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Publications >> International Forum Publications >> Consolidating Democracy in Taiwan
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April 16, 1996, Washington, D.C. Executive Summery Introduction The Election Panel I: Analyzing the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Chair: Marc Plattner Tun-jen Cheng Yun-han Chu Panel II: Implications of the Elections for Democratic Development Chair: Paula Dobriansky Edward Friedman Huang-hsiung Huang Hung-mao Tien Luncheon and Address Introductions: Carl Gershman Speaker: Stephen Solarz Commentator: Jeane Kirkpatrick Panel III: Economic and Social Aspects of Democratic Development Chair: Amb. Nat Bellocchi Karl Fields Chyuan-jenq Shiau Eric Tong-sheng Wu Panel IV: External Factors and Democratization Chair: Larry Diamond Cheng-yi Lin Michel Oksenberg Participants International Forum for Democratic Studies Institute for National Policy Research (Taiwan) |
About This Report
On 16 April 1996, the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Institute for National Policy Research (Taiwan) convened a one-day conference on consolidating democracy in Taiwan. The conference sought to examine the Taiwanese political landscape in the wake of its historic March 1996 presidential elections to identify obstacles to the strengthening of Taiwan's democracy, and to explore the impact of international factors on Taiwan's future prospects. The conference brought together 35 leading Chinese and American scholars and present and former Taiwanese and U.S. government officials; another 60 people attended as observers. (See the appendix for a list of participants.) Former Congressman Stephen Solarz gave the luncheon address and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick offered commentary. This report summarizes the presentations and comments made during the day-long conference. It also provides some basic background information on the complex political situation in Taiwan. While every effort has been made to portray accurately the range of opinions expressed, space and organizational considerations have required omissions and paraphrasing. This report was written by David G. Timberman, and edited by the International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Institute for National Policy Research. Any errors in fact or interpretation should be attributed to the author and editors. Executive Summary Taiwan's decade-long democratic transition culminated in the legislative balloting of December 1995 and the presidential election of March 1996. The peaceful democratization that has taken place on the island since the late 1980s is as impressive as was Spain's in the 1970s, and could have as big an impact on the Asia-Pacific region as the Spanish transition had on Latin America. Despite its small size, Taiwan has a burgeoning modern economy and is an important actor in regional politics. Challenges to democracy remain, of course. Some begin at home. The corruption-riddled political system must be cleaned up, changes to electoral rules must be considered, and the "politics of identity," reflecting tensions between those of indigenous-Taiwanese origins and those of mainland stock, must be managed skillfully in order to avoid polarization. The elections witnessed the continued dominance of the long-ruling but no longer monopolistic Nationalist Party (KMT). Its candidate, incumbent president Lee Teng-hui, won reelection with 54 percent of the vote. Lee, a native Taiwanese and Cornell Ph.D. who became vice-president under Chiang Ching-kuo in 1984 and then succeeded to the presidency upon Chiang's death in 1988, accelerated and broadened the liberalizing and democratizing reforms that his predecessor had begun. The greatest changes came after Lee was elected to the presidency in his own right in March 1990. The chief competition to President Lee's 1996 reelection campaign came from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has become the main opposition grouping. Two other tickets ran, one endorsed by the New Party (NP), a breakaway faction from the KMT, and one independent. The question of cross-Strait relations dominated the race. Lee and the KMT continued to support the eventual reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, and held that in the meantime, the Republic of China on Taiwan should receive recognition from the community of nations. The DPP, pointing to Taiwan's de facto independence, called for a referendum on Taiwan-mainland relations. Those relations continue to pose the biggest threat to democracy in Taiwan. During early 1996, mainland China put on displays of military force in the Taiwan Strait serious enough to cause the U.S. to post two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the vicinity. Beijing's tactics were meant to sow fear and disunity on Taiwan. Conference participants hoped that this bullying would ultimately enhance Taiwan's internal consensus and strengthen its commitment to democracy, but not all were confident on that point. Assessing the elections, participants agreed that a stable, three-party system seems to be emerging as KMT hegemony continues to subside, though possibilities for future party splits remain. The KMT's stranglehold on the state apparatus and its emoluments seems to be loosening, though ties to the military and security establishments remain strong. In any case, Taiwan's economy and growing civil society have become too sophisticated and vibrant for any one party to control. Economic development and its concomitants especially rising literacy rates and incomes made democratization possible, if not inevitable. Still, problems of "civic culture" cloud the horizon, among them mainlander-Taiwanese tensions, the widespread collusion between money and political power, and a general apathy toward public matters. Taking the measure of such difficulties, the conference participants remained cautiously optimistic about democracy's prospects in Taiwan. The most serious challenges, they agreed, will come not from within but from without. Geography and history combine to make Taiwan's security situation peculiarly delicate. The elected officials who govern Taiwan must skillfully manage their country's highly fraught and complicated relationships with mainland China and the United States if the island is to remain free, unified, and democratic. Introduction On 23 March 1996, the people of Taiwan participated in the first direct presidential election in Chinese history. This election was the culmination of an impressive, decade-long process of democratization in Taiwan a process with considerable implications for the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the other remaining autocratic states in Asia. The election campaign and voting took place in the context of a series of intentionally threatening missile tests and military exercises by the PRC. In a response evocative of the 1950 dispatch of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, Washington sent two aircraft carriers to patrol international waters in the vicinity of Taiwan. As a result, the March election also had and will continue to have significance for the complex triangular relationship among the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States. On 16 April 1996, the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and Taiwan's Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) convened a day-long conference in Washington to assess Taiwan's presidential election and its impact on the prospects for democracy in Taiwan and in East Asia. This report summarizes the presentations and comments made during the meeting. The Election It was less than a decade ago in July 1987 that the late president Chiang Ching-kuo ended nearly 38 years of martial law in Taiwan. Since then, a remarkable, largely peaceful process of democratization has occurred without harming Taiwan's social stability or its impressive economic performance. The major elements of this transformation include a series of constitutional reforms, the holding of competitive elections at all levels of government, the "Taiwanization" of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), the development of a multiparty system, the expansion and deepening of civil society, and an explosion of privately owned media. On March 23, more than 10.7 million of Taiwan's 14.3 million eligible voters (75 percent) went to the polls. They actually voted in two sets of elections: one for president and vice-president and one for the 334 members of the National Assembly. (The National Assembly's powers are limited primarily to amending the constitution; most legislative functions reside with the Legislative Yuan, for which elections were held in December 1995.) There were four presidential tickets. Two were nominated by the two largest political parties, the KMT and the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The other two tickets were independent, although one received the endorsement of the third-largest party, the New Party (NP). The KMT ticket was headed by President Lee Teng-hui (who became Taiwan's first native