THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

Proceedings of
The National Endowment for Democracy's
Third International Conference on Democracy
April 15 and 16, 1991
Washington D.C.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION
Carl Gershman .................................................. 1

## CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: MAKING THE TRANSITION
Gabor Demszky .................................................. 3
Zbigniew Janas .................................................. 5
Marian Munteanu ................................................ 6
Konstantin Trenchev ........................................... 8
Leszek Kolakowski .............................................. 9

## LATIN AMERICA: CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY
Edgardo Boeninger .............................................. 13
Enrique Krause .................................................. 15
Francisco Wefort ............................................... 18
Emilio Alvarez .................................................. 19

## SURVIVING DICTATORSHIPS
Doan Van Toai .................................................. 21
Bona Malwal ...................................................... 24
Li Lu .............................................................. 25
Gustavo Arcos Bergnes ....................................... 28

## AFRICA: TOWARD MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY
Fred Chiluba .................................................... 31
Gibson Kamau Kuria .......................................... 32
Clara Osinulu .................................................. 34
Bernard Muna ................................................... 36
Larry Diamond .................................................. 38

## THE MIDDLE EAST: TOWARD A NEW ARAB SOCIAL CONTRACT
Mohamed Abdel Bekhechi .................................... 41
Ergun Ozbudun .................................................. 43
Ali Hillal Dessouki ............................................ 45
Saif Abbas Abdulla ........................................... 48

## SOUTH AFRICA: AFTER APARTHEID
Sathasivan (Saths) Cooper .................................. 51
Murphy Morobe ................................................ 52
Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert ................................ 54
Khetha Shubane ............................................... 56

/continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE SOVIET UNION: DEMOCRACY OR EMPIRE?</th>
<th>59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Stankevich</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikhaiilo Horyn</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trivimi Velliste</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Rumyantsev</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nina Belyaeva</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman Jim Leach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLOSING LUNCHEON - THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT</th>
<th>69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fang Lizhi</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zofia Kuratowska</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Richard Lugar</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman Stephen Solarz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| STATE DEPARTMENT RECEPTION                                 | 77 |

| 1991 DEMOCRACY AWARD DINNER                                 | 81 |

| ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS.                      | 91 |
INTRODUCTION

The National Endowment for Democracy’s third biennial conference on democracy was convened against the backdrop of the unprecedented democratic developments that had occurred around the world in the two years since the last conference was held. That conference, entitled “The Democratic Revolution,” expressed the euphoric mood of 1989 and anticipated the remarkable events that were to unfold in Eastern Europe and elsewhere during the latter half of that year. The 1991 conference theme of “The Unfinished Revolution” evoked instead a mood of realism regarding the complex problems of transition and consolidation facing the countries that had experienced democratic breakthroughs, as well as the tremendous tasks still ahead for countries struggling for democracy and freedom.

In an essay published in the Spring 1991 issue of the *Journal of Democracy*, Samuel P. Huntington referred to the democratic revolution of the past 15 years as “democracy’s third wave,” during which the number of democratic countries actually doubled from 30 to 60. He suggested, however, that the revolution may have run its course, that in the immediate period ahead democratic gains would be more difficult to come by, and warned that a reverse wave, backsliding toward authoritarianism, was a real danger.

Democratic activists around the globe therefore face a twofold task: to help consolidate democratic gains where they have been made, and to push forward wherever possible. These activists, along with prominent intellectuals, dissidents, political scientists, human rights activists and others, gathered for the Endowment’s conference to address those challenges.

On one level, the conference was distinguished by the quality of the speakers on the various regional panels: Leszek Kolakowski, Edgardo Boening, Fang Lizhi, Sergei Stankevich, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Gibson Kuria, among many, many others. But the real meaning of the gathering lay in the ability of the over 400 participants representing more than 50 countries to have a common discussion about democracy.

Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the power of the democratic idea, which now extends throughout the world and inspires people of vastly different cultures, levels of economic development and political traditions.

This was an exhilarating experience for all who participated, and a great source of hope for the future.

On the occasion of the conference, we were honored to present our 1991 Democracy Award to Presidents Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua and Vaclav Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, two leaders who represent the world’s hope for a democratic future. Their awards were presented at a special dinner ceremony attended by some 500 guests.

The success of the conference and its related events was the result of support and assistance received from individuals too numerous to mention here. I would, however, like to recognize the members of the Endowment’s Board of Directors for their support; in particular, Chairman John Richardson for his participation throughout, Senator Orrin Hatch for hosting the sessions in the Dirksen Auditorium, and the other members of the Board who served as panel chairmen. I would also like to give special mention to the State Department’s translators, Office of Public Liaison and Diplomatic Reception Room staffs; to Raya Hand of USA Hosts Travel for her patience and perseverance in assuring the arrival of our international speakers; and to Thomas Marsh, for his donation of the 1991 Democracy Award statues.
Because the Endowment chooses to fund the biennial conference with private contributions, we are also particularly grateful to the following donors for their financial support:
Air Products and Chemicals Inc.
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
The American Federation of Teachers
American Trucking Associations
Amway Corporation
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation
The International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen
The Samuel Freeman Charitable Trust
The Hurford Foundation
The Joyce Foundation
Kriebel Associates
The John M. Olin Foundation
Ross, Dixon & Masback
The Sarah Scaife Foundation.

This book, which contains the speeches made at the conference, offers a microcosmic view of the state of democracy in the world from the point of view of some of its leading proponents. As such, it illuminates the extent to which the democratic idea has become the principal force shaping the new order of politics in the world. It is a testimony to their courage and vision and to the aspirations of countless millions struggling to establish democratic systems around the world.

Carl Gershman
President
National Endowment for Democracy
In the wake of the dramatic revolutionary events which transformed Eastern and Central Europe in 1989, democratic leaders throughout the region now face the very real tasks of making the transition to full democracy. As panel chairman Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in his opening remarks, the path of this transition from communism to democracy is a totally uncharted course. There is no model to be followed for a successful transition, and the challenges of building democratic institutions, developing open market economies and establishing a strong rule of law are immense.

Gabor Démzséky, mayor of Budapest, has been involved in the struggle for civil and human rights in Hungary all of his adult life. Formerly editor of the samizdat paper Hirondo, he founded the AB Independent Publishing House, and was one of the founders of the Alliance of Free Democrats. In the first free elections in the Spring of 1990 he was elected member of Parliament representing one of the constituencies of the seventh district of Budapest.

When the Communists wrested political power for themselves in 1948, activists gathered in the streets in celebration singing “by tomorrow we’ll turn the whole world around.” Through the forced abolition of market conditions, the almost complete nationalization of private ownership, and the economic volunteerism they called economic planning, the leadership succeeded in “turning” the communist countries, Hungary included, into economic chaos.

Let me first mention a few points which illustrate the consequences of the last four or more decades of communist domination. Last year the Hungarian government owed $21 billion — almost double the per capita debt of Poland, and almost four times that of Czechoslovakia. We are left with a country where the ratio of agricultural workers is about five times that of Western Europe on the average, and where the per capita GNP is about $3,000.

In the wake of the communist regime there remains a country in which state ownership approximates 90%, where in economic terms only monopolies exist, there is no accumulated capital in the hands of the population because through nationalization and subsequent government measures everything was taken away, and where for the past forty years a conscious attempt was made to abolish the traditional Hungarian middle class. It is true that in the last two decades the regime’s brutality decreased significantly, but the popular anti-intellectualism of the communist structure endured to the end.

I have to mention these sad and perhaps horrifying facts so that you can appreciate the circumstances under which Hungary must try to bridge the gap to become competitive with Europe and the world market. Our situation is much more difficult than it was, for example, for Spain when it made the transition from a dictatorship to a
democratic environment. In Spain, market economy prevailed even when there were certain diversionary mechanisms in place, as there generally are in all dictatorships. In addition to establishing democratic conditions, we Eastern Europeans have to reconstruct a market, teach our people to venture into business, and create the economic, legal, infrastructural and other frameworks in which this can take place.

Besides grave concern, I can also relate some encouraging results. For example, last year Hungarian companies got a foothold on the world market. The country succeeded in acquiring trade assets worth almost $1 billion, which in Hungarian history is almost without precedent. It is also an unqualified success that in the second half of last year as many joint ventures were established as existed up until that time. Of the newly formed joint ventures, a significant percentage came into existence with minimal capital investment, predominantly in the service sector. In the wake of privatization, increasingly more companies are being admitted to the Budapest Stock Exchange. Here too the first signs of change are evident.

It is also an absolutely important and unquestionably positive sign that the world's leading companies are one by one positioning themselves in Hungary. The ranks were led by General Electric, which acquired a majority interest in Tungsram, one of Hungary's most renowned firms, followed by General Motors, with an Opal automobile factory and an assembly shop now under construction. After extended negotiations, Suzuki is also building a factory in Hungary.

The country is making an extraordinary effort to improve the backward condition of its infrastructure. Based on an agreement which was won by international tender, Siemens and Ericsson will build one million telephone lines within three to four years. Negotiations are also underway with Italian and Austrian firms for the construction of highways. We are continuing to develop the possibility of hooking into the Western European electrical system.

History has repeatedly proven that emergence from dictatorship releases enormous energies in people. The recent oppression ended not only in Hungary but also in our neighboring countries of Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who for us are extremely important commercially, historically, and psychologically. We dearly wish that an ordered existence will develop in our remaining neighbor countries. We are especially rooting for the completion of the frustrated revolution in Romania, since two and a half million Hungarians live there and it is not immaterial to us whether the country chooses democracy or dictatorship.

The resolution of conditions within the Soviet Union is also very important. One simply has to look at the map to understand what it means for a small nation of ten million people when circumstances are unstable in a neighboring country of one hundred million. Some research institutions are prognosticating that with the introduction of Soviet international passports, the world must prepare for six to eight million refugees. We know that a significant number of these refugees, deprived of purchasing opportunities in their own country, will only be able to reach the neighboring countries of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

We Hungarians are well aware that in our 1100 year history, seldom has our situation been as difficult as it seems these days now that we have regained our independence and political sovereignty. We have no insolvable hostilities with our neighbors, merely resolvable conflicts. Our interests are the same as those of Western Europe, as well as our Czech, Slovak, and Polish neighbors: to join the European community as soon as possible and as completely as possible.
We were stubborn about rejecting communism during the past several decades -- sometimes through revolution, other times through reform -- but we always tried to get rid of it. For today, we have succeeded in this, but our stubbornness remains. Henceforth, we shall be just as committed to rectifying all that four decades of communism have destroyed.

In the last several very difficult years we have proven to Western bankers that the Hungarians are prompt in repaying their loans. Now we would like to prove to Europeans and other investors that if the Hungarians were capable of creating revolution in 1956 when that was what was necessary, they are capable of negotiating a mutually beneficial business deal in 1991 because today that is what is necessary. I hope from now on this latter practical persistence is always the only thing we'll need.

Zbigniew Janas is chairman of the Stefan Batory Foundation, a member of the Polish Parliament, and co-founder of Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity. A member of Solidarity's National Coordinating Committee, he actively participated in shaping the underground structures of Solidarity during the period of martial law.

In the process of transformation from a communist to a democratic system, success or failure depends upon a variety of economic and political changes. The most important factor with regard to economic changes is how the government and parliament establish the rules and how the business sector takes advantage of them. I am confident about the direction of these changes in Eastern Europe, as most of the people active in these spheres are pragmatists. The declared objective for the Eastern European countries is to become a part of unified Europe in the foreseeable future. In my opinion, however, it is equally important for us to be able to say that after we become a part of Europe we will not start to blow it up from inside. We must prove to ourselves and to others that we are capable of disbanding prejudice and mutual hatred and of working together to solve our conflicts.

The basic question then is how to build cooperation between the nations of Eastern Europe and who to entrust with this important task. In my opinion it is not a task for governments, presidents or parliamentarians -- at least not for them only. Faced with immediate tasks such as conducting free elections, these individuals might consider matters of international cooperation to be of marginal importance. The matter of cooperation with neighbors from the formerly socialist bloc is therefore work for enthusiasts who do not think it's dreadful that success might come only after several years.

It is a difficult time to promote international cooperation on the political agenda. People are more concerned with the level of their income than with their neighbor, who is often feared or at best held in contempt. One really must be absolutely
apolitical to even think oneself capable of something as serious as friendship between a Pole and a Ukrainian or a Slovak and a Hungarian. Therefore, most of the activities in the area of international cooperation are a matter for genuine activists broad-minded enough to know that cooperation between post-communist nations might be the deciding factor in achieving the main objective of creating a united Europe.

To illustrate this point, I would cite the example of what the Stefan Batory Foundation and the Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity organization did in the period between the elections in Poland in June 1989 and early 1990, which I would call the time of great fireworks. During that period we organized more than 45 international meetings with individuals, many of whom are now leading the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The meetings were organized without engaging a penny from the Polish parliament or government. During the plenary sessions, small group discussions and private meetings, we tried to find consensus on how to ease the sharpest conflicts which, after all, are deeply rooted in our societies. At each of the meetings so many ideas for joint activities were considered that there would have been enough work for several years. The politicians in the group returned to their own duties, but those of us active in the sponsoring organizations remained committed to implementing the discussions and to our goal of creating a foundation of real friendship among the nations of Eastern Europe.

Given the importance of the non-governmental sector in creating solid foundations for democracy through international cooperation, we must also address the issue of long-term financing for these efforts. None of these organizations have a permanent source of financing. One cannot expect to form such a fund from Western European or U.S. sources, or from the post-communist nations which are in poor economic condition. I would suggest that a small percent of the debt reduction granted to Poland and other countries emerging from communism be converted for use in the creation of this sector. This proposal has been presented to senior government officials responsible for financial reforms in Poland and they approved of it.

The transformation from communism to democracy will be successful only if we manage to build a democratic infrastructure. In my opinion, our main objective for the coming years must be the formation of democratic institutions so that people feel secure about democracy regardless of changes in the parliament or the government. This can be achieved only through a strong non-governmental sector as a counter-balance to state institutions.

I hope that our common labor will be successful in building Eastern and Central Europe as part of the free democratic world.

Marian Munteanu is president of the League of Students in Romania and a member of the coordinating committee of the Civic Alliance, Romania's largest grassroots organization. His brutal treatment at the hands of the miners in June 1990 aroused an international outcry, including petitions from Amnesty International on his behalf.

I represent the League of Students, an organization created immediately after the December 1989 revolution in order to help in some way with the construction of a democratic system in Romania. For a better understanding of the current general situation in my country, I must first tell you a few things about the former communist system in Romania. Communism in Romania was the result of a Soviet occupation which destroyed our former order, including all the democratic institutions in society, and left us
with the memory of one million political prisoners and 400,000 victims. Generally the Romanian population identified with communist ideology because of strong communist propaganda. In reality, things are different, and this confusion caused by communist ideologies and communist propaganda is a principal explanation for the situation in Romania today.

In December 1989, the revolution had a very clear anti-communist character. The bad thing was that the general population believed that at the very moment of the revolution, communism was finished in Romania. This of course was not so.

In the first days of the revolution, a group of former members of the nomenclature took and kept the control of the national television and the most important newspapers. Their control of the media explains all that happened after the revolution in Romania. The media gave the impression to the population that communism was finished. The official position was that Romania would be a democracy with new institutions and a market economy. We must understand that for a man who has no experience with democratic life or democratic institutions, democracy is only a matter of affirmations. If those in power positively assert or officially confirm that good things are happening, the people will quickly believe.

For the opposition forces it was very clear from the beginning that control of the media was most important. We realized that if the population were to know the truth and understand exactly what happened after the revolution, the actual power structure could not exist more than a week. In fact now, after a year and a half and a very hard struggle by the opposition forces, the people are beginning to understand. A few days ago we had demonstrations around the country organized by the Civic Alliance, a sign that people have begun to understand that the official position wasn't a real democratic one.

After all the disastrous events of the last year, the general understanding of the situation is much better. If the opposition forces successfully realize our media programs -- new independent television stations, independent newspapers with increased circulation all over the country -- the political problem posed by the former communist forces will be finished in a very short time.

Everybody says that the revolution in Romania was a revolution of youth, and generally that is true. In December 1989 the youth of the country united and fought against the former communist system. Immediately after the revolution, the youth in Romania refused to participate directly in the elections by affiliating with a specific political party. Now we have a bit more experience and I predict that the youth will become more politically active during this next period. All of the forces that we call civil society are stronger and more active.

In talking about the "unfinished revolution," I would say that in Romania the revolution is in fact finished because the revolution was clearly oriented against the system. What we're trying now to do is have once again our normal life. It is an entirely new situation and we have no previous experience to show us how to make this transition from a communist to a democratic
system. I can say, though, that in the same way that the December 1989 revolution was brought about by the younger generation, in the new transition in Romania, the youth will remain a political force.

Konstantin Trenchev is chairman of Podkrepa, a confederation of labor in Bulgaria formed in February 1989 which now has nearly 500,000 members representing every industrial sector. Under Trenchev's leadership, Podkrepa played a leading role in the opposition to the regime of the last communist dictator in Bulgaria, and in November 1990, led a nationwide general strike which forced the reborn formerly communist (now socialist) Prime Minister to resign.

When I received the invitation for this conference and read the theme of "The Unfinished Revolution," I questioned in my own mind why the process of democratization remains unfinished. I am not a philosopher and cannot give a philosophic answer, but as a doctor and an intellectual from Eastern Europe, I have personally experienced the difficulties in this struggle to achieve democracy and have come to some conclusions I would like to share with you.

My approach to democratization is not philosophic but realistic. According to it, democracy is a system which allows society to structure its social hierarchy and to function based on a set of principles which are the most acceptable and practical at a given moment. These principles prevent negative and destructive tendencies and serve as the basis for the survival of contemporary civilization. I don't intend to say that there are no problems in democratic society — but let's compare any democratic country with the bitter experiences which we have had in Eastern Europe.

Let's suppose that in a society only the negative processes are brought out. One need only to look into the most recent communist camp to see a society where tens of thousands of people were killed in peaceful times because they refused to accept a crazy idea which derives from social utopia, psychopaths and terrorists. It is a society where the system has as priorities hatred and jealousy promoted by the actively governing individuals; where the unifying factors are not mutual respect, tolerance, confidence and humanity but repression and fear. I speak of a society where the spiritual deviation reached such a point that it declared treason for a virtue. This kind of society is a threat to all others. External efforts must be made to help internal forces make the necessary changes in this society in order not to become victims of it themselves.

Fortunately, God gave the human being an internal need which is expressed best and most completely in a free society. For a human being the ability to dream and chart a future is an absolute necessity. This anticipation of a better future motivates one's life.
and behavior. In non-democratic societies the extreme difficulties, fear, repression and resignation lead to a narrowing of perspective. But this narrowing has a limit behind which the individual cannot retreat any longer and which eventually leads to the explosion of aggressive behavior. As many of the representatives here from Eastern Europe can confirm, lack of expectation is the most destabilizing factor of all.

Reducing the level of social pressure and avoiding social explosion in a period of difficult transition from centralized economy toward market economy is possible only if basic democratic principles are introduced quickly into society. With pressure from outside and from within, all forces obstructing the democratic process, mainly the Communist party, must be removed from the political scene.

Leszek Kolakowski, a leading critic of the communist regime in Poland in the 1950s and 1960s, was expelled from the University of Warsaw in 1968 and emigrated to the West. He is a senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University, and a member of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago.

The extraordinary events of the last two years in Central Europe have resulted in Himalayas of print, and it is hardly possible to add anything new or original. Nonetheless, I want to present a few thoughts concerning the postrevolutionary hangover in Central Europe. In fact, this hangover was unavoidable. There has never been a successful revolution (bloody or not) that has not produced massive disappointment almost at the very moment of its victory. This was inevitable because, in order to mobilize the amount of social energy necessary to overthrow a well-established

order, people must have extremely inflated hopes -- hopes that simply cannot be realized. The discrepancy between such expectations and the postrevolutionary reality is bound to be very large, yet prerevolutionary self-deceptions are a necessary condition of success.

It was predictable and predicted that in all the countries of Central Europe the unity of the democratic opposition, once cemented by a common adversary, would fall apart soon after the communist regime had been defeated. Distinct ideas, mentalities, and interests, which were previously more or less hidden, would come to the surface. There is nothing calamitous in this. Rather, it should be considered a return to what we may call normality in the Western sense. Alas, normality is still far away. In Poland, there are about 150 political parties, only a few of which have any electoral significance and none of which, it seems, has an impressive membership.

It was no less predictable and predicted that the obstacles in the path of economic reform would be immense, but how immense they would turn out to be could not have been predicted. The transition to a market economy with a substantial private sector is easier said than done. There has never been a historical precedent for this sort of transition, and everything had to be
improvised on the spot. What was needed was no less than the rediscovery of money. The point was not simply to limit inflation, but to put into place mechanisms that would make it possible to know what things cost. Under the old command economies, prices were arbitrarily set by central planners; nobody knew the real cost of anything. Since the market is the only reliable source of information about prices, the freeing of prices was a fundamental condition of reform, but it had bad sides as well. The immediate results were a decline in most people’s living standards and a rise in unemployment. Taxation measures designed to prevent an increase in wages provoked widespread discontent and strikes. Among Polish workers one may even hear voices claiming that things were better under the Communists, when there was no fear of unemployment. About politics they say, “We couldn’t care less.”

This does not mean, of course, that Poland or any other country in Central Europe is threatened by a mounting wave of communist sympathizers. The situation provides fertile ground, however, for all sorts of demagogues promising people that all social and economic problems can be solved in no time. Freeing prices was a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition of the transition. A great deal of national wealth, including large parts of industry and parts of agriculture, is still in the hands of the state. Ownership titles are often very unclear, as are legal rules dealing with business and privatization, which might frighten off foreign investors.

The denationalization process does not necessarily imply that everything must be privatized as a matter of rigid dogma. State-owned companies can coexist with a market economy, as the experience of Western Europe shows. The extent of state intervention is a contentious issue between movements with a more or less social democratic leaning and the die-hard Hayekians. It is certainly arguable that market forces themselves do not automatically solve all social problems.

The communist heritage survives not only in the economy and in political institutions, but in minds as well. The workers want to have shares in their companies’ profits and to remove restrictions on profits, but they would also like to have guarantees against unemployment. The peasants want to have freedom of trade for their products, but demand that the state fix minimum prices for agricultural commodities and protect them from imports by high tariffs. The intelligentsia enjoys the regained freedom of speech and print, but also wants lavish state patronage of cultural goods.

All these conflicts can be solved only by more or less awkward compromises. One cannot have the best of both worlds. Above all, establishing a strong rule of law turned out to be less easy than expected after decades of a system in which the party leadership had been practically unrestrained by law. Again, everybody is for the rule of law, but it is easier said than done. One may reasonably hope that this messy state of affairs will eventually be put in order, but it will take years. Still, I do not believe that Poland or Czechoslovakia or Hungary is threatened with a kind of dictatorship as a solution for what might occasionally seem intractable chaos. Political vitality in these countries is too widely dispersed, and there do not seem to be dictators in waiting among the really important political elite.

Among the victims of communism’s ongoing demise is the extraordinary alliance of workers and intelligentsia that was once embodied in Poland’s Solidarity movement. This holy grail of democratic opposition was actually found in 1980 and functioned quite well during the military dictatorship and thereafter. It lost its old meaning, however, under the new conditions. Solidarity is still in search of a new identity now that its previous role as a broad civil rights movement encompassing all sorts of political, cultural,
and economic grievances and aspirations has come to an inevitable end. In a totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regime with an obligatory ideology, intellectuals can achieve a kind of socially privileged position that they cannot keep in a democratically ordered society. In communist regimes, the workers can strike if the system is already weakened, whereas intellectuals can speak as individuals or small groups and make their voices audible and significant. They can contribute to the corrosion of the system by individual acts.

