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Publications >> International Forum Publications >> Democratic Consolidation in South Africa: Progress and Pitfalls
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Session 1 Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective: what constitutes democratic consolidation? Philippe Schmitter The concept of democratic consolidation has proven surprisingly controversial for two principal reasons. First, democracy is supposed to be a unique regime type in its capability to change its own rules in response to changes in popular will. In this sense, it is not intended to be a system with permanently fixed rules, and thus is not really supposed to be consolidated. Second, all existing “consolidated” democracies fall short from the point of view of democratic theory. They violate a central principle of democracy—equality based on citizenship—by adopting arrangements that systematically discriminate among citizens. One example is the grouping of voters into different kinds of units, which are then overrepresented or underrepresented: In Switzerland, for example, votes in some cantons can count up to 15 times as much as those in others. Countries justify these disparities in different ways, but the fact that “consolidated” democracies often have some undemocratic features makes it difficult to apply the concept of consolidation across different cultures or time periods. In my own research, I have been trying to measure the concept of the consolidation of democracy by using a 13-step “scalogram” that contains the various tasks that countries seek to accomplish in establishing and strengthening democracy. The first nine of these steps include such basics as the drafting, ratification, and widespread acceptance of a constitution; the holding of free, fair, and widely accepted elections, and the diminution of electoral volatility; and the turnover of parties or coalitions in power. The tenth step, which is the focus of my current research, reflects the notion of “partial regimes.” These appear where democracy is consolidated not as a whole but by bits and pieces and at different times. Such partial regimes include the political parties law, the electoral law, the question of devolution, the constitutional court, the form of the executive, the central bank, and industrial relations. The final three steps of the scalogram focus on the quality of the democracy that is being consolidated, and move in the direction of a substantive (as opposed to a procedural) definition of democracy. The principle of the scalogram is that the greater the number of countries that have accomplished any particular step, the easier that step must be to accomplish. Another possible finding is that the greater the number of countries that have accomplished a particular step, the earlier it is likely to occur in the temporal sequence of consolidation. Steven Friedman If one looks at the criteria for determining what enables democracies to consolidate, one would conclude that South African democracy should not last very long. First, it is a racially divided society and voting tends to follow racial patterns. This leads to the perception that access to political influence depends on racial identity. Second, it has extremely high levels of economic inequality that significantly coincide with racial division. Third, if one accepts Adam Przeworski’s claim that there is a strong correlation between levels of economic development and consolidation of democracy, South Africa’s level of development suggests that it has another three years to go before the junta steps in. If you look at South Africa superficially, according to what we can identify as the key criteria of democratic consolidation—representation, partici-pation, consensus, and capacity—it looks very good. But if you look a bit deeper, you see very significant challenges and problems in all of these areas. Its representative system is quite weak; the gap between citizens and representatives is acute and where an absence of rotation in power coincides with racial cleavages, there is an immense alienation of minorities. As far as participation is concerned, rights to take part freely in politics have not been abridged since 1994, but the new agenda that is emerging within the government is less comfortable with the laissez faire tolerance of the last three years. There are significant constraints to authoritarianism, but an attempt to abridge freedoms is still possible. Although elite consensus exists, consensus among citizens is less certain and the withdrawal option—in which the disaffected drop out of politics rather than pursue their interests through democratic processes—seems to be a real threat. Low levels of compliance with democratic rules suggest a significant divide. Finally, on capacity, physical delivery is probably better than we might have expected, but the government’s capacity to extend its reach into society to protect the liberties of citizens and act on a mandate from them is fairly weak. Marc F. Plattner The most essential feature of a “consolidated” democracy is that it has become relatively secure against reversion to authoritarianism. This means avoiding not only rebellion or coup d’état but also an erosion or hollowing out of its democratic character through excessive concentration of power, weakening of civil liberties, and the like. This would seem to be the chief threat in South Africa. South Africa is unusual among third-wave democracies. It is ruled by a dominant party—but unlike Taiwan or Mexico, not the same