Events >> The Democratic Invention Lecture Series >> Diogo Freitas do Amaral
Professor of Political Science
University of Lisbon, Portugal
April 6, 1998
The Portuguese Transition to Democracy

While Diogo Freitas do Amaral cannot deny the powerful symbol that is Portugal's peaceful transition to democracy, he believes many fail to see that it is not a perfect model for other countries. Amaral does not see Portugal as a model because its people were twice robbed of their stated desire for democracy, and the delay in fulfilling the people's wishes proved costly. Fortunately, the cost of democracy has given the Portuguese considerable wisdom about governance and they are now implementing the many lessons they learned.

The first suppressing of the movement toward democracy began in 1968 with the elevation of Marcello Caetano as prime minister, a post he held for six years by using various repressive tactics against his opposition. But Caetano's tactics weren't sufficient and, on April 25, 1974, the military carried out a unique coup d'état, unique in that its goal was to bring about democracy. The leaders of the coup, the Junta of National Salvation and the Armed Forces Movement (MA), promised to avoid radicalism and to prepare Portugal for elections.

Exactly a year later, elections were held with the results in favor of the Socialists and the Popular Democrats, both of which promised a peaceful transition to democracy. But for a second time in a decade, the Portuguese people were denied their democratic rights. The Portuguese Communist Party, the radical left, and extreme elements of the MFA colluded to thwart the desire of the Portuguese. Beginning at the end of Caetano's regime, the Communists had worked hard to put their government into place by replacing the prime minister and the president with communists, arresting the major private business leaders, consolidating all unions with the communists' Intersindical, and instituting a "Council of the Revolution," the main governmental body (composed of communist military officers) that decreed measures of disastrous nationalization and collectivism. When the 1975 elections were ignored, the democrats refused to let the communists rule the country. Throughout the summer--known at the "Hot Summer of 1975"--Portugal was wrought with constant demonstrations and disturbances by both sides until November, when General Ramalho Eanes put down the communist coup in Lisbon and avoided civil war. This is the history of Portugal's rocky road to democracy; unfortunately, its normalization took another fourteen years.

The highlights of the fourteen transitional years include democratic presidential elections in 1976, abolition of the Council of the Revolution in 1982, joining the European Union in 1985, and finally, thoroughly reforming the Portuguese constitution in 1989. In that time, Portugal has paid a high price for the delays in its transition to democracy. An excellent comparison can be made with Spain, which also moved toward democracy in the 1970s, but did it in one fell swoop. While Portugal implemented nationalizations and subsequent privatizations, Spain restructured its economy for the better; while Portugal implemented and ended agricultural "reform," Spain succeeded in developing a prosperous agricultural sector; and it took Portugal thirteen years to develop a viable constitution while Spain had one at the outset of its transition. Clearly, Spain has come out ahead and Amaral attributes that to Spain's smooth transition to democracy. Furthermore, Amaral blames the bloated Portuguese government, brought on by left-wing leaders, for the sorry state of the economy. In the last fifteen years, civil servants' ranks have tripled, government expenses have doubled, and total public debt has increased seventeen times over. For all this expansion of the Portuguese state, there is widespread tax evasion, the judicial, educational, and health ministries are deeply troubled, Portugal's Social Security is threatened, and there is not enough public housing. For Amaral, there is no question that Portugal is being held back by a huge administrative state and he believes that the revolutionary transition to democracy cannot stop now.

If the Portuguese learned anything from their troubled path to democracy, it is that progress must be earned. Fortunately, the Portuguese have worked hard for progress in their country and not all indications are negative: the military is controlled by civilians, colonization has turned into a policy of friendship and cooperation, half-a-million expatriates have returned, political stability is now the norm, and public finance is under control. The Portuguese have learned many lessons from their history and are using them today to reverse the mistakes of governments in power from 1968 to 1975 and to continue their progress toward more prosperity.

(Special thanks to International Forum Intern, Mr. Alex Lamy, for writing this summary)

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