One can predict that this privileged role of intellectuals will end in the coming years with the return to normality. Professional politicians will probably replace writers, historians, actors, and professors in the political machinery. It needs stressing, however, that Poland, in contrast to former Soviet protectories, succeeded in creating not only a politically active class of intellectuals but a political worker elite as well, which might conceivably shorten the process of reconstruction.

I would like to conclude by making three polemical remarks that do not seem to be out of place. First, the present situation in Poland emerged from the long series of negotiations between the opposition and the Communist party and government early in 1989. At that time, there was a vocal minority of people both in Poland and elsewhere who were hostile to the very idea of negotiating and making deals with Communists. This minority now believes that their resistance has been vindicated because communism collapsed anyway, and because the negotiations weakened the opposition by needless compromises and soiled it by dirty deals with the enemy. I consider this position wrong; today it reflects mainly the frustration of those whom the political process left behind.

It is true that in the years 1987-89 communist rule was clearly enfeebled, even though nobody could imagine the pace of its future disintegration. But the decisive mo-

ment in the disintegration of communism was the Polish elections of June 1989, only partially free for the parliament and entirely free for the upper chamber. The results of these elections were so shattering, so devastating that the Communist Party simply collapsed, and the first non-communist government was formed. But the elections were a direct result of negotiations and could not have been organized in any other way. Without them the disintegration of communism would probably have been much more complicated and possibly bloody. As a result of the way the whole process began, Poland was left behind by other countries that followed it in a domino effect. They could benefit from their position as latecomers, whereas Poland was left for some time with a parliament in which 65 percent of the members were communist nominees (even though hardly anybody among them would still define himself now as a Communist).

It is plausible to believe that Gorbachev's intention at the beginning was simply to replace particularly compromised and hated leaders like Ceauşescu, Honecker, or Husák by another and presumably more flexible team of neo-communists. Eventually, he probably realized that this would not work and that keeping the party in power, while perhaps feasible, would demand a price he was unable to pay: the total destruction of everything he was trying to accomplish in his own country. The 1989 "roundtable talks" in Poland set in motion the entire wheel of crashing changes. To say now that one should not have negotiated because communism broke down anyway is like saying, "You should not have killed the tiger because you see that the tiger is dead anyway."

Second, since Gorbachev first came to power in 1985 there have been those people who insisted that both perestroika and the changes in international communism were no more than a gigantic hoax designed to
get U.S. troops out of Europe on the pretext that the Cold War had ended, leaving the continent ripe for Soviet domination. Everything, they averred, was planned in advance in order to keep communist power intact under the false light of glasnost and various pseudo-changes. Incredibly enough, there are still people who continue to assert this interpretation of events, which I think now borders on insanity. It is clear that nothing was planned in advance (or at least that whatever was planned went wrong), and that Gorbachev reacted to unexpected events in haste without knowing what would happen next; that there was no super brain that organized everything for the benefit of Soviet power, no cunning super magician who pulled strings and moved the puppets before the eyes of the dazed audience. The collapse of communism in Central Europe is real, and those who refuse to recognize this have a mindset that is a mirror image of the communist way of thinking. According to the communist doctrine of old, capitalism cannot really be reformed, only destroyed in a revolutionary cataclysm. So now communism, according to the doctrine noted above, cannot be changed and finally fall apart through bloodless pressure, but can only be crushed in a violent upheaval. To cling to this ideology now, I think, is a symptom of doctrinal blindness.

My final remark is directed at the army of Sovietologists who for years and years, starting with Khrushchev's time, kept repeating that the communist system was getting better and better every day. Whoever was in power or came to power at a given moment -- Brezhnev or Andropov or Gorbachev -- opened an era of great promise. Most Sovietologists, of course, stopped short of claiming that the Soviet system was a splendid model lighting a radiant pathway for mankind. They simply tried to convince us that the system was becoming more and more democratic, more and more pluralistic, and more and more rational with every passing night. Moreover, they were usually ill-disposed if not downright hostile to the emerging democratic opposition (or the dissenters) in the Soviet Union and its satellites because such movements, according to their theory, hampered the natural tendency of communism to democratize itself and placed obstacles in the path of the Soviet vehicle's rush toward glorious "convergence". These Sovietologists kept explaining to us -- until quite recently -- that there were not the slightest symptoms of instability, let alone of crisis or disintegration, in the Soviet Union.

But to dismiss some implausible interpretations of events is not to come up with a credible prediction for the future. We cannot avoid the temptation of playing fortune teller, but we know that we do not possess this most desirable gift. It is plausible to think that the coming years will not bring any radical solutions to the recently decommunized countries. Instead, these countries will keep riding down a very bumpy road without either perishing or finding perfection.
The dramatic events in Eastern Europe over the last year may have caused some to forget that the democratic revolution of the 1980s actually began in Latin America. The hemisphere has witnessed remarkable changes, yet there remain profound problems of poverty, debt, drug trafficking, and not least, political legitimation. The question throughout Latin America is whether or not it can overcome these problems and consolidate the democratic gains of the last decade. Panel chair Ambassador Sally Shelton Colby noted in her opening remarks that as the countries of the region move to this next stage of democratic development, they face the real possibility of setbacks because the roots of democracy are shallow and the challenges of establishing permanent democratic institutions and systems are great.

Edgardo Boeninguer was appointed to the Chilean cabinet as Minister, Secretary General of the Presidency after serving as a key advisor in Patricio Aylwin’s presidential campaign. One of his country’s leading political thinkers, Dr. Boeninguer held the post of national budget director under President Eduardo Frei from 1965 to 1969, and was rector of the University of Chile from 1969 to 1973.

The process of democratization in Chile, a process that recently culminated in the first democratic elections in 20 years, did not start from scratch. Chile has a democratic tradition of long standing, which broke down in 1973 after more than a decade of severe political polarization. It took perhaps ten years after the 1973 coup for democratic stirrings to make themselves felt, and another seven for us to reestablish democracy. Now we find ourselves favorably situated to consolidate our democratic political system at the same time that we achieve sustainable economic growth with social equity. I think I can say with some confidence that we are on the way to achieving both of these goals.

The primary ground for my confidence is the basic consensus that we have achieved as a nation on the need for democracy and the market. The Left has abandoned its attacks on democracy as mere “bourgeois formality”; with the threat to democracy from the Left subsiding, the threat from the Right has subsided too. The old dichotomy of capitalism versus state socialism has also lost its polarizing power. All significant actors now agree on the need for a relatively open market economy.

Another reason for optimism is the peaceful character of the transition. This was possible not only because of our democratic tradition, but also because of the presence of strong institutions. Social organizations such as unions and professional associations initiated the mass protests that forced liberalization on the reluctant Pinochet regime. Political parties with strong roots in society then took up the slack once a modicum of liberalization had been won. They challenged the regime at the polls and eventually put together a coalition that could win the elections and lead a democratic government.

Achieving a peaceful transition required making some compromises. We accepted a number of “safety valves” left in place by the outgoing regime to ease its exit. Holdovers from the old regime would retain a certain degree of political power, change would have to be gradual and limited. What we got in return for these concessions was a reasonably level playing field that gave us a chance to win the elections, which we did.

Our project now is to continue building a normal, nonconfrontational political system that combines continuity with gradual and peaceful change. Hence the governing coalition’s continued acceptance of the rule that it takes a special majority in Congress for major institutional reform. Hence the
government's willingness to be flexible within the framework of its program. The basic consensus that we have achieved has enabled us to keep pursuing the successful open-market policies that had already been put in place under our predecessors. We have steered a steady macroeconomic course, thus ensuring continuity and responsible management in economic policy. The Aylwin administration spent its first year in office carefully nurturing entrepreneurial trust; as a result, investment rates are high, and should go up even further in the future. The inflation forecast for this year, following 1990 adjustments designed to cool the overheated economy, is only 15 to 17 percent -- far lower than the typical rates of the 1980s. Prospects for growth are good.

Our demonstrated concern for social equity has also helped to win popular support. Recently, we took a giant step toward placing business-labor relations on a non-confrontational footing by reforming labor-relations law on the basis of a three-way consensus among government, unions, and management.

Tense labor relations are hardly the only problem inherited from the past. There have also been what I call "turbulences" in our relations with the military. Thus far, disputes between the government and the military have been resolved in the context of a clear insistence on our part that the President's authority under the existing Constitution must be respected. At the same time, we have been careful not to force the military into a corner.

A similar caution has marked our efforts to come to grips with the thorny question of human rights violations committed under the old regime. Thanks to the dedicated work of the highly respected Commission for Truth and Reconciliation -- a special task force set up by the President -- the reality of these violations is now well known and indisputable. The victims have been morally vindicated; we are now working on material compensation for them and their families. Justice in terms of punishment will have to remain somewhat limited, however. The juridical structure we inherited includes an amnesty law that protects most of the perpetrators of these violations prior to 1978. At the same time, we will not approve any additional amnesty laws. The courts will deal out punishment, but only within the limits of existing legality.

Strengthening institutions is yet another vital task of democratic consolidation. Much of the instability that has often beset Latin American democracy can be traced to weak political institutions. The failure of many parties to sink deep roots in society and the lack of a coherent party system are especially serious defects. Chile is fortunate to have strong, firmly rooted parties, though they need modernization. The Congress is another key institution that we are intent on strengthening. It must have more technical support and access to information in order to play its proper legislative role and prevent congressmen from lapsing into passivity or irresponsible populism.
Among those things working in our favor, I must mention Chile's general freedom from large-scale corruption and its tradition of honesty in public service. We benefit as well from our independent judiciary, an institution which our present course of judicial reform should enhance even further. The presence of the comptroller general's office, though currently a bit of a burden in terms of bureaucratic processes, is an additional asset.

All things considered, I would say that Chilean democracy is adequately equipped to withstand the basic challenges and threats it must face. As long as severe polarization is avoided, the risk of authoritarian regression or a military coup is slight. The new consensus on the need for democracy and the market makes such polarization unlikely. There cannot be a coup d'état in a country like Chile unless a significant sector of society knocks on the doors of the barracks, and this will not happen if no sector of society feels threatened by others because of polarization.

That a coup is not likely does not mean that there are no dangers to democracy, however. The main threat is populism, by which I mean the danger of responding to widespread social demands by making promises that outstrip the resources available to fulfill them. We have learned enough about the benefits of responsible macro-economic management and stable expectations from both our own and our neighbors' past mistakes to recognize populism for the snare it truly is. The resultant maturation of our political and societal leaders has left us well armed to resist this demagogic temptation.

Widespread popular disaffection can endanger democracy as surely as can a military coup. The best proof against such disaffection is economic growth. We are making growth a priority, for without it there is no way to avoid conflict and polarization over the distribution of wealth.

Mass disaffection can also arise over poor performance in the area of social equity and welfare. This is particularly true in countries where, as in Chile, there is a strong egalitarian strain in the traditions of most political parties. The government must manifest genuine concern for the well-being of the people. Gradual improvement in living standards can be compatible with sustained popular support, as long as there is a visible and consistent effort to foster it. The people must perceive a genuine and continuing commitment to social justice.

A third potential source of popular disaffection is the breakdown of law and order. Chile is currently contending with a certain degree of political violence. There have been several political assassinations, including that of a prominent senator and conservative leader early in April. Terrorism has been known to strike even the most securely democratic countries; democracy itself cannot automatically put an end to all political violence. The government is absolutely determined to fight these lawless outbursts. The struggle to suppress them will not be quick or effortless, but the most important thing is that we are not handling this problem in a partisan way, but are seeking to unite and mobilize the whole country against political violence. Here again we have in our favor Chile's traditions of democracy and the rule of law. Taking all these things together, I believe that our hopes for the successful consolidation of democracy are well warranted.

Enrique Krause is a historian of Mexican development and democracy and editor of the Mexican magazine Vuelta. He is the author of several books, publications and essays on cultural and political history, including his major study of Mexican democracy, Democracy without Adjectives.
Surely 1989 will be remembered as the miraculous year of the velvet revolution in Prague, the end of the cold war, and the liberation of captive Europe. It also merits being remembered for other less dramatic but equally significant events. In the same year, the majority of countries in Latin America opted for both democracy and an open economy. What we saw in Latin America was a kind of reverse domino effect – instead of falling one-by-one, the pieces suddenly stood up.

Traditionally Latin America’s public life has been marked by the existence of four vast historical paradigms: militarism, revolutionary academic Marxism, populism, and a closed economy. To an increasing perceptual degree throughout the 1980s, these four paradigms began to fade. Militarism sent itself into what might almost be called voluntary retirement, sometimes through demonstrated incompetence, sometimes through the effect of internal democratic pressure and international sanctions. Either way, the generals found themselves becoming anachronisms more appropriate to the national museums than to the presidential palaces. The messianic kind of attention originally generated by the Cuban revolution gradually dissipated. Perhaps the principal reason for this is the discredit into which the classic revolutionary model has fallen around the world, particularly with regard to its claim to be the instant solution to the problem of social justice. The quiet of the closed idyllic universe of Marxist theory was punctured by bad news from reality. The Salvadoran people ignored one call after another from the guerrillas for a general insurgency. The Nicaraguan people, tired of war, scarcity and speeches, voted with and for common sense. Together with the withdrawal from the political scene of the military and thus the Marxist theories of redemption, the paradigm of an economy closed by the viable hand of the state also fell into discredit. The principal reason for this was of course its demonstrated failure in practice. Moreover it was impossible to ignore the success enjoyed, for example, by the export-driven model of Southeast Asian countries which began their cycle of development much later than Latin America.

Only Fidel Castro, locked up in his Caribbean island prison, remains to symbolize the four paradigms of Latin American backwardness -- camouflage uniforms, larger than life size photographs of Marx and Lenin, endless speeches and an economy which devoids the means of its own subsistence. But apart from this regrettable vestige of the past, Latin America is tending toward equilibrium, realism and responsibility – which is to say toward genuine maturity.

Four paradigms -- weakened, discredited, but alas not yet completely vanished. Although some countries will be more successful than others, it is possible to imagine that if the present trend toward maturity persists another ten years, Latin America will enter the twenty-first century with governments more respectful of liberty and law, with societies more just, prosperous and politically and socially aware. The first contribution to consolidating this maturity is to scrupulously respect the rules of the democratic game. There is much talk of the recent economic success of Chile under the dictatorship of General Pinochet. There are even those who go so far as to argue that economic freedom is fully compatible with political dictatorship. But the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite and the election of his successor in 1989 shows that Chileans regard political freedom as a desirable end in itself. With time and broader perspective it will be seen that the political maturity associated with Chile over the past 100 years -- the very same that endured two decades of chaos and dictatorship -- has basically favored economic development as well. The consolidation of Latin America's
new economic policy requires time and patience. The experiments in financial populism were allowed two decades to prove that they did not work. The new dispensation likewise deserves a chance to prove itself.

One of the most urgent means of consolidation for the region consists of the modification of the legal system towards something resembling what exists in the Anglo-Saxon societies. Thus, just as the colonialist tradition in our countries disdained the tradition of elections and votes, it also imparted a justice excessively bound to codes too inclined toward bureaucratic delay and therefore bribery; too little anchored in the sense of individual and community responsibility.

These and other improvements would be far easier to effect in our countries if we had sufficient voices of intellectual dissidents frankly opposed to statism. Unfortunately, in Latin America today the intelligentsia is anti-democratic and continues to favor at least three of the four paradigms of stagnation. Intellectuals are the decided enemies of the generals of the Right but they have not found equally repugnant certain generals of the Left. Their propensity for ideology has rendered them utterly impermeable to empiric proof or scientific argument. Even after the dramatic events of 1989, they do not feel particularly obligated to examine their fundamental beliefs. They continue to utterly reject the notion of private property, except such as happens to belong to them. They cling fast to their faith in the state, which still in most cases pays their salaries.

The failure of real socialism merely establishes the triumph of ideal socialism. While not actual practitioners of urban guerrilla warfare, they are accomplished warriors on the more continual battlefields of editorial pages, newspapers, lecture halls and café tables. Few among these intellectuals would favor the actual installation of a communist regime, but political and economic populism are clear objectives. Anyone who has observed them at close range, who has read their sermons or listened to their homilies, cannot help but think that the last Stalinist on the planet will not die in the Soviet Union -- he will breathe his last breath in some Latin American university.

In spite of these relentless ideologues, the picture of Latin America is far from black. Quite the contrary, we are probably witnessing the highest degree of maturity that Latin America has attained this century. The end of the cold war has cancelled in all probability the prospects of the paradigm of real socialism. If the generals remain in wholesome retirement, only one shadow remains to darken Latin American life. That is, the unholy alliance of the Latin American intellectuals with the populist political leadership. In Mexico this threat is serious. It is represented by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the son of Mexico’s most popular populist, revered President Lazaro Cardenas, who, like the famous medieval Spanish warrior El Cid, wins battles after he’s dead. Were the populists to achieve power in Mexico, these people would reverse the process of maturity and generate new cycles of economic deterioration. Worse still, the population might not hold such a leadership fully accountable for the results. For the secret of populism is
as old as demagoguery -- to postpone, to avoid, to confuse society’s ability to properly judge those who govern it. Exploitation of cheap sentiment and popular ignorance is the easiest out. At this point in the century, to close the economies of these countries and impoverish still further their public life means more than merely losing a few years -- it means sacrificing the future.

Francisco Wofford is the secretary of the executive committee of the Center for the Study of Contemporary Culture (CEDEC) in Sao Paulo, Brazil. CEDEC’s two-fold objectives are to conduct research on society, politics, the economy and culture in Brazil; and to provide an open forum for debate on the burning theoretical and practical issues related to the construction of democracy in Brazil and the rest of Latin America.

In discussing the consolidation of democracy in Brazil, I think we must ask ourselves if we Brazilians are really facing up to the risks and challenges of this process. We have experienced important political democratic changes in Brazil in the last ten to fifteen years. Electoral participation has greatly increased, with nearly half of the population participating in the election of 1989, compared with less than one third for the election of 1960. We have also witnessed important improvements in our democratic culture. We do not have all the democratic tradition of, for example, Chile, but instead we have had a happy tradition of cynicism of democracy in Brazil. In the last ten or fifteen years the Brazilian people have learned to value democracy as an end in itself. We no longer face the problem of proving the legitimacy of democratic mechanisms but we do have to prove that democracy has the ability to solve economic and social problems. The end of the military regime in Brazil was not only a matter of political pressures but also a matter of economic difficulties. These same economic difficulties which helped to end the military regime are now undermining our young spirit of democracy.

I think most Brazilians would agree that we have three or four practical issues that must be addressed if we are to further consolidate democracy in our country. First, we face the problem of reforming the state. Second, we have in Brazil not only an external debt but also a social debt. Brazil is a country of nearly 150 million people, with nearly 50 million at or below the level of absolute poverty. Only ten percent are able to pay income tax because the others are all below the minimum level defined by the income tax service. You can imagine therefore the social pressures inside the political system.

Third, consolidating democracy in Brazil means a conscious effort to build and develop political parties and a democratic political party system. I would make a comparison once again with Chile, which has a very happy tradition of a multiparty system. This is not the case in Brazil. We have political parties, but we don’t have a political party system in the democratic sense, so each party sees itself as if it is the future of a one-party system.

FRANCISCO WOFFORD
My final observation, and a reason for hope, is that all these risks and challenges are taking place at a moment in which Brazilians -- as well as other Latin Americans and people around the world -- are facing a new process of modernization of economies and new pressures toward economic integration. The full scope of modern economic and social problems is no longer a national question. It is an international question that requires a new vision of the future. To build and consolidate democracy is to connect these countries with the process of modernization of the world.

Emilio Alvarez is a Nicaraguan intellectual and political leader who has worked for more than 35 years to promote democracy and freedom in his country. A key player in the negotiations leading to Somoza's ouster, he was a major force in the Broad Opposition Front. After the February 1990 elections, he served as a member of the team representing the Nicaraguan government in the peace talks with the armed resistance.

The importance of this forum is that it gives us an extraordinary opportunity to hear from a broad cross-section of the different cultures represented speaking about the challenges of managing a transition to democracy. In Central America that task is a new job. Those five tiny republics have suffered during a century of devastation wrought simultaneously by dictators, civil wars and chronic poverty.

The first of the five republics to be part of the democratic transition was Costa Rica. Leaders of that country discovered early on that an extended education, freedom and property are the basic elements necessary to achieve political stability. The other four republics have followed a different model. Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras were able to substitute charismatic military dictators for an extraordinary alliance between the military establishment and the high income groups. The results have been a sort of stability that has permitted these republics to elect presidential governments through democratic elections. But that alliance has been unable to deter a disrespect for human rights and extended corruption in high levels of their administrations.

The Nicaraguan case is very special. That country had the opportunity for the first time in its history to elect a democratic president only because the two superpowers decided not to continue their support of their proteges and give the Nicaraguans an opportunity to change through the more civilized way of free elections. Arrangements for the election were made through a series of compromises. We were accustomed to military victors who had the power to make all the decisions without any challenges, but in this election we did not emerge with a complete victory of one party and a complete defeat of the other. The new leaders were willing in the pre-inauguration period to sign a protocol of transition that guaranteed the opposition party a role in the governing of
the country. Thus with the new government we have old totalitarian structures still present in the police, the army, the judicial system and so forth. This poses a great challenge for the new leadership in governing effectively.

Another challenge for the democratic transition in Nicaragua is that we don’t have strong political institutions to support the process. There really are 14 democratic political parties now divided in their approach. The corporations, producers and trade unionists have suffered such harassment and economic crisis that they practically do not exist.

The main advantage to this formula of consulting with the opposition in governing the country is that it represents a policy of national reconciliation, something we need badly in Nicaragua. Still, there are many difficulties because the opposition remains under the old ideologies of a benefactor state, full bureaucracy, strong army and subsidies to the central government enterprises. So how can you bring order to the economy? In the face of a deep economic crisis the contradiction between the government that pursues a correction of hyper-inflation with a partner that looks in the opposite direction is really a problem. It is true that we now have freedom of the press, a market economy, and no war -- but the majority of the people are anxious that the Sandinista regime be dismantled. To strongly lead the democratically-elected new order while at the same time addressing these other concerns is the major challenge we face in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua needs help in this difficult situation in the following areas: bringing the economy out of its crisis state, political education, support for a free press, free radio, free television and reinforcing the weak institutions in society in order to have a full start on democracy. This process requires creativity on the part of those who are trying to help. They must withdraw from the old schemes and consult with the Nicaraguan people on how to better assist the transition. Any plans for aid to Nicaragua must also consider how they will contribute to Central American integration, for our nations are not able to survive alone.

We face several urgent tasks -- first, to fix the economic crisis, and then to comply with the promises we have made to the resistance movement members to fully integrate them into society. We must continue to demilitarize the state. We can follow the scheme of Guatemala or Honduras and build in the wake of a totalitarian regime a feeble army regime, but that would be nonsense. We must promote a new constitution because without a constitution the government is in a strait jacket and cannot function properly. The final challenge for Nicaragua will be not to follow the old traditional schemes of our institutions that would take us back in history, nor to go to the way of the other Central American Republics. Our model for progress still is Costa Rica.
The session served as a stark reminder that despite the democratic revolution of recent years, there are still many countries where dictators rule and democratic activists are persecuted or forced into exile because of their beliefs. Panel chairman Henry Cisneros commended those brave individuals who, in spite of great personal risks, continue to express a democratic voice and to keep democratic hope alive.

Doan Van Toai is president of the Institute for Democracy in Vietnam. A “third force” opponent of the South Vietnamese government, he was arrested by the Communists after the fall of Saigon for refusing to cooperate in the expropriation of all private property in the South. He was sentenced to two and a half years as a political prisoner, an experience which he writes about in his book, The Vietnamese Gulag. Since his flight to the West, Toai has been a leading spokesman for human rights and democracy in Vietnam.