party that held power under the authoritarian regime. And unlike East European civic movements such as Solidarity in Poland and Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the African National Congress (anc) has been able to maintain its cohesion and seems likely to sustain its electoral majority for some time. In these respects, South Africa resembles the post–World War II “second-wave” democracies, especially those that emerged from colonial rule. The parallel with India’s successful democratization under the dominant Congress Party, which had both a nationwide institutional structure and an inclusionary stance with respect to the country’s diverse groups, is striking. The key question is whether the anc leadership will continue to show the same kind of democratic commitment as the Congress leadership did. Eddie Webster Much of our understanding of consolidation has been shaped by the notion of a double transition—the attempt to establish a democratic order in the context of pressures both for growing economic liberalization and for deregulation. In South Africa, we are involved in a triple transition, with the addition of moving from a racial system to a different order. In this context, I am not sure how appropriate the transition literature is. We are a society that is better understood as one that has gone through a struggle of national liberation against a particular colonial history. The struggle for democracy in South Africa was not understood simply as a quest for the right to vote and to have a rotating government; it also hoped to produce a much more fundamental change in the nature and fabric of the society. Adam Habib When considering the notion of a racially divided society, other factors, including the class dimension, need to be taken into account. At the anc’s latest conference, non-African cabinet ministers did very well in the voting for the National Executive Committee. In certain suburbs, where middle-class minority groups reside, individuals voted in ways different from the general minority population. This indicates that race may not be a guaranteed determinant of political behavior. The quality of democracy can affect consolidation of democratic procedures. Over time, the lack of “quality democracy,” especially measured by the delivery of substantive, mainly economic, freedoms, could lead to the erosion of “procedural democracy.” The problem with the national liberation transition thesis is that it points you to the African continent. More useful comparisons, however, can be made with Latin American cases. Charles Simkins The scope of South African democracy is deficient in at least two respects. Some places, particularly in urban areas, are under “wild west” conditions and are not effectively regulated by the state. At the local level in traditional rural areas, where traditional circuits of power function, democracy is unconsolidated. One of the principal problems of South African democracy is that there is no normative consensus about what political competition is. But there are also potentially positive factors. One is that some aspects of democratic consolidation preceded democracy itself. Modern industrial relations date from the late 1970s, and the current rules for the central bank are fundamentally those of 10 or 15 years ago. Continuity in these partial regime spheres makes for a degree of optimism about democratic consolidation. Discussion The discussion centered around the framework for transitions proposed by Schmitter and the problems of inequality and political disenchantment. On the framework, the discussion focused mainly on the need to clarify which indicators of consolidation are part of the definition, which are causes, which are consequences, and which occur coterminously with consolidation but are not necessarily causally related to it. Other points were that:
Political disenchantment was viewed as part of a consolidated and mature democracy. Although initial expectations of democracy may be very high, expectations do tend to change as people discover what democracies are -and are not- good at accomplishing, and as appreciation of values such as freedom increases. Session 2 The Party System Larry Diamond A feature of political parties in a party system that promotes consolidation is inclusiveness—they provide an avenue for all interests to participate. Inclusiveness suggests that power-sharing or consociational democracy may be needed in some contexts. Although this risks compromising system efficacy, power-sharing arrangements can be transitional rather than permanent. It is also helpful if people identify with a political party rather than feel that no party represents their interests. Institutionalized linkages with other organized interests in society and institutionalized electoral support for parties over time are important. The existence of cross-cutting cleavages, so that elections are not ethnic or racial censuses, means that political parties that bridge these cleavages, not only in their leadership and parliamentary lists but also in their bases of electoral support, are important. Finally, competitiveness is necessary to promote democratic consolidation, as are party coherence (unity on goals, procedures, principles, and strategy) and internal party democracy. In Latin America, and very visibly in Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, low levels of institutionalization of the party system, high levels of volatility, weak linkages to organized interests in society, and low levels of popular identification and involvement with parties