UN began a peace process aimed at helping the Afghan people find a political solution to the crises in their country. The Bonn conference in December 2001 produced several recommendations, and in accordance, the first Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) took office in Kabul. However, the Bonn agreement, a product of international negotiation, has some serious flaws: It gave undue weight to the NA, as they were the only ready organization on the ground to help the U.S./UN coalition; given the deep divisions within Afghanistan, the tasks assigned to the AIA are extremely difficult, if not impossible; with some 5 million Afghans as refugees in neighboring countries and with no law and order prevailing, a legitimate and meaningful Loya Jirga cannot be convened. Indeed, just four months after Bonn, we are already witnessing obstacles to peace and security in Afghanistan. The warlordism has re-emerged and old rivalries have resurfaced. It is clear that these conflicts cannot be resolved by force. The solution, therefore, is a neutral and demilitarized Afghanistan. This may be controversial; nevertheless it could pave the way for a peaceful and prosperous future. It can put a stop to warlordism within the country. It will also spare the high cost of building a strong and modern army, eliminate the possibility of future coup d'états, and prevent foreign military bases within the country's neutral borders. With a reasonably peaceful climate, the chances of good governance will increase. Only then can the reconstruction process be nurtured. Interim and future governments must, from the outset, strengthen civil society and allow it play a crucial role in nation-building and economic development. But priority must be given to:
Since much has been said by many about what to do in Afghanistan, it is now time to spell out how to do it, and to give indigenous ownership in the reconstruction process. ABUL HASSAN CHOWDHURY For pre-independence Bangladesh, military intervention was the rule rather than the exception, and long periods of it meant not only the denial of democratic rights but also economic rights of the people. While this was true for the whole of Pakistan, the brunt of it was felt most severely in this eastern wing. However, it did lead to independence in 1971, and this was possible only because of democratic movements that encapsulated the aspirations of all the people, regardless of which part or color of the quilt they represented. Post-independence saw the swift drafting of a constitution, framed in 1972. But the country as a whole must once again show the kind of commitment to democracy as in the early 1990s-which led to the downfall of General Ershad's dictatorship-when even the armed forces sided with the people. Since their history has also been determined and shaped by the events of 1971, we find ourselves with an army that has been very supportive of the democratic process. Bangladesh is also a moderate Muslim nation. Without the spirit of pluralism, as well as good governance, transparency, and a healthy functioning parliament, it is impossible to bring about participatory democracy. In order to manage conflict, rather than the parliament plenary sessions, the parliamenary committees have to be more effective and functional. And ministerial stewardship of these committees is crucial to avoid government-versus-opposition conflict. Only if we are all united may we find positive, collective, and innovative measures for progress and development. DISCUSSION » One of the weaknesses of democracy in South Asia is that the different needs, interests, and aspirations are not considered. Almost every state in the region is multilingual, multiethnic, multireligious, and multicultural. Yet these diversities within our borders are not addressed at any level of governance, and so identity politics is increasingly a cause of conflict in the region. » Given the powerful impact of many interventions in the region by the U.S., do its military campaigns, unilateralist actions, and intelligence operations impede the indigenous resolution of conflict through democratic means in the region? » When Pakistan had a military intervention in 1977, two years later the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan. When Pakistan had another military intervention in 1999, again, two years later there were the events of 9/11, and the bombing of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is a strange coincidence that when the Soviets entered Afghanistan, General Zia became crucial to U.S. interests, and that similarly for the present U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, Musharraf has also proved crucial. » It is simplistic to say that the existence of a democratically elected government in and of itself ensures democratic conflict resolution. There are five further necessary conditions:
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