|
|
|
|
International Forum >> The Democracy Forum for East Asia>> Inaugural Conference
|
|
|
Introduction
Session I: Party Structure Session II: Party Decision Making Session III: The Candidate Nomination Process Session IV: Citizen Outreach Agenda Participants |
Session I: Party Structure Chair: Chung In Moon, Yonsei University Participants generally agreed that greater participation, accountability of leadership, transparency, and institutional safeguards are important for the democratization of political parties. The discussion identified a number of sources and elements of the undemocratic character of political parties in East Asia. These include hierarchical domination by a few individual leaders, the prominence of personality and personal ties in decision making and party nominations, lack of transparency in decision making, fragmentation, inefficiency, traditional social ties, and inflexibility in engaging the public. It was widely recognized that problems such as these have greatly diminished public support and respect for political parties in East Asia. The discussion in this session mainly explored how and to what degree parties need to be democratized in East Asia, and where the pressure to reform will come from. Underlying the discussion was the assumption, which had been vigorously articulated by several participants in the July 1999 founding conference of the Democracy Forum, that the democratization of political parties is an important priority for improving the quality and stability of democracy in East Asia. Political parties in the region generally lack strong bases of popular support and transparent, well-institutionalized, rules and procedures. As a result, most societies in the region manifest high levels of cynicism about political parties and party politicians. This cynicism tends to diminish the public’s support and esteem for democracy in general. Increasing public commitment to democracy requires that key political institutions—not least, political parties—become more open, responsive, and accountable, and more actively engaged with the public and its views. For these reasons, democratizing the internal organization and functioning of political parties is seen as an important step toward deepening democracy overall and thus advancing new democracies toward consolidation. The tension between democratic accountability and party cohesion: Several participants expressed concern over how to define the process of democratization, given differences in political culture. The starting point for this discussion was one participant’s argument that even people who have political awareness may not want to see a contest between potential political leaders in the party. It was argued that party members may want a party leader to go forward without opposition, but this does not mean that a democratic process was prevented. Many participants throughout the working conference made reference to the tension or trade-off between effectiveness and democracy. On the one hand, political parties in a democracy need to be democratically accountable, not only externally, to the electorate once every four or five years, but internally, to their members and their various constituencies. Greater democratic deliberation and transparency in procedures and methods of decision making, and more extensive and meaningful grassroots participation in the affairs of the party, are all important goals for the reform of political parties. But political parties also need some degree of hierarchical organization to function effectively, especially during election campaigns when decisions require expertise and must sometimes be made quickly. Based on extensive experience working with political parties in countries around the world, one participant emphasized the need for effective organization that elicits member participation. Membership, he argued, must be defined and structured in some way. A membership fee, for example, provides an incentive for members to seek some voice and to be active in party affairs. Internal party reform should focus on three targets: leadership selection, candidate selection, and policy formulation. In parties around the world, reform in recent years has focused more on the first two areas than the third. Leaders tend to want to keep a tight grip on policy formulation. One way to make them more accountable—and to enhance democracy within the party—is to provide for regular rotation in party offices. The Irish party Fine Gael, for example, has a three-year term limit for branch, district, constituency, and national officers (such as the chair of the Executive Council). The party leader, who is always the party’s nominee for prime minister, is not subject to the term limit but must seek a vote of confidence from the parliamentary party within three months of a general election (unless the party is forming a government). The vote, which is held by secret ballot, ensures that the leader is accountable to the party on a regular basis and cannot remain as leader indefinitely. In addition, Fine Gael party rules can only be amended at a general party congress, and any change must be confirmed by a mail ballot of all party members. Some years ago, the selection of delegates to the party congress was opened up to a vote by all members of the party branch, but only people who had been members for at least three months could vote. These various measures provide a check against the party being hijacked by a particular faction. At the same time, they can invigorate a party. Fine Gael membership increased by 35 percent after party decision making on candidate nominations and other issues was opened up to the general membership. Organizational reforms can change the exclusive and top-down nature of party governance and leadership selection. For a long time, decisions of the Liberal Party of the Philippines were limited to a small group, the party Steering Committee. At its last congress, the Liberal Party abolished the Steering Committee and replaced it with a 100-member Directorate. It is composed of representatives of party branches, with each of the country’s four major regions supplying 25 members. This body elects members of a National Executive Council, which also includes the party’s elected governors, mayors, senators, and congressmen and the chairs of party sectoral organizations. The new structure is flexible, in that a subgroup of 15 (the political council) can meet on a daily basis to take quick decisions, but it must then submit its decisions for ratification to the Directorate or National Executive Council. Thailand’s Democrat Party has a 49-member National Executive Committee, but that body is also too large to make decisions on a daily or weekly basis. It therefore delegates most of its decisions to a 17-member Steering Committee, and then holds an annual national convention to set broader policy directions. By contrast, Thailand’s New Aspiration Party recently suspended its Steering Committee (of 15 to 17 members), because of a belief in the party that it had not been reporting adequately to the National Executive Committee and had lost accountability. Now the latter body (composed of House members and representatives of branch offices and regional committees) will be the primary decision-making organ. Although it is large (70 members), a participant felt it could work. In Asia, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stands out for its level of internal democracy. Its party chairman serves for only two years and is elected, often in hotly contested races, by the party members. The party congress consists of delegates who are elected by regional branches, and the party chairman has no say over the nomination of candidates, who are chosen democratically in party primary contests. However, this system of party governance suffers from too much democracy. Because the