have been significant obstacles to democratic consolidation. Khehla Shubane The challenge of national liberation has largely been met in South Africa and the society now needs to move on and address other issues. But this is prevented by the forms in which its political parties exist. The problem is that the parties are based on irreducible identities; this inhibits political options. Conservative politics, for example, does not exist per se because just about every conservative political grouping in South Africa is ethnically very narrow or racist; there are no parties that advocate conservative economic perspectives, but at the same time appeal to all races. A related problem, which has beset a whole range of countries in Africa that are coming to grips with democracy, is the persistence in power of former liberation movements that are then able to monopolize legitimacy. Because South Africa’s political parties were founded in the past and were concerned with problems of the past, they have tended to preoccupy themselves with the issues of the past rather than address emerging problems. Mandela is the last of the national liberation movement leaders in South Africa; when he steps down, it would be a very opportune time to close the chapter on those politics. Philippe Schmitter Party government occurs in parliamentary systems in which the executive depends on continuous party discipline and has the means of reinforcing it should it lag. Access to government depends on your membership or good standing in parties. The single weakest aspect of the Brazilian system and its consolidation is the almost complete absence of a consistent and coherent party system. This is often ascribed to the presidential system, yet Brazil is not doing that badly. There is no clear correlation between executive format—the choice between presidentialism and parliamentarism—and the quality of a party system. We need to give some attention to the extent to which the discussion about governance shifts the focus of responsibility for consolidation away from political parties to institutions of civil society. We also need to think about the creation of bargaining mechanisms, particularly corporatist arrangements, that often have no relationship to the party system and operate without parliamentary certification, or even without recognition by the standard institutions of a party-centered democracy. I am convinced that these organizations and mechanisms are not capable of replacing political parties. Sandy Johnstone Four approaches to assessing the place of party systems in the consolidation of democracy are helpful. The first is the framework of competition established by constitutional guidelines. This we can take for granted in South Africa. The second is the different claims, profiles, and constituencies of the parties. These are tentative in South Africa because there is substantial agreement among the parties on central issues, such as macroeconomic policy. The third is regularities in measured support through elections and polls. Here there is a strong tendency in the country toward a dominant-party system. The fourth is the political culture in which the parties operate—their values, attitudes, practices, and expectations. In the absence of a strong national political culture of competition, party competition has largely dissipated into regional issues, identities, and rivalries. Possible alternatives to vigorous party competition include dialogue within the dominant party or with unelected veto groups, and deal-making and consensus in society that have little to do with political parties. Robert Mattes Rotation in power is not as important to democratic government as the degree to which the governing party perceives a threat of losing power in an election. Since 1994, we have seen a movement away from political parties in South Africa. In late 1994, surveys showed that 12 percent were independent voters; by mid-1997, 42 percent claimed to be independent. There has been no change in the relative levels of identification with different parties among non-independents, however, and if there were an election tomorrow, voting patterns would probably not look any different. Although the sharp increase in independents suggests a fluidity that would ensure vigorous competition, for the time being there is no place for dissatisfied voters to go. The problem is with the parties and the party system. One important exception is identification with the United Democratic Movement (udm) formed by former National Party (np) minister Roelf Meyer and ex-anc deputy minister Bantu Holomisa; it has grown to between 4 and 7 percent. The extent of support for the udm indicates that there is potential for moving toward a cross-racial and socially conservative political party. Discussion The discussion focused on the dominant-party debate, voting patterns and the need for electoral reform, the effect of violent transitions on the party system, and the scope for party development given the broad consensus on economic policy. Some participants argued that it is doubtful that the anc is becoming a dominant party because this would require more than just winning successive elections; it also would suggest monopolization of the social agenda, but significant countervailing forces prevent the anc from achieving this. The survival and longevity of opposition parties may be determined either by opposition control of subnational government (prospects for this were debated), or by what happens within the majority party itself—the extent to which internal pluralism