Taiwanese president when he succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988), with his premier Lien Chan as vice-presidential candidate. Both Lee and Lien are former academics with doctorates from U.S. universities who entered government in the early 1970s. The DPP ticket consisted of Peng Ming-min and Frank Hsieh, both native Taiwanese. Taiwan's largest opposition party, the DPP has regularly received at least a third of the vote since its formation in 1986. Peng Ming-min is an academic who was put under house arrest for advocating Taiwan independence and later spent over two decades in political exile in the United States. The independent ticket of Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun ran with the full support of the NP, which was formed in 1993 by a breakaway faction of the KMT. Lin and Hau are both former vice-chairmen of the KMT. Lin, a native Taiwanese, competed with Lee Teng-hui for the KMT nomination, but lost. Hau, who was born on the mainland, is a former general who served as premier from 1990 to 1993. The fourth presidential ticket, and the only genuinely independent one, consisted of Chen Li-an and Wang Ching-feng. Chen was born on the mainland and educated in the United States. He has served as minister of economic affairs, minister of defense, and president of the Control Yuan. Wang, a 44-year-old lawyer and social activist, was the youngest candidate and the only woman. Although Chen is an impressive technocrat, his campaign emphasized a return to more traditional Buddhist values and behavior. The platforms of the three major parties differ on a range of issues, including constitutional reform, economic policy, education, social welfare, Taiwan's international status, and cross-Strait relations. Thanks to Beijing's hostile actions prior to the presidential election, the closely interrelated issues of Taiwan's international status and cross-Strait relations dominated all others. With regard to cross-Strait relations, the KMT and the KMT-controlled national government have continued to advocate the eventual reunification of Taiwan and mainland China, but hold that the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan should be recognized by the global community as long as China is divided into separate governments. As a result, Taiwan's foreign ministry has sought to enhance Taiwan's presence in international organizations, including the United Nations. The NP, headed by former leaders of the KMT, is even more adamant in its advocacy of eventual reunification and has accused Lee Teng-hui of secretly championing Taiwan's independence. The DPP, by contrast, believes that Taiwan has indisputably established itself as a de facto independent nation politically, economically, and culturally. The DPP, therefore, rejects the notion that Taiwan is a part of China and calls for a national referendum on the issue of Taiwan's relationship to the mainland. In the three weeks before the election, Beijing conducted missile tests and military exercises to display its ability to attack Taiwan, and warned other nations not to intervene in support of Taipei. Beijing also dismissed the electoral process and accused President Lee of wanting to separate Taiwan from the mainland. In the United States, Congress responded to Beijing's "missile diplomacy" by issuing joint resolutions that supported Taiwan, condemned the PRC, and called for a stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense. The Clinton administration responded by sending two aircraft carriers to international waters in the vicinity of Taiwan to monitor PRC military activities. (Largly because of this escalation of international tensions, the elections became a major news story worldwide; more than 600 journalists from around the globe flocked to Taiwan to cover the event.) The Clinton administration was careful to affirm its continued acceptance of the 1972 Shanghai Communique's assertion that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part. But Beijing's provocative behavior, the congressional resolutions, and U.S. public opinion compelled the administration to make a strong statement of U.S. support for Taiwan. It was in this context that Taiwan's voters reelected Lee Teng-hui as president with 54 percent of the vote. Three weeks later, leading Taiwanese and U.S. experts, meeting under the sponsorship of INPR and the International Forum, offered their views on the significance of the elections, the prospects for democracy in Taiwan, and the implications of Lee's victory for Taiwan's relations with the PRC and the United States. These views are summarized in the pages that follow. Session I Analyzing the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Tun-jen Cheng The December 1995 elections for the Legislative Yuan were significant for at least two reasons. First, the Legislative Yuan elections were a prelude to the 1996 presidential election. Most of the candidates for the Legislative Yuan were endorsed by one of the four presidential candidates. Second, the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections marked only the second time that all legislative seats were subject to election. (The first time was in 1992.) The 1995 legislative elections were a close call for the KMT (See Table 1 in the appendix.) The opposition campaigned hard and effectively. The KMT received only 46 percent of the vote (down from 52 percent in 1992), and won five fewer seats than in 1992. As a result, it now has a narrow majority of only three seats. In the 1992 elections the DPP had made notable progress, winning 31 percent of the vote, but in 1995 it increased its share only slightly to 33 percent. The most impressive performance in 1995 was by the NP, which was formed in the summer of 1993 by breakaway members of the KMT. The NP received 13 percent of the vote in the 1995 legislative elections and 13 percent in the 1996 National Assembly elections. This party, whose support base is among the military and urbanized Taiwanese, has proved astute at getting its supporters to distribute their votes strategically among the several NP candidates in multiseat constituencies. (By contrast, high-profile DPP candidates in several districts have gotten more votes than they need often at the expense of other DPP candidates.) The outcome of the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections suggests the following conclusions about Taiwan's evolving political system: 1) The KMT has not succeeded in preserving one-party dominance. Instead, a stable three-party system is in the making. Each party appears to have a secure base of support. There may be some adjustments in the relative strength of the three parties, but a big surge by any one party is unlikely because all three face constraints that limit the rapid expansion of their bases of support. The KMT continues to have a core of support in less urban areas, and it has huge financial resources at its command, but under Lee Teng-hui it has lost the support of many mainlanders and much of the urban population. The DPP seems to have moved from a stage of development characterized by rapid growth to one of slower growth in part because of limited support for its goal of Taiwan independence. The DPP leadership appears to recognize the need to broaden its base. The NP has passed its first electoral test and emerged as a solid third party, but its spectacular increase in 1995 may be a one-time gain; its image as a mainlander party may limit its growth in the future. 2) The emerging multiparty system is propelling the institutionalization of coalition politics in the Legislative Yuan. Coalition politics will be an increasingly important dimension of the Legislative Yuan, and logjams will continue to be a feature of the legislative process. A few defections or no-shows can turn the KMT into a de facto minority party in the legislature. This will not necessarily result in parliamentary instability, however. The KMT's razor-thin majority signals a need for more sophisticated legislative strategies and greater party discipline than has existed in the past. Rather than risk being pulled apart by the opposition, the KMT will endeavor to co-opt opposition-party members into the new government. Differences of opinion on policy issues within the KMT will prompt it to seek cooperation with the minority parties. Conversely, heavy-handed KMT efforts to steamroll legislation will exact substantial political costs. The development of competitive multiparty politics has important implications for policy making. It is likely that there will now be less partisanship in formulating policies on cross-Strait relations. At the same time, however, there will be more partisanship and, possibly legislative logjams when it comes to issues of welfare and social development, the economy, and technological development. It is also likely that political pressures will work to aggravate rather than abate the national government's budget deficit. 