Many have said that the recent triumph in the Persian Gulf will at last bury the trauma of the Vietnam war. But anyone who follows the debate over normalization with Vietnam and the related debate about the support for the non-communist resistance in Cambodia knows that the trauma is not dead yet.

In Vietnam, America’s best intentions produced terrible results because the United States failed to use its most powerful weapons in the fight against the Communists. Those weapons were not its B-52s, or its helicopters, or its hundreds of thousands of troops, but rather its democratic institutions, its free society and its free market. Instead of offering these great assets as an alternative to the propaganda of the Communists, the U.S. backed a right-wing dictatorship and helped it pursue a military war. This strategy played into the hands of the Northern Communists, who used the people as their tools. It has been said that the Americans won every battle in Vietnam yet lost the war. This could happen because every military victory, achieved at the cost of Vietnamese lives and property, was a political defeat. The lesson is that a democracy cannot win a military war against a communist revolution.

Over the last few years, I have been amazed by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The U.S. achieved this without spending billions of dollars, without expending thousands of lives. It was the vibrant American economy and the free society of this country, not the American military strength, that forced the socialist camp into reform and perestroika. The Communists thrive on foreign enemies but they are powerless against the enemies within.

I remember a conversation I had in Saigon in 1975 with a Northern Communist who had just arrived in the South. He told me that Jane Fonda surely was a CIA agent provocateur because otherwise she would have been executed when she returned to the U.S. after visiting Hanoi. When I met this man again a few years later, he told me that he finally understood that Jane Fonda wasn’t a CIA agent, she was just a member of a free society. He learned that through two years of living in South Vietnam, where even after 1975 there was enough of a taste of freedom left for him to begin to understand what it meant to live in a free society.

I am very encouraged to see that the U.S. foreign policy in the post Vietnam war period has moved away from support for right-wing dictatorships and toward the export of its own free society. The lesson is that democracy is more than just free elections and rights guaranteed on paper. Democracy is also an opening of people’s minds, an opening that allows them to re-
pect government institutions without fearing them, and to take political responsibility personally. This is the American idea of government of the people, by the people and for the people. This idea is crucial for stable democracies because unless people believe a government belongs to them they will blame it and turn against it when things go wrong.

Without this idea, in countries where political development is immature, people consider the government only in terms of whether it leaves them alone and what it provides for them. By this standard, the new emerging democracies are in trouble. The governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union now leave people alone, compared to a few years ago, but the people are poorer than ever, and the enthusiasm that people felt for throwing off totalitarian regimes can very quickly turn to disappointment and anger when there is no food in the stores or not enough money to buy it.

It is not enough to overthrow repressive regimes and allow democracy to flourish. It is not enough to rip out the weeds; the new plant must be sheltered and nurtured so that it can grow.

Therefore the challenge to organizations like NED is twofold. First, they must help develop democratic consciousness and democratic institutions in Eastern Europe so that the citizens of these countries believe that they have won their governments, and secondly, they must help make these countries economically viable.

As a Vietnamese activist, what happens in Eastern Europe matters to me for two reasons. First, I know that if the democratic experiment fails there, it will be a coup for the hardliners in Hanoi, and a terrible blow to reformers and activists inside Vietnam. Second, the successes and failures of specific reforms in China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe help educate me about what reforms are worth pushing for and what strategies to pursue.

At the Institute for Democracy in Vietnam, we have learned that the best chance for a democratic future in Vietnam demands a combined strategy consisting of four main elements: maintaining support for dissident movements; encouraging reformist factions; exploiting the economic open door; and supporting moderates rather than extremists.

First, we must continue to support independent activities, including both underground samizdat writings and meetings and independent movements that can sometimes function in public. Reform from above must be stimulated by pressure from below. Only the development of independent society can insure that what one leader gives, the next doesn't take away.

Second, we must also encourage reformist factions within the Communist Party. Today many Soviets hate Gorbachev as an authoritarian figure. But without Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, democratic groups in the Soviet Union would never have flourished to the point where they could challenge the Communists. Reform from above and reform from below must be pursued together.

The third element of our strategy
involves reform from outside, the greatest opportunity for which comes in the economic area. The economic failure of the communist countries has forced some of them, Vietnam included, to a reluctant opening to the West. Some people feel that the West should respond by demanding political reform in exchange for removing sanctions, ending embargoes and allowing investment. I see it differently. As poor as it is, the Vietnamese regime is too proud to make political concessions in exchange for aid and trade. They will let the people starve first. Demanding political concessions from outside strengthens the hands of the hardliners, who use the demands to prove that the West is still imperialistic. Let the activists inside raise that demand.

Just as important, the half-open economic door is itself an opportunity for democratic development. We should push it open and move aggressively into Vietnam. The contacts with the West, the prosperity that trade will bring and the experience with Western business methods and culture, can help the reformers inside Vietnam. It is true that in the short run an economic opening also alleviates pressure on the hardline regime, but the first effect is more important than the second.

A final element of my strategy is to support moderate groups and individuals inside Vietnam. Support for right wing or violent groups can only backfire and help maintain the communist regime. The Communists thrive on painting their opponents as reactionaries and imperialists. If the violent approach didn’t work with the full might of the American army, how could it work with a few bands of disorganized and underequipped mercenaries?

After China, Vietnam is the largest Stalinist regime left in the world today. Yet last year the NED spent only $70,000 to support democracy in Vietnam. During the war the U.S. spent that much on Vietnam every ten seconds. The U.S. Congress should help to build the NED into a powerful international agency and the NED should reserve a large budget to promote democracy in China, Vietnam, Cuba and the few other such regimes that continue to exist.

Much has changed in Vietnam since 1987 when the Institute for Democracy in Vietnam was founded. At that time there were no voices that dared to challenge the regime. Since 1989 there have been thousands of such voices, among them many former communist or third force leaders. The most prominent is Tran Xuan Bach, who was expelled from the politburo after calling for a multiparty system. From Saigon last month Dr. Nguyen Khac Vien, a leading Marxist intellectual, called on the leadership to resign from their positions and asked the party “to accept the fact that Western democracy is the democracy of the people.”

There have been many other such statements, and there are signs that the end is at hand for the hardline Communists in Hanoi. But the fall of the Hanoi regime will not automatically lead to democracy in Vietnam. Organizations like the Institute for Democracy, with support from agencies like the NED, must help the people inside Vietnam to pursue a thoughtful strategy leading to democracy. Only then can we really bury the trauma of the Vietnam war.
Bona Malual is editor of the Sudan Democratic Gazette and former publisher of the Sudan Times, a newspaper which sought to play a unifying role through objective coverage of events in Sudan. Mr. Malual was outside of Sudan at the time of the June 1989 coup, after which the new regime suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Parliament and banned political parties, trade unions and newspapers. Until such time as he can return to Sudan, he continues publishing the Gazette.

These days when I travel around the world and talk about the Sudan I find that people think that problems within the Sudan are Afro-Arab problems, rooted in the fact that the country is inhabited by Muslims, some of whom claim Arab descent, and non-Muslims, most of whom claim African descent. It is a country where people are accustomed to the traditional schisms of a multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-racial state. The question often posed is: can Arabs and Africans, Muslims and non-Muslims live in the Sudan? The bleak picture of repression and dictatorship that is the Sudan today is in a sense lost in that traditional identity.

I'd like to tell this audience that even though those problems of race, culture and religion have not disappeared from the Sudan, we have found a united cause in the belief that in order to solve the problems of ethnicity, religious and racial diversity, we need a democratic climate. That is the driving force behind what those of us involved with the democratic movement have been trying to do. While the world is breathing an air of freshness about what has taken place in Eastern Europe and the other changes that are taking place around the world, even in Africa, where many nations are tinkering with democracy, the situation in Sudan is cause for a great deal of concern.

The Sudan is governed by a repressive totalitarian Islamic fundamentalist regime. In the Western world in the days of the cold war it was fashionable for those of us who spoke out for democracy to be asked “why are you against Islamic fundamentalism? It is one way to assure your country will never have communism.” I have never lived in a communist country, but even after everything I have read about conditions such as in Romania, I assure you that given a choice I would still opt to live under a communist system. At least in the communist system you will be identified as an opponent of the state and then hunted down. Under the present regime of the Sudan you are an enemy unless you prove that you are an Islamic fundamentalist.

We have in the Sudan a repressive bloodletting regime that has been in power for two years and as a result large numbers of people, young and old, have been driven out of their country and are living in exile. The state of the country is such that everyone lives in fear because the regime is criminal and willing to kill for any reason. In that kind of situation the people of the Sudan have forgotten ethnic or Arab vs. non-Arab problems. They want only to restore
democracy because democracy is the first answer to the problems the country faces. Without democracy, we feel in the Sudan that we cannot live together as one, that the civil war which has ravaged the country for most of the 35 years since its independence cannot be brought to an end. Without democracy we do not think we can end the current famine. In spite of the fact that the Sudan is the largest country in Africa with more than 300 million acres of land that are good for agriculture, today we are a famine-stricken society.

Because of the famine and the extreme repression afflicting the country today we do not think the people can from within fight the regime. Therefore many activists are leaving the country and attempting to fight the regime from without. I appeal to you as democrats, as people who know what it is to help those who are in need of their freedom, to come to the aid of the people of Sudan. There are things that we together can do. One of the most important is not to allow Sudan to be closed off from the world. One of the reasons these problems do not go away is that the people of Sudan have not had the opportunity to develop democratic institutions. It has been said that people of Sudan are among the most democracy-loving in the world yet they have never had the chance to practice that democracy. With repression, famine and economic devastation, the regime is trying to ignore the problems of the country. We ask you to appeal to your leaders to recognize the regime for what it is. Here is a country beleaguered by its own regime whose people call upon the international community to come to their aid. If we can succeed in exposing the crimes and the affliction with which the present regime is torturing the people of the Sudan, we as democrats will do a great deal of good.

Li Lu was the deputy commander of the Chinese Student Democracy Movement in Tiananmen Square. Along with Chai Ling, he led the students from the Square on the morning of June 4, 1989. He went into hiding, and eventually escaped to the West. Currently he is a student at Columbia University in New York, where he continues to work for the Chinese democratic reform movement.

Today is April 15. Exactly two years ago on this day the former secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobong died. The death of Hu Yaobong on this date was spontaneously recognized as a common signal by university campuses all over China to start a protest movement, which eventually spread to factories, government agencies, other cities and the countryside and later from China to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, tolling the funeral bell for the whole of the communist bloc.

Hu Yaobong was a symbol of political reform in China. Since escaping from China, I have thought a lot about the convergence of these two seemingly unrelated events which made the spring of 1989 a time ripe for the emergence of the Chinese democratic movement on a massive scale. But the fundamental reason for the start of this demonstration in China was that for 40 years, the Chinese people endured crimes committed by the Beijing regime.

Another important reason for the 1989 movement was the emergence of a new generation that was born during the Cultural Revolution, the darkest time in the history of modern China, and grew up during the ten years of reform, the most open period of the communist regime. We have seen the sufferings, and we know for sure that we do not want to repeat the lives which our parents and grandparents have led. We saw the differences between what life is and what life can be; indeed, what life should be
for us. For the first time in 40 years, a whole
generation glimpsed the possibility of
thinking independently. We were infused
with a longing for an independent life, free
from total and oppressive control of the
state. In the spring of 1989 on Tiananmen
Square, the whole world watched when we
made our choice for democracy.

In the spring of 1989 we made our ideals
known with the most concrete of actions. As
hunger strikers, we spoke from our hearts
and minds with our lives at stake. When the
tanks moved in and bullets started flying, we
calmly stood by our belief in non-violence,
again with our lives at stake. The world
watched one lone student in front of a
column of tanks. The world should know
that there is a whole generation behind that
young man.

On the opposite side of this generation
of young Chinese is a group of old men in
their eighties who endured the long march
and survived, fought a bloody civil war to
win power, and now cling desperately to
those seats of power with their feeble legs
and walking sticks. The student movement of
1989 stood up to these old leaders who
refuse to see that their dream of a strong
China has led to enormous suffering for the
Chinese people. In a very real sense, the
whole Tiananmen movement in 1989 was a
struggle between this special group of old
men and a generation of young Chinese who
make up half of China's one billion people.

The students on Tiananmen Square
successfully mobilized all sectors of Chinese
society, people of all ages, from all walks of
life. The students had so much support only
because they spoke aloud the desires of all
the Chinese people for a better life. At the
height of the movement, millions of people
were on the streets of Beijing, and people in
more than 300 cities in China participated in
demonstrations. In the spring of 1989, the
old leaders won. They crushed us with tanks,
machine guns, and dumdum bullets, but not
forever.

Sadly, the confrontation between this
group of dying old men and the rest of
China is and will continue to be the basic
political reality for China for some time to
come. On the bright side, the biggest
achievement of 1989 was that for the first
time in 40 years, millions of Chinese have
publicly stood up and dared to be counted.
The dark side is that many Chinese have
paid a heavy price for this. Thousands were
killed, tens of thousands were arrested, and
many more were punished by being sent
into internal exile, forced from their jobs,
expelled or refused entry by schools.
Moreover, the little freedom we had during
the last ten years of reform is being limited
again. Still, since the Beijing Massacre,
people have awakened, they have no more
illusions about their communist leaders. Even
though the Chinese people are facing
bayonets at their throats, they will wait for
their chances again.

One consequence of the 1989 movement
is that the old leaders will now cling to
power at all costs. As with the first genera-
tion of leaders who fought their way into
power in other communist countries such as
Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea, they will
not let go until they die. The real dilemma
of continuity in communist regimes is re-
served for the second and third generations
of communist leaders. This is what
Gorbachev is facing now, and what will face
whoever takes over China after the old
leaders die. On the one hand, the second
generation of communist leaders cannot
maintain total and complete control simply
because they lack the personal connections
and military background which they must
use to wield their tactics of terror, and they
will be forced to pacify the populace by
instituting reform. On the other hand, by
reforming, they risk doing away with their
system, and even themselves in the process.
The fact is, there is no way out. The problem
is the system itself. This system is an in-
curable disease, like AIDS. The diseased
system must die in order that human society can be saved.

I personally don't believe communism can survive in the hands of its second generation of leaders, certainly not in China. The real challenge then, is how to build and conduct a democratic movement and ease in the transition as smoothly and peacefully as possible. There is always the possibility that China will face new uprisings, and that communism will collapse into heaps of chaos in the hands of new communist leaders, just as the events in the Soviet Union are painfully indicating. In China, because of the brutality of the Beijing massacre, the transition can only be more difficult. The situation is dangerous - the whole society is akin to sitting on top of a keg of gun powder, waiting for an accident.

We as human beings must do all we can to avoid more bloodshed. However, the assumption of some Asian and Western government officials and scholars that the current communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China are the best hopes for maintaining stability in the region, is, I believe, simply illusory. The worst may be avoided if people are dedicated to non-violence, if the opposition is well prepared, if more people are better organized and informed. The solution lies entirely in the preparation. We cannot very easily achieve this inside China because of the increasingly oppressive rule since 1989 -- therefore the overseas Chinese democracy movement becomes even more important, and it needs concrete assistance.

We need to increase information broadcast into China on the model of Radio Free Europe or Television Marti. The Chinese people will make the right choice in time if they are not consistently being misinformed by the state-controlled media. Now that Eastern Europe has chosen freedom, due considerably to the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, such resources can be transferred to a Radio Free China or Radio Free Asia. In time, it will make an impact in China, North Korea, and Vietnam similar to the one it has already had in Eastern Europe. It is to all of our benefits to aid the emerging democratic movements because, I believe, only democratic governments in Russia, China and elsewhere will make the world more stable and safer for all.

I recently learned that Congressman John Porter of Illinois has proposed a bill to support such a Radio Free China. I hope, from the bottom of my heart, that other Congressmen and Senators will support it. Indeed if I had had the chance to learn from a Radio Free China that the Beijing government has systematically abused the human rights of the Tibetans, I would have spoken out on Tiananmen Square. If I had learned in China that my fellow Burmese students were being massacred by their government, not once, but five times, I would have spoken out on their behalf. We need to insist that the universal standards of human rights are respected across national and cultural borders, and having access to the right kind of information would help. We need to work together with other emerging democracy movements in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. We need to know what’s
going on in our own country. Most importantly, we need to insure that the future transition in China will be conducted in a peaceful and non-violent way. Having the basic educational information on democracy and non-violent techniques would help.

To conclude, I will tell you a true story. On the night of June 3, 1989, as the tanks began to move into Beijing, as many as one million people came out of their homes to protect the students. Soldiers opened fire on whoever was in the way. Innocent people fell by the wayside. Unarmed people did the best they could to protect themselves. The city went crazy — bullets, fire, screams, falling bodies, people running amok in every street of this ancient city. In the center of the Square, the scene was totally different. The last few thousand students gathered at the foot of the heroes monument sat quietly, peacefully and solemnly. The wounded came back continuously to report the killing on the streets leading into Tiananmen Square. By 3:00 in the morning, after some resistance at the northern part of the square, the troops finally surrounded us. Four hunger strikers volunteered to negotiate with the army commanders and got a promise for us to leave the square through the southeast exit by 7:00 a.m. I looked at my watch — it was 4:45 a.m. Only ten minutes after we started to move, the tanks rolled into the square. A dozen students who were not able to move fast enough were crushed.

Outside of the square, everything had by then become very quiet. It was the kind of quiet that came after a big battle as the silence of death was visible everywhere. Destroyed buses were still burning. Bricks and stones littered the streets. Bodies were mostly removed but blood stains could still be seen on the ground. Beijing was no longer the city we knew. Chai Ling, Feng CongDe and I walked in front, leading the students. We walked slowly, solemnly and looked back again and again to the square with tears. Heavy smoke could be seen rising from the square. Students held their flags high, though the flags were now dirty and torn, and carried their tents and blankets with them. One student beside me who worked in the printing section was still carrying his mimeograph machine. A journalist walked toward us, looked at his machine with surprise and pointed at the blood stains on the road and asked, “If I had a gun with me, would you want to trade your mimeograph machine for the gun?” The student shook his head slowly and said “A gun can only grow power.”

I thought of Mao Zedong’s famous quote: “Power grows from the barrel of a gun,” a motto which captures so well the beliefs of the old men who are still ruling China, and their faith in violence. Here I hear the distinct voice of a new generation who believe in the power of knowledge. It was at that moment I realized that this group of old men have failed to break the hope of millions for a democratic China. In the long run, truth is mightier than the gun. The future of China belongs to a new generation.

**Gustavo Arcos Bergnes** has been secretary general of the Havana-based Cuban Committee for Human Rights since 1988. Injured at Fidel Castro’s side during the 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks, he later served as Cuba’s ambassador to Belgium until he was arrested on political charges in 1966. He was imprisoned from 1966 to 1970 and again from 1981 to 1988. His remarks were delivered at the conference by Professor Luis Aiguilar of Georgetown University.

I was honored to receive your invitation to participate in the National Endowment for Democracy’s third international conference on democracy. I have decided not to leave Cuba at this time, but I would
like to take advantage of your kind invitation to send you these remarks, which I hope will contribute to the noble and indispensable objectives for which the conference is being convened.

First, on behalf of the human rights activists in Cuba, I would like to join in the homage that your institution is paying to Presidents Violeta Chamorro and Václav Havel. In greeting these admirable champions of freedom -- the one, a daughter of the Americas, and the other, a son of Europe -- rather than use my own words, which are sincere but of limited range, I prefer to borrow from the Cuban Jose Martí and the Englishman E.M. Forster. In the nineteenth century, Martí called upon the Cubans to fulfill their duty and free themselves from the colonial yoke, but without hatred for Spain, the land of their fathers. Martí said:

There are men who can live without dignity. There are others who suffer as if in agony when they see other men around them living without dignity... Always, when many men lack dignity, a few others will embody the dignity of many. These are the ones who, with a terrible force, rebel against those who rob the people of their liberty, which is to rob them of their dignity. These men carry the burden of thousands, of entire nations, and their human dignity.

In 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, Forster stated:

I believe in aristocracy... if that is the right word, and if a democrat may use it. Not an aristocracy of power, based upon rank and influence, but an aristocracy of the sensitive, the considerate and the plucky. Its members are to be found in all nations and classes, and all through the ages, and there is a secret understanding between them when they meet. They represent the true human tradition, the one permanent victory of our queer race over cruelty and chaos. Thousands of them perish in obscurity, a few are great names. They are sensitive for others as well as for themselves, they are considerate without being fussy, their

pluck is not swankiness but the power to endure, and they can take a joke.

I turn now to the current situation in Cuba, that part of humanity to which I belong. Let me begin by quoting two Cuban citizens describing the system of government imposed here three decades ago. This is a negation of life, said one university professor in Havana. This is a putrid shirt, said an artisan from a provincial town. Today, the Cuban people are paying the price for the mistakes we have made since we emerged as a sovereign state in 1902: an almost permanent administrative corruption; sham elections; dictatorships; civil wars; a second U.S. intervention -- authorized by the Platt Amendment to the 1901 Constitution and unfortunately requested by a Cuban president -- that contributed to the growth of a national "dependency" complex; and an unsophisticated political culture, based more on the charisma of individuals than on political ideas, thus provoking adulation of the hard-fisted ruler or implacable criticism of the democratic ruler.

All this gradually led to the deterioration of the republic's political institutions. Hence the birth of the skeptical phrase: "El cubano, o no llega o se pasa." ("Cubans either never get anywhere or go too far.") Thus "politics" practically became an evil word, synony-

Dr. Luis Aguilar reads message received from Gustavo Arcos.
mous with corruption or deceit.

Nevertheless, since the 1930s, the national panorama has not been entirely negative. There were achievements in the social sphere that benefitted the workers. In the political sphere, the 1940 Constitution, one of the most advanced of its era, was promulgated. In the international sphere, with respect to our relations with the United States, the Platt Amendment was repealed and more favorable commercial agreements were concluded. In the cultural sphere, the Cubans made their greatest creative achievements. In the moral sphere, notwithstanding the widespread corruption of public life and the existence, until now inevitable in all societies, of prostitution and common delinquency, the majority of the population respected and maintained the tradition of family life and religious faith inherited from Spain. Finally, the Cuban people were not inclined to be dogmatic, nor were they marked by a tendency toward permanent rancor.

The fall of the Batista dictatorship in 1959 gave rise to a collective joy and an immense faith in building a better Cuba, in purifying it on all fronts. We were ignorant of the wisdom contained in the Latin maxim “summum jus, summa injuria” (“Extreme justice, extreme harm”). And we blindly trusted one man, Fidel Castro, who demonstrated the proven truth contained in Lord Acton’s phrase: “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” The results are plain to see: an unceasing economic crisis; an almost total loss of credibility in the eyes of the world; the growing disillusionment of the Cuban people, reflected in the inert cynicism of some and the rebellious attitude of others; and the accumulated hatred propagated and promoted by the regime itself for all these years. Together, these factors threaten to result in a social explosion that could degenerate into a bloody confrontation.

Castro’s government, increasingly showing signs of desperation, has so far rejected all sensible appeals by Cubans and foreigners to save Cuba from this dead end. He has also responded with institutionalized repression inside Cuba and with phrases like “Socialism or Death,” a message that no one inside Cuba wants to hear and that finds no support abroad. It is already common knowledge that “the era of Castro” has been the gravest mistake of our history, and we still do not know what additional suffering we must yet endure before arriving at the inevitable point of democratic change. We can only hope that the suffering wrought by this “traumatizing experiment” will have sown the seeds for a mature and effective democracy.

Before ending these remarks, I would like to make a comment that perhaps contains the embryo of an idea regarding the recent war in the Persian Gulf. I shall comment in the form of a question: Is it not possible that this war, and perhaps even Iraq’s previous war against Iran and the Iraqi repression of the Kurds, might have been avoided if Iraq had a democratic form of government, characterized by a separation of powers, respect for fundamental freedoms, and widespread participation in decision making? Would it not serve the cause of peace, and decrease the levels of ambition and distrust that divide men and nations, if membership in the United Nations were contingent upon the ability of each nation to demonstrate that it has a broadly democratic form of government?