party leadership has no say in the nomination of candidates for parliament, the party winds up with a weaker slate of candidates than it would have otherwise. For this reason, DPP leaders have proposed to the party congress that the 31-member Central Committee (which is elected by the party membership) be given some say in the selection of candidates. Most participants acknowledged the need for some kind of balance between control and professionalism on the one hand and openness and mass participation on the other. If professionalism and central direction are lost, parties become too diffuse and can lose their institutional coherence and electoral competitiveness. Indirect election can blend the principles of democracy and professionalism. In Poland, for example, delegates to the party congress are chosen through indirect election, which gives more influence to regular party leaders while still allowing democratic input. In many parties members of parliament are automatically selected as delegates to the party congress. There is also a tension between internal fairness and the party’s competitiveness in a general election. The principal objective of a political party is to win political power. A party chooses a candidate who can mobilize the enthusiasm of the public, while an individual who has risen from the grassroots and labored with dedication may be bypassed because he is not likely to inspire broad support. What is effective from the standpoint of the party as a campaign organization may not seem fair to all the party members. Polish parties were cited as an example of an internally democratic system that has not had a true contested battle for leadership in at least ten years. Since it is rare for a party to be blessed with an individual who represents the party spirit and also has the qualities of an effective leader, parties tend to nominate candidates who are most likely to win elections. A general consensus is formed within the political party even before the election takes place. Even though elections are conducted fairly, one could argue that this is not an entirely democratic system. Does pressure to reform come from within or without political parties? There was a wide spectrum of opinions concerning whether pressure to reform should come from within the party or from the grassroots. Some participants maintained that reform requires a synergy between party leaders, party members, and the demands of the public. Other participants, however, debated over which group would actually drive reform, suggesting that it depended on the party structure and political culture. Some argued that pressure to democratize should come from within the party. It takes a strong leader to release some of the party’s hierarchical authority and to allow more participation from below. If the leaders are strong enough, such internal democratization does not necessarily mean that a party will lose power. A Korean participant expressed concern over this theory when applied to the Korean case. Why would party leaders give up their privileges and power? Because of the strong regional basis of the vote in Korea, parties can count on getting a predictable range of votes without having to democratize, so there is no incentive for party leaders to pursue substantive democratization. Other participants also suggested that the impetus for party reform would have to come, to a substantial extent, from the mass base of the party, and even from outside the party, in civil society and the mass media. In a later session, a Korean academic participant noted that recent efforts to reform corrupt and undemocratic party practices had not been successful. In particular, he pointed to the need for an accounting system of party funds to ensure transparency, so that National Assembly members would be less dependent on party bosses for their campaign financing. “Parties cannot reform on their own,” he argued. “We need civil society to press for political reform.” Much of the impetus for reform in Thailand has come from civil society, which pressed for the adoption of a new constitution in 1997, followed by new organic laws on elections, electoral administration, political parties, and corruption control. Thailand’s organic law on political parties requires that a party establish one branch in each of the country’s 400 parliamentary constituencies, and that each branch leader be elected by party members in the constituency. Thailand’s oldest party, the Democrat Party, now has branch organizations in more than half of the constituencies and is encouraging members to set up branches in additional constituencies. The party’s National Executive Committee, in turn, is elected by the party’s branch leaders and members of parliament. The New Aspiration Party is also following the mandate of the organic law to set up branches in each constituency. Several Asian participants felt there was much to learn from the Thai example, particularly the way in which leaders from nongovernmental organizations and academia played a principled role in pushing for political reforms. In the Philippines, many civil society organizations are beginning to discuss constitutional reform and they are deriving inspiration from the example of Thailand. In some countries, the obstacles to party democratization may lie as much outside the party—in the social structure and political culture—as inside. In Indonesia, for example, the leadership of the National Awakening Party (PKB) comes mainly from ulama, traditional Muslim religious leaders, who drive support for the party in a patrimonial way. While in theory the party leadership is elected from below, in reality the flow of influence is from these local religious leaders. The party’s authority structure reflects its dependence on this communal group and its established leaders. As a result, the PKB’s Central Board is weak, and power mainly resides in the 300 district branches it has established since Indonesia’s political opening. While the party structure is decentralized, it is not necessarily democratic. In the Philippines as well, party politics is controlled by local elites or warlords who shift from one party to another looking for patronage and who perpetuate a clientelistic style of politics. Given the highly presidential nature of the governmental system and the personalistic character of the political culture, parties in the Philippines are weak. These social and cultural phenomena present a challenge to any party that seeks to modernize and reform its structures. The Liberal Party, for example, is now trying to move away from domination by a few individual leaders by strengthening the party caucus, having the party congress elect party leaders, and recruiting grassroots members to establish party branches. But many believe that comprehensive reform of political parties in the Philippines will require a much larger process of political reform of the entire system (including public financing of political parties). Conclusion: Many party representatives recognized the problem inherent in the large gap between an outwardly democratic political system and an array of political parties that are internally undemocratic. In Korea particularly, parties are based on the leadership of one person who controls all the resources. In several of the countries represented, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan, the way that political parties mobilize votes is heavily dependent on the distribution of patronage at the local level and must work through local bosses, clan leaders, religious figures, and others. Many participants believed that the electoral process would become more meaningful and democratic to the extent that political parties sought to mobilize support behind policy positions and platforms rather than relying on personalities, regional or other identity ties, and patronage. |
|
| |