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International Forum >> The Democracy Forum for East Asia>> Inaugural Conference
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Introduction
Session I: Party Structure Session II: Party Decision Making Session III: The Candidate Nomination Process Session IV: Citizen Outreach Agenda Participants |
Session III: The Candidate Nomination Process Chair: Jong Wan Kim, Sejong Institute The third session surveyed descriptions and comparisons of the nomination process for legislative and other candidates used by political parties in Asia and elsewhere. It also considered reform efforts underway, obstacles to reform, and reform alternatives. The tension between internal party democracy and the organizational cohesion and electoral competitiveness of the party was an overarching, recurrent theme of the third session. There was wide recognition of the need for some balance between these conflicting goals, requiring some role for the central party organization in selecting candidates. Participants discovered that the candidate nomination process varies considerably across countries in Asia (and around the world). There are also important gaps between the formal and actual practice of candidate nomination. It was felt that no single external model for reforming the candidate nomination process would work. Balancing internal democracy and party coherence in the nomination process: The question of how parties should nominate their candidates for elective office involves an inescapable trade-off between competition and cohesion within the party. Vigorous discussion among the working conference participants appeared to underscore much previous writing and analysis about this basic trade-off. If there is no competition and grassroots participation in selecting candidates, parties lack internal democracy and transparency, and both democracy in the overall political system and the public image of political parties suffer as a result. However, if there is no role for the central party leadership in candidate selection, a party may lack unity of purpose, programmatic or ideological coherence, and organizational discipline. These deficiencies can seriously endanger the cohesion and effectiveness—even the viability—of parties, and thus the quality of democracy. The goal of grassroots participation and choice must therefore be weighed against the need for party coherence and discipline. Similarly, several participants spoke of the need for a balance between centralization and decentralization in the decision-making processes of the party. A participant from Thailand argued for the importance of involvement by the central party organization in the nomination process to preserve party discipline and coherence (and thus party viability). For that reason, the National Executive Committee (NEC) has the final say on party nominations in Thailand. Since the NEC is elected from within the party, the process has a democratic basis. In fact, there are other elements of democratic participation in nominations as well. While the NEC has the ultimate power to nominate candidates at all levels (in both the Democrat Party and the NAP), the party branch offices and ad hoc selection committees and regional committees propose and screen candidates for the NEC to review. The one office for which this method is not used is the upper chamber of parliament, the Senate, because under the 1997 constitution, senators are not permitted to have a party affiliation and parties are forbidden from playing a role in these campaigns. A similar process (local consultation and participation but final selection by the National Executive Committee) is used by the Liberal Party in the Philippines. Here, however, there are two differences: nominations for subnational offices (governor, mayor, local councillors) are essentially determined by the local branches, while senators are elected under a first-past-the-post system, with the whole country as one constituency. Such a system weakens the position of small parties, which are forced into coalitions with either the administration party or the dominant opposition party prior to the campaign to give their candidates a chance of winning. Both the Philippines and Thailand show signs of party weakness during the candidate nomination process. The problem is especially serious in the Philippines during congressional midterm elections, when opposition parties find it difficult to retain and recruit candidates. Most candidates want to run on the ticket of the ruling party because of the Philippine president’s vast control over patronage and local development spending. Thus, while the ruling party tends to present a strong list of candidates, the opposition is normally divided into several weak parties, some of which many enter into tactical alliances with the ruling party, which allocates certain constituencies to them. These factors limit the ability of a party to nominate candidates. In contrast to the Philippines and Thailand, Taiwan has a strong party system in which it is relatively rare for politicians to switch to an opposing party. For the national parliamentary elections, DPP candidates are chosen through a party primary in each legislative district, in which half of the decision is determined by a vote of party members and the other half by a public opinion poll. Similar methods choose candidates at lower levels. The difficulty of finding a method that is both democratic and effective is underscored by the fact that, in its 14-year history, the party has changed its method of nominating candidates at least five times. In 1996, the DPP ran a U.S.-style primary election to choose its presidential candidate, but less than 10 percent of the DPP members turned out to vote. Despite the many obstacles to democratizing the candidate nomination process, several parties have moved closer toward improving democratic participation while maintaining party cohesion. In Thailand, the new constitution and organic laws set minimum standards for political parties. People are nominated to executive offices, whereas before these privileges tended to be bestowed on leaders of a faction in a party. The system is becoming more transparent because more capable people have the opportunity to run for office, a Thai participant argued. In Cambodia, at least one party (the Sam Rainsy Party) is reforming its candidate nomination process to allow for more participation by party members. In the future, party members will be required to enroll in a provincial council, and a congress of provincial, district, and commune councils will be called to elect the party-list candidates for parliament for each province. Obstacles to a transparent nomination process: Participants reached a general consensus that lack of education, fear of involvement in politics, and controversies over the control of resources pose obstacles to the democratization of parties (as well as other institutions). Even if there is political will within the party to reach out to various sectors of society, education and reform are necessary to make these efforts effective. Several party representatives expressed concern that too many voters do not understand what parliament is, and people at the grassroots do not fully comprehend the issues at hand. The lack of past democratic practice and experience can also be an obstacle. During the election campaign of 1999, as