I am profoundly grateful, personally and on behalf of the human rights activists in Cuba, for your letter of invitation, which has allowed me to express my views before the participants of this world conference on democracy, all of whom I am certain belong to that family of human beings of which Martí and Forster spoke.
AFRICA: TOWARD MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY

The democratic revolution, especially the events in Eastern Europe, have inspired democratic activists throughout the world, nowhere more so than in Africa. Panel chairman Eddie Williams noted that a growing number of countries in Africa are moving toward multi-party democracy or are under growing pressures to do so.

Fred Chiluba is chairman general of the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions and vice president of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. He has frequently been mentioned as a likely candidate for the next president of Zambia.

I would like to begin by stating that Africa did not begin to agitate for pluralism when the revolution started in Eastern Europe. We started much earlier than that. Obviously, the fight may have been a little sporadic, but the fight was on.

It has to be borne in mind that during the struggle for liberation, Africa was first fighting for decolonization from the Western European countries (including Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal) that had colonized the continent. This move away from colonization meant that Africa therefore befriended and declared total solidarity with East European countries and the Soviet Union. Unless we understand this phenomenon, we will not be able to understand why most of Africa opted for socialism and the one-party dictatorship.

Following the period of decolonization, there were many military and countermilitary coups that tried to agitate for change. I am not justifying the beauty or merit of any military coup, because those that came actually only tended to exacerbate the problems that already existed. But they took place all the same because there was no better avenue for people to express their political wishes.

These coups did not succeed, however, and in the 1980s when the peaceful democratic revolution began in Eastern Europe, Africa saw a chance to begin to work for change in a different way. Africa had been ready for change since the 1960s, but the world was not ready to go along with the coups and counter coups. In the 1980s when this important peaceful movement toward change began to spread, Africa took advantage of the moment. Today the whole of Africa is engulfed in it.

In Zambia, this movement began in late 1989. The state was forced into adopting certain measures toward change, and now, after 17 years of a one-party dictatorship which has controlled the press, the church, and everything you can think of, political parties are being formed. People are legally free to think for themselves. For the first time in 17 years there will be parliamentary and presidential elections based on a pluralist system of government. Here we have something in common with Kenya, in that we must attract such movements as the trade unions, the church, students and grassroots movements if we are to succeed in these
elections. Otherwise it will take a very long time for change from a one-party to a multi-party system of government. In Zambia we are lucky because these organizations are working together for change and we are sure that we will succeed.

It is, I think, with some kind of pride that I would share with my friends in Kenya and all other African countries, my belief that change is coming -- the only problem being that it may be very violent because of the resistance of those in authority. Here is where the international community will be called upon to ensure that they render every assistance available in order to pursue this matter of passive transition from dictatorship to pluralist political systems on the African continent.

My experiences and the experiences of the Zambian people will tell you it is like the biblical saying, "All things are possible to those who believe." All things are indeed possible and even dictatorships can be changed. I believe that we simply need the commitment and conviction that the noble course we are about to take is one for which there is no price too high to be paid. Once we are clear that we must pay any price, certainly change cannot be too difficult to bring about.

Democracy, or lack of it anywhere, be it in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Far East, or Africa -- the principle is the same. The moral, material, and financial support for democratic development must be evenly distributed in order to ensure that we live in one world, where all human beings are equal because they were all born equal and must be seen as equals before the law.

Gibson Kamau Kuria is a Kenyan lawyer and human rights activist whose defense of many human rights cases led to his arrest and detention without trial for eleven months in 1987. He left Kenya in July 1990 because his life was in danger and is currently a visiting fellow at the Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School researching the causes of the failure of the Kenyan constitution.

In Kenya, the movement toward a multi-party system is really one to restore multiparty democracy in a country from which it was banished by the political party which formed the government after the attainment of independence in 1963. That sole party has enacted numerous constitutional amendments and other laws designed to enable it to remain in power forever.

Kenya has become known to many people in the world today because of three historical facts. First, Kenya has the distinction of being the country that first took up arms to remove British colonialism and establish democracy. It did so in 1963. Second, while many countries in the 1960s were moving toward planned economies and one-party dictatorship, Kenya remained firm with a market economy and a democracy. The sad third distinction is that Kenya now stands equally with China with great deter-
mination to use as much violence as necessary to hold on to one party dictatorship. There have been many instances of violence, including attacks on members of the Bar Association. The greatest object of the Kenyan government right now is to obtain an injunction to restrain the leaders of the democracy movement who are in the Bar Association of Kenya.

The democracy movement in Kenya is so strong and determined that it will not rest until multiparty democracy is restored, and the Kenyan government is equally determined to hold on to power. In my opinion, there are therefore four possible scenarios for Kenya’s future. In the first scenario, as the tension continues, the army will conclude that the Kenyan government is unable to govern and there will be a coup d’etat as there was in the 1960s in Ghana and Nigeria. We will witness cycles of military power and attempts at democracy. In the second scenario, the army will recognize that the democracy movement needs assistance, and remove Moi and his group, as the Malian army has done. The army, however, has a habit of breaking its promises, and one can only hope that will not be the case in Mali.

The third scenario is that the current government will capitalize on ethnic tensions, particularly between the Masai and Kikuyu communities, and attempt to prove that people from different ethnic groups are incapable of making multiparty democracy work. We would therefore see armed groups rising up to remove the government, with much bloodshed following, as in Somalia and Liberia.

The fourth scenario, the one for which the democracy movement is working, is one where pressure and agitation for the restoration of multiparty democracy comes through strikes, demonstrations and other lawful means, with the government resigning and the caretaker government taking over to help supervise multiparty elections.

Multiparty democracy was one of the many principles adopted by Kenya after independence in 1963, along with a bicameral legislature with a Senate and House of Representatives, a federal system, a separation of powers and a Bill of Rights. The current situation is a result of the failure of that constitutional endeavor. This failure is the result of a number of factors. First, the constitution that was adopted could open the way for democracy but it could not alone permanently establish it.

The constitution draws upon Kenya’s experience during the colonial period, where certain democratic structures existed. These had to be dismantled and the basic essentials of democracy had to be identified and distinguished from the casual trappings of a so-called democratic system. The fact that the colonizer was white tended to confuse the issue of oppression so that all oppression was seen as coming from whites. In addition to colonial bitterness, there was the experience of captors in 1929, the generally wrong fear of the market economy and the failure of the British to allow Kenyans to train as lawyers. During colonial rule, then, the constitution was a manipulative document interpreted to allow the government democratic restraint. These factors all contributed to the banishment of multiparty democracy in Kenya. The one-party system came into being because of an assumption identical to that in the communist philosophy that this kind of dictatorship of the proletariat has the power to enact laws, even those that deprive the people of their rights.

During the period of President Kenyatta, there were numerous constitutional amendments that weakened democracy very greatly. However, the doctrinal powers were still in place, the Bill of Rights was enforceable and the right of participation still existed.

Then came Daniel arap Moi, the current President. His first act was to manipulate rules to prevent political competition and have himself declared the unanimously-
elected President of Kenya. Since then he has been trying to abolish political competition completely. In 1982, the constitution was amended to take away the multiparty system. In 1988, another constitutional amendment abolished the independence of the judiciary and of the public service, ensuring that public servants and judges would carry out the wishes of the current government.

The lawyers in Kenya, first as individuals and also as members of the Bar Association, started expressing concern about these departures from constitutionalism. The Bar Association started taking up cases, and as the political control became so total, the Bill of Rights became the instrument the lawyers were using to challenge the moral, legal and political basis of authoritarianism.

The collapse of communist systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union brought the Kenyan people the proof they needed that one-party systems do not work, and they began demanding change. The lawyers and the Bar Association urged the people to use their rights still guaranteed by the Bill of Rights — freedom of association, protection by the law, and the right not to be discriminated against because of one’s political opinions — to the maximum extent possible.

This led President Moi to a panic. In June of last year, he started to crack down on individuals, stepping up the repression, positioning intelligence officers outside lawyers’ offices, including my own, beating up journalists and detaining pro-democracy leaders. In spite of all this, I still believe that the current government is going to fall and that the fourth scenario mentioned earlier, with the peaceful return to multiparty democracy, will come to pass.

Once democracy comes, it will be on a firmer foundation than it was at independence because the numerous mistakes made have been identified. The collapse of the one-party systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will also support our return to multiparty democracy. As I see it, the economic and strategic interests of the Western countries pose the greatest remaining obstacle. The international community needs to recognize the right and duty of every nation to promote democracy. We need a declaration similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which ensures the international obligation of a nation to further democracy. Such an obligation will clearly have economic and strategic implications that I am not sure the international community is prepared to accept. There are indications of increasing support for the idea that economic assistance should be linked to a country’s human rights and democratization record. The question, therefore, is how far the international community is prepared to go.

Clara Osinulu is program representative and director of the African American Institute in Nigeria. An anthropologist, she has written extensively on the role of Nigerian women in society.

I invite you to come with me along Africa’s road to democracy, which is filled with about ten hills which must be pushed down to make way for democratic progress. The African countries are young nations where traditional requirements for democracy exist, but they have been pushed aside. Throughout Africa we have great economic instability as well as great violence, such as that in Liberia. Poverty, lack of education, ignorance, corruption and the military dominate the African political scene. Keeping these factors in mind, one can see why Africa is having problems with regard to multiparty democracy.

In spite of all this, there is in Africa a political restlessness and a desire for change toward multiparty democracy. This desire is not just a piece of fancied enlightenment that
will blow over in time; it is the outcome of a gradual realization that has come over the last two decades. Military or even benevolent single-party democracies are mere cosmetics and do not address the real issue of a divergent general populace within a given geopolitical setting. Therefore we have seen some positive changes in Africa. In the Benin Republic, for example, Soglo has been installed as president in place of Matthew Kerekou. In Togo, in October last year, President Eyadema, who had been ruling for 23 years, was confronted with unprecedented riots and protests. The government is still holding on to one-party rule but the clamor for multiparty democracy is unmistakable and it is only a matter of time. In Zaire, Mobutu, after 25 years in office, is about to give in to pressure for a multiparty system by announcing the creation of three political parties, including his own. In Mali, in January, there were massive anti-one-party protests against the government. I have deliberately given this continental landscape so that you can better understand exactly what is happening in Nigeria.

The Nigerian situation is slightly different from all the aforementioned. The ingredients that make up the Nigerian experience ask for a multiparty approach to democracy — there is no alternative. Nigeria is a large country, with a population of over 100 million and over 200 different ethnic groups, so there is no way that we shall not have multiparty democracy. Nigeria is unique in certain respects because we did have multiparty democracy after independence. We had the First Republic and the Second Republic made up of different political parties. They were aligned however, not on political issues, but around ethnic groups, and this was a major problem. In addition, there has always been a bit of violence after an election, and therefore the military has stepped in to control this kind of instability. As a result of the instability, we've had two thirds of the period since independence under the military regime. This is most unfortunate. The economy, of course, has been going down the drain as a result of ignorance, corruption and the other characteristics that I mentioned earlier. The political alignment missing in the First and Second Republics has not improved with time.

The most crucial recent dramatic aspect of our political development has been the imposition of two parties on the population. About 30 associations had been formed when the government announced its transition program and stated that from all the political parties it would choose only two. Eventually, 13 of these 30 associations pushed forward their applications for registration. On the eve of the day that the government was supposed to announce which two parties would be recognized, the President read a three-hour speech at the end of which he held up two pamphlets and said, “I am giving you a little to the right and a little to the left, two political parties, the National Republican Convention and the Social Democratic Party.”

These two political parties are supposed to cut across all ethnic, regional and religious
groups. The Nigerian people were not given the time to experiment and to work out the differences between these various groups. Instead people had to register with one or the other of these two parties without really knowing who is leading them or what they stand for. Nigerians came together in coalitions behind these two imposed parties largely because they do not want the military to have any excuses to call off the transitional program. The issue now is to see what happens in the elections scheduled for 1992. Right now, Nigerians are “towing the line,” registering behind these two parties, hoping to actually achieve civilian rule by 1992.

I would summarize Nigeria’s prospects for multiparty democracy as follows: First, there are certain natural phenomenon such as heterogeneity that will work against a one-party system in Nigeria. Because of our diversity we are bound to have a multiparty democracy. Secondly, historical developments have shown that considerable instability erupts as soon as domination by any single group seems apparent. Thirdly, we have always had a proliferation of political parties. Even on the eve of the Third Republic, we have a mosaic of different political groups. Fourthly, the two-party system imposed by the government is an amalgamation of some of the identifiable, pre-existing political parties which have realigned themselves into these two political parties. Fifthly, the Nigerian government has had to sacrifice the process of evolution in the hope of unity, peace, stability, and progress, taking a short-cut of imposing two parties as a means to an end. Lastly, and perhaps the most important issue at stake in the Nigerian context, is this: Nigerians want to achieve a successful transition to civilian rule by the year 1992. The second part of that important goal is the establishment of a democratic machinery that will keep the military permanently out of government.

Bernard Muna is president of the Cameroon Bar Association. In 1987 he was elected president of the Central African Union of Lawyers, made up of lawyers from ten countries. He is active internationally in the field of human rights, and was instrumental in the development of a model human rights charter for developing nations.

When I received an invitation to take part in this conference, what struck me most was the title, for what we find ourselves in the midst of is indeed an unfinished revolution. This revolution began in Africa soon after the Second World War, when the colonized peoples launched their struggle for freedom. African political leaders of that era were mainly concerned with lifting the yoke of colonialism and gaining political independence. By the beginning of the 1960s, most of the countries in West and Central Africa had gained political independence in one form or another and the rest of Africa was not far behind. A revolution had begun; it has not yet been completed.

It was a revolution that started with calls for the liberation of the African peoples from colonial exploitation and slavery, and expressed their aspirations to self-government and independence. Self-government and independence were granted to the new nations, but the revolution was hijacked by the new indigenous leaders. The African people were never handed their full sovereignty. In the name of national unity and rapid economic development, many basic human rights and democratic freedoms were sacrificed. Dictatorships, minority governments, and single-party regimes became the order of the day. The peoples of Africa watched helplessly as their own countrymen became the new oppressors. Country after country suffered as oppression, tribalism, and gross injustice ran rampant.

Ironically enough, the retreating colonial powers had left most of these young nations
with the necessary structures of democratic government: multiparty parliaments, independent judiciaries, and strong executive branches. Before long, however, most of Africa’s multiparty parliaments and independent judiciaries had been done away with. Rulers preferred strong central governments without checks and balances to limit their power.

The revolution also remained unfinished in another respect. During the colonial period, the European-imposed governments had their own administrative structures, tailored to serve the aims and needs of colonialism and the colonial power. At no time did these aims include the development of the colony for the benefit of its people. Yet the new indigenous governments that took over after independence did little or nothing to change the administrative structures that they had inherited; the new rulers found in these structures a convenient means of consolidating their power and oppressing their fellow citizens. Even if all of Africa’s post-colonial rulers had had nothing but good intentions, however, the colonialist structures that passed into their control could never have proven themselves suitable for serving a sovereign people and developing the nation for their benefit. Hence, the need to reform these structures is another aspect of the unfinished revolution.

What, then, are the prospects for multiparty democracy in Africa today -- or rather for democracy simply, since I do not believe that there can be any other kind? The notion of one-party democracy in Africa was at best an empty dream, and for the most part nothing but sheer hypocrisy. One-party democracy can work only with an angel as president and saints as members of the central committee. Even in heaven, the existing order was challenged by Satan, and we all know that today he is still in the opposition.

The second phase of the revolution of Africa -- what General Olusegun Obasanjo has called the second independence of Africa -- now seems to be underway. The leaders who hijacked the revolution and trod upon the sovereignty of the people are now being called to account. Thirty years of dictatorship, minority government, and one-party rule have brought neither national unity nor economic development. Africa is still ravaged by civil wars and ethnic conflicts, as well as by ignorance, poverty, hunger, and disease.

Today, thankfully, respect for human rights and the establishment of a democratic society are coming to be seen as the true means to unity and development. But this view is not universally shared. Some ask whether democracy is not a luxury for Africa, and wonder if truly democratic government can be maintained in the midst of ignorance, poverty, and hunger. Others suspect that democracy might prove an impediment to development, or fear that it will merely exacerbate intertribal tensions and make the task of government that much more difficult.

It must be admitted that in Third World countries today, development must be brought about under political conditions far different from those which prevailed in Europe and North America at the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Today the philosophy of human rights has become popular politics, while the economics of the
private enterprise system have become much tempered by the concept of an equitable society whose government will devote itself to solving the problems of mass illiteracy, hunger, poverty, and ignorance. In Africa, the need to deal with such problems plays a key role in shaping the choices that democrats must make. Are there really any choices? The temptation to sacrifice certain freedoms in the name of economic development is one to which Africans must not yield, for we would only be repeating old mistakes.

I believe that in Africa, as elsewhere, there exists a large silent majority. It is this majority that has risen today against the corrupt and oppressive practices of the ruling elites. The members of this majority have risen against the pillage of their nations by tiny and selfish minorities. They ask for a fair and equitable society; a society that is just and respects the rule of law; a society in which they are free to choose their political leaders and to hold them accountable for their actions. Many African countries contain dozens, and in some cases, hundreds of different tribes and ethnic groups. Yet in no case does the survival of any of these tribes depend upon the conquest or exploitation of any neighboring tribe. Today all Africans recognize the need to keep their nations together; most tribes recognize their dependence on one another. Single-party rule and minority dictatorship, not democracy, have fueled the tribal conflicts of these last few decades.

In a democratic Africa, the majority would govern but the rights of the minority would be respected. The second independence of Africa will require not only the introduction of true popular sovereignty, but also the complete transformation of the old colonial-era administrative structure into one that serves rather than oppresses the people. Decision making at both the local and national level must be opened to popular participation. This must include an educational effort that will teach the people of Africa how to understand democratic and human rights, and how to defend them against violation. Freely elected parliaments and truly independent judiciaries are also needed in order to check abuses of executive power.

It is in light of these changes that we can talk of the prospects of multiparty democracy in Africa. The African people understand that the defense of their rights and freedoms rests in their own hands. They also realize that these rights can only be firmly established in a democratic society and that the defense of these rights is a continuing process.

Today, many sons and daughters of Africa are dying or being jailed in fights for these rights. Because democracy and human rights are not being handed to them on a platter, the people of Africa know their true value and are ready to defend them. It is this new spiritedness on the part of the African people that has put the fear of God, or rather the fear of the people into the hearts of dictators and single-party governments throughout the continent. A few are still resisting democratic reform, but their days are numbered.

I would say, then, that the prospects for multiparty democracy in Africa are quite promising. The people of Africa must keep up the fight until their second independence has been achieved, until the revolution is finished.

Larry Diamond is senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and co-editor of the Journal of Democracy. He is the author of “Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The First Republic,” and is editor, with Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan Linz, of “Democracy in Developing Countries,” a comparative study of democratic experiences and prospects.
As Mr. Muna said, this is an extraordinary moment in African history, a time of a second beginning. More than two dozen countries on the African continent are experiencing tremendous democratic ferment. The democratic transitions in other parts of the world have encouraged this period of great possibilities for democratic development in Africa, but they have not caused it.

There are, I believe, two reasons for what is happening in Africa. First of all, democracy is not a luxury in Africa, it is a necessity. When you look at the waste, corruption, abuse of human liberty and of basic developmental priorities that have occurred under personal dictatorships in so many different parts of Africa, you realize that the future cannot be secured without basic human rights, procedures that ensure the accountability of the rulers to the ruled, a rule of law and due process. Secondly, Africa is experiencing democratic ferment because people are organizing themselves, not because the world is giving them democracy on any kind of platter. Organizations of civil society -- trade unions, bar associations, student associations, women’s groups, independent institutes and others -- are struggling at great risk in the search for democracy.

The next point I’d like to make is that the world must remain positively involved in this struggle for democracy in Africa. International democratic assistance is important to Africa and African democratic activists are asking that the democratic West intervene on their behalf. In my opinion, regimes such as the Moi regime in Kenya will not yield unless they are compelled to do so. That means, in part, serious and coordinated international pressure.

Why is democratic change in Africa important to the United States and other Western countries? At some point we must care, because our own ethics will not allow us to see Africa descend into famine, unabated civil war and the kind of chaos that we’re seeing in Liberia. If we don’t intervene now on behalf of democracy, we will have to intervene later under much worse circumstances to repair the kind of turmoil and damage that will surely result in many of these countries if democratic progress falters. What the African people are asking for is assistance to establish the sort of democratic structures that will allow them to hold their governments accountable.

It’s interesting to note that the one country in Africa that has managed to maintain a democratic government continuously since its independence is the thinly populated country of Botswana. Botswana has had the highest rate of economic growth on the continent, has done more to improve the quality of life than any other African country in the same period, delivering water, roads, markets, schools and healthcare for its people. Why has this happened? One might argue that it’s because Botswana has diamonds and great mineral wealth, but so have other African countries. The most important reason for this success is the fact that democratic structures, formal and
informal, have served to make government accountable and responsive to the people. The system which has worked there can work in other African countries as well.

Democracy is not something that need happen only after development. In fact it is a requirement for development and indeed one could argue that it is the only way Africa can survive in the coming decade.

Following the panel discussion on Africa, Clara Osinulu of Nigeria shares information with Zofia Kuratowska, member of the Senate of Poland.
The session on the Middle East is further evidence of the extent to which the impact of the democratic idea is extending throughout the world. The title of the session comes from a document currently circulating among democrats in the Arab World looking toward a more democratic future for the region. Recent events, not least the war in the Persian Gulf, have put democracy on the agenda in many countries throughout the region.

Mohamed Abdel Bekbechi is a professor of public law at the University of Oran in Algeria. He is active internationally in the field of human rights and has written extensively on the subject.

I would like to share with you some thoughts on democracy as a fundamental concept to implement justice, peace and development within individual states and among the nations of the international community and to give some highlights of the Algerian experience with democracy building.

It seems to me that it's important to summarize some specific elements of the democratic question in the Third World at large and in the contemporary Arab World. If we glance at the political map of the Third World, it reveals that there has been some distinct change in the last few years. In one country after another various forms of military or totalitarian rule have been replaced by regimes of a more democratic nature. In Algeria the bloody confrontation of the 1988 riots opened the way for democratic progress. Since February of 1989 significant steps toward a pluralist society and a government with a democratic constitution have been taken. Is democracy on the advance? If we take a closer look, we find that in different countries the process of democratization has progressed to varying degrees, and in some cases must be evaluated skeptically with regard to its permanence.

In Algeria's one-party system, in spite of an appearance of monolithic unity, the National Liberation Front has always been riven by deep divisions in outlook and sharp conflict over policy. Since the death of past-President Boumedienne and the arrival of President Chadli, the change of atmosphere in Algeria has permitted a freer expression of divergence and, in some cases, a sharp clash of opposing factions within the ruling group. The main division has been among the so-called Boumedienists, reluctant to see a modification of the old system, and the reformists, seeking to liberalize and urging a middle-of-the-road course of action. In his first year in power, President Chadli attempted to adopt the centrist position, seeking to excommunicate the so-called Boumedienists as well as the leftists and the Islamists. Various groupings have emerged on the question of how far the regime should proceed in liberalizing the economy and decentralizing the administration and whether it should maintain its nationalist stance or adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward the capitalist countries.