3) Taiwan is well on the way to consolidating its democracy. Elections take place with little or no violence. The people's right to dissent from and campaign against the government is not disputed. Both KMT- and DPP-controlled local governments have limited their involvement in electoral campaigns. The Legislative Yuan has become very assertive at the same time that the Executive Yuan has lost influence. A variety of "cross-cutting" social and economic issues diminishes the potential for the "identity issue," which pits native Taiwanese against mainlanders, to lead to conflict. Yun-han Chu The magnitude and significance of Lee Teng-hui's winning 54 percent of the presidential vote can hardly be overstated. His was a completely convincing victory and represents the best performance of any KMT candidate in the last four years. President Lee's victory was a godsend to the KMT leadership, given its fragile majority in the Legislative Yuan, and it should help to keep KMT discipline in the legislature. It will give Lee considerable strength in his dealings with the PRC and the international community. The Lee-Lien ticket did relatively well everywhere, but its support was more rural than urban, and more southern than northern. The KMT candidates attracted swing voters from the DPP, although the exact extent of the defection by DPP supporters must be confirmed by postelection survey data. The DPP performed poorly relative to both the KMT and the NP, receiving only 21 percent of the vote. The DPP ticket of Peng Ming-min and Frank Hsieh was not a strong one. Peng and Hsieh waged an ineffective campaign. They failed to offer innovative policies; instead, they simply preached independence. As a result, they could not extend their support beyond the segment of Taiwanese society that favors independence. The DPP's defeat will compel the party in the future to focus more on issues other than independence. The NP did not nominate its own candidates; instead, it endorsed the candidacies of Lin Yang-kang (former vice-chair of the KMT) and Hau Pei-tsun (former chief-of-staff and former premier of the KMT). By winning almost 15 percent of the vote, Lin and Hau challenged the DPP's position as the dominant opposition party. The vote for Lin and Hau paralleled the vote for the NP in the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections. Hau, a retired general and former premier, was particularly attractive to NP voters. The NP appears to have consolidated its base of support. Although, the independent ticket of Chen Li-an and Wang Ching-feng garnered only 10 percent of the vote, these candidates did relatively well considering that they did not have the support of a political party. Chen is looking ahead to the presidential election in 2000. It should be kept in mind that the 1996 presidential election is not a good measure of the long-term electoral strength of Taiwan's political parties. The Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections are a better gauge. The poor performance of the DPP in the presidential contest is an aberration attributable to Peng's low popularity. In all other elections, including the National Assembly election, the DPP has consistently received about a third of the vote. Conversely, Lee Teng-hui's victory exceeds the typical level of support for the KMT, which is about 45 percent of the vote. Therefore, Lee's victory will not necessarily translate into future gains for the KMT. There are two opposing hypotheses concerning the impact of Beijing's saber-rattling on the outcome of the election. The first posits that the impact was marginal and insignificant. This is based on the assumption that President Lee would have received at least 50 percent of the vote in any case. There are a number of reasons for believing this: the KMT won 52 percent of the vote in the 1994 gubernatorial elections, which were comparable to the presidential race in many respects; Lee has enjoyed high approval ratings, in part because of his high international profile; Lee's popularity is bolstered by his being the first president of Taiwanese origin; and Lee enjoyed the advantages of being an incumbent backed by one of the wealthiest political parties in the world. The opposing hypothesis is that the PRC's military exercises pushed support for Lee over the 50 percent threshold, thus giving Lee the very mandate that Beijing wanted to deny him. The evidence for this includes the following: preelection polls showed a large number of uncommitted voters (45 percent); the KMT was divided (two of Lee's challengers had broken away from the KMT); Taiwan's economy is not as strong as it used to be; and Lee's handling of relations with China was seen by some as ambiguous and controversial. What is certain is that the tense military situation made cross-Strait relations the only real issue in the campaign. Lee Teng-hui was well positioned to use this issue to his advantage, and he succeeded in doing so. He criticized Lin and Hau for being soft on the PRC and Peng for being irresponsible in his call for independence. As a result, candidate Lin and candidate Chen both had to condemn Beijing for claiming that it could speak for Taiwan, and the DPP had to soft-pedal its call for independence. It is also clear that Taiwan's voters resented Beijing's attempts to dictate whom they should or should not vote for. Their resentment prompted the Taiwanese people to rally around Lee and to speak with greater unity vis-…-vis the mainland. The majority of people on Taiwan prefer to leave the resolution of the issue of cross-Strait relations open-ended, so that they can avoid making an explicit choice between independence and reunification. As a result, it is expected that over the next four years Lee will strike a balance between advancing new diplomatic initiatives and repairing the damage done to cross-Strait relations. President Lee's ability to consolidate a unified and more centrist position vis-…-vis the mainland will not work to Beijing's advantage. It is likely that Lee will seek to reopen cross-Strait dialogue at the same time that he pursues efforts to raise Taiwan's international profile. Discussion A participant asked what the likelihood is that Taiwan will remain a three-party system. One of the presenters acknowledged that it is very difficult to predict what will happen with the political parties. Internal strife within the DPP has intensified; Peng has created the Nation-Building Foundation, perhaps to secure his long-time goal of independence for Taiwan in the event a major rupture within the party occurs. Taiwan independence, the trademark of the DPP, helped to establish the party, but this issue has limited appeal to the urban middle class. If the DPP continues to base its identity on the independence issue, it will never become the majority party. The NP has only limited room to grow and may try to win over the supporters of Chen's presidential candidacy. Another presenter observed that both the KMT and the DPP are "utterly factionalized" and could easily split. Therefore, it is essential to look at the factional dynamics within both parties. The DPP cannot afford a public split or cooptation by the KMT, so it will tighten party discipline. The KMT has resources to use against potential defectors, but party discipline is difficult to maintain in a semipresidential system. A question was raised about the potential impact of a switch to single-seat constituencies, a change that has been advocated by some KMT leaders. A participant responded that, all else being equal, single-member districts favor large parties like the KMT, whereas proportional-representation systems benefit small parties. The KMT no longer enjoys a competitive advantage under the existing system, as the opposition parties have developed their own vote-equalization schemes. But a change to single-member constituencies would hurt the NP the most because it uses the existing system so well. A change might also allow the KMT to gerrymander districts to its advantage. If a switch occurs, then, it is more likely to be to a system that combines proportional representation and single-member districts. A participant asked about the extent of the transformation of the KMT into a competitive political party independent of the state. Specifically, he asked if the KMT might split apart if it were to lose its historic status as the ruling party. One of the presenters thought it unlikely that the KMT would lose its ruling-party status in the near future. According to him, the DPP and the NP probably will not join together, and divisions within the DPP are more easily manipulated by the KMT than the other way around. A participant suggested that it may be the KMT's vast resources that serve as the glue that keeps it together. A presenter concurred, noting that the KMT has enjoyed access to state as well as party resources. The KMT may have billions of dollars in resources, but it also has a large cadre of serving and retired party bureaucrats to support. In fact, the disintegration of the KMT would have serious social consequences because of the sheer number of KMT pensioners it would affect. Another participant observed that the KMT's dominance has been supported by three pillars: 1) its ties to the state, including the military-security apparatus; 2) its control over an extensive organizational