Indonesia was making a historic transition from authoritarian rule, parties lost a lot of credibility because of the lack of transparency and accountability in the candidate nomination process. Undemocratic practices reasserted themselves, as parties changed their candidate nominations even after an internal election had been held. An additional problem was that Indonesia had created a complicated electoral system that combined elements of proportional representation and majoritarian systems. Many participants and party insiders knew before the election that those who were awarded seats could be different from the ones for whom voters thought they were voting. Despite the best efforts of numerous local and international NGOs to educate voters about this possibility prior to the fact, however, it became apparent after the general election that many ordinary voters did not fully understand how the new system had worked. The case of Indonesia also shows that decentralization of the party nomination process does not necessarily ensure democratization. In the PKB, which is dependent on the traditional authority of the local ulama, the loyalty of the candidate to the ulama in a particular district weighs heavily in determining the party’s nominations to lower-level offices. The central party organization has virtually no say over nominations to provincial and district assemblies, which are determined by the party’s provincial and district boards. This, however, is in keeping with the spirit of a new local autonomy law that almost completely decentralizes governing power and spending authority away from Jakarta to the provinces and districts. The gap between formal rules and actual practice: Democratizing candidate nominations requires bridging the gap between formal rules and actual practice in some countries, particularly Korea. If this is to be done, the problems of leadership domination (“party bossism”) and money politics must be confronted. Several participants maintained that in Korea, the national party leader decides almost single-handedly who the party’s candidates for the National Assembly will be. The criteria for selection are loyalty to the party, personal loyalty to the party leader (which strengthens the leader’s control), and the ability to finance their own campaigns and perhaps to donate substantial money to the party. Since many party nominations (both in some geographical constituencies and in the top tier on the party list for proportional representation) can be considered safe, the money factor essentially means that “a lot of people buy their seats.” Anticipating voters’ negative reaction to money politics, some parties instituted committees to create the image that the nomination process is bottom-up and that candidates are chosen based on effectiveness. However, several Korean participants supported the contention that actual nomination practices are not democratic and transparent, despite the formal appearance. The one Korean party that appeared to have a democratic selection process for its parliamentary candidates was the new Democratic Labor Party of Korea. It nominated 22 candidates for the April elections by a majority vote of the party membership in each constituency. However, none of its candidates went on to win a National Assembly seat. In discussing possible reforms, one participant argued that it is simply not realistic to emulate a U.S.-style system of primary elections. Unless something is first done to curb money politics in Korea and certain other Asian democracies, selection of candidates through primary elections would only tighten the grip of local political machines that have disproportionate access to money. This is why greater transparency and accountability in campaign and party finance are so important. There are also the questions of what independent body would supervise a party primary election, and how such an election can be meaningful in the absence of active participation by party members. It is important to maintain a sense of realism. It became apparent that East Asian democracies are hardly the only emerging democracies in which money matters heavily in the electoral process. In Poland, the buying of nominations to safe seats is considered unethical but not illegal. There is also some evidence that parties give nominations to candidates who have weak party links but who enjoy popularity or stature in society. Even for Poland’s PR seats, people vote with specific candidates in mind. The reality is that parties want to win elections, and they thus seek candidates who can help them do that. Any reform must start by recognizing this most basic electoral incentive. A participant reiterated the necessity of a well-defined party structure. Before parties can generate more scope for membership participation, they must provide a defined structure for membership: who are the members of the party, how are they recognized, and what are their obligations? There must also be clearer provisions for party accountability. These types of reforms are necessary to improve both the organizational coherence and the democratic character of the party. Even as mass participation in the candidate nomination process is extended, a role for the central party organization must be maintained, or the cohesion of the party will be lost. The Green Party in Ireland failed to develop because it had a weak hierarchical structure and little organizational coherence. Although the party had some decision-making mechanisms, there was no recognizable titular leader to whom voters could relate. Ironically, some role for the central party is also important, for equity reasons. If a party wants to achieve a certain gender or age (or other demographic) balance in its nomination of candidates, it needs to allow the central organization some role in shaping the overall national mix of party candidates. Otherwise, the uncoordinated decisions of many local and regional party branches may result in the exclusion of women or minority candidates. One issue of debate among participants was whether parties should strive to infuse parliament with new members or continue to support incumbents. Some participants stated that all democracies have high proportions of incumbents, allowing for greater professionalism, continuity, and experience. The trade-off is that voters are left with less influence over who gets elected, and parties and parliament may thus become less responsive to voter concerns. Conclusion: The discussion in this third session highlighted the formidable historical, cultural, and practical obstacles, as well as intrinsic contradictions, that confront efforts to democratize the candidate nomination process. However, it also identified a number of alternative, concrete reforms that parties can adopt to develop a nomination process that is fairer, more open and transparent, and more likely to promote participation and choice from the grassroots. These reforms can go a long way toward democratizing a party’s means for selecting its candidates without stripping the central party organization of the measure of involvement that preserves the party’s institutional coherence and effectiveness. Each party must find its own balance between democracy and coherence, but most Asian parties must clearly reform if they are to improve their own public image and the quality of democracy in their countries. |
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