This political fractionalization within the National Liberation Front was considered an indicator of the existence of a democratic propensity in Algeria even before 1988. There have been many debates about instituting democratic processes in Algeria, and now, for the first time in three decades, a democratic administration may indeed be installed. President Chadli maintains that he wants to once again build democracy in Algeria; that his idea of reform was a step in laying the solid foundation for true democracy. He objected, however, to any implementation of democratic processes that was imported from abroad without accounting for Algeria's specific cultural norms. Still, he
subscribed to the basic tenets of democracy and stated that the political system must guarantee the right for everyone to think and speak the way he or she chooses. He also insisted on the idea that freedom of speech, as a basic and essential human right, must be guaranteed by law. There is no question of his understanding of the democratic process and his intention to implement it in Algeria, but it's not so much his understanding as his practice and application of the democratic idea that creates complex questions about his role in building a democratic Algeria.

The primary difficulty in his effort to build democracy was the fact that such a process was directly related to his effort to prolong the National Liberation Front's rule. The question remains of how long it will take to implement genuine democracy in Algeria. Since 1989 Algeria has belonged to the club of democratic states where the people voted for a new Constitution dealing with three main principles of democracy: an open multiparty system, a presidential regime with a very large attribution to the Parliament and complex power-sharing with an independent judiciary.

While Algeria's commitment to a democratic system may not be in question, there are a number of factors which must be addressed when considering the actual path of development and future chance for democracy in the country. First, we must consider the common political and cultural features historically shared with other countries of the region. Algeria is a part of the Maghreb and we know that all the states of the Maghreb are, to varying degrees, organized as centralized bureaucratic states. Whatever bases of identity, organization and loyalty exist on either a smaller or larger scale, the state must still be seen as the foremost political actor on the national scene -- the wielder of power, shaper of options and distributor of resources at all other levels of society. One must also recognize that Algeria is a member of the Arab World and a Muslim nation where there exists a relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and the state.

In many instances, Algeria included, the fundamentalist movement can be seen as a challenge to and rejection of the state in its current form. The emergence of Islam as a political force in Algeria can be explained by several historical facts. The National Liberation War was fought by laymen whose motives were secular, not religious. But when independence came, Islam was recognized as the state religion and a good deal of lip service was later paid to the doctrine that there could be no real independence without socialism and no socialism without Islam. Since 1981, Islam has become much more of a political factor. The militants of the Islamist movement are principally the youth, the poorest and the jobless in society; but recruitment is also made among high schools, universities and now among a new class of traders who work under the cloak of a new, informal economy. Many of those attracted to Islamic fundamentalism are people who have been excluded from the benefits previously given by the state, or who see the state as corrupt or negligent, ignoring its economic and social obligations. The Islamic movement, on the other hand, challenges the very existence of the current state. Political
would like to begin by referring to two major trends in the Middle East which are described by Leonard Binder in his recent book on Middle East politics entitled *Islamic Liberalism*. Binder refers first to the rise of the bourgeoisie, and second to the recession of the state. At first sight, both trends would seem to facilitate democratic development. The rise of the bourgeoisie, after all, means a reduction in the autonomy of the state, and the unchecked power of the state bureaucracy. The bureaucratic power of the authoritarian state has been considered one of the major obstacles to democratic development in the region; therefore any such reduction in their absolute power should facilitate democratic progress. We witness the second trend of recession of the state in more than one country of the region, including Egypt and Turkey, and the tendency toward market economy and private enterprise in a number of other countries as well. Again, theoretically speaking, this should facilitate democratic progress, because as long as economic power remains concentrated in the hands of the state, the political struggle in the Middle East becomes a “winner-take-all” life and death struggle.

However, Binder himself rightly points out that neither the rise of the bourgeoisie nor the recession of the state guarantees the development of liberal politics. He recognizes more than one possible path of political development in the Middle East, stating, “At the moment, the Islamic resurgence and the rise of capitalism appear about to converge or clash. The question is whether their confluence can lead to the establishment of liberal government or whether it is more likely to lead to an anti-capitalist authoritarianism of the state, to an obstinate rejection of modernity and capitalism, or to the emergence of a repressive, authoritarian, capitalist state.” In other words, in some form, bourgeois or capitalist states can also be authoritarian and anti-democratic.
If the bourgeoisie is on the rise, what are some of the obstacles in the path of democratic development? Again, Binder rightly observes that the bourgeoisie in the Middle East is not strong enough to do the job alone. Among the possible allies are the state apparatus, which is dominated by rather authoritarian bureaucrats, who are not terribly likely candidates for cooperation; and the rising new political force of Islam. Neither is particularly auspicious for democratic development.

One of Binder's assumptions is that secular liberalism in the Middle East is declining and is unlikely to serve as an ideological basis for political liberalism in the Middle East. He states that the secularist position has lost political support, and is rather pessimistic about its future. He therefore puts his hopes on the development of a kind of Islamic liberalism, a rather uneasy synthesis of Islamic fundamentalism on the one hand and political liberalism on the other.

I believe that is a rather difficult synthesis from an ideological or intellectual point of view, and in practical terms the likelihood of it happening is rather small. I was very much impressed by the presentation of our Sudanese colleague and my own belief is that the fundamentalist position of Islam, if taken seriously, is quite incompatible with liberal democratic values. If this is so, according to Binder's framework, the scenarios for democratic progress are not terribly optimistic. He himself draws pretty much the same conclusion, and although he has some hopes of a kind of Islamic liberalism, he doesn't see it as likely under the present circumstances.

In my view, the two main obstacles in the path of democratic development in the Arab world are the questions of the role of fundamentalist Islam and the problem of national identity. I've already said a few words about the rise of fundamentalism. It's interesting that in many states the fundamentalist groups appear as one of the two major contending forces. This was very dramatically so in Algeria, it may very well be so in Tunisia if the movement is recognized as a political party, and in Jordan they did pretty well in the parliamentary elections. I assume that in a number of countries the same experience can be repeated if more or less free elections are allowed.

With regard to the question of national identity, if we try to imagine a model of the genesis of democracy, I think the line of causation runs from the national unit or identity to political legitimacy of the state and from there to the possibility of democratic development. There are, of course, many others who have emphasized the importance of national unity or a sense of identity as a pre-condition for democratic development. For example, Rostow says in his article on transitions to democracy, "Democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities. In order that rulers and policies may freely change, the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry must be continuous." He also quotes a remark by Sir W. Ivor Jennings, who says, "The people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are."
In the case of the Arab World there are two major challenges to the legitimacy of the local or national state. One is the force of Pan-Arabist nationalism, the other is the classic ethnic mosaic of most of the Middle Eastern countries -- the loyalties below the state level, be they to a sectarian community, tribe, or ethnic or linguistic group. I think it is fair to say that in many parts of the Arab World the legitimacy of the existing local state has not been established as strongly as in many other parts of the world because of these two challenges.

I'd like to say a few words about Turkey by way of comparison. First, with regard to the role of Islam as an obstacle to democratic development, I would note that contrary to Binder's observation about the loss of acceptance of secular liberalism in the Arab World, I believe secular liberalism is still the dominant political discourse in Turkey. The Kemalist secular nationalism has never been rejected. Under the pressures of the last 40 years of democratic government, it has been modified to some extent, but it retains all of its essential features. Secularism continues to be the basic organizational principle of the Turkish Republic. I don't mean to say there are no fundamentalist religious groups in Turkey, but they are a distinct minority.

The second issue of national identity is perhaps more important. Turkish nationalism, or the legitimacy of the national state, is not under the threat of either a Pan-Turkish nationalism or competing loyalties of sub-state groups. Of course there are many primordial groups in Turkey, but they are more or less united in a sense of belonging to the national state.

These two factors explain, in my mind, the relative success of the democratic experiment in Turkey as opposed to its failure in most of the Arab World. I would not say that Turkey is a paradise of democracy, but I think it's fair to say that by Middle Eastern standards, Turkey's democratic experience should be considered of relatively high quality and reasonable stability. We have, after all, had ten free elections since 1950, the legitimacy of which has not been contested.

What can we expect for the prospects of democracy in the Middle East? Certainly the Middle East will be influenced by the democratic revolutions in other parts of the world. My optimism, however, is very limited. I don't expect most Middle Eastern countries will become democratic overnight, especially in light of the two restraining conditions that I mentioned earlier. Still, more modest achievements seem to be possible in the short run. I would say it might be possible in the Middle East to see the development of a gray area between full democracy and full dictatorship, described in Latin American research as "democradura" and "dictablanda", or limited democracies and softer dictatorships.

The two Arab countries which I believe are the most likely candidates to achieve full democracy are Egypt and Kuwait, mainly because they both have an identity which will lead to a firmer legitimacy of the territorial state, which will in turn facilitate the growth of democratic strategies.

Ali Hillal Dessouki is professor and director of the Centre for Political Studies and Research at Cairo University in Egypt. He is president of the Arab Association of Political Science and a member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has written extensively on politics and foreign policy in the Arab world.

War is the culmination of human drama. The Middle East today is living in the shadow of a great war, a war whose impact will be felt for years to come. The war galvanized the peoples and states of the region, changed the balance of power there, and drew attention to the potential vulnerability of many Middle Eastern re-
regimes. It posed the threat of instability in a number of states, and fostered a region-wide atmosphere of emotionalism, sensationalism, and politicization. The shooting may have ended within weeks, but the war's political, social, and psychological effects are likely to linger for a long time to come.

It seems to me that the war has left mixed signals for democracy. There are two sets of lessons to be drawn. One, which I and others like me maintain, is that the war and the crisis that preceded it demonstrate the importance of democracy. Had there been democracy in many Arab countries, had democracy influenced the conduct of relations among Arab states, the crisis might have been dealt with at its roots — indeed, it might not even have occurred. The Gulf crisis, in other words, was the function of a lack of political participation, of legitimate regimes, of accountable governments.

I am afraid, however, that some of the region's rulers are drawing different conclusions. Worried by the chaos and confusion of the war's aftermath, these people think that what we will need in the coming months and years is discipline. Their emphasis on law and order is closely tied to concern for the security of their regimes.

The last decade or so preceding the war saw a steady, though slow process of democratization in the region. While it would probably be an exaggeration to speak of "winds of change," the handwriting (to shift the metaphor) was definitely on the wall. There were more calls for liberal freedoms, more moves toward multipartism, more appeals for constitutionalism and governmental accountability, and more growth among the institutions of civil society. My own country, Egypt, can serve as an example of how this process has unfolded over the last 20 years, long predating the democratic ferment of the 1980s in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Egypt achieved its independence in 1923; from then until the military takeover of 1952, it had a multiparty system. For 25 years after that, it had a one-party regime. Then in 1977, it returned to a multiparty system.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the shift back toward multipartism began as early as 1967, in the wake of Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day War. People realized that that defeat, as well as a number of other problems in our national life, had something to do with our country's lack of broad political participation and interest-group representation. In February and October 1968, students and workers took to the streets to call for democracy. The early 1970s were punctuated by massive nationwide demonstrations for the same purpose. These in turn led to a national debate lasting from 1974 to 1976. In 1977 came the legal restoration of multiparty politics.

Since that time there have been ups and downs, of course, but freedom of speech and the press has endured. There are nine active political parties, although one -- the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) -- remains dominant over a fragmented opposition. The judiciary has proven independent enough to nullify several of the other branches' decisions, most recently in 1990 when a court invalidated the existing election law and thereby forced the government to dissolve the National Assembly and call new elections.

Among the lessons to be drawn from Egypt's experience, I think, is that ruling elites will eventually respond to the forces of democracy. The Egyptian elite, in a sense, democratized from within. By encouraging democratic reforms under Sadat and Mubarak, the NDP regime became a partner in the democratization process, not its victim. The regime both influenced the process and was in turn influenced by it. Thus the Egyptian experience involved a democratic movement to which the regime adapted and adjusted itself.

The second lesson relates to the fragmented nature of the opposition. Egypt has political parties, but no really coherent party system. We have parties that make up what
one might call a professional opposition: they habitually oppose the government on every single issue. (Indeed, there have even been cases where the government has adopts a position advocated by the opposition, only to find the opposition suddenly switching to the other point of view.) So while we do have a number of parties, we still lack the broader consensus, the broader system, to accommodate all political parties. Weak as our parties are, moreover, they still disdain the art of compromise and show little knack for coalition politics. This betrays a certain deficit of what one might call democratic temperament, meaning that penchant for compromise and coalition building which is needed to bring people together and form a majority.

A third lesson drawn from the Egyptian case (but applicable, I think, to the whole Arab world) concerns the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism or extremism. Egypt, like many other Arab countries, has a sizable group of citizens (many of them young people) who argue that our laws should be drawn directly from the Holy Book and who seek to implement the word of God. Some in this group use violence, while others work within the law. Egypt has managed -- and I think that we have achieved a great deal here -- to integrate the mainstream of this movement into the political process. This offers an example of how to bring people who choose to remain outside the constitution and the due process of law back into the forum of peaceful political competition and debate. In bringing such people into the political process, one is inculcating liberal values, teaching them the art of working within the system rather than driving them further into the wilderness. If we want to establish a stable democratic regime, all major political forces must find a place within the system, whether we like them or not.

The fourth major lesson concerns the contradictory implications of political reform and economic reform. Here is a puzzle that we must face frankly and courageously: Most developing countries are badly in need of economic reforms to pare back the public sector and reduce state intervention, but the political dangers are considerable. At least in their initial stages, such reforms often hurt the poor. In all likelihood there will be soaring inflation, declining living standards, and a sizeable element of political instability. The timing and political management of economic reform has been a major issue in Egyptian politics. Democratic political reform is desirable, but its concrete implementation cannot be considered without taking into account the possible harmful and destabilizing effects of privatization and of the market economy, especially on the poor.

Although I do not know to what extent this is true in other countries, it is an intriguing feature of Egyptian politics that in a country where half the population is under 25 years of age all major party leaders are now over 60 years old. The younger generations are not yet fully integrated into the political process, and the older generations -- both in the government and in the opposition -- are holding fast to the helm of leadership.

Moving beyond the lessons to be learned from Egypt in particular, let me now turn to...
some major obstacles that confront democracy throughout the Arab world. The first is cultural. Here I would say that we share something in common with what the Latin American panelists who spoke earlier described. Islamic Arab culture is hierarchical, informal, and noninstitutional— all qualities that must somehow be moderated if Arab democracy is to succeed. A second obstacle is the constant geopolitical tension that afflicts the region. Middle Eastern governments can always argue that democracy is not feasible as long as terrorism and war remain ever-present threats. Certainly it is true that regional tranquility, if and when it is achieved, will greatly assist the cause of democracy in the Middle East. A third difficulty is one that I have already touched on—namely, a shortage of the sorts of organizational skills needed to sustain a democratic society. Let me conclude by saying that democracy requires not merely a set of political institutions, but an appropriate social structure and culture as well. Democratization is a constant and complex labor, not a simple job that can be done, once and for all, overnight. We must be patient, and we must arm ourselves with perseverance.

Is all this effort worthwhile? The answer is yes, because democracy is the only system that recognizes no “end of history.” Unlike other ideologies, the liberal system envisions no end of history, for it holds that human dreams can never be quenched, that creativity and innovation can develop continuously over time. Democracy is the only system which can assure us that our dreams of a good life on earth will not die, that they will neither be totally disappointed nor totally fulfilled.

Saif Abbas Abdulla is chairman of Kuwait Outreach. From 1980 to 1987 he served as cultural counselor at the Embassy of Kuwait in Washington, DC. In 1990 he was named chairman of the Department of Political Science at Kuwait University, a position he was unable to assume because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

It is an irony that in the Middle East people seek to blame all their social and economic problems on their governments. Yet it is singularly true that people have the governments they deserve. One realistic approach to the problems of politics in third world countries is to look into society for the weaknesses that can be manipulated by governments and other social forces.

I would first like to speak about Kuwait's uniqueness and its background with regard to democracy, and will then return to the larger issue of the minimum requirements for a movement toward true democracy in the Arab world.

Kuwait has been a constitutional democracy since 1962. The constitution, which is a social contract between past, present and future generations, was not fully adhered to and Kuwait has not been able to benefit fully from a free and democratic society. Although political stability and goodwill contributed to several visible successes, more could have been achieved.

The movement “Tajama' Al-Ahrar Al-Demokratiyeen” or Liberal Democrats Forum, was established to articulate the aspirations and grievances of the Kuwaiti masses. Its members pondered on the many misjudgments that led to the very same social and economic problems that ultimately rendered society vulnerable to the catastrophe of the Iraqi invasion. They came to the conclusion that if society had been freer, more open and more pluralistic it would have been more prepared for the invasion and better able to deal with it.
The Liberal Democrats Forum noticed various discrepancies in Kuwaiti society. These included the lack of a sound educational system, which is a prerequisite for the creation of good citizens, capable manpower and a technically sound labor force. In addition, Kuwait was never able to properly define its economic system, which is the main reason that the country fell into economic stagnation and was further plunged into the disaster of the stock market collapse of the 1980s (also called the “Souk Al Manaha”). Many more hasty and irrational decisions were made, which culminated twice in the dissolution of the National Assembly, and in the suspension of certain laws and of parts of the constitution.

Although Kuwait pursued a non-aligned foreign policy, kept a good posture vis-a-vis the Arab countries and was instrumental in solving many intra-Arab conflicts, it was not able to formulate an independent foreign policy and could not do enough to circumvent the Iraqi invasion. Nor did society and government establish an adequate defense system.

Despite the fact that Kuwait was ahead of many countries in establishing a free and active press since the adoption of the constitution in 1962, it still failed to create a responsible and constructive media, which is an essential part of society. As in other countries in the third world, radio and television were monopolized by the government and the so-called free press was not always sensitive to the problems of the Gulf and its people. This, in part, contributed to the creation in the area of the gargantuan monster, Saddam Hussein.

Kuwait’s social welfare agendas were neither well crafted nor fairly implemented; so much so that housing policies and conditions still lack effectiveness. Corruption and misuse have afflicted the health services, which have otherwise been good. The labor force is predominantly non-Kuwaiti while Kuwaitis continue to shun blue-collar jobs.

Roads and communications, although first rate, have nevertheless contributed to an unimaginable number of highway crises and deaths, especially among the youth. Equal opportunity in the area of economic and social life, which could have laid the foundation for a real democratic system, was not implemented. Women and youth are kept out of important decision making processes that vitally affect their lives and work. Women are not allowed to vote in Kuwait even though this is not a provision of the constitution. Equal wages for equal services has not always been the norm. Quite often women and other nationalities do not receive equal pay and have not been treated fairly.

In short, the constitution of Kuwait has not been fully adhered to and this has led to the fact that power, position and influence have been controlled by a few in society. Worse than the above, society was beginning to base its judgment of people not on merit but on sectarianism, tribalism and nepotism.

What is happening now in Kuwait is that society is looking to the future and working to develop its democratic culture. Kuwaitis want a society with a sense of tolerance of different political opinions, respect for human rights, open debate, free elections and independent media. This is a society which believes in institutional democracy rather than a democracy which is based on a
word of God or a mission for an Arab nation to achieve glory. In short, Kuwaitis want to salvage their society through the application of and adherence to their constitution and by the institutionalization of true democracy, equal opportunity, mass participation and responsibility.

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the non-cooperation of the Kuwaitis with their occupiers has illustrated that, overall, the Kuwaitis were satisfied with their political system and rallied around their government. This provides additional evidence that the political culture of the Kuwaitis has given them a sense of stability, justice, advancement and growth.

Through the years Kuwait has been good to its people and its neighbors. It has sewn the seeds of a good society and polity. It is our hope that more democracy and stability are the keys to prosperity and the pursuit of happiness.

What are the implications of the Kuwaiti situation for the progress of democracy in the Gulf region as a whole? Although the six Gulf states have much in common, there are a variety of political and historical circumstances which differentiate us and must be taken into consideration. Therefore, if we in the Gulf states are to use the movement for democracy in a positive fashion, I believe the ideal way would be through the creation of an Arab Federation designed to promote security in the region. With security assured, we can focus our efforts on developing our culture and achieving the democratic society which I described earlier.
Since the release of Nelson Mandela last year, South Africa has begun to move more rapidly toward democratic change. Panel chairman James Joseph noted that this historic process of transition, while immensely complex and difficult, is hopefully irreversible and will result in a democratic post-apartheid South Africa.

Sathasivan (Satbs) Cooper is the national director of the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy in South Africa, which was founded in 1990 by Oscar Dibomo to focus on the promotion of multi-party democracy, political tolerance and national reconciliation in South Africa. Cooper’s more than 20 years of involvement with the anti-apartheid movement includes serving as a member of the committee which established the Black People’s Convention and as an officer of the Azanian People’s Organization.

South Africa’s tragic history is marked by a lack of democratic institutions, process and culture. True multipartism and political tolerance have not been allowed to develop within the structures of South African society, nor to repose in the hearts and minds of its citizens. Therefore there are no models or precedents for democratic success in South Africa. There is very little in our 81 year history that we can emulate and rely on. The massive imbalance in political, social and economic access confronting the majority of citizens has generated a climate of escalating insecurity, strife and dislocation.

In spite of all this, the success of the opposition to apartheid and the reform measures adopted by the present government have given rise to enormous challenges and opportunity in South Africa. The country stands at the threshold of major transformation. However, the threats to peace, stability and security for all in South Africa have never been greater. Precisely at the time that the political, social and economic debates have been enlarged and provide greater promise than ever before, the levels of poverty, educational disadvantage, social degradation and political constriction have conjoined to create a crisis of expectation and unprecedented community violence. A nascent attempt at nation building is developing, but the patience and goodwill of the overwhelming majority of citizens are being taken for granted and often abused by key political and other factors.

The reality and rhetoric of the past influence in many ways present thinking and action, posing serious inhibitors for the future of South Africa. There is a need to move from the politics of oppression to the politics of multipartism; away from the populism of the past toward issue-based politics; and away from rhetoric to reality and delivery. The Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, which I represent, is founded on the strong belief that there is a clear need for an independent institution that will promote, advocate and monitor democratic values and processes in South Africa.

Serious concern has been widely expressed that the current process of transformation of the South African political system is not necessarily sufficient to ensure the establishment of a multiparty democratic system. There is an increasing realization that the best constitution in the world will not work unless it operates in a political culture of mutual tolerance and respect for diversity.

In the next few years, the following political scenario is likely to unfold: The fundamentals of a new constitution will be hammered out, even though the positions of the various parties and movements now seem implacable and rigid. Some form of local government elections will take place, leading eventually to national elections based on a one-person, one-vote proportional rep-
Murphy Morobe helped found the Soweto Youth Congress and was active in the United Democratic Front from its inception. He served three years on Robben Island, and has been detained on several occasions. He escaped from detention in 1988, took refuge in the United States consulate for six weeks, and then walked out after receiving assurances that he would not be re-detained.

The African experience is laden with examples of societies where those who have either initiated, facilitated, or imposed change have themselves eventually fallen victim to the same vices against which their struggles were originally fought. In forcing the Nationalist Party in South Africa to wake up and come around to accepting the inevitability of change, I believe that we in the opposition movement have been creating new conditions which, depending upon their scope and intensity, will also invariably impact upon us in a number of different ways. As the previous speaker indicated, all the main players in South Africa have to contend not only with changes in our political and economic environment, but also with how that environment will and must impact upon us. This holds true whether one looks at the situation in South Africa from a political, ideological or organizational point of view.

Every aspect of South African society is today subjected to quite vigorous scrutiny. We have to contend with the fact that nothing is given once and for all. The validity of every notion, program or action must be tested against what are clearly very complex factors and domestic and international relationships which themselves often call for significant unraveling. As our situation evolves and indicates the possibility for improvement, the international political and economic situation is itself undergoing a tremendous state of flux. That means that the processes in South Africa have to relate in

representation for a lower and upper house. Those political groupings on the left that have thus far been excluded and have decided to remain aloof from the negotiation process will participate. New political alignments will be created with choices for national leadership being subjected to democratic will and accountability. Discriminatory apartheid legislation will be finally consigned to the rubbish heap of history and foreign investment will return, concentrating on the developmental needs of the country.