infrastructure, including state-owned enterprises and affiliated social groups (e.g., farmers, women, and youth organizations); and 3) a political network based on local clientelism. The KMT's control of the state apparatus is declining, although it has maintained its ties to the military. But this is largely through the efforts of President Lee, and Lee's successors are unlikely to achieve the same results. The rise of the NP makes the first pillar even more vulnerable. The second pillar has been precarious for some time. Only the third pillar remains fairly solid. Finally, another participant asserted that, rather than being in decline, the KMT may well be rejuvenating itself. President Lee has four years to reform the KMT, and his victory gives him the authority to make changes. Perhaps the NP has peaked and will not be able to consolidate its gains. The DPP, in its disarray, is vulnerable to KMT cooptation. This participant also suggested that estimates of the KMT's financial assets are vastly exaggerated. Session II The Implications of the Elections for Taiwan's Democratic Development Edward Friedman There are several reasons to celebrate recent political developments in Taiwan. First, the peaceful democratization of Taiwan is as impressive as the democratization that occurred in Spain in the 1970s, and could have as great an impact on Asia as the events in Spain had on Latin America. This is because Taiwan is not merely a small island: it is an important player in the Asia-Pacific region. A second reason for celebration is the extraordinary "Taiwanization" of the KMT. The KMT used to be a classic political machine, run by mainlanders, that ruled the Taiwanese people through its control of state power and dispensation of money and patronage. As a result, the Taiwanese consciousness that began to emerge in the 1970s was initially anti-KMT. To their credit, key leaders of the KMT recognized the need for the party to "Taiwanize" itself. The landslide election of Lee Teng-hui is evidence of how far the KMT has come. A third reason to celebrate is the maturity that Taiwan's voters displayed in the March elections. The voters understood the problems and risks of pursuing independence, yet they avoided the temptation to make the issue more emotional than it already is. For this, the electorate deserves a great deal of credit. Taiwan faces several serious challenges, and it would be a mistake to expect Taiwan's democratization to simply continue in a straight line. Taiwan faces a problem with the relationship between the voting system and the demands of governance. The president is elected in a first-past-the-post contest; the legislature is elected by a single-nontransferable-vote (SNTV) system in multiseat constituencies. The SNTV system, which was invented in Japan in the 1920s, tends to favor wealthy, patronage-based parties (such as the KMT and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party). As a result, the SNTV system has come to be seen as corrupt, and there are mounting calls for changing the rules of the game. Clean politics has become a major issue. In Japan, the discrediting of the SNTV system occurred gradually over half a century of democratic institutionalization. In Taiwan, dissatisfaction with the system is mounting quickly and early in the process of democratization. This complicates the process of political reform. As the ruling party, the KMT will have to initiate change, but people are suspicious of the party's intent. A second challenge is how the political system will manage the politics surrounding the Taiwanese-mainlander "identity issue." No one predicted the explosion of identity politics that has occurred over the last several years, and the issue is not about to disappear. Identity politics could fuel the further factionalization of the KMT, which in turn could lead to a legislative stalemate. The legislature must be willing to break through ideological gridlock and pass a meaningful legislative program. A third cause for concern is the PRC's response to developments in Taiwan. Beijing would be happy to see a political stalemate on Taiwan and heightened distrust and anger among the Taiwanese people. Beijing will be tempted to poison Taiwan's domestic politics. But the leadership in Beijing may use such a heavy hand that it might discredit itself completely. PRC meddling could result in exactly the opposite of the intended effect, causing the Taiwanese people to see that they have a common stake in centrist, gradual democratization. This sense that "we're all in this together" could ameliorate the divisions caused by the identity issue. Thus there will be many bumps along the road for Taiwan. Navigating the journey will take great political skill by both the KMT leadership and legislators. It will also take great maturity and patience on the part of Taiwan's electorate. This is a lot to ask. Huang-hsiung Huang Taiwan's first direct presidential election was not easily achieved it was the result of a two-stage battle. The first stage of the campaign for direct elections was led by advocates of democracy within and outside of Taiwan. This phase, which dates back to 1988, was driven by the demands of the opposition and nongovernmental groups. The opposition saw direct presidential elections as the way to overturn the "minority rule" of the KMT. The second phase involved a four-year debate within the KMT over direct versus indirect presidential elections. The resolution of this debate in favor of direct elections, as favored by Lee Teng-hui, enabled the National Assembly to amend the constitution in July 1994. The direct election of Taiwan's president is not only an important political reform, it is also a recognition that sovereignty resides with the Taiwanese people. Direct elections promote the development of citizens' consciousness and sense of national identity, which in turn strengthens the belief that Taiwan is a sovereign state. This process also compels the international community to recognize Taiwan's sovereignty. The ROC government today is wholly chosen by free elections. Therefore, the ROC dating back to 1949 should be called the old or First ROC, and today's ROC should be called the new ROC or the ROC Second Republic. Taiwan's democracy is practiced within a fixed boundary; therefore, the ROC Second Republic can represent only Taiwan and its people and cannot claim to represent all of China. Recognizing this, the DPP seeks to pass a new constitution and to build a new country based on the "one China, one Taiwan" principle. President Lee's landslide victory will have a profound impact on the domestic political environment. The KMT will continue its transformation from a "Chinese nationalist party" to a "Taiwanese nationalist party." In tandem with the Taiwanization and localization of the KMT, remaining members of the KMT old guard will be eased out of leadership positions. Lee will face no challenge within the KMT, but maintaining the KMT's fragile majority will depend on Lee's leadership and popularity. In the past, KMT electoral strategy focused on the party's local branches and relied on local faction leaders to mobilize networks of voters with the use of vote-buying. In the most recent elections, however, the KMT utilized its dominance of the mass media in its national campaign. It also organized "associations to support the campaign" at the district and township levels, with a view to recruiting and mobilizing supporters from all classes and vocations. This helped the KMT to bypass local faction leaders and reach the grassroots directly. This strategy succeeded in the gubernatorial and presidential elections, and has triggered the KMT's transformation from a "top-down" to a "bottom-up" party. The low vote for the DPP's presidential slate spread a sense of defeat within that party. The DPP also feels threatened by the Taiwanization and localization of the KMT. Never before has the DPP felt such pressure. As a result, the DPP is likely to change its organization, possibly by establishing grassroots sections. It is hoped that this new strategy will energize the party, weaken factions, increase internal competition, and give the DPP the resources it needs to compete. The presidential election centered on two closely related issues: cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's international status. The presidential campaign can be viewed as the first genuine national opinion poll on the independence issue. Peng Ming-min was the first political leader in Taiwan to publicly advocate a "one China, one Taiwan" policy. Although he received only 21 percent of the vote, this pro-independence vote takes on greater significance when several factors are considered. First, public debate of Taiwan independence has been legal for less than four years. Second, President Lee is extremely popular, and more than a few voters believe that he secretly favors independence. Third, the presidential election occurred in the midst of Chinese propaganda and military threats, which caused voters to rally around the president. Combining the votes received by Lee and Peng suggests that more than 75 percent of