is to be tolerated is still being determined within the anc. Other countervailing forces in the anc include the fact that in the different provinces the party is very different, and in at least three of them the provincial ancs are under threat (KwaZulu/Natal, Western Cape, and Northern Cape); that at the local level accountable leaders are growing in stature; and that differences are also beginning to arise between anc people who are inside and outside the government. India was not seen by participants to be a good example for the proposition that a dominant-party system might help to consolidate democracy because it has been incapable of addressing poverty and inequality and of dealing with a tremendous rise in ethnic conflict; these prob-lems have been significantly tied to the dominant-party structure itself. If a dominant-party system is nevertheless considered desirable for consolidation, it would have to go hand-in-hand with a great deal of decentralization and devolution to prevent the dominant party from becoming all-pervasive. It was pointed out that comparative data suggest that parliamentary democracies last longer, are better able to handle conflict, and are more flexible than presidential forms of government. One danger to avoid, therefore, would be constitutional amendments that would make the South African system more presidential. On voting patterns, the need for caution in drawing too much from current surveys was emphasized because disenchantment with parties expressed well before an election is unlikely to affect people’s voting behavior on election day. Given the strong voter identification with particular parties, parties are not competing for the same market. Despite the fact that both the anc and np have rejected electoral reform, it was widely agreed that one of the highest priorities for democratic deepening in South Africa is to establish some constituency basis for representation in Parliament. Something has to change in the current electoral system (by which members of the Parliament are now elected entirely from national and regional party lists) to allow for greater accountability. More attention needs to be given to the special problem of violent transitions in which both the national liberation party and the previous authoritarian regime are rooted in war-like structures. This seems to mitigate against a more democratic and transparent form of rule. Although there is a high degree of elite consensus on macroeconomic policy, it was pointed out that there may be other dimensions of economic policy on which there is disagreement. One can favor fiscal discipline with relatively high taxes and state regulation, for example, or one can favor it with lower taxes and more rapid economic liberalization and privatization. This could still emerge as an economic policy cleavage within the existing consensus. Session 3 Representative Institutions E. Gyimah-Boadi Parliaments in Africa have been resurrected at least formally and there is a growing confidence and assertiveness among Africa’s new legislatures, especially in relation to executive branches. Legislatures have increased their involvement in the ratification of international treaties and in making policy in their respective countries. Attempts are being made to enforce greater transparency and accountability in government operations, and public access to parliaments is being expanded. But serious barriers to representative government remain, including low levels of institutional development. Most parliaments are notoriously deficient in equipment, technical capacities, and skills. Financial resources are always very limited. There often is also a desire on the part of African presidents to keep their legislatures weak and subordinate. A lingering attraction for strong leadership persists in the context of an authoritarian political culture which is normally embodied in a strong executive in the constitution and a very centralized admin-istration. In the context of weak private sectors, weak independent nonstate media, and weak civil society, it is very difficult for parliaments in Africa to do a good job of enforcing oversight in an environment of transparency and accountability. Because African legislatures are products of fairly recent democratic transitions, there is still a strong fusion of party and state structures in spite of democratic constitutions and liberalization. Jabu Sindane The relationship between those in authority and the electorate is weak in South Africa; accountability is therefore weak as well. Together these weaknesses constitute a threat to democracy. Many people do not know what Parliament does nor who their representatives are. If representatives were communicating with the electorate, people would have a fair idea of what national and provincial parliaments do. The anc itself has raised this as a concern in its discussion documents, which argue that it would be a mistake to separate the function of governing from the tasks of building the anc as an organization. My recommendation is that all levels of government explore the possibility of using radio to get in touch with their constituencies; this is by far the most powerful communication medium available. It is also the way in which respondents to surveys conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council in 1996 and 1997 indicated that they wanted to receive their information. Terry Karl New democracies are faced with the prospect of full participation but without the prior historic building of representative institutions. This means that their representative institutions are bound to be extremely weak. Accountability is a product of electoral rules. There is no reason for an elected representative in South Africa to be accountable to a constituency. The electoral system is strong on inclusion at the expense of accountability. Representative institutions may also be weak due to the uneven reach of government authority. We should not just look for representation in parliaments and political parties, but also in the thick networks of interest organizations, such as labor, business, and civil society organizations that are no longer based on production interests. These networks of representation are accompanying and fortifying the kinds of traditional networks of representation through parties that have tended systematically to discriminate against some groups, such as women. The most interesting examples of new forms of representation occur at the local level, not only in Africa but all across Latin America as well. Sipho Maseko Most parliamentarians do not see their connection with a constituency as a very important part of their function. Because there is strong party loyalty in South Africa, public accountability by elected officials is sometimes sacrificed. Ministers of the anc are treated with kid gloves by members of the same party in Parliament. We also need to revisit the powers of the provinces. Their legislatures are producing no bills on policy issues. The only laws that have been passed through the provincial parliaments are appropriation bills or technical measures to bring the provinces into line with the new Constitution. The major products of the provinces are corruption, incompetence, and the free spending of taxpayer money. I am suggesting that if the provinces are not fulfilling any useful function, they should be scrapped. They may provide valuable opportunities for political compe-tition, however. Phiroshaw Camay Of concern in South Africa is that once the caucus is decided on a position representatives are expected to follow its line. Also, we have to think about the size of representative institutions. We might want to rationalize those structures, as well as the provinces and permanent statutory commissions. The key question is: Who will decide on these reforms? If the anc is going to be in power for the next two years and probably after the next election, are they to dictate the pace, content, form, and timing of electoral reform? The threats to this democracy include the possibility of a reversion to violence. A further question that should be addressed concerns the fight over institutional power between Parliament and the other structures outside Parliament, such as the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (nedlac), a quasi-corporatist structure that offers labor, business, and other civil society interests a stake in policy making. Alf Stadler Political elites, members of Parliament, and civil servants believe that the representative institutions they work in can provide a vehicle for generating policies that will meet the expectations for fundamental transformation that are so widespread in the society. But this assumption is by no means universally accepted. There is enormous skepticism about the capacity of representative institutions to deliver even a small portion of that transformation. While there may be no antisystem parties, if we look at local politics we find many cleavages emerging between establishment and anti-establishment groups. The complication in finding them is that sometimes both the establishment and the anti-establishment groups call themselves anc: Those opposed to the system often claim the anc’s symbolic mantle by labeling themselves, by implication, the “real” anc. Another, much broader problem that is shared in other parts of the world is the move toward differentiated citizenship. Instead of citizenship being identified with a set of uniform characteristics according to which one citizen is interchangeable with another, identities people seize on confer on them special kinds of rights and special kinds of obligations. This is the case for sexual identity, religion, and ethnicity. In the United States, the claims of Native Americans, for example, seem almost to require constituting a separate creation myth. Discussion The discussion concentrated on the lack of any substantial commitment to liberal democracy in South Africa and the problems of representation, language, and traditional authority. One point was that since none of the major parties was committed to liberal democracy before the transition began, it is doubtful that any are committed to it today. The ideas of “democratic centralism” and “sole legitimate representative,” which have strong roots in South African political culture, are antithetical to the notions of liberal democracy and the essentially indeterminate nature of democratic processes. The legacy of a heavily unrepresentative state is also very hard to overcome. Parliament is weak, but it is also creating a veneer of an effective and strong consolidating democracy. It may in fact be merely a rubber stamp of a new sort. Although there are no incentives for accountability in a closed-list proportional representation system, it is not clear that a constituency system would make very much difference. We already have a 60 percent constituency system in local government, but people feel less connected to municipalities than to the national president. And when 80 percent of the population are not articulate in English, the language of politics, that is a very serious