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Publications >> International Forum Publications >> The 1999 Elections and the Future of Nigeria
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Chair: Larry Diamond
Panelists agreed that this is a decisive moment, since people have been waiting to adopt and consolidate democracy in Nigeria for a very long time. Eight years ago, in fact, several of the panelists participated in another conference on democracy in Nigeria; the report on that long ago meeting was entitled "Transition Without End." Following the inauguration of a civilian government on 29 May 1999, the next step should be Nigeria's transition to a constitutional system, a more trans-parent system with greater accountability. Clement Nwankwo described the work of the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 66 human rights and civil-society organizations formed in September 1998. Most member organizations of the TMGare longstanding opponents of military rule in Nigeria. While members had concerns about the ability of the military to lead a transition in Nigeria, there was a consensus that it was important to monitor the military's commitment to its promises, from voter registration to the inauguration of a civilian president. The TMG made efforts to be as broadly representative as possible. It includes, for example, Christian and Muslim religious organizations, women's groups, groups that thoroughly distrusted the transition process, and groups whose members stood as electoral candidates. Nearly 11,000 TMG election monitors were deployed throughout Nigeria during the four rounds of elections. The TMG believes that it is very important to continue monitoring events following the presidential election, including the court case filed by Chief Falae, the joint app-ad candidate who lost the election. Chief Falae has said that Nigeria needs to document for posterity the controversy over the elections. One panelist pointed out that in 1993 it was a court case that no one took very seriously, filed by an unknown organization called the Association for a Better Nigeria, that provided the pretext for the military regime's annulment of the elections. So it is particularly important this time to ensure that no one has an excuse to derail the transition process. The TMG monitored developments until the inauguration ceremony on 29 May 1999. Legitimacy Panelists discussed a number of issues and problems in the aftermath of the elections. One of the most immediate is the question of the new government's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Low voter turnout in all rounds of the elections clearly limits the degree of legitimacy of General Obasanjo and his government. The TMG estimates that no more than 25 percent of Nigerians voted in the presidential election; this is clearly not a mandate from the majority of the citizenry. The new leadership has very little room for maneuver, given high popular expectations; limited credibility due to the election irregularities; continued concern over the role of the military, which at a minimum will be a potent interest group; and serious economic problems following the years of dictatorship. The country's infrastructure is archaic, the supply of electricity is erratic, there are gasoline shortages in an oil-producing country, and millions of people are unemployed. General Obasanjo will need to build legitimacy, in the words of one panelist, "by not starting out with business as usual" in the face of these problems. Many of Obasanjo's supporters come from among the military and discredited politicians; people expect him to retire at least some of them and bring in younger people with better credentials. Federalism A second crucial issue in the effort to make Nigeria a constitutional democracy, and one discussed by the panel at some length, is federalism. Beginning with the process of Nigeria's decolonization from Britain in the 1950s, and using what one panelist termed "common sense as opposed to political theory," Nigerians decided that a federal system of government was essential for their country. The 1963 Constitution incorporated a federal constitution with a constitution from each region. Even during the civil war of the late 1960s, the military was forced to respect the autonomy of the regions. Ironically, federalism was virtually ended by the ascension of General Obasanjo to power in the 1970s. Everything was centralized, including the universities and religious activities. Obasanjo, in the words of one speaker, "brought the current constitutional disarray on himself as well as on the rest of the country." Since Obasanjo left power in the early 1980s, the military has continued to vandalize the federal system, withholding revenue owed to the states and localities, proliferating new states, and instituting as state governors a regular rotation of military officers completely beholden to the head of state in Abuja. Nigeria is a vast and complex country that needs many strong leaders rather than one traditional "big man." People therefore expect that the current transition process will restore federalism and end the military's unitary command structure. One panelist argued that it is, in fact, in Obasanjo's own interests to return to a system of power-sharing with the regions, because that is at least one policy that will please most Nigerians and in turn bring the government international goodwill. Several facets of the return to a federal system were discussed. These included the task of constitutional and functional decentralization (following the long-ignored principle that the central government should not undertake any function that can effectively be discharged at a lower level of government); the task of financial devolution (which should include breaking the federal stranglehold that exists on nearly 80 percent of public revenues and expenditures and using a derivation principle both to compensate oil-producing areas and to reduce the central government's capacity to intervene in interregional economic inequalities); and the task of structural reconfiguration (which includes reassessing the number of current states, their configuration, and the implications for interregional and ethnic relations). Regional and Ethnic Issues A third major concern for Nigeria and its new government is addressing regional and ethnic problems. In the words of one panelist, "Nigerians expect the transition to end the domination of a narrow, exclusionary elite from the north." The past 14 years of military rule have been Nigeria's most sectionally restive since the civil war. Two manifestations of this were Nigeria's short-term, controversial membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and an aborted 1990 coup that aimed at expelling