Events >> The Democratic Invention Lecture Series >> Afred Stepan
November 2, 1998
Federalism and Democracy

On November 2, Alfred Stepan, Professor of Political Science at Oxford University and the author of many publications on democracy, spoke on the subject of FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY. The lecture, presented at George Washington University, was part of a series called THE DEMOCRATIC INVENTION being cosponsored by NED's International Forum for Democratic Studies, the Mario Soares Foundation, and the Luso-American Development Foundation.

Pointing out that there are potential dangers as well as potential advantages of federalism in a democratic context, Stepan reminded the audience that while the majority of democratic countries in the world today are unitary, all the multinational democracies are federal. Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and India are all characterized by linguistic, ethnic, and other forms of fragmentation, but their federal systems offer them the means for managing some of the leading problems associated with extensive pluralism. In addition, Stepan continued, federalism in countries such as Russia, Nigeria, China, Mexico, and Burma is necessary if they are to emerge as successful democracies that respect cultural diversity and encourage socioeconomic development.

While there are many different models of federalism, Professor Stepan chose to examine the U.S. model, but also emphasized the importance of viewing it in a comparative perspective. Citing William Ryker, he noted that the U.S. model has three principal aspects: First, it is the result of a bargain entered into by previously sovereign polities, each of which agreed to give up part of its sovereignty in order to pool its resources with the others and thereby increase the security and economic potential of the U.S. in general. Second, these states also sought to prevent a tyranny of the majority by establishing two legislative chambers, one for representation according to population (the House of Representatives), and one for representation of the states on the basis of equality (the Senate). Third, as a result of the federal character of the U.S. Constitution, all of the states share equally in the constitutional powers of the Senate, thereby providing constitutional symmetry. Although many view the U.S. model of federalism as a leading example, that model, according to Stepan, is not consistent with most other democratic federal systems; on the contrary, it is actually a significant exception. It is possible, he said, that U.S.-style federalism would even be dangerous for democratizing countries, especially those with multinational populations.

To evaluate the applicability of the U.S. model, it is therefore necessary to view it in comparative perspective. Unlike the U.S. case, characterized by a bargain made between the original states in the U.S.(a kind of "coming together" federalism), some important democratic federations have emerged as a result of a different procedure and rationale. States like India, Belgium, and Spain, all with unitary features, appear to have concluded that the best way to hold their countries together democratically is to devolve power and bring the otherwise contending polities into federations. Under this form of federalism, which Stepan referred to as "holding together" federalism, such federations are formed not out of agreements entered into by previously sovereign states to give up part of their sovereignty for the sake of union, but out of agreements reached by members of constituent assemblies themselves to create such unions.

A third form of federalism that Professor Stepan described can be called "putting together" federalism. In this case, unlike democratic approaches, a central power makes a strong coercive effort to create a single multinational state out of a group of independent states. This model, he said, can be seen in the formation of the Soviet Union, for instance.

In addition to delineating these three general models of federalism, Professor Stepan also examined what he called the "demos-enabling/demos-constraining" continuum. One may measure the demos-enabling or demos-constraining character of a state by considering the nature of representation in the upper chamber. According to this analysis, the U.S. is second only to Brazil in being demos-constraining because of the degree to which the "territorial" branch of the legislature (the Senate) participates in law-making. In general, according to Stepan, the greater the overrepresentation of less populous states and the greater the underrepresentation of more populous states, the more that chamber is demos-constraining. Given the two-seats-per-state formula in the Senate, a vote in Wyoming is in effect equal to 66 votes in California; this reveals how demos-constraining the U.S. actually is. Other factors Professor Stepan considers important in evaluating the demos-constraining or demos-enabling potential of a state include the policy scope of the territorial chamber, the degree to which decisions on issues are allocated to the states or other sub-units of the polity, and the degree to which the federation is constitutionally symmetrical. On this last point, unlike the symmetrical federalism found in the U.S., Stepan pointed out, all other multinational democracies are asymmetrical, assigning different linguistic, cultural, and legal affairs to different states to help ensure that the multinational polity can be held together.

[A special note of thanks to International Forum intern, April Swain, for writing this summary].

BOOKS BY ALFRED STEPAN:

  Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: southern europe, south america and post-communist europe, coauthored with Juan J. Linz (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

  Democratizing Brazil, editor (Oxford University Press, 1989).

  Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the southern cone (Princeton, University Press, 1988).

  The State and Society: Peru in comparative perspective (Princeton University Press, 1978).

  The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, coedited with Juan J. Linz (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

FORTHCOMING BOOKS:

  Federalism, Democracy, and Nation, coauthored with Juan J. Linz.

  Research project on "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy."