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International Forum >> The Democracy Forum for East Asia>> Inaugural Conference
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Introduction
Session I: Providing Democratic Leadership Session II: Conflicting Interests and Strategies of Governmental Actors in Effecting Economic Reform Session III: Civil Society’s Response to the Economic Reform Agenda Agenda Participants |
Session II: Conflicting Interests and Strategies of Governmental Actors in Effecting Economic Reform
The conflicting interests and strategies of governmental actors—presidents and prime ministers, ministers and the bureaucracy, or ruling parties and their oppositions—in dealing with the economic crisis have been a stumbling block to economic reform. Despite the consensus for reform within the government at the onset of the crisis, the differing interests of various governmental actors have often led to confusion, delay, and the weakening of economic reform. In Korea and Thailand, for example, the conflict of interests has been most evident in the relationship between the ruling and opposition parties, and between elected officials and bureaucrats. Despite a fundamental agreement on the need for reform, opposition parties have criticized and, at times, opposed government reform policies to score political points with their domestic constituencies. Without offering their own alternatives, opposition parties have faulted reform proposals that they claim would increase unemployment or do other social harm. When the new prime minister in Thailand took the initiative in the wake of the crisis, for example, the opposition went so far as to challenge successfully the constitutionality of some of his proposed legislation. Attempts by opposition parties to exploit the crisis politically have helped erode public confidence by projecting the image of a government in gridlock and disarray. The bureaucracy has also attempted to block the government’s reform program to protect its own interests. At the onset of the crisis, the Korean government decided to downsize not only to reduce the budget but to show that it could tighten its own belt before asking the rest of society to do the same. Without setting such an example themselves, government leaders did not believe they would have the moral leverage to persuade business conglomerates to shed unprofitable subsidiaries or labor unions to make concessions that would increase flexibility in the labor market. Not surprisingly, the bureaucracy balked at the projected layoffs and budget reductions and refused to cooperate with the president’s plans for government downsizing. Through widespread and continuous opposition and intense lobbying in the National Assembly, the bureaucracy succeeded in limiting the reform to minor reductions and organizational reshuffling. The government’s failure to tighten its own belt weakened its moral authority to call upon other social actors to make concessions for the sake of economic reform. In a time of crisis, democratic leaders, both elected or nonelected, have a special responsibility to resolve their conflicts—or at least to reduce them to manageable proportions—so they can agree on a concrete policy. While legitimate differences must be aired and debated, leaders must stay focused on the larger goal of economic reform. This effort requires the various governmental actors to be self-disciplined, but also to make compromises and even momentarily to set aside their conflicting interests to forge a policy consensus. What governmental actors have to realize is that, even in a democracy where public deliberation of the issues is often a lengthy process, there is a time for talk and a time for action. In a crisis, governmental leaders must act quickly and decisively not only to develop a clear course of action, but to show that they are committed to the planned course of action by firm and consistent application of the policy. |
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