South Africa will emerge from its self-imposed exile from the community of nations of the world. During this period, it is strongly hoped that the economic base will spread to include the greater majority who have thus far been excluded. The only safeguard for true stability, peace and security in South Africa is to assure total political, economic and social access for all.

South Africa today stands at the brink of immense possibility or continuing devastation. I believe that despite the long, painful attempt to sow the seeds of true democracy, conception has taken place. The labor will be fraught with difficulties, but the new birth will be a model for all the world to celebrate.
one way or the other to those international developments. I would say that in many ways, that has already begun to happen, as can be seen in the debates and the discussions that are taking place on the shape of the future economy in South Africa.

Quite often in a process such as ours, it is possible to define exactly what you want and how you want to go about getting it, but it is more difficult to determine whether any guarantees can be made for success. As I mentioned earlier, we are dealing here with processes that are changing, and we must remain open to new experiences and situations.

There are a number of things that need to be done, especially in terms of a transition in the South African political situation that would benefit all South Africans. One of the many things that must be addressed is political tolerance and the building of a democratic tradition on the grassroots level in the country. Saths Cooper also alluded to this in his remarks. I belonged to the United Democratic Front, which, when it was formed in 1983, saw as one of its main tasks the building of a very strong democratic tradition on the grassroots level. This tradition of democratic experience will help to guarantee that the outcome of the political process is not something imposed upon the general population, but rather the result of a genuine form of participation by peoples of different races and different political backgrounds.

The levels of violence that we see in South Africa today pose a very definite challenge for those of us who have stood in public forums and claimed that we are fighting for democracy. The challenge we face is how we are going to ensure that the process of negotiation to which the ANC has committed itself, and for which so many other forces in the country are yearning, is actually given the necessary chance to begin to work toward the resolution of this conflict.

Sometimes people speak about reconciliation and the fact that the black community is not united in its efforts. That observation suggests that we should have no differences at all. I think that the main objective of organizations like the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy and IDASA is to ensure that the diversity which we have in our community is harnessed in such a way that those positive forces that must inevitably flow from interaction are properly utilized, without allowing the divisive elements to go on destroying our society. It is not going to be easy because we are dealing with a society where over 87% of the population has effectively been shut out of any democratic expression for as long as white rule has obtained in South Africa. In the end, our struggle is not about positions for individuals, but rather it is a struggle for the improvement of all our people.

What we are dealing with in South Africa is a situation where democracy is being introduced and actually fought for by individuals who are fighting for their very survival, and are having to act democratically in so doing. This is not easy, considering the fact that the other side of the coin consists of a regime which over the years has built into its own structure mechanisms for its survival which have not foreseen the fact that they would be negotiating with the ANC or that they would
have to contend with the need for the transformation of our society into something new and totally different from white domination.

**Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert** is director of planning and policy for the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) which he formed in 1986 together with Dr. Alex Boraine. A visiting professor at the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Business of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, he has written extensively on South Africa’s options for a post-apartheid society.

I was struck by Dr. Brzezinski’s statement yesterday that there is no model or formula that can be followed for the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe, and would like to begin my remarks by noting that the same applies in the South African case.

There are several key features in our process of democratic transition. First, I don’t think we can view transition in South Africa as being of the colonial variety, where the dominant minority regime throws a “flag down/flag up” ceremony and disappears from the political arena. In our case, the incumbent regime precipitates transition and is present throughout the process. Obviously I am not suggesting that its power or sovereignty will remain untouched, but it is going to be present throughout the process and that lends a certain dynamic to the kinds of problems that we are going to have to face.

I believe there are two main sets of problems that have to be negotiated between the regime and its opponents. Broadly speaking, one set has to do with problems of normalization -- the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles, getting rid of apartheid laws -- in a sense I suppose one could say the leveling of the playing field. The other set of problems has to do with the process of democratizing and determining how to include previously excluded groups and interests in political and other decision making processes. It would be nice to think that these two processes could follow chronologically in a neat package, but this obviously is not going to happen. To the extent that we do make progress in the first area of normalization of political life, demands in the second for democratization are going to intensify and complicate the process.

If we look at the current relationship between the incumbent regime and its opponents, there seem to be three transitional mechanisms being debated: the idea of a constituent assembly election that would address the problem of the legitimacy of a new constitution; the idea of an interim government and setting up mechanisms for sharing the responsibility for managing the transition; and the idea of a multi-party conference which would address the problem of setting the agenda for transition. The manner in which these transitional mechanisms are being debated clearly demonstrates that at this stage, there is no commonly shared strategy for transition.

When one listens to the regime on the one side and some of its major opponents on the other, it is quite clear that they do not at this stage share the same view as to the viability and role of these transitional mechanisms. The PAC and others reject the idea of an interim government or the idea of a multi-party conference and would demand the immediate creation of a constituent assembly. To a very large extent, this demand flows from the success of similar elections in Namibia. I think there is a fundamental confusion here in the sense that we in South Africa must address at least three problems that were not present in the Namibian case. First, we face the issue of external monitoring, of determining who will see to it that
the process is being conducted in a fair and free manner which in the Namibian case was done by UNTAG. Second, there is the issue of maintaining stability in a non-partisan manner. And thirdly, we have an incumbent regime that has to divest itself of authority. All three of these problems are inherent in the transition in South Africa and must be resolved. They cannot be resolved by constituent assembly for the simple reason that in order to be successful, a constituent assembly presupposes non-partisan maintenance of stability, monitoring of the process and a redefinition of the status of the incumbent regime. Therefore these problems have to be resolved somewhere else. In this regard I think the ANC broke a potential deadlock by suggesting a multi-party conference to address these three major issues.

In the case of South Africa, it seems highly unlikely that there will be some kind of external intervention (such as the United Nations in Namibia) to perform those tasks. This adds an additional problem to our transition, because in a sense we have to generate from within our own political resources and mechanisms to deal with these problems.

I believe that there are several unresolved issues that could have a direct bearing on the manner in which we will move through this transition process. I wish to mention just three. The first is the problem of an unresolved security situation, with criminal violence, transitional violence, and strong suspicions of state-generated violence taking place. The agents responsible for maintaining security are seen as part of the problem rather than as a potential source of maintaining stability. This is obviously something that will have to be resolved soon, in fact even before one can think seriously of a multi-party conference. This idea that the regime must take seriously the problem of violence was behind the ultimatum issued by the national executive committee of the ANC last week.

A second imponderable is the degree of organizational incoherence of the parties engaged in the process of negotiation with the regime, specifically the ANC, PAC and others. As a result of the fact that new legal space is being created which unbans the ANC and opens the way for other organizations to join the process, a liberation movement committed to a strategy of revolutionary transition must, in a very brief space of time, adjust itself to becoming a political organization that can effectively engage in the bargaining process. At this stage, none of the major opposition groups have had the time or the opportunity to hold domestic national congresses and become organizationally more coherent. Consequently, I think one is going to see a certain degree of strategic ambiguity within the different organizations until this problem has been solved.

A third imponderable is the state of the economy itself. If the stagnant state of the economy and the economic decline continue, it obviously will aggravate many of the problems of normalization and democratization that confront all the negotiating parties. In fact, to the extent that some kind of coalition center will eventually share responsibility for managing the transition, that center is going to be faced with severe problems of delivering the goods. It can only do so if
there is a certain degree of economic recovery.

Considering where we started and what we are trying to do, it would be easy to be cynical or pessimistic. Let me instead end on a hopeful note. For the first time, we in South Africa are joining the community of nations struggling to become democracies. This is a new and energizing experience. We have squandered precious time and resources defending or attacking a despicable and unacceptable system of government. I don’t believe we can ever go back. I would concur instead with Professor Konakowski’s judgment yesterday regarding the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe -- we will not collapse, nor will we reach perfection within the next few years, but we will have a bumpy ride and we will survive.

Khehla Shubane, who was imprisoned for five years on Robben Island because of his anti-apartheid activities, is a research officer at the Center for Policy Studies of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.

In the many debates that are taking place in South Africa today, quite a few people are beginning to focus on civil society as an institution that can have a considerable impact on the quality of the democracy we are going to have in the post-apartheid era. Broadly speaking, these people argue that democracy’s future will depend in large measure on whether or not we are able to build up a true civil society, meaning that array of private, nongovernmental groups and organizations in and through which ordinary South Africans can make sense of their everyday lives.

Among those who are focusing on the question of civil society, there are basically two opposing viewpoints. According to one, South Africa is already endowed with a fairly robust civil society; the only thing that those concerned with the future of democracy need do, the argument goes, is to ensure that all of those private formations are left intact and are not absorbed into the state. The opposing view holds that there is no civil society in South Africa. Its adherents argue that apartheid is essentially a form of colonialism, and colonialism militates against the emergence of a civil society.

I share the latter view. I think that part of the reason why we in Africa do not yet have viable civil societies is that our countries are still emerging or have just recently emerged from colonial domination. Such societies tend to be pervaded by what I call the politics of liberation. Liberation movements arise to represent the interests of all the dominated and oppressed people, and therefore tend to take an undifferentiated view of all the various interests that exist within the oppressed community. Not surprisingly, societies dominated by liberation movements find it extremely difficult to form a vigorous civil society.

Yet if South Africa currently lacks a robust civil society (at least in the political sense), that does not mean that one cannot be built in the post-apartheid future. But there is nothing inevitable about the process, which will depend for its success on several conditions being met. One is the complete acceptance of competitive politics at the national level. A second is the acceptance of the legitimacy of interest-group representation. Among black South Africans at least, this is proving difficult to accept, for interest groups still tend to be represented by and through liberation movements. If this continues into the post-apartheid era, we may find ourselves in trouble. A third condition requiring acceptance is the notion that policy debate should not be confined to existing political parties or movements, but should be open to a much wider group of interlocutors. Nongovernmental groups especially must be brought into those debates.
I think that South Africa has a chance of moving along the broad path that I have outlined. Multipartyism, for example, appears to be in the cards: we now have a number of fairly strong parties or groups that are unlikely to want to meld into a single political party. I do not envision the National Party ever wanting to join hands with, say, the ANC in order to govern the country as one organization. Then there is Inkatha, which I think wants to continue as an independent formation, and will wish to contest future democratic elections under its own banner. None of these groups is strong enough to reconstruct the country all by itself. While these organizations are not going to collapse into one, I believe that each also realizes that all the others have a role to play in the construction of a future democracy. We also have groups like the white business community, the press, the universities, and similar institutions that have long traditions of fairly independent existence. All these institutions and groups cherish their autonomy from the state and from existing political parties, and will most likely continue to do so. They too can help lay the basis for competitive politics in a democratic South Africa.

There are also many black community organizations that deserve credit for making possible the transition that is now underway in South Africa. These are the groups that since the late 1970s and early 1980s have led the assault against apartheid. Today they are continuing to entrench themselves throughout South African society as representatives of their various constituencies. This process will probably continue, if only because economic realities make it unlikely that post-apartheid South Africa will be a place in which the material desires of all are fulfilled. We are still going to have homelessness and unemployment in a post-apartheid South Africa. The persistence of scarcity means that interest groups will not lose their raison d'être under conditions of political democracy.

The labor of building democracy in South Africa will be much easier if our liberation movements recognize that since they arose in response to a fairly specific set of historical conditions -- namely, apartheid -- the dissolution of those conditions means that their historical role has come to an end. I realize that this is a provocative suggestion, but I am convinced that the future of South Africa requires not liberation movements, but democratic political parties. Our task, then, is to create conditions under which our broad-front liberation movements can break up and allow the various interest groups that have heretofore been accommodated within them to be represented by political parties. The towering prestige associated with the liberation struggle, a prestige that might otherwise serve to launch one political party into perpetual power, might thus be shared among many post-apartheid political parties in a way that could immensely enhance competitive politics.

South Africa's blacks, especially, need to start fostering a robust and autonomous civil
society. All sorts of black organizations that should be bulwarks of civil society are now really adjuncts of the liberation movements rather than truly independent formations. As far as the existing independent organizations in the white community are concerned, their ability to form the basis for a vibrant post-apartheid civil society will depend upon the extent to which their structures become racially representative. All South Africans can contribute to the task of building a new civil society, which must succeed in order for democracy to prevail.

Panelists for the session on South Africa (l. - r.): NED Chairman John Richardson, Sabs Cooper, Van Zyl Slabbert, NED Board member and panel chairman James Joseph, NED President Carl Gershman, Murphy Morobe and Khebela Skhabane.
The Soviet Union is in the throes of a profound political, economic, cultural and structural crisis which cannot be resolved without fundamental democratic changes. In introducing the discussion, panel chairman Ambassador Mark Palmer commended the efforts of the participants in the movements for democracy in the Russian and non-Russian republics alike who are working to cast off the yoke of totalitarianism, rebuild a society devastated by Stalinism and its aftermath, and create a new political order based on democratic institutions and processes and respect for individual rights.

Sergei Stankevich is deputy chairman of the Moscow City Council and a member of the Congress of People’s Deputies. A political scientist by training, he wrote his doctoral dissertation on the United States Congress and the legislative process.

The success of the so-called “velvet” revolutions which transformed Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1989 cannot be repeated in the Soviet Union. Some of the democratic forces hoped that by increasing pressure on the Soviet regime from below and by stimulating mass participation in direct protests, it would be possible to give power to a fully democratic government in our country. For me, this idea was at best romantic and impractical from the very beginning.

I am rather skeptical about the timing of our democratic revival. Totalitarianism has deep roots in our society, in the minds of older generations, in vital institutions and in economic structures. It cannot be removed by a one-time surgical operation. Democratic forces in the Soviet Union must be prepared for quite a long period of uneasy transition. Within this period we have to accept the coexistence of hardly compatible persons, ideas and institutions. The situation in the republics of the Soviet Union now is extreme. The spread and continuation of mass strikes have put the economy on the edge of real catastrophe. In the wake of the recent drastic price hikes, confidence in the government has dropped to almost zero.

These days it is not so easy to answer the question of who is in power in the Soviet Union. I would say that there is currently no power at all in the country. What we have instead are several competing centers of influence. One of the most powerful centers of influence is President Gorbachev and those around him, with control over such key state instruments as the army, KGB and police. The other centers of influence are the governments of the republics and the main political forces and movements. The result of our recent political developments is a rather complex and unstable interaction between these competing centers of influence. But there is no single power. One cannot sense a particular governing impulse that is capable of reaching those addressed and being carried into action. This vacuum of power is a tremendously dangerous situation. Whatever the central government proposes now, nothing can be accepted with trust.

Any serious attempt to alleviate the situation should include two things: minimum stabilization and a coalition government of confidence. Stabilization became the key word in our political vocabulary just recently. Most people see two options in connection with stabilization -- stabilization by force or political stabilization. Stabilization by force is theoretically possible in our country, where many communist leaders now speak of General Pinochet with great sympathy. I am absolutely sure that even if it happens, any stabilization by force cannot last more than several months, and cannot bring about the alleviation of any of our country’s economic problems. The only real option then is political stabilization, but it faces two principal obstacles. One is the absence of a political
middle ground. Instead of a center, we have
the two extremes of communist fundamentalists and radical democrats. The absence of
a dialogue in the center is, I think, the main obstacle to real political stabilization. Another
obstacle is the absence of inter-republic
reconciliation. I think that the four key
republics -- Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia and
Kazakhstan -- should, as soon as possible,
mutually recognize each other's sovereignty
and negotiate the terms on which they can
coexist in some form of union. Perhaps I
disagree somewhat with my colleague from
the Ukraine on this, but I am absolutely sure
that we still need some form of the union
between these four republics at least. The
form this union should take and the terms
and conditions on which we can cooperate
must, however, be a matter of the republics' free choice. In isolation it will be very
difficult to guarantee the irreversibility of
democratic reforms, and the restoration of
the old regime will be a much more serious
threat.

Unlike many of my radical colleagues in
Moscow and throughout the Soviet Union, I
am not calling for a final decisive attack
against the system, with death or victory
resolved. I propose another main slogan --
that is, "rooting," making deep roots. We
should develop roots for our democracy in
our economy, in all sectors of our society,
and especially in our younger generations.

Communism should go out with tears
and sweat, not with blood.

**Mikhailo Horyn** is political director and
deputy chairman of Rukh, the Popular
Movement of the Ukraine. First arrested for
his political views in 1965, he emerged in the
1970s as a leading figure in the Ukrainian
Helsinki Monitoring Group. Arrested again
in 1981, he was pardoned in 1987 having
spent six years in a special labor camp.
Horyn was elected to the Ukrainian SSR
Supreme Soviet in March 1990 as a
representative of an electoral district in the
Lev region.

Yesterday, Dr. Brzezinski commented
that the peoples of Eastern Europe,
having freed themselves from the control of
the USSR, are seeking their own approaches
to solving the complex problems of democracy building. I would add the Ukraine to the
list of those colonies of the Soviet Empire
that are taking their first steps on the road to
freedom.

Ukraine's subjugated status is not limited
to the 70-year period of communist terror.
In the seventeenth century, as a free Kozak
republic, it found itself within the confines of
the empire of the Russian czars. Within 120
years it had lost its independence and its
democratic system and was transformed into
a colony. Any attempt to establish an indepen
dent state during the revolution of 1917-
20 was crushed by Bolshevik armies sent to
Ukraine by Lenin. During its stay in the USSR
Ukraine has suffered two mass famines, the
most recent orchestrated by the Communists in 1932-33 in order to crush for good
our people's resistance to the regime, taking
the lives of approximately seven million
victims. As a result of such purposeful geno
cide, the number of Ukrainians did not
increase during the sixty-year rule of the
Bolsheviks — in 1979 it was at the 1917 level of 35 million.

Our losses, however, haven’t been limited to this. Due to deliberate anti-Ukrainian policies, large areas of the south, southeast and north Ukraine are severely Russified. In cities with populations of one million or more there was not a single Ukrainian school. Ukrainian churches — the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and Byzantine Catholic Church — were banned, their clergy shot or exiled to Siberia. Terror, the media, cultural and educational institutions all were used to erode the national consciousness of the people. Our statesmen and political leaders were branded as traitors. The study of Ukrainian history was banned, books by Ukrainian historians were removed from public libraries and either destroyed or locked away in special holdings, inaccessible to readers. Perhaps our greatest setback was the confiscation of private property, the establishment of modern slavery, especially in the rural areas. This caused people to lose individual initiative and stop searching for new work methods and production processes. The despotic regime was forming a new type of Soviet man — “homo-sovieticus” — man without national and universally human feelings, without initiative or the desire to search. This new man did not entirely squeeze out our ethnic type, but to this day causes us great difficulties.

The problems that we face during this time of the Gorbachev reforms have been caused to a great extent by our difficult past. Unlike other East European peoples and the Baltic and the Caucasus republics, we are faced with the task of solving problems which were not brought about by life. These tasks include the national rebirth of our people, the introduction of the Ukrainian language into all areas of life and the rebirth of the Ukrainian churches. We are forced to solve this set of complex problems at the same time that we are trying to transform the economy and fighting for the formation of an independent Ukrainian state. Therefore the process of democratization and the struggle against the efforts of the Communist party to preserve the Soviet empire are somewhat slow. The political struggle is intertwined with the widespread work of political education. Our specific problems are also connected with the necessity of trying to bring about all these transformations simultaneously on a territory of 6035 square kilometers and among a people of 52 million.

Our democratic forces today number almost 20 parties, the largest of which is the Ukrainian Republican Party, with approximately 9000 members. The largest public and political organization is Rukh, a Ukrainian-style popular front which has united in its ranks one-half million members and now exercises considerable influence on the political climate in Ukraine. Just before the March 1990 elections the democratic forces united and formed the Democratic Bloc, which won 120 seats in the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (some 26% of the total) and became the opposition to the party majority in the Parliament. The opposition, which took the name the People’s Rada, has had some success. Due to its initiative, the parliament passed the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine, the law on the economic...
independence of Ukraine, the law on a Ukrainian national bank and the resolution that youth should do their military service on the territory of Ukraine. All these documents form the legal foundations for the future independence of Ukraine. But the Communist Party’s majority in the Supreme Rada interferes with the implementation of these laws and resolutions. The opposition enjoys widespread support among workers and students, and rallies, demonstrations, and this year’s miners’ strikes have all pressed the demands that these laws be put into effect.

The Democratic Bloc has come to power in three regions of western Ukraine, which have become a bastion from which the idea of nationhood is propagated all over Ukraine. Consequently, in these areas of Ukraine the Communist party is now the opposition, finding itself, for the first time, out of power. The city councils of some cities along the Dnieper River are also in the hands of the democratic bloc. While this is a great achievement, it also causes significant difficulties in as much as it demands the formulation of a specifically regional rather than a general approach vis-a-vis the ruling Communist party.

The Ukrainian democratic community has significant problems because of inter-denominational misunderstanding, which are being inflamed by Communist party authorities. Pressed by the national liberation movement, the Communist party is resorting to a policy of exacerbating relations between nationalities. However, it wasn’t able to create inter-fronts in Ukraine only because in their political platforms, Rutkh and leading parties made clear that in a future Ukrainian state, all citizens, irrespective of national affiliation, would enjoy equal rights under the law. Still, the party succeeded in creating a Crimean Autonomous Republic and conducts propaganda for the creation of a “New Russian” Autonomous Republic in southern Ukraine.

Ukraine also faces the issue of the new Union treaty. The opposition is against the creation of a new USSR and believes that any new version of the USSR carries with it the risk of reverting to principles of empire. Even Solzhenitsyn’s proposal about the creation of a Slav federation is nothing but a version of an empire on a smaller scale. Ukraine has a key role to play in the collapse of the empire. The empire can exist without the Baltic states, but not without Ukraine, because Ukraine is a major producer of industrial goods and agricultural commodities. Russia, which has also suffered from communist experiments, also has a key role to play in this process. If Russian patriots truly pursue the idea of creating a Russian state, our own road to freedom will be easier and shorter.

Unfortunately, the West, especially the US government, has not freed itself from the spell of Gorbachev and still believes that he wants to democratize the USSR. But the USSR and democracy are a contradiction in terms. A human being cannot be free while his people are enslaved.

Trivimi Velliste is vice chairman of the Congress of Estonia and president of the Estonian Heritage Society, a pro-independence organization which has become one of the most prominent political forces in Estonia. A social and political historian by profession, he is highly regarded as an expert on current movements in the Baltics.

I would first like to draw your attention to the fact that those of us speaking on this panel are here at all. A few years ago this would have been entirely inconceivable. If by any miraculous chance any one of us would have been able to attend, we would surely have been punished immediately
upon our return home by the local branch of the KGB.

Yesterday our Chinese friend Li Lu compared communism to AIDS, but I believe that it's much worse than that. AIDS brings about physical death — communism has brought and is still bringing about moral death. We Estonians and the rest of the Baltics never caught that disease voluntarily — it was brought forcibly by way of rape. The independence of Estonia was declared in 1918 and secured by the peace treaty of Tartu in 1920 between Soviet Russia and the newly-created republic of Estonia. The Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 meant that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were squeezed between the two icebergs of the communist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Only now are we slowly starting to recover from that shock. We are like people who have suffered from a tragic car accident and have to learn to walk again. This is our comeback to civilization.

Many remarkable things have been happening in the Baltic States during the past four or five years. Democracy is being restored. The movement to save Estonian national heritage started as early as 1986, when, in a major challenge to Soviet authorities, the Estonian Heritage Society was the first nationwide grassroots pro-independence organization to publicly display the Estonian blue, black and white banner. The Estonian example caught fire in Lithuania and Latvia and very soon the flags of independence were flying in those countries too. In another symbolic act, the Estonian Heritage Society restored the monument to the late Estonian President Konstantin Petz, which was destroyed by the Soviets in 1940 immediately after the occupation. The monument was originally inaugurated in 1939 and was restored and re-inaugurated exactly 30 years later, with about 30,000 people attending the ceremony.