problem for representation and participation. In the governing party there are two political cultures—that of the exiles, which is not very accountable, and an activist culture in which there is more of a notional connection with the grassroots. Even this latter ethos is, however, elite-centered. When government politicians claim to have consulted the people, this usually only means that the first level of activists has consulted the second. On the question of traditional leadership, research in Zambia has indicated that an attachment to traditional authority is not necessarily incompatible with support for democracy. People in Zambia who believe in a role for traditional leaders also became more involved in national politics. But in the long run, the attitudinal dissonance is likely to be problematic for the consolidation of democracy. The fact that people are more willing to turn to institutions that are hierarchical and paternalistic suggests that they might even accept that kind of authority from elected leaders. Session 4 Devolution Larry Diamond There is a trend in both developing and developed countries toward the decentralization of state power. Where local government has meaningful authority and responsibility, decentralization can perform several positive functions for democratic development in the country as a whole. The first is citizen development through active direct political participation and the creation of a democratic political culture. The second is wider participation by citizens. Third, local government is, or should be, more responsive and accountable. Fourth, local government is more likely to be representative of the people in a local jurisdiction, in terms of ethnic and racial identity, than the center. Fifth, local and state or provincial government can potentially exercise a check on abuse of power at the center, especially if some of the subnational governments are controlled by parties other than the party at the center. Sixth, subnational government is important for developing democracy because it generates a shared stake in the system among contending elites. Four potential problems and pitfalls may accompany devolution—the emergence of authoritarian enclaves; greater intolerance of opposition groups and discrimination against minorities at the local level; fiscal inequality; and waste, redundancy, and confusion of both authority and finance at different levels of government. To attenuate these dangers, the national Constitution and Bill of Rights must be supreme with the judicial and political means to enforce that supremacy. Strong civil society and democratic local party structures are also essential to overcome entrenched power relations and to provide pressure for good governance. Edgar Pieterse It may be useful to think about devolution and decentralization beyond the question of how one makes government more responsive, and to look at the potential articulation between development goals and democratic objectives. The emerging policy framework in South Africa attempts to grapple with that dynamic. The state is now seen to be a brocanteur (dealer) who mixes and matches different approaches and combinations of delivery. Holistic and integrated development has become orthodoxy and the old dichotomous reading of state–civil society engagement has been transcended. An under-standing of the relationship as a deeply mutually interdependent one has developed. The more interesting question is how the interfaces among the various spheres should be structured, including the relations between community and private sector, private sector and state, and state and community. In the South African context, the notion of cooperative governance suggests that, horizontally and vertically, government departments and spheres of state need to operate in a mutually reinforcing and supportive manner. How one would construct a policy and legislative framework to give effect to this and accommodate the wide range of diversities and the huge problem of social, economic, and other forms of inequality is the critical question. The appropriate devolutionary split between provincial and local government is a further aspect that still demands discussion. Philippe Schmitter One of the most important concepts currently being debated in Europe is subsidiarity. This is not just an issue of territorial devolution, but also of functional devolution. Subsidiarity has been difficult to cement in Europe because territorial and functional boundaries do not coincide. In that light, I want to make a few remarks about cooperative governance. In Europe, the term multilevel governance is used and the European Union is regarded as another level of governance. In Europe, we no longer talk about three tiers of government, but about five or six. Multilevel governance means that there is no fixed federalist formula or assignment of competences. Member states bargain with each other continuously. The other new development in Europe derives from the notion that you cannot fix boundaries horizontally. An intermediate layer is developing between the municipality and national state, the “infra-national” regions. Many responsibilities are being devolved to units such as Emilia-Romagna, Baden-Württemburg, and Jutland in different European countries. These units then make alliances with each other across national borders. A process of regionalization is occurring within well-established national states and a subregionalization is occurring that crosses national borders, involving, in some cases, even noncontiguous regions. Those that