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International Forum >> The Democracy Forum for East Asia>> Inaugural Conference
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Introduction
Session I: Providing Democratic Leadership Session II: Conflicting Interests and Strategies of Governmental Actors in Effecting Economic Reform Session III: Civil Society’s Response to the Economic Reform Agenda Agenda Participants |
Session I: Providing Democratic Leadership The economic crisis in East Asia has raised critical issues about the role of democratic governments in effecting economic reform. On the one hand, the crisis has posed difficult challenges for the aspiring and emergent democracies; on the other hand, it has provided an extraordinary opportunity to consolidate democracy by establishing a form of political leadership consonant with and committed to democratic values and institutions. Unfortunately, democratic governments in East Asia have not taken full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the crisis to provide the kind of leadership that would effectively consolidate democracy in the region. Although the governments have been able to weather the crisis without undermining their democratic foundations, they have fallen short of fully exploiting the potential of a democratic system to establish and institutionalize democratic leadership in the course of effecting economic reform. This gap attests to the difficulty of institutionalizing democracy even under normal circumstances, much less under the constraints imposed by economic crisis. The importance of using democratic and transparent methods of deliberation and negotiation to adopt economic reform policies was a recurrent theme of the workshop. Participants from a number of countries agreed that economic reform will be more sustainable if it is debated openly in a given society and if major interest groups participate in discussions about the design and implementation of reform policies. While some participants acknowledged that this might lead to a more gradual pace of reform, there was broad agreement that such an open and deliberative process would better reconcile the short-term tensions between democracy and market-oriented reforms, and that the principles and procedures of democracy should not be sacrificed in the pursuit of structural economic reforms, however important they might be. But pursuing economic reform in a democratic fashion requires skills of political communication and persuasion, negotiation, and consensus-building that not many of the region’s policy makers appear to have in abundance. In applying the criterion of democracy to East Asian governments’ reform efforts, the nature of democratic leadership and the context in which that leadership is exercised must first be considered. Given the constraints of effecting structural economic reform, there is the possibility of a tradeoff between democracy and efficacy. Increasing public participation in the economic reform process may be good for democracy, but not for efficient and rapid resolution of pressing economic problems. There may also be other tradeoffs that political leaders must weigh carefully in deciding economic policy. Another consideration is the qualitative aspect of democratic leadership. The model of democratic leadership is not uniform but varies with how the political leader deals with the particular factors impinging on economic reform. One common problem is that groups that fear an adverse impact on their narrow interests will try to block reforms that benefit society in general. Typically such groups are the most vocal in opposing reform and thus have a disproportionate influence over public policy. Lastly, elected leaders themselves are often motivated by short-term interests (such as the need for reelection) rather than long-term interests. Even when the above factors have been considered, the East Asian governments have fallen short of providing democratic leadership on substantive grounds. In countries that have been the hardest hit by economic crisis—Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia—the governments have been unable or unwilling (or both) to consult and involve the wider public in drafting an economic reform agenda and, more importantly, to articulate the need for reform to a public hungry for vision from its leaders. As a result, these governments have not been particularly effective in transforming the support for reform that existed at the onset of the economic crisis into support for specific reform programs. Most roundtable participants agreed that because democratic societies are characterized by a plurality of interests and views, successful leaders must not only articulate policies clearly, but must, in effect, sell their policies to a skeptical public. They must bargain and compromise with different organized interests, generate broad public support, and forge coalitions as necessary to enact needed reforms. Successful leaders are conciliatory in tone and approach and display openness and flexibility in dealing with constituent groups whose vital interests may be adversely affected by the reforms. Democratic leadership, however, does not imply avoiding difficult choices to be all things to all people. On the contrary, it requires making choices between alternative policies and conflicting strategies for building policy consensus. Reformers must make practical decisions as to how much of their policy interests they are willing to sacrifice to win over their opponents, and how much political risk they are willing to incur to achieve their goals. Above all, democratic leadership must be proactive, not reactive, if it is to get things done. The key to successful leadership is building a consensus from the diverse and conflicting interests inherent in a democratic society. It is only by providing this kind of leadership that political leaders can be successful not only in enacting economic reform but in strengthening the democratic foundation of society. |
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