Also in 1989, the grassroots citizens movement was initiated by a declaration of three newly-created democratic organizations in Estonia — the Estonian Heritage Society, the Estonian Christian Union, and the Estonian National Independence Party. Citizens committees in each county were a clear challenge to the Soviet authorities, who probably underestimated the danger and did not take any decisive physical action. Just a few weeks later, an independent Congress of Estonia was elected in a fairly democratic process. There were many candidates and the balloting was secret, but the problem was that the Soviet citizens and the Soviet occupation army also participated in the election. Nevertheless this so-called parliament is referred to by many Western reporters as the democratically elected Estonian parliament. It is in fact only a relatively democratically elected parliament.

We have therefore a relatively schizophrenic situation in Estonia — there are two sitting parliaments and people don’t know to whom they should listen. The present-day government in Estonia has been formed by the Supreme Soviet. The moral and legal authority, however, comes from the independent Congress of Estonia, which was elected on the basis of the legal continuity of the continuity of the independence of Estonia, which has never ceased. The only
way out of this schizophrenic situation is agreement between all the political forces to elect a new legislature which would be the sole authority in Estonia. This could be achieved only by the consensus of political parties in Estonia, of which there are about a dozen.

Recently a weekly roundtable conference of Estonian political parties has been making progress as levels of political civilization rise. A major decision has been made to hold elections to the reconstituted assembly of Estonia, possibly next November. If we are able to accomplish that we will certainly be able to lay a solid foundation for new Estonian statehood, for re-establishment of legitimate government in Estonia.

So far we are in a transitional period -- we have embarked from one bank but have not yet reached the other. We are floating between earth and heaven. The real difficulties will start after we have re-established our independence. There will be economic difficulties and we will probably need some sort of a Marshall Plan such as provided for post-war Europe, which would certainly help to formulate the backbone of both our domestic policies and our national security policy. Hopefully we will be able to do all that in peace.

Hopefully we will be able to negotiate our independence with our eastern neighbor this year. If we are able to do that, the Soviet Union will have four friendly neighbors on her western border -- Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. If that is so, certainly we will turn Lake Peipus on the border of Estonia and Russia into a lake of peace and friendship. I hope that the many Estonian exiles who long to return to their homeland will be able to do so by next Christmas without having to apply for an entrance visa from the Soviet embassy. I would also invite you to celebrate the New Year in Tallin with us without having to apply for a Soviet visa.

Oleg Rumyansev is secretary of the Constitutional Commission which in 1990 produced a draft of a new constitution for the Russian Republic. Dubbed the "James Madison of Russia," he is a deputy to the Russian Republic's parliament and a key figure in the coalition of democratic forces called Democratic Russia.

I am a representative of this so-called Russia, which has been blamed many times yesterday and today as the main reason for all of the troubles in our country. I would like to hear more criticism of the system itself and less of the Russians and the multi-national Russian people.

Everybody is excited about what is to be expected from the Russian democrats in determining the fate of the Soviet Union in the near future. We want to stress once again that we have a clear vision of what to do for Russia and the union and have already begun to implement our program. Four major steps have been taken over the last year, beginning with the declaration of state sovereignty last May, the 500-day economic program announced in August, the new Russian constitution drafted in November, followed by a period of intense inter-republic treaties which the Russian parliament signed with the other sovereign republics. I believe that the major reason for the fall of Gorbachev and perestroika is the lack of imagination in politics and economics. These four initiatives demonstrate that we democrats in the Russian parliament have the imagination necessary to move forward, and that is what differentiates us from the declining center.

The third congress of the Russian parliament which just ended managed to initiate deep reforms into the structure of power. The Congress, which was aimed to dismiss Yeltsin, ended with giving him new powers. More powers were also given to the parliament. This was a very important step
for implementing our new constitution. When the constitution draft was published in October and November of last year, the entire propaganda machine of the Communist party was aimed to crush it. The Russian Communist party adopted a special resolution, "No to the constitution of thieves and robbers." For us, the constitution is much more than just one more project according to which we must reorganize our life. With it we are trying to create some sort of a legal framework for society to start the process of reform.

We believe that the constitution must be a social contract between civil society and the state, because there can be no modern developed state without a developed civil society. In the 1980s in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the democratic opposition used the slogan of rebuilding civil society. We share this goal, and in our draft constitution, we have put this category on a constitutional level.

Yesterday one of the Radio Liberty correspondents asked me what must be done to support democracy in Russia and the Soviet Union. I answered that we must put all our strength into creating a civil society and a new middle class in our country. This is the same thing which Sergei Stankevich just mentioned about "rooting" -- the root of reform lies in civil society.

In drafting the reforms proposed by the constitution, we started with the idea of a Presidency. We decided that our Russian President, who will be popularly elected, must be given more powers so he can be a strong, efficient leader. Later this week in Moscow I will deliver a draft on the President's powers in the Russian federation, along with draft laws on elections, and the constitutional court. We intend to start implementing the constitution piece by piece.

After the June 12 Presidential elections, we will need a large reorganization of the Russian parliament and of the local soviets. We must start the process of de-sovietization, changing the local soviets into more efficient municipal governments. Here in the United States ten people governing a city are assisted by 200 officers. In my country 200 politicians govern a village where ten exhausted officers are faced with solving the problems and don't know what to do about simple municipal tasks like garbage disposal. We must change those proportions.

Boris Yeltsin is today a national figure with large popular support. He is the only person, for example, who can stop the strikes if we need to. The only figure who can head the democratic team negotiating with the center is Boris Yeltsin.

In the third congress of the Russian parliament we also put forward the concept of a roundtable discussion at which we would address the issue of the future of the Soviet Union power structure and the composition of the union. I don't quite agree with Mr. Horyn from Ukraine because I am absolutely sure we still need some form of the union -- perhaps a loose, asymmetrical confederation, tight between Russia and Kazakhstan, and loose between Russia and Ukraine. Another goal of the roundtable will be negotiations between teams of highly respected competent politicians. The creation of these teams is a major step toward a coalition government. For the first time since
March of 1988, Gorbachev has responded positively to the idea of a roundtable. He now understands that he must be in contact with democrats who are working for this goal.

I want to conclude my remarks with the idea that Sergei Stankevich spoke about of the danger of the radical, or revolutionary democrats. Unfortunately the conflict in society and the lack of political culture show us that today the reactionary Communists acting the same way as the revolutionary democrats. Both rejected the idea of a roundtable — the reactionary Communists because they say it will bring an end to their power, and the revolutionary democrats because they say no to any negotiations with Gorbachev. This dead end politics leads to a union between the two extremes. That’s why we need to reinforce the center and continue to search for more reformist steps.

Nina Bolyueva is president of the Interlegal Research Center, a network of voluntary groups specializing in conducting research on relations between state and society, creating new forms of information exchange, offering legal aid to civic institutions and leadership training programs for the voluntary sector.

I am probably the only one on this panel who is not directly involved in practical politics and thus do not bear any responsibility for what is happening in our country these days. Therefore I can allow myself the privilege of asking questions rather than answering them. I deeply believe these are questions we all need to bear in mind if we are to finally achieve the results we democrats seek.

The first question is “what is democracy?” We have a sort of confusion in our country, with a division between the old reactionaries and the new democrats. Democracy was viewed only as the governing of the new democrats. There was a very strong feeling that if we simply succeeded in electing people like Sergei Stankevich and Oleg Rumiantsev to the governing bodies, democracy would come. Finally they were elected but still there was no democracy. This caused a great deal of confusion and controversy between old and new structures, resulting in fighting about strategies and tactics, and many losing sight of our final goal.

In the beginning of the process of democratic change, there were three major tasks to be addressed: decentralization of power, ideologization of power structures, including especially the executive and military power structures, and de-monopolization of property, because only with property rights and economic activities could the country really reach true freedom. I cannot say at this moment that we have succeeded in any of these three tasks. There were some very practical steps taken by the Russian parliament to bring us closer to the idea of private property, but the situation is such that something proclaimed in law still does not work very well in practice. What does work in practice is not adequately fixed in the legal system and therefore the economic activity and the market that is developing is called a black market. With regard to ideologization, we first had the wonderful result of destroying the idea of the communist ideology as the only one possible. A strong anti-communist ideology was developed and is becoming even stronger as the majority of the parties build their strategies and increase their popularity by simply blaming the Communists. Political life is being highly ideologically split while executive powers are still strongly controlled by the former communist apparatus.

The most difficult and confusing task comes with decentralization of powers,
because we have so many different levels of power that currently exist. We have to ask ourselves what level of decentralization we want to end up with. Each governing level strongly believes that decentralization should end up on its own level. This is not just a question of distribution of functions for more effective governing – it is also a matter of the level of forces playing a serious role in today's political climate.

To explain this situation further, I would like to focus for a moment on the Russian federation. Even the most respected of the peoples deputies supported the idea that autonomous republics should be equal in signing the union treaty and that differences in levels of national sovereignty should be diminished. As the republics gain more power and decentralization moves to the republic level, they do not feel very comfortable recognizing autonomous regions as equal partners. The huge democratic wave did not touch many of the autonomous region's authorities, which are still controlled by the Communist party apparatus. These regions continue to build up their powers, fighting Yeltsin's policies and supporting the central government. Now there are at least two trends with the union treaty – one proposed by the democratic movements which brings up the idea of a confederation of sovereign states; the other initiated at the union level but including autonomous republics, which could easily overcome the base of the democratic movements. Supporting democratic movements in the autonomous republics, giving them as much independence as possible within a Russian sovereign state, is therefore a serious challenge for the Russian democrats.

Another important issue deals with changing not only the level but also the form of power. Even Georgia, Moldavia and Lithuania are still being governed by the Soviet state. The mode and structure remain in the center even as it becomes obvious that this structure does not work. When we have 500 deputies in Moscow and 150 in each of 33 districts and very limited resources to implement their policies you can very easily imagine that this structure does not work at all. But on a tactical level democratic forces are fighting these structures – they came to power through the old structures and are undertaking enormous efforts to bring more legitimacy to those structures. We need to be concerned with what comes next. If the existing structures do not prove their effectiveness, we need to develop alternatives. This movement has begun and many people are now working to develop civil society so that when this shift in power takes place, we have a new type of governing body strong enough to take responsibility for the situation in the country and able to bring stability.

I would like to make one last point on the question often asked of whether it is possible in this social and national unrest for military or repressive force to be used to suppress the democratic movement. I don't believe this can happen and I think the wave of protest around the events in Lithuania proved that these methods do not work. The continuing miners' strikes also show that if the people of the country begin to experience a certain level of democracy and to understand political structures and do not limit themselves to individual concerns such
as improving their own economic status, but instead focus on demanding radical economic reform, this country cannot ever again be returned to stagnation.

Congressman Jim Leach offered the following remarks in summing up the panel on the Soviet Union:

The speakers have made clear that we are on the cusp of one of the great turning points in history — in a geostrategic sense the Soviet empire appears to be splintering from within as well as from without. More than anything else it strikes me that this discussion emphasizes the need to stress the basics. As an American, I feel compelled to respond briefly to Ms. Belyaeva’s question “What is democracy?” by stressing the obvious — the basics are theories of revolution, the individual and economics. Our theory of revolution has to do with individuals endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights.

Mr. Horyn noted the blasphemous effort of the state to establish a new type of Soviet man — “homo-sovieticus” — man without nationality or human feeling. It’s only such a feelingless man who could, as Mr. Velliste described, allow Estonia to become a victim of a vanguard rape, an act he described as worse than AIDS because the moral dimension was more untenable. Here Mr. Stankevich noted that stabilization is a new key word in the state’s vocabulary — such a term applies to protecting a constitutional framework described by Mr. Rumiantsev.

Interestingly from an American perspective, we have a general aversion to radical thought. DeToqueville described our country as having a “pensant for moderation,” and based on this we have a tendency to overlook a profound political fact — the basic philosophical notion that our heritage is profoundly more, not less, revolutionary than that provided by the Marxist model. I stress this in summary for the simple reason that if we want a foreign policy to reflect our heritage and our philosophy — which most Americans do most of the time — we’ve got to understand that our heritage is very radical. There should be no misunderstanding about the coincidence of American values and republic aspirations, and the self-determination implications of the Declaration of Independence of the United States cannot be compromised abroad or at home.

We must all pray with Mr. Stankevich that communism goes out with tears rather than blood, but however it goes, it will wither away if freedom-loving people of the world unite.
Luncheon Chairman Ambassador Winston Lord welcomed guests to the concluding session by stating, “Surely no conference has carried a more telling title. Just since the Endowment’s last conference we have truly witnessed a revolution for democracy and human rights. Exactly two years ago today the winds of change first began gusting in Tiananmen Square, and they have been spreading ever since thanks to the character, courage, tenacity and tenacity of people like the men and women who have spoken to us the past two days. At the same time, these speakers have eloquently reminded us that the pursuit of freedom is unfinished, that success is a process, not an end in itself and even as we salute the advances of liberty, we are sobered by the tasks that lie ahead.”

In addition to featured speaker Fang Lizhi, the concluding luncheon included remarks from Zofia Kuratowska, member of the Polish Senate, speaking on behalf of the international participants, and Congressional remarks by Senator Richard Lugar and Congressman Stephen Solarz.

Fang Lizhi is a Chinese astrophysicist who has emerged in the last decade as China’s most eloquent advocate of democracy and academic freedom, christened by some “China’s Andrei Sakharov.” In the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, he sought asylum at the American Embassy in Beijing, where he remained for 386 days. He is currently affiliated with the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University.

All who care about democracy are concerned about the question of whether or not China can become a democratic country. In 1989, movements for democracy were successful in Eastern Europe but failed in China, thus giving rise to the question: Is it impossible for China to achieve democracy?

I am not an astrologer who makes predictions, but only an astrophysicist who has no way of foretelling most of China’s future. But there is one point that I can predict with confidence: China will not be able to avoid moving toward democracy. My reasons for this prediction are very simple: a democratic China fills the needs of both the Chinese people and the world.

Some people say that China is a big country and a poor country, and that the first needs of the Chinese people are in economic development, not democracy. This seems hard to deny. The facts show that modernization has been the goal of the Chinese people for a long time. Time and again, however, Chinese efforts at modernization have ended in failure. The most recent example of this is the reform movement that began in the late 1970s, saw some successes through the first five years of the 1980s, but beginning in 1987 moved step by step toward failure.

Why do Chinese efforts at modernization fail? Why do reforms fail? Why has the Chinese economy remained largely inaccessible? Obviously, it is not because the Chinese people are not good at working or doing business. The economic success of overseas Chinese around the world belies such a conclusion. The problem has to do with the authoritarian political system in China. Therefore, without reform of China’s autocratic political system, it will be impossible to bring about modernization. This is a basic reason why the Chinese people need democracy.

Of course the Chinese people’s need for democracy arises not only from the economic failures of the current communist system, but also from its extreme inhumanity. Namely, it has trampled upon the most basic dignity, rights and freedoms of its own citizens. This explains why the movements
that have arisen to oppose such regimes have always been movements specifically dedicated to democracy and human rights. The pattern has been the same whether it appears in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China.

The true record of human rights in China has been hidden because Chinese authorities have thoroughly blocked communication about it. Some people have even been misled into believing that China has been free of human rights violations. The Tiananmen massacre of 1989 shocked many people. It marked the first time the outside world could see for itself how cruel and violent the behavior of the Chinese authorities can be. But the Tiananmen incident is only the tip of an iceberg. I cannot describe here the rest of that iceberg in its terrible entirety, but will mention just one item: there are, according to incomplete statistics, at least 976 labor reform camps in China. It is hard to say exactly how many people are in them, but we do know that the inmates of certain camps in Xinjiang Province number between 50,000 and 80,000. How many of these are political prisoners? Again we do not know, but one informed researcher has estimated 10 percent to be political prisoners.

Recently the Chinese leadership has used the distraction of the war in the Persian Gulf to intensify the repression of those fighting for democracy and freedom in China. They have resumed the trials of students who took part in the peaceful demonstrations at Tiananmen. This is a new desecration by the Chinese authorities of the universal principles of human rights. It is clear that basic human rights cannot be guaranteed without a democratic government.

In sum, Chinese history teaches us: modernization needs democracy; human rights needs democracy. This is why we Chinese pursue a democratic China.

The world at large also needs a democratic China. In today's world the human race lives in a unified atmosphere within which the exchange of news, knowledge, and culture flow freely. It is no longer possible to keep China's affairs separate from those of the rest of the world.

A democratic China would contribute greatly to stability in East Asia and thus in the entire Pacific region. Recently, the cold war over, Eastern Europe has embarked upon a new road. Even the two Koreas have begun talking to each other. China, however, remains a country divided, as it has been since 1949, and is formally in a state of civil war.

In our small global village, more and more worldwide problems have been set upon our table: population, energy, the environment, global warming, and deforestation. Obviously with respect to relations within our global village, we must also ask where the problem lies. So long as there exists anywhere in the world a government that can be proud of the Tiananmen massacre, or a dictatorship that refuses to apply universally recognized principles to control its own behavior, it will remain hard to imagine the possibility of world understanding. History teaches us that to indulge a government that is proud of murder at home eventually brings major dilemmas before the rest of mankind. The human rights
problem is therefore another very important global problem, and China’s democracy and human rights problems are also the world’s problems. The Tiananmen massacre not only caused China to suffer, it polluted the world environment as well. Without the gradual improvement of the world’s human rights environment, solutions to the problems of our global village cannot be guaranteed.

It is clear that the struggle for freedom and democracy in China is far from over. The road to Chinese freedom and democracy has already been long and difficult, and is likely to remain so for many years to come. It may take a decade, a generation or even longer. But whatever the case, there can be no denying that a trend toward democracy, freedom and human rights has been set in motion and will be very hard to turn completely around. The historic demonstrations in Tiananmen Square have revealed the enduring truth that the time for freedom and democracy in China eventually will come.

China’s twentieth century history has closely paralleled world trends. At the beginning of the century, when communism was on the rise worldwide, it also gained rapidly in China. At mid-century, when many countries were one after another becoming “proletarian” dictatorships, China became one also. Today, with the communist system in decline, communism in China is losing its reputation as well. Thus we can predict with confidence that China, as part of a worldwide historical trend, will eventually move away from authoritarian rule and toward more democratic government.

The world will never forget the men and women of Tiananmen in 1989 who paid with their lives for freedom and democracy in China. This is why, despite the many frustrations and disappointments in today’s China, I still view my country’s future with hope.

Zofia Kuratowska is a member of the Polish Senate who was swept to victory with the largest majority of any of the 553 candidates in Poland’s June 1990 elections. A distinguished hematologist and adviser on medical affairs to the Catholic Church, she also served as an executive board member of Solidarity’s health care section.

It is my great privilege to have the opportunity to make some concluding remarks. First of all I would like to say that this conference was really a great and exciting event, demonstrating how fast political events are taking place around the world. Between our conference in 1989 and today, the countries of Eastern Europe changed completely. The communist system in Europe does not exist anymore, even in the Soviet Union. Who could have predicted that after only two years time the Soviet state would not be a union; that the republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would have at least partial independence, and Ukraine, Georgia and Russia would be moving quickly in the same direction. Great progress can also be seen in Latin America. Two years ago we could hardly have imagined that Violeta Chamorro, who was with us for the 1989 event, would be elected President of Nicaragua!

Forgive me for presenting here my personal opinion, but I would not be a member of the Polish democratic movement if I did not point out that it was the huge democratic movement Solidarnosc which made possible the rest of the changes in Eastern and Central Europe. It was Solidarnosc which opened the way to freedom, showing the people in that part of the world that the communist regime could be crushed without violence; that the meaning of “revolution” is in fact nothing but transition into democracy, independence and freedom. The Solidarnosc movement was a model for human activity in support of
future. The democratic revolution will not succeed, however, without international economic assistance and moral support. The role of politicians from the democratic world in this transition process is enormous. We can no longer listen to the arguments of the opinion-making politicians who proclaim: “Don’t disturb the dictator because he has a good will and he himself will change the system for the better.” Dictators and totalitarian systems never change themselves. For a long time we heard such arguments about Stalin, Ceaucescu, Brezhnev, and now Gorbachev, de Klerk and others.

There is one last but very important problem we must face in the transition to democracy. As can be seen from our experience in Poland, the most difficult step in the democratic transition is that of changing the mentality of people educated in the totalitarian system. We need to free them of fear and encourage them to actively participate in the democratic process. This will take time, but it is also an important part of the work that remains to be done for international organizations supporting democracy.

In closing, on behalf of the participants I would like to express our deep gratitude to NED for everything this organization has done for us in supporting the transition of our countries to democracy. Due to your activity we all feel as members of one great family.

Senator Richard Lugar

It is a rare privilege for those of us who value freedom and democracy to come together every other year under the auspices of the National Endowment for Democracy to honor heroes. This morning we heard in the Halls of Congress an eloquent address by President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua. I mention her specifically because two years
ago, she sat in this audience at the Endowment’s conference along with advocates of freedom from around the world to exchange information and share experiences. Recently I was with another democratic leader, President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, as she celebrated her fifth year in office. These two heads of state are criticized widely as being good people but ineffective leaders. They are individuals who live in countries with vast economic difficulties, political dissention, and the real possibilities of military or semi-military groups undermining fragile democracy. In both cases, to a very great extent the U.S. was euphoric at the time of the elections which brought these individuals to power; sadly, American attention fairly promptly moved on to some other agenda. Among our compatriots in this country they are sometimes easily and rapidly forgotten.

The dilemma of this situation becomes much more acute when thinking about the democratic dream. Several years ago, in a most memorable set of remarks, the famous Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa stated that the whole secret of democracy is longevity. He pointed out that while the last three administrations in Peru have arguably been failures by most standards, they were still to be commended because they lasted; they ran the course and maintained democracy. I would like to reiterate his point that the ultimate supreme test is whether democracy can last. The ultimate dilemma is always whether the system can last long enough for people to understand the ideas of plurality, of how political parties, the military, academics and various groups fit in society. A basic democratic infrastructure needs to be given time to take root.

One year ago I was in East Germany when a fateful election was held. The election took place only a short time after the Berlin Wall fell, much too short a time for those who were trying their wings at democracy. In speaking with the representatives of the various fledgling political associations preparing for the election, I had a conversation with a woman who had been a professor of American literature at Leipzig University for 25 years. Clearly she was imbued with a democratic spirit, since most of the texts for her classes had to be "bootlegged" into the country, and those who tried to send her books were often rebuffed. Yet when she was asked how she planned to vote, she responded "socialist," because she feared the profound changes that would come if the democrats won. Indeed she was right, and now the leadership is predicting 50% unemployment for the Eastern five states of Germany during this calendar year. Production facilities are dormant or being torn down because they are environmentally unsatisfactory. State subsidies for universities and the arts are a thing of the past. In short, all her worst fears are occurring.

Democracy and freedom are very tough agendas. Yet on that March Sunday in Leipzig, people, by a vote of two to one, chose that uncertain course.

As I looked at my perhaps two dozen colleagues ready to enter the House chamber today, I asked myself where the others could be; what else could be more important than celebrating democracy in Nicaragua, an issue which we’d debated for over ten years. All of

Senator Richard Lugar
this was forgotten for the moment, and that is truly a tragedy.

It is our obligation to commemorate democracy and to celebrate with democratic activists. While some may argue that we are not obligated to support them financially or politically, we are at least required to pay homage to their struggle and to do whatever is appropriate in our own political context to help secure lasting democracies. In that spirit, I rejoice with each of you and with those newly emerging democracies around the world. We are determined that they will prevail.

Congressman Stephen Solarz

I am particularly honored to share this platform with Dr. Fang Lizhi. Like Andrei Sakharov in the Soviet Union, he realized that scientific work could not take place without a political environment of free inquiry, tolerance and ultimately, democracy. Dr. Fang is therefore an effective voice for that stream of Chinese political thought which says that China's contemporary crisis cannot be resolved without a democratic transformation, and that a continuation of the 42-year old Leninist system will only retard progress in the economy, society, and in China's place in the world.