Taiwanese voters oppose reunification with China. Support for reunification will continue to diminish in the future while a sense of Taiwanese identity and civic consciousness will continue to swell. As subjects of the new Taiwanese state, people in Taiwan will give a new meaning to being "Taiwanese" in order to differentiate themselves from Chinese on the mainland. The Chinese military threat has further solidified Taiwan's commitment to democracy. Beijing's hostility and arrogance have fueled Taiwan's development of a separate identity. If the nature and behavior of the Chinese regime do not change, the gap between democratic Taiwan and communist China will grow, not only politically, but also culturally, socially, and psychologically. The direct presidential election marks the beginning of a de facto "one China, one Taiwan" system, although neither China nor Taiwan officially recognizes this shift. But the DPP sees it and will continue to pursue a platform that explicitly recognizes the reality of "one China, one Taiwan." Taiwan's status in the international community is like that of a "lowly, humble daughter-in-law." Not only is Taiwan deprived of the rights of a sovereign state, but it is treated worse than was the Palestine Liberation Organization before it acquired self-government. As a result, all four presidential candidates contended that Taiwan needs to be recognized as a full-fledged member of the international community. Lee and Peng have both advocated enhancing Taiwan's international status. Chen agreed, although he was concerned with the techniques used to achieve this end. Even Lin, who was labeled as "pro-reunification," did not oppose Taiwan's return to the international community. Hung-mao Tien The March presidential election had important implications for three aspects of Taiwan's democratic development: Taiwan's democratic consolidation, its constitutional framework, and its party system. 1) The elections represent a critical step toward democratic consolidation. The presidential election was the latest in a series of competitive elections held on the national, provincial, county, and municipal levels since 1988. The electoral process has matured significantly, and competitive elections are now the basis of the regime's legitimacy. Recent elections have gone smoothly the presidential election was free of violence or noticeable irregularities. Vote-buying is still a problem in parliamentary and local elections, but it was not reported in the presidential contest. Although there is a free press, the KMT and the government continue to dominate the electronic media through their ownership of Taiwan's three nationwide television networks. 2) The elections may contribute to a de facto alteration in the distribution of political power within the existing constitutional framework. Taiwan's system of government continues to be based on ROC founding leader Sun Yat-sen's five branches: the Executive Yuan, the Control Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, and the Examination Yuan. In addition, executive functions are divided between the president (now directly elected) and a premier, who is selected by the president with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. Some think that this five-way division of functions and authority is anachronistic and unnecessary, and there are proposals to abolish the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan. Many in the DPP also want to eliminate the position of premier in favor of a presidential system. The five branches of government are likely to continue as long as the KMT remains in power, but de facto modifications are occurring in two important areas. First, the separation between party and state is growing. The KMT Central Standing Committee is no longer the locus of governmental power. Second, given Lee's popularity, the de facto power of the president appears to be growing. Lee ran a very personal campaign in which he communicated directly with voters. His landslide gives him greater power than the appointed premier and the cabinet. President Lee's influence will be somewhat less in the Legislative Yuan. Politically, there is no center of gravity in the Legislative Yuan, so lawmaking will be subject to constant negotiation. This raises the possibility of legislative stalemate especially now that the KMT is no longer able to railroad legislation. Avoiding such stalemate will require increased interparty consultation and cooperation. 3) The elections will hasten the evolution of Taiwan's political parties. Regardless of their performance in the elections, all three parties face challenges. The DPP must deal with its limited electoral support on the independence issue. The NP faces a generational problem and overreliance on mainlander support. And although the KMT remains dominant, its power has waned. The KMT's popular support in Legislative Yuan elections has declined from 72 percent in 1980 to 46 percent in 1995. (The party continues, however, to control most gubernatorial and mayoral seats and legislatures at all levels of government.) Some of the KMT's recent decline is attributable to the creation of the NP, but the trend began before the advent of the NP. The result of the recent presidential election is exceptional much of the vote for Lee would not translate into support for other KMT candidates. KMT concerns about its future could prompt substantial intraparty reform, resulting in a leaner and more focused party. This process will be complicated by a behind-the-scenes post-Lee succession struggle that has already begun. Discussion One participant argued that the three KMT or government-owned television stations honored the doctrine of equal time for candidates during the election campaigns. Another noted that a large portion of the staffs of these stations seemed to sympathize with the NP. It was also pointed out that the explosion of privately owned radio stations and cable-television systems has reduced the KMT's dominance of mass media. A participant asked if Taiwan's bureaucracy, long controlled by the KMT, can be politically neutral. A presenter responded that the KMT continues to try to use the bureaucracy for its own benefit, but its ability to do so has declined. Many senior bureaucrats support the NP, and a number of local governments, including the Taipei city government, are now controlled by the DPP. A presenter expressed concern about the military's political allegiances and about civil-military relations. He wondered whether the military would subordinate itself to a non-KMT leader and whether China's bullying has strengthened the hand of the military in Taiwan. Another presenter responded that efforts have been made to subordinate the military to civilian control through education and the rapid turnover of officers. But the process is a long one. Tensions with the mainland will complicate the issue of civilian control over the military. The military has requested a larger budget and advocated military exercises in the wake of the mainland's exercises. But the military budget is not a contentious issue, since no party objects to a budget increase. Luncheon Address Stephen Solarz The democratization of Taiwan is one of the most impressive political achievements in the history of the Chinese people. The question no longer is whether there will be democracy on Taiwan; now it is in which direction Taiwan's democracy will go. This is a relatively new development as recently as 1983 the political situation in Taiwan appeared bleak. Martial law was still in effect, political parties were prohibited, the government controlled the press, the judiciary was a mechanism for suppression, strikes were prohibited, and the legislature was dominated by "old thieves" who were not accountable to the Taiwanese people. For all these reasons, Taiwan's economic miracle needed to be matched by a political miracle. Today, the situation in Taiwan has been dramatically transformed. Martial law was lifted in 1987, competitive elections are conducted regularly, opposition parties have been legalized and are well represented in the legislature, the press is free, the judiciary is impartial and independent, and strikes are permitted. There is no shortage of claimants to the paternity of this extraordinary achievement. Credit goes to Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, the "Kaoshiung eight" and other political prisoners, overseas Taiwanese who pressed for democracy, the U.S. government and Congress, and most of all the people of Taiwan, who demonstrated great courage and energy. To the extent that Taiwanese democracy faces any threats now or in the future, they come not from within, but from those on the mainland who refuse to rule out the use of force to reunify China and Taiwan. The future of democracy in Taiwan will ultimately be determined by Taipei's relationship with Beijing. Beijing's proposal for reunification is, on its face, very generous in the level of autonomy that would be granted to Taiwan. On paper it represents a major concession of the PRC's sovereignty. The problem is that for understandable reasons including Beijing's handling of Tibet and Hong Kong the Taiwanese do not trust China. The United States has an important role to play in securing the future of Taiwan's democracy. It is unthinkable that the United States would abandon Taiwan to its fate. Washington must make it absolutely clear that it will not tolerate the PRC's use of force but will take whatever action is necessary under the Taiwan Relations Act, which continues to serve both U.S. and Taiwanese interests. Washington must also emphasize that the issue of Taiwan's relationship with the mainland needs to be resolved not just peacefully, but also in a way that is acceptable to the people of Taiwan and is compatible with Taiwan's political and economic pluralism. It is also important for Washington to discourage Taiwan's leaders from provoking Beijing. Geography is destiny, so Taiwan must find a modus vivendi with the mainland. It is not in Taiwan's interest to increase cross-Strait tensions or to force the rest of the world to choose between Taiwan and China. Finding solutions will require political will, confidence, and creativity on both sides. Compromises cannot occur in an atmosphere poisoned by threats and tensions. Constructive ways must be found to reduce cross-Strait tensions. Taiwan and China must negotiate progress on direct trade and on postal and communications links. At the same time, President Lee should be free to travel abroad without creating a crisis. Beijing should not be threatened by Taiwan's search for participation in regional and global organizations. After all, the joint membership in the UN of North and South Korea and East and West Germany has not been prejudicial to reunification. How Taipei goes about making its case for UN membership will be critical. The acquiescence of the PRC, as a member of the Security Council, is required. Therefore, Taiwan needs to persuade Beijing that its membership would not be incompatible with the resolution of their differences, and that it might actually help. The PRC acquiesced to Taiwanese membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, so it ought to be possible to find a way to accommodate Taiwan's membership in the UN. The long-term success of Taiwan's democracy depends on a mutually acceptable resolution of cross-Strait relations. This will require trust, which depends on more flexible and forthcoming behavior by the mainland. This may not happen quickly, but there is reason to hope that Taiwan's economic and political miracles will be matched by a diplomatic miracle. Commentary Jeane Kirkpatrick The related processes of socioeconomic modernization, liberalization, and democratization have progressed marvelously on Taiwan. This is extremely gratifying because of the benefits to the Taiwanese people. The transition is all the more remarkable because Taiwan's democracy has developed in the shadow of a competitive and sometimes threatening major power. Taiwan's democratization has followed a classic pattern that underscores the importance of the beliefs of elites in the development and consolidation of democracy. Taiwan's democratization was not the result of a single declaration or election; it was a gradual process. Even so, democratization in Taiwan has not taken nearly as long as it took in Great Britain, France, or Germany. Taiwan's leaders reflected seriously about what had been done wrong on the mainland, and they probed the nature of the relationship between leaders and followers. Under Chiang Ching-kuo the boundaries of political action, organization, and speech were expanded. Views gradually changed about what was legitimate opposition and what was not. Over time, key members of Taiwan's elite became convinced of the fundamental value of democracy. The leadership came to see it as their responsibility to guide the country in the direction of democratic government. Taiwan's democracy should be lasting, stable, and strong because it has been built on a solid foundation. Democratic beliefs, habits, and practices have been established, internalized, and reinforced. Moreover, Taiwan's economic and political success makes it an enormously important model elsewhere in Asia. Taiwan's elite-led democratization carved a path to democracy that other Asian governments would do well to follow. And Taiwan further demonstrates that democracy can be practiced by all Asians, including the Chinese people. With regard to Taiwan-PRC relations, the restraint of both governments since the elections is encouraging. New aggression by the mainland is not likely, but should it occur, the United States should not overreact. Too much importance is attached to Taiwan's efforts to join the United Nations. The UN is not the most important forum for world issues. The issue of UN membership is one dimension of the larger Taiwan-PRC relationship and will be resolved between the two. That resolution does not depend on the merits of Taiwan's application to become a UN member. Session III Economic and Social Aspects of Democratic Development Karl Fields The recent elections are a watershed in the history of Taiwan and of Chinese societies. Three major observations can be made regarding the economic and social aspects of Taiwan's democratic development. First, the economic prosperity and social mobilization associated with Taiwan's rapid industrialization combined with unique social dynamics to facilitate Taiwan's democratic transition. Second, a civil and economic society conducive to democracy has begun to emerge in Taiwan, but significant obstacles remain. And third, Taiwan's nascent civil society is not yet matched by a well-developed civic culture. Thus democratic "deepening" will be neither easy nor inevitable. 1) The economic prosperity and social mobilization associated with Taiwan's rapid industrialization combined with unique social dynamics to facilitate Taiwan's democratic transition. Taiwan's democratic development was made possible by the achievement of basic socioeconomic "preconditions" (such as a high rate of literacy and rising incomes), but several other factors unique to Taiwan significantly influenced the process. These included: The role of Taiwan's leadership, particularly the elite's "strategic choice" to accept democrati-zation as inevitable; The rapid growth and increased complexity of Taiwan's economy, which made it difficult for the KMT to maintain control of the economy and society; Increased prosperity and relative distributional equity, which made political compromise, bargaining, and electoral defeat more palatable; and A balance between conservative and extremist social forces owing to land reform, the leveling influence of the ethnic issue, and the flourishing of small and medium-sized businesses (which minimized labor-capital conflict). 2) A civil and economic society conducive to democracy has begun to emerge in Taiwan, but significant obstacles remain. Taiwan now enjoys all the basic elements of a democratic society: an autonomous political society, the rule of law, a fair state apparatus, a free and lively civil society, and an institutionalized economic society. Moreover, there are several encouraging signs of the deepening of civil and political society. First, nongovernmental organizations have "arrived with a bang." They date back to the consumer, environmental, and women's-rights movements of the early 1980s. Today they range from national-level organizations to community and neighborhood groups. A second encouraging sign is the increase in political demonstrations. Although demonstrations sometimes seem chaotic, they teach valuable lessons in participatory democracy. The third positive development is the liberalization of the media. Underground radio stations and cable television have broken the KMT monopoly on the electronic media. Public-affairs and talk shows have proliferated. These shows are not always of the highest quality, but they are an important vehicle for airing public opinion. This progress notwithstanding, two serious obstacles remain. The first consists of the related issues of reunification and subethnic tension between native Taiwanese and mainlanders. These remain potentially divisive issues that could severely strain Taiwan's democratic institutions. The second obstacle is the increasing collusion of money and political power. Democratization has led to the pervasive and collusive bonding of private capital and political power. At a minimum, democratization and localization have given business elites and other moneyed interests new opportunities to influence public policy. As a result, the authority and autonomy of economic decision makers have eroded. Even worse is the widespread popular impression that the collusion of moneyed interests (and criminal elements) with politicians is pervasive and unchecked. If this problem goes unaddressed, it could undermine the legitimacy of Taiwan's democratic system. 3) Taiwan's nascent civil society is not yet matched by a civic culture, so democratic deepening will be neither easy nor inevitable. Taiwan's civic culture, for all its gains, remains underdeveloped. Taiwan's adult population grew up under four decades of martial law with their "heads down and mouths shut." Respect for authority, fear of dissent, and distrust of independent organizations are widespread. In general, public apathy prevails. For Taiwan to blossom fully as a democratic society, a stronger civic culture must develop. It will not happen quickly, but there is reason to hope that generational change and shifts within the KMT itself will deepen civic culture. Chyuan-jenq Shiau The distinctive structure and dynamics of Taiwan's economy have had an important impact on the country's democratic development. First, Taiwan's export-oriented industrialization has made it highly responsive to the changing international division of labor. The Taiwanese people have needed to be rational and flexible. These characteristics have also benefited Taiwan's political development. Second, the predominance in Taiwan of small and medium-sized, often family-owned, businesses has produced a relatively egalitarian society. The diffusion of ownership makes people very aware of and sensitive to the ways in which social and political developments affect the economic environment and vice versa. Authoritarianism involves state domination over society. In Taiwan, authoritarianism meant government control over politics, the economy, social movements, and culture. Taiwan's democratic development has involved a series of shifts in state-society relations brought about by a decline in state domination. One of the first shifts involved the business community, which began to exert influence on economic policy making in the late 1980s. Threatened by the United States' demand for change in Taiwan's economic polices, Taiwanese businessmen asked the state to deregulate foreign-exchange controls and permit trade with socialist countries (most significantly the PRC). Businesses also pressed for privatization and the removal of special economic privileges for KMT-owned enterprises to level the economic playing field. A second shift occurred because the state's essentially neomercantilist policies ignored the plight of labor, consumers, and the environment. This fed an expansion of social movements comparable to that in the United States during the 1960s. Since 1990, however, social movements have lost some of their momentum, for two reasons. First, the state has acted on many of their demands. Second, the political parties have absorbed many of the issues and leaders of the social movements. Eric Tong-sheng Wu A constellation of economic and social factors has contributed to the process of democratization in Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui increased the scope and speed of the political liberalization begun under Chiang Ching-kuo, but over the last 40 years a variety of economic and social developments have nurtured democratic development. These include successful land reform, relatively equal income distribution, the emergence of a prosperous middle class, the development of small and medium-sized business, and geographically diverse economic development. The role of business also has been important. Most businesses were sympathetic to the opposition movement during martial law. The ideals espoused by the opposition a freer and fairer economic environment and less government intervention were goals shared by many businesses at that time. Moreover, business saw and continues to see the long-term benefit of the social stability provided by democracy despite the occasional disorder that accompanies it. Business support for democracy was not ill-founded, for democratization has stimulated entrepreneurship and enhanced social stability. In recent years, President Lee's centrist policies have wooed business away from the opposition and appealed to Taiwan's middle class. The government has become more a partner with business than a fear-inspiring police force. Because of this, the small-business sector gave Lee massive support in the presidential election. Now business must learn to live with the negative aspects of democracy: deadlock, delays in policy making, pork-barrel politics, and higher spending on social welfare. But most businesses think this is a small price to pay. Furthermore, the business sector realizes that the shift to information-based industries a high priority for Taiwan can happen only in a democracy. Looking ahead, several significant trends are apparent. First, the liberalization of the financial and industrial structure will continue. This will foster a healthy mix of small, medium-sized, and large businesses, which should deter the overconcentration of business in large groups. Second, education and culture will also be liberalized so that Taiwan can become an information and technology center. Third, emphasis on local issues and concerns, including local history, culture, and community affairs, will grow as the political process becomes more open and people become more assertive. Already the explosion of grassroots civic organizations is evident. Finally, a relaxed national-language policy will defuse the divisiveness of language and ethnicity issues. Political liberalization will produce greater integration, not greater conflict. The March presidential election was a victory for the people of Taiwan and for popular sovereignty. Sovereignty now resides with the people. While many are still busy debating whether Chinese are suited for democracy, Taiwan has forged ahead. In doing so, Taiwan has proved that democracy is a universally applicable system of government. Taiwan has successfully blended Western and Chinese values to demonstrate the way in which a traditional cultural heritage can be drawn upon to build a modern democratic society. Discussion A participant asked if corruption and socioeconomic inequality are increasingly important political issues and, if so, whether they will hurt the legitimacy of Taiwan's democracy. Might they be "cross-cutting" issues that will moderate divisions caused by the identity issue? A presenter responded that corruption and socioeconomic inequality are not major issues. He noted that there is little in the way of class consciousness in Taiwan because of the speed of economic development and social transformation and because of the low barriers to entry into the capitalist class. Instead, Taiwan's politics have been dominated by the issues of reunification and Taiwanization (or national identity). Taiwan's subethnic cleavage is intense, but it fades with each generation. Another participant warned against "euphoric triumphalism" when thinking about Taiwan, noting that democracies are never fully consolidated and the future is always uncertain. He suggested that a feeling of unfairness may be growing in Taiwan, brought about by such problems as rampant insider trading on the Taipei stock market. Also, he noted, the government will have to favor large capitalists over small ones to generate the large investments needed for Taiwan to be a global leader in the technology and information sectors. This may add to a sense of growing favoritism and inequality. Another participant cautioned that the government will need to act more quickly and decisively than it has in the past if it hopes to attract international investors. He said that international investors were skeptical of the government's ability to do this, and he expressed concern over the increased politicization of economic policy making and infrastructure development. In response, a presenter pointed to a variety of factors favoring Taiwan's continued economic development: unleashed entrepreneurship, the development of a domestic capital market, an emphasis on industries that require less investment, and an increasing consensus in the Legislative Yuan on issues of economic policy. Session IV External Factors and Democratization Cheng-yi Lin The Taiwan government adheres to the principle that there is but one China and that China shall eventually be unified. In February 1991 the government-sponsored National Unification Commission (NUC) adopted guidelines for unification that envisage a three-phase process starting with exchanges and reciprocity, followed by building mutual trust and cooperation, and concluding with a phase of consultation leading to reunification. But the government will not establish official contacts with the mainland leadership unless Beijing renounces the use of force and ends its practice of isolating Taiwan internationally. Despite the lack of official contacts, relations between Taiwan and China have developed considerably since 1987. Tourism, trade, investment, and cultural and sports exchanges have increased rapidly. Since April 1993 there have been at least seven rounds of semi-official talks between Taiwan and the PRC. Both Jiang Zemin and Lee Teng-hui have issued proposals for managing and resolving cross-Strait relations. According to most public opinion polls, no more than a third of Taiwan's population supports independence. In fact, more and more people on the island are neither pro-reunification nor pro-independence. Surveys conducted between mid-July 1995 and early 1996 showed that between 46 percent and 53 percent of Taiwanese favor the status quo. It is clear from the NUC guidelines that the KMT's policy is actually "one