the Muslim north from the Nigerian federation. During the recent election process, argued one panelist, there was a tacit agreement that the next president should come from the south, despite a disavowal of this goal by the Abubakar administration. Northerners, many of whom feel that the north must retain state power as a ounterbalance to southern economic and educational advantage, remain suspicious of the presidential election results. However, Obasanjo is not seen as having disturbed northern dominance during his previous tenure. Ironically, he remains unpopular in his own southwestern region. His winning the People's Democratic Party presidential nomination over Alex Ekweme was unpopular among the Ibos, who continue to feel marginalized since the civil war. It remains a fact of political life in Nigeria that the president's ethnic and regional identity is considered more important than his personal abilities or ideological and policy orientation. Politics is still seen as an ethnically based zero-sum game. The low voter turnout, however, hows Nigerians' disenchantment with this ethnoregional outlook. To resolve these continuing issues, Nigeria, in the words of one speaker, "will need a president who is completely detribalized and committed to using federalism to share power and resources broadly and equitably." The Military A fourth major challenge discussed was finding a new role for the Nigerian military. Despite the commitment of General Abubakar to making a transition to civilian rule, the military has undoubtedly dictated the pace and content of that transition. Although on one level Nigeria may look like what Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman term a "post-crisis transition," with the military in disrepute and the economy in disarray, the relative weakness of civil society and politicalparties in Nigeria means that in fact the military still retains considerable influence. Few reforms have been made in the military, aside from a few key retirements. There is an urgent need for dialogue on a nonpolitical role for the military. The military needs a new professional mission and a new force structure, possibly including a significant reduction from the current level of 80,000-90,000 troops. Civilian control structures and expertise also need to be developed, since civilians have had no role in managing defense and security for the past three decades. Dialogue and engagement are needed to break down a long history of distrust and unproductive collusion between the military and civilian politicians. One panelist characterized the military's influence in the near future as more likely to be a veto power over certain institutional arrangementscoupled with a demand for immunity from prosecution for corruption and human rights violationsthan a coherent agenda of its own. The role of civil society in deterring coups was briefly discussed. The 1994 petroleum union strikes, for example, were the most effective opposition to military rule yet seen in the country. The Economy and Corruption A fifth critical issue is the revival of the Nigerian economy, which has been in a depression at least since 1992 and is likely to get worse before it gets better. There have been a few recent gains, including a reduction in inflation and progress toward setting a realistic foreign exchange rate. Very serious problems remain, involving elements as basic as reliable power and fuel supplies. A reform package that will secure international debt relief and improve Nigeria's credibility to investors is essential. Fundamental change will be needed in order to attract new capital, either foreign or expatriate. In the longer term, it is essential to diversify the economy beyond oil and gas. Agriculture must be revived, both for export and basic food production. Potential new strategies, such as rice production in the Niger delta, should be explored. Manufacturing should be expanded, and the possibility of developing service-sector areas like telecommunications and financial services should also be explored. Economic reforms will require a strong economic team, autonomy for key economic agencies like the central bank and ministry of finance, decisive improvements in important policies such as privatization, an anticorruption effort, and a strategy to address economic equity issues. Two years ago, Nigeria ranked last on Transparency International's corruption index, and it has improved little since then. Panelists mentioned General Obasanjo's status as a charter member of Transparency International and hoped that this meant he was serious about addressing corruption. One participant emphasized that the problem of corruption is hard to overstate. Politics and government service are seen by many Nigerians primarily as a means for accumulating wealth; even if a particular official tries to resist this trend, family members often expect revenue from their relative's position. Whatever his personal credentials and intentions, General Obasanjo is embedded in a deeply corrupt network that exists throughout the political system. Thus it is essential to have an institutional context in which some state institutions can restrain others. The 1979 Nigerian Constitution had a credible anticorruption apparatus on paper, establishing a code-of-conduct bureau and tribunal and requiring periodic asset disclosure for all public officials. This apparatus was never put into place, but civil society and the international aid community could usefully focus on this sort of institutional mechanism for both vertical and horizontal accountability. Civil society clearly has an important role in building a legitimate democratic process in Nigeria. The TMG has decided to continue as a coalition, organizing itself to monitor good governance practices and secure the accountability of the Nigerian government. It will be seeking the support of the international community to do this. All of Nigeria's political parties also need to be strengthened, as well as aided in understanding the principles of democracy and how such a system could work in their country. Nigeria's judiciary has been compromised by the military and needs to become more independent, while the legislature needs to understand that its job includes holding government officials accountable for their actions. Press freedom is also essential to making the new system work. The panel concluded that much needs to be done following the transfer of power on 29 May 1999. As one participant pointed out, the alternative to a failed civilian government should not be a military regime. Rather, it is important to enshrine and follow constitutional provisions that establish democratic mechanisms, including those for transferring power. |
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