I gather that Dr. Fang is basically optimistic about the prospects for democracy in China. This is a source of great encouragement, for if China's leading democrats were pessimistic about the future of their country, it would have profoundly important implications for the rest of us.

I would like to offer a few thoughts about the more general question of the democratic transformation of Leninist political systems, of which China is obviously one. This is probably the most important issue facing those of us who hope for the spread of freedom around the world. Leninist systems are, by their nature, particularly difficult to transform. They possess powerful instruments of social and political control, which sap the courage of those who would put their lives on the line for freedom. They employ a purportedly "scientific" ideology that fools some of the people all of the time and many of the people some of the time; use the bogeyman of external threats to dampen down internal challenges; and have demonstrated many times over their will to crack down on any dissent or opposition in order to maintain their totalitarian rule.

The events of the last few years have marked a watershed in the history of Leninist systems. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the only way of maintaining communist rule and solving the country's serious economic problems was the democratization of the political system. In Eastern Europe, from the Baltics to the Adriatic, the iron curtain has ascended. Elsewhere in the world, from Nicaragua in Central America to Mongolia in Asia, Leninist leaders lost the will to crack down in the face of mounting peaceful popular opposition, in part because their masters in Moscow lost their will to preserve the Soviet external empire. The crackdowns in China
and Vietnam and the political tightening in Cuba were the exceptions to the dominant trend of collapse throughout the Leninist world.

One question for the future is whether ruling groups in the remaining Leninist systems will preserve the will and capacity to meet new challenges. Another is whether Leninists in the Soviet Union will make a comeback, with or without Mikhail Gorbachev. A third and more profound question is how democracy will be preserved and consolidated in those systems where Leninism has collapsed. It would, in my judgment, be a profound mistake of historic proportion for those of us committed to the success of democracy to take its longevity for granted in regimes that have recently rejected Leninism and adopted democracy.

Socially, the end of Leninism has uncovered historic enmities that threaten to undermine political stability and even national integrity. Politically, democracy is unlikely to survive unless institutions are built to manage social tensions and apportion the inevitable economic sacrifice. Democracy is more likely to succeed if a civic culture of social institutions, political tolerance and accommodation is developed.

The events of the past two or three years are the most dramatic of the long twilight struggle of the Cold War. They represent the victory of political values that had their origin in the West but have long since become universal.

However, if the new democracies of Eastern Europe are not consolidated, and if the waning democratic momentum in the Soviet Union is not reinvigorated from within and reinforced from without, then the prospects for progress in the remaining Leninist regimes will diminish, and the sense of well being that we all feel at this historic moment on the long march of mankind to freedom will greatly diminish and eventually disappear.
Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, (pictured above, second from right) hosted a reception for international participants in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms of the Department of State. Pictured at the reception are (left to right) Congressman Howard Berman, Marita Rosa Martini of Conciencia/Argentina, NED Chairman John Richardson, Kimmitt, and NED President Carl Gershman.
The Honorable Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, hosted a reception in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms of the Department of State for international participants attending the conference. The Endowment was also honored to receive greetings from a number of world leaders on the occasion of the conference, several of which are reprinted here.

Under Secretary Robert Kimmitt welcomes guests to the State Department Reception.

NED Chairman John Richardson (r.) welcomes Congressman Howard Berman.
On the occasion of the third international conference on democracy convened by the National Endowment for Democracy, I would like to convey my appreciation for NED’s continuous efforts in strengthening the victory of democracy around the world. My special greetings are also sent to all those present at the conference, who even under the most severe circumstances have always been brave enough to proudly raise their heads toward the light of democracy and human rights.

NED must be duly praised for the many-fold assistance through which it greatly contributed to the victory of democracy in Hungary and in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. NED helped us greatly in preparation for the first free elections in more than 40 years, and continues to render keen attention to provide valuable experience in fostering our democratic achievements. Our special gratitude is due for NED’s involvement in helping the competing political actors to become more effective and for making the responsibility of choice fair and understandable for everyone.

I would like to send my heartfelt congratulations to President Havel, a good friend and personality whom I very much respect, and to President Violeta Chamorro, who for me represents the triumph of the Nicaraguan people’s desire for freedom and democracy, for being selected as the recipients of the 1991 Democracy Award.

Let us pray that our joint efforts and the activity of such institutions as NED in furthering the cause of democracy will help us, once and hopefully not in the too distant future, to hold hands in helping other nations and peoples to gain the award of their continuing struggle for liberty: democracy.

Greetings received from
Arpad Goncz
President of Hungary

I would like to extend greetings to those gathered on the occasion of the National Endowment for Democracy’s conference on “The Unfinished Revolution,” and to the Endowment’s 1991 Democracy Award recipients, Presidents Vaclav Havel and Violeta Chamorro, two individuals who deserve our admiration for their struggle for democracy and our support for their efforts to open a new era of freedom and development.

The revolution for democracy continues, not only in the new and emerging multi-party systems in Central Europe, Latin America and Africa, but also in the countries that have for some time known a pluralistic political system. In fact, we cannot consider that such a revolution has reached its goal if we have not been able to reduce the great inequalities that still exist in our societies. To discuss the “unfinished revolution” is therefore a useful way to call attention to the complexity of the problems that we, as democrats, are faced with in our daily fight for a more human and fraternal world.

Greetings received from
Mario Soares
President of Portugal
It is my pleasure to salute the National Endowment for Democracy for once again gathering the world's leading advocates of the cause of democracy. May I first express the oneness of the Filipino people with the peoples who have just gained or are still struggling to gain their rightful freedom. Among this latest wave of freedom fighters, we in the Philippines have had the unique privilege of being among the first to regain our liberty in a truly peaceful manner. In the course of striving to sustain the democratic institutions that we have re-installed, my countrymen and I have been constantly reminded that for freedom to endure, we must be ready to defend it at all times. The latest movements for democracy have proven once more that people will not tolerate the repressive intrusions of tyrants. On behalf of the Filipino people, I heartily congratulate those who have newly won their liberty. My heartfelt congratulations too, to Presidents Violeta Chamorro and Vaclav Havel, recipients of the 1991 Democracy Award, for their outstanding courage and perseverance.

As I greet the participants at this conference, I feel it imperative to remind everyone that democracy lasts only as long as its institutions fulfill the needs of its constituents. Long live democracy!

Greetings received from
Corazon Aquino
President of the Philippines
Endowment Board member Madeleine Albright (r.) greets President Chamorro and Foreign Minister Dienstbier at the Award Dinner.

Endowment grantees (l. - r.) Chansamone Voravong of Laoitan Democratic Initiatives (LDI), Penelope Faulkner and Vo Van Ai of Quo Me, and Dao Yang of LDI.
The Endowment presented its 1991 Democracy Award to Presidents Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua and Vaclav Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at a special dinner ceremony on April 16. President Chamorro was present to accept her award; Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, himself a leading democratic activist with Charter 77 and the Civic Forum, accepted on behalf of President Havel. His Holiness The Dalai Lama offered the invocation for the award dinner, which was attended by some 500 guests. Vice President Dan Quayle was present for the award ceremony and offered the concluding remarks for the evening's program.

Pictured at the 1991 Democracy Award Dinner are Vice President Dan Quayle, President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who accepted the award on behalf of President Vaclav Havel. Donated by sculptor Thomas Marsh, the 1991 award statue is a replica of the "goddess of democracy" statue erected by pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, China in June 1989.
Vaclav Havel was the pivotal intellectual and political leader of the democratic revolution that swept Central Europe in 1989. Like Thomas Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia whom he resembles in so many ways, Havel is a political leader whose preeminence is rooted in his intellectual integrity and moral authority. . . . In "Politics and Conscience," a speech that became a manifesto for his country’s democratic revolution, Havel described his philosophy as “antipolitical politics,” meaning “politics as practical morality, as service to the truth.” At a time when communism appeared indestructible, he wrote that “wholly personal categories like good and evil still have their unambiguous content, and under certain circumstances, are capable of shaking the seemingly unshakable power with all its armies of soldiers, policemen and bureaucrats.” Truth eventually did prevail, and this banned writer and persecuted dissident became the president of his country. Having assumed the burden of leadership, he is now grappling with the awesome challenge of building democracy on the ashes of communism. . . . For his leadership in building democracy as well as his courage in resisting totalitarianism, the Endowment is honored to present its 1991 Democracy Award to Vaclav Havel.

The Hon. Dante B. Fascell
U.S. House of Representatives
NED Chairman Emeritus
Acceptance Speech by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier

It is my pleasant task to have the honor of receiving, on behalf of Mr. Vaclav Havel, the President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, your 1991 Democracy Award. Both the pleasure and the honor are even greater since you have decided that my President should share this award with Madame Violeta Chamorro, the President of Nicaragua.

The National Endowment for Democracy has for several years been engaged in efforts to assist democratic movements and strengthen democratic institutions around the world. In so doing it represents the broad and profound commitment to democracy common to all people of the United States, a commitment deeply rooted in the history and tradition of this country.

I do not think I need to stress to this audience that promoting democracy is hard and never ending work which requires the full engagement of committed peoples the world over. I would like to express my belief that in choosing this year's recipients of its Democracy Award, the Endowment has made a positive symbolic act. In choosing the bearers of the highest offices in two countries that have only recently emerged in the family of democratic nations, the Endowment has reminded people in democratic movements around the world who are struggling for what the free world considers to be essential and inalienable human rights that their efforts are not in vain, that no situation is hopeless, and that no defeat is so definite that it cannot be turned into victory. Who would have believed a few years ago that Nicaragua would soon have a democratically-elected administration, that the debilitating civil war,
costly in terms of human life, would be over, and representatives of the fighting sides would be working in a common effort for the reconstruction of the country. Not even many within the small group of Charter 77 would have thought that the fall of 1989 would mean the fall of communism in Eastern Europe or that in the spring of 1991 I would be accepting the Democracy Award on behalf of Vaclav Havel, the playwright President. Indeed it must have taken a true master of the absurd to create such a drama in the realm of the real world.

This award is a recognition of the efforts our people have made. It's also an obligation that puts great responsibility upon our shoulders. It simply takes much longer than the year and a half that has passed since our revolution to create a true democratic revolution in the minds of people who have had no practical experience with democracy for some half a century.

However, in the process of gradually ridding our society of the heritage of 50 years of totalitarian rule, we have already taken some first steps. In preparing the framework for democratic reforms, we have formulated a constitution with a list of basic rights and freedoms -- indeed the first of its kind in the history of our country, passed by our parliament early this year. Internationally we have found new friends within the community of democratic nations and are positively and actively re-evaluating our relations with former allies and neighbors. We are in the process of preparing bilateral treaties with our neighbors and are gradually dismantling the organizations of the Warsaw Pact. In the Eastern and Central Europe security venue we are trying to satisfy our needs by putting our eggs into as many baskets as possible. Good working relations with the North Atlantic Alliance and its member states, further development of the CSCE process, our association with the institutions of the European community, as well as strong and friendly relations with the U.S. are the most important among those efforts.

This is not the occasion for a broad outline of our policies. I've only tried to mention some of our achievements and plans and in so doing to show you that the honor which you have bestowed on President Havel with this Democracy Award has not been completely undeserved.

I am proud to represent my President and my country and thank you on behalf of Mr. Havel for the award.

I would also like to assure you of my belief, which I share with the government and people of Czechoslovakia, that with your continued help we shall overcome the problems Czechoslovakia is facing and find our permanent place within the steadily growing family of democratic nations.
Pictured at the Award Dinner are (l.-r.) NED Board Chairman John Richardson, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, President Violeta Chamorro, NED Board Secretary Sally Shelton-Colby.

NED Board member Senator Orrin Hatch (l.) looks on as His Holiness the Dalai Lama greets President Violeta Chamorro.
As a human being and a political leader, Violeta Chamorro symbolizes both the traumatic history of Nicaragua and the aspirations of its people for democracy and national reconciliation. She lost her husband to political violence but kept alive his vision of a free and just Nicaragua. She saw her family divided by the same political polarization that rent her nation, yet she has managed to hold both together. Though persecuted and at times silenced, she kept the flame of freedom burning at the newspaper La Prensa so that it could eventually ignite a national political movement for democracy and peace. . . . When Dona Violeta and I stood together on the platform at the Endowment’s last conference in 1989, no one could have predicted the astonishing events which would bring her to power in Nicaragua. . . . Nicaragua has a hard road ahead. But that road, for the first time in Nicaraguan history, now points toward democracy. This is due in no small measure to the courage, humanity and democratic spirit of Violeta Chamorro, who has bound her nation’s wounds and given new hope to its people, never swaying from the goal of achieving authentic and enduring national reconciliation. It is with honor and pride that the Endowment presents its 1991 Democracy Award to Violeta Chamorro.

*The Hon. Nancy L. Kassebaum
United States Senate*
Acceptance Speech by President Violeta Chamorro

It has been several years since I visited the National Endowment for Democracy for the first time, when I was a newspaper editor. At the time, the paper I was working for had just recently re-opened after being closed for over a year. The former government in Nicaragua, which was not very concerned with the rights of the people, censored the paper and caused it to close down. This newspaper was stripped of its material and equipment, left without paper or the means to advertise and most of the staff were exiled. On my trip to the Endowment, I was accompanied by representatives of the Nicaraguan unions, private enterprises and owners of small radio stations – all groups which the Sandinista regime was trying to suffocate in its attempt to eradicate the last traces of a civil society in Nicaragua.

I later returned as a presidential candidate for a coalition of democratic political parties who opposed this totalitarian government. There were very few people who believed that this coalition and this candidacy would be successful. On both trips, the Endowment opened its doors to me, offering assistance and above all, giving me friendship.

Now I return as President of my country, and I am greeted with the same open doors and friendship and also with the great honor of receiving the Democracy Award that is presented by the Endowment to representatives of different countries of the world for their contributions toward democracy. The 1991 Democracy Award is an honor, as much because of the prestige of the institution that is giving it to me, as for the cause that it represents. For me the latter is the most noble – so noble that my biggest desire since my husband died for this flag and bequeathed it to me, is to fight for democracy. The prestige becomes more prestigious and the honor becomes even more honorable because I share this award with Vaclav Havel, the President of Czechoslovakia.

Democracy is what unites a city in Europe and a city in Central America, despite historic differences.

In my homeland, the advent of democracy did not occur through violence or force. It took place solely through free elections. For the first time in the history of the twentieth century, the result of a vote ended a totalitarian dictatorship and the two civil war opponents agreed on peace – not because of the victory of one group, but because of the conviction of both.

Democracy was born in Nicaragua patriotically – it was born democratically. The characteristics of its birth are those which confirm my belief in democracy and encourage me to spread its ideals to others, with patience. For me, patience is the key for promoting peace – I don’t believe in using force for any reason, and while I try to maintain due respect for other’s viewpoints, I am
always trying to convince them of mine. I have even been attacked by both the national and foreign press because I don’t personify the image that the world has of a typical Latin government leader who pounds the table with their fist. I govern as a woman and as a woman, I don’t believe that violence or force can win anyone over. Those who govern a country have to be the first democrats, so that democracy can exist. Government leaders and the way that they govern provide the best examples of democracy for people.

In Nicaragua, dialogue is what turned our economy around. We did this by having conferences that cost us both time and patience, but through planting the seeds of dialogue, we have harvested both peace and understanding. Another basic requirement, especially in Latin American countries, is that the development of democracy diverges from militaristic ideals. For this reason, from the first day I was elected as President of Nicaragua, I have not stopped fighting for disarming, both morally and physically -- not just in Nicaragua, but in all of Central America. I made a decision to bury tons of military arms in Nicaragua -- to pull out the roots of military ideals in a country that has thwarted democracy so many times. Each gun signified at least one human life that would be stricken down. Instead of burying our children, I wanted to bury these arms forever, as a symbol of the new Republic. My country’s battle is a difficult one. But true democracy will only happen when we rid the people of the mentality that war and violence present solutions to our problems. Whatever problem arises, it can be resolved democratically. War never brings the answer -- it only presents new problems.

Finally, I have to make one last demand before the democratic world: New democracies need moral and effective solidarity. We need help from all of you so that the disastrous economic situation that we inherited from the mistakes of the previous regime does not affect or handicap the development of our growing democracy. Let us be victorious in all of our battles for freedom! Let us achieve solidarity of all free people -- the most beautiful conquest for democracy this century!
Presidents Havel and Chamorro represent democratic statesmanship at its very finest -- brave, principled, and committed to the defense of human rights and democratic values. It is fitting that they are being honored by the National Endowment for Democracy, an organization funded by the Congress, supported by the Administration, dedicated to building democratic institutions around the world. As a private organization, NED has a unique role to play, bringing together democratic activists from all over the world and pursuing its programs in an independent manner.

"The Unfinished Revolution" was a most appropriate theme for the NED conference, for indeed that is just what democracy is -- an unfinished struggle that must be fought over and over. President Eisenhower perhaps said it best: "Freedom is something which must be earned every day that one lives." The struggle for democracy does not end when a dictatorship is overthrown. New democracies still have a long and difficult road to travel, building new institutions, changing public attitudes and instilling new hope. Progress must be steady and gradual. Such new democracies deserve our long term commitment and support.

As an American, I am proud that the democratic ideals that took hold here in 1776 continue to inspire the world. I pledge to you that the U.S. government will help further advance the global democratic revolution, not because we are starry-eyed idealists, but because we are hard-headed realists. As realists we know America is never true to herself unless America supports the cause of liberty. As realists, we agree with the great Yugoslavian democratic activist Milovan Djilas, who said, "The true political realists of East and West are those who refuse to accept tyranny." Thank you for being such realists. May your struggles for democracy be crowned with success.

The Honorable Dan Quayle
Vice President of the United States
Endowment Board member Winston Lord (second from left) introduces his son to fellow Board members Charles Marwat (second from right) and Frank Faubonkopf (r.).

Endowment grantees from Guatemala (l.-r.) Arnoldo Kuestermann of ASIES, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, human rights ombudsman, Jose Luis Chena and Rolando Cabrera of CEDEP, and Jose Maria Argueta of Centro ESTNA.
ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS

In addition to the panelists whose remarks are included in this book, we were fortunate to have Endowment grantees representing organizations in some 30 countries join us for the conference. Their participation was invaluable to the overall success of the event.

Graciela Adan, Fundacion Universidad de Rio de la Plata (FURP), Argentina

Olisa Agbakoba, Civil Liberties Organization, Nigeria

Saidou Agbantou, Commission Beninoise de Droits de l' Homme, Benin

Vladimir Alloy, Atheneum Press, France

Agustin Arias, Centro Pro Democracia, Panama

Jose Maria Argueta, Centro ESTNA, Guatemala

Irma de Arias Duval, Conciencia, Argentina

Fanor Avendano, Centro de Formacion Juvenil (CEFOJ), Nicaragua

Sadikou Ayo Alaa, Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Democratie et le Developpement Economique (GERDEES), Benin

Enrique A. Baloyra, Centro de la Democracia Cubana, Miami, FL

Jean Max Bazin, Celebration 2004, Haiti

Astrid Benedek, Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, New York, NY

Leopold Berlanger, Haitian Institute for Research and Development, Haiti

Ricardo Bofill, The Cuban Committee for Human Rights, Miami, FL

Esmael Burhan, American Friends of Afghanistan, Omaha, NE

Rolando Cabrera, Centro de Estudios Politicos (CEDEP), Guatemala

Jose Castillo, Radio Corporacion, Nicaragua

Jose Luis Chea, Centro de Estudios Politicos (CEDEP), Guatemala

Lilliam Colston, Movimiento de Mujeres Nicaraguenses (MMN), Nicaragua

Eduardo Ferrero Costa, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales (CEPEDI), Peru

Penelope Faulkner, Que Me, France

Clara Fonsegra de Escobar, Conciencia, Colombia

Maria Gowlan, Conciencia, Argentina

Jose & Ana Maria Gutierrez, Radio San Cristobal, Nicaragua

Esther Silva de Gheris, Conciencia, Peru

Liang Heng, The Chinese Intellectual, New York, NY

Eugene Iwanciw, Ukrainian National Association, Washington, D.C.

Monica Jimenez de Barros, Participa, Chile

Arnoldo Kuestermann, Asociacion de Investigacion y Estudios Sociales (ASIES), Guatemala

Irena Lasota, Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, France
Ramiro de Leon Carpio, Instituto Atanasio Tzul, Guatemala
Dimon Liu, Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy in China, Washington, D.C.
Olga Mallarino de Pizano, Conciencia, Colombia
Nicolae Manolescu, Civic Alliance, Romania
Maripaz Martinez Nieto, International Coalition for Human Rights in Cuba, Spain
Nadia McConnell, Ukraine 2000, Washington, D.C.
Maria Rosa de Martini, Conciencia, Argentina
Emma Mercedes de Silvero, Mujeres Por La Democracia, Paraguay
Patrick Molutsi, Democracy Project, Botswana
Serges Montes, Celebration 2004, Haiti
Georges Nicolas, Human Resources Development Center, Haiti
Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu, Center for the Study and Research of Pluralist Democracy in the Third World (CERDET), Senegal
Boshena Olshaniwsky, Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine, Newark, NJ
Dette Pascaud, KABATID, Philippines
Guillermo Potoy, Centro de Formacion Juvenil (CEFOJ), Nicaragua
Jorge Poveda, Centro de Asistencia Democratica (CAD), Costa Rica
Brenda Pombar, Conciencia, Ecuador
Carlos Quinonez, Via Civica, Nicaragua
Julia Robles, Conciencia, Ecuador
Carmen-Maria Rodriguez, The Cuban Committee for Human Rights, New York, NY
Frantisek and Larisa Silnitsky, Problems of Eastern Europe, Washington, D.C.
Martin Simecka, Charter 77 Foundation, Czechoslovakia
Jean-Sylvera Simon, Celebration 2004, Haiti
Francis Blandon Somarriva, Movimiento de Mujeres Nicaraguenses (MMN), Nicaragua
Maciej Strzemiebusz, Polish Television, Poland
Juan and Anibal Toruno, Radio Dario, Nicaragua
Rev. Joseph Tshawane, King-Luthuli Transformation Centre, South Africa
María del Valle, International Coalition for Human Rights in Cuba, Spain
Elita Veidemane, Atmoda, Latvia
Chansamone Voravong, Laotian Democratic Initiatives, France
Vo Van Ai, Que Me, France
Aydin Yalcin, Yeni Forum, Turkey
Xavier Zavala, Libro Libre, Costa Rica
Luis Zuniga, Asopazco, Miami, FL
The National Endowment for Democracy is a private nonprofit organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. Through its worldwide grant program, the Endowment assists those abroad who are working for democratic goals. The Endowment, which has received an annual appropriation from the U.S. Congress, is a tax-exempt organization as defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

**BOARD OF DIRECTORS**

John Richardson  
*Chairman*  
Charles T. Manatt  
*Vice Chairman*  
Sally Shelton-Colby  
*Secretary*  
Jay Van Andel  
*Treasurer*  
Madeleine Albright  
Harry Barnes, Jr.  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Henry G. Cisneros  
Edward Donley  
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.  
Orrin G. Hatch  
James A. Joseph  
John T. Joyce  
Thomas H. Kean  
Lane Kirkland  
Winston Lord  
Mark Palmer  
Susan Kaufman Purcell  
Olin Robison  
Eddie N. Williams  
William E. Brock  
Dante B. Fascell  
*Chairmen Emeriti*  
Carl Gershman  
*President*  

1991 Conference Book Credits  
Editor: Margaret A. Ferry  
Editorial Assistant: Dennis Scott Day  
Cover Design: Studio Grafik  
Photos: Mattox Photography  

For further information, please contact:  
Public Information Office  
National Endowment for Democracy  
1101 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Suite 203  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Phone: (202) 293-9072  
FAX: (202) 223-6042