are home to high-tech industries, for example, combine and form interest groups to pressure the European Community in Brussels. Networking resolves the problems of multilevel governance. Where does democracy fit into this? How do you design representative institutions flexible enough to correspond to the flexibility found in the real world of multilevel governance? It is one thing to create a network, another to make it accountable to a broader range of active citizens who are affected by it. Those of us who have been thinking in terms of democratic theory do not yet have the answer to this. I invite all of you to give some thought to these questions: 1) How do you democratize networks? and 2) How do you democratize situations in which territorial and functional constituencies do not correspond, as in a classic nation-state, and are constantly changing with respect to each other such that they cannot be fixed in the way we assume to be characteristic of democracy? Charles Simkins Devolution as an accommodation of subnational identities is common. When the interim South African Constitution was being negotiated, in the process of getting to the provincial boundaries the whole pattern of nineteenth- and twentieth-century black and white settlement was accommodated. A fascinating map was published in the newspaper showing how closely the new boundaries coincided with linguistic equivalents. The most urgent local government need is the modernization of rural local government. In every urban center there were fiscally and organizationally strong white municipalities to form the core of the new local governments. But for rural local government, the distinction between the commercial farming and (black) subsistence areas was so great that what is needed now is a public finance infrastructure to support rural development. Discussion New problems in regionalism, representation at lower levels of government, devolution of financial responsibilities, and the culture of nonpayment were the main issues raised in discussion. It was suggested that there does not seem to be wholehearted popular or elite support for provincial and local government as spheres of representation; they are seen purely as vehicles of delivery, and the assumption seems to be that what is to be delivered will be decided on the national level. Although there is latitude for vigorous policy debate in the provincial legislatures, it does not happen often. Developmental local government provides opportunities for local representation, but could become a rubber stamp because concern with delivery can reduce local participation in decisions to limited negotiation with local constituencies about how to apply predetermined national policies on the ground. Given that the anc is likely to be the majority party for some time, not only at the center but in most provinces, intraparty relations and how they affect intergovernmental relations will be crucial. When seven of the nine provinces are controlled by the national ruling party, which also has an overwhelming majority at the center, it is hard to imagine the provinces being politically autonomous unless the provincial party branches really have substantial autonomy. On devolution of financial responsibility, it was pointed out that the next fiscal year is likely to be decisive for provincial government. Central government has decided that the provinces must spend 85 percent of their transfers on health, education, and welfare functions. In this fiscal year, they were given a block grant that they could divide up as they wished. Particularly in the education field, however, two provinces in particular, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, appear to have diverted considerable amounts of money intended for education to other functions. The central government has thus intervened with the 85 percent requirement on spending. Although the premier of KwaZulu-Natal initially objected, he quickly fell into line and agreed that new priorities must be given to provincial functions. This is only one of the subtle ways in which the center is shaping the course of devolution. There seems to be a common wisdom among councillors that local government is caught in a vicious cycle because it lacks money: It does not have money because it is not delivering; it can’t deliver until it gets money. The concept of legitimacy has therefore been the driving force behind the Masakhane Project, a government program that aims, among other things, to increase levels of service payment to local government and that seems to have been based on the belief that once local government is perceived as legitimate, people will start paying. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (idasa, a nongovernmental organization, or ngo, that researches and promotes democratization) interprets the results of its most recent survey to mean that willingness to pay has nothing statistically to do with legitimacy, responsiveness, trust, or performance, but seems to be more a matter of whether citizens believe they can get away with not paying. This implies that payment depends on more effective management, not on legitimacy. It also found that local voters want local government to tackle a far more ambitious range of activities than they now address: Resource transfers from the center are not going to be adequate to enable local governments to do everything that voters would like them to do. Their ability to raise revenue locally and to get people to pay their rates will be crucial. |
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