China, but not now." In contrast to the KMT position, the DPP holds that Taiwan is and should remain an independent nation. As early as 1986, the DPP party platform specified that the future of Taiwan should be determined by all residents of the island. In September 1991 the DPP launched a campaign for Taiwanese membership in the UN. The New Tide faction of the DPP also proposed a clause in the party platform calling for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan. At the DPP's fifth national convention in October 1991, the Formosa and New Tide factions adopted a platform amendment that states, "According to the principle of self-determination, the formation of an independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan with the establishment of a new constitution must be decided upon by all the inhabitants of Taiwan through a plebiscite." The battle between the KMT and the DPP over unification (tong) and independence (du) has become more complicated since the NP split from the KMT in August 1993. The NP accused Lee Teng-hui of moving Taiwan toward independence and betraying Chinese nationalism. President Lee's visit to Cornell University in June 1995 had a great impact on Beijing's policy toward Taiwan. Beginning in July, Beijing departed from its peaceful-reunification policy to combine criticism in the media with coercive military pressure. China sought to influence Taiwan's historic presidential election with three rounds of military exercises starting with missile tests and ending with amphibious landing exercises on Pingtan Island, off Fujian Province. Beijing's main purpose was to diminish Taiwan's status as an independent political entity. According to Chinese premier Li Peng, "regardless of how Taiwan's leaders are selected, the fact that Taiwan is part of China's territory and that its leaders are only leaders of one region of China cannot change." China's military exercises led to the deployment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet near Taiwan and provoked anti-Chinese sentiment on the island. The exercises also made cross-Strait relations the primary election issue. Prior to the exercises, President Lee's opponents had hoped to attack him for his questionable purchase of an expensive villa and his reported link to gangsters and money politics. Instead, the military threat caused the Taiwanese people to rally around their president. (Thirty-nine percent of voters polled said that they took Beijing's military exercises into account when they voted.) Lee skillfully used the PRC's military exercises to broaden his base of support. The PRC's coercive campaign against Taiwan was not a complete failure. Beijing demonstrated its ability to set the agenda in Taiwan's elections. Beijing's actions also caused all the presidential candidates to pledge to seek better relations with China after the elections. President Clinton's decision to deploy the aircraft carriers Nimitz and Independence near Taiwan to monitor China's military activities indicated that U.S. policy regarding the situation in the Taiwan Strait had shifted from "strategic ambiguity" to "strategic clarity." There is no doubt that Washington opposes a military solution to the Taiwan question, but the United States does not intend to enter into direct military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. Through preventive and defensive measures, Washington hopes to ease the tension between Taiwan and China and demonstrate U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The carrier deployment helped to defuse the crisis and smooth the conduct of the presidential election, but this action also forced Washington to become more involved in the Taiwan-China feud and strained U.S.-PRC relations. At the same time, the Clinton administration has continued to tell Beijing that Washington opposes Taiwan independence; the administration has played into Beijing's hands by obstructing Taiwan's efforts to upgrade its international status. In the near future, Taipei will seek peaceful relations with Beijing rather than peaceful reunification. For Taipei, a peace accord in which Beijing renounces the use of force will have to precede the opening of direct commercial and transportation links. For the PRC, Taiwan's acceptance of a one-China principle and a "one country, two systems" formula is a prerequisite for an official end to the hostilities. The United States has two options: 1) it can promote the peaceful reunification of China with the consent of the people on Taiwan, or 2) it can help Taiwan maintain the status quo with the tolerance of Beijing's leaders. The U.S. government should stick to a policy of providing Taiwan with sufficient defensive weapons. Taipei is realistic enough not to seek U.S. assistance in pursuing the principle of self-determination, but it needs Washington's reassurance that the PRC will not be allowed to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by military means. Michel Oksenberg It is worth considering three basic questions regarding Taiwan's foreign relations. First, what are the essential elements of Taiwan's national-security policy? Second, what effect has democratization had on these? And third, how is the world likely to respond to Taiwan's efforts to distinguish itself from the mainland? The eight basic elements of Taiwan's current national-security policy are as follows: 1) Maintaining the support of the United States. U.S. backing has been critical to Taiwan politically, economically, and militarily. Recognizing this, Taiwan has successfully established and maintained extremely close ties to U.S. political leaders and other policy makers. 2) Maintaining a viable military in order to make an invasion too costly for the PRC. 3) Sustaining a high rate of export-driven economic growth in order to raise living standards and accumulate foreign-exchange reserves. 4) Improving ties with the mainland, as demonstrated by the ballooning of cross-Strait trade and investment and some instances of quiet coordination on common foreign-policy concerns (e.g., the common assertion of Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea). 5) Recognizing that democratization contributes to national security by legitimizing the regime. 6) Seeking to expand economic, cultural, and political ties with the rest of Asia, particularly with Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 7) Cultivating ties to overseas Chinese communities, particularly in Asia and the United States. 8) Seeking heightened international recognition commensurate with Taiwan's economic success and political development. The consequences of democratization for Taiwan's foreign relations have been varied and somewhat contradictory. First, democratization has strengthened Taiwan's ties to the United States. These two democracies now share a much stronger affinity. One reflection of this was the extensive and glowing coverage the U.S. media gave to Taiwan's presidential election. Democratization also has implications for cross-Strait relations. The increased competitiveness of domestic politics has required the KMT-controlled government to pay even greater attention to sustaining Taiwan's economic growth. This has resulted in increased pressure to expand Taiwan's trade and investment ties with the mainland. At the same time, democratization has made Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese efforts to influence the island's domestic politics. It also has widened the political and cultural gap between the mainland and Taiwan and heightened Chinese concerns that, considering the direction of recent political developments, time does not favor peaceful reconciliation. Finally, democratization has had a mixed impact on Taiwan's formulation of foreign policy. In one sense, it has enhanced the capacity of the government to conduct foreign policy because the state has been strengthened by its increased legitimacy. On the other hand, Taiwan's elected officials now must be more responsive to popular aspirations and make sure their policies have public support. These concerns have narrowed the scope of officials' options and increased the influence of interest groups. As a result, it has become more difficult for Taiwan to pursue a consistent and coherent foreign policy. These changes are significant, but several basic conditions have not changed. First, Taiwan sits less than a hundred miles off the coast of mainland China. China is not going to go away, and Taiwan cannot escape China. Taiwan's long-term security will have to depend largely on its relations with China. Also unchanged is the centrality of Taiwan's economic performance to its security. Taiwan must remain internationally competitive; its past achievements do not ensure its future success. Finally, the security of Asia as a whole remains crucial. This underscores the importance of constructive relations among the United States, China, and Japan. How will the countries of the Asia-Pacific region respond to Taiwan's efforts to enhance its regional and international profile? It is still too early to tell, but a number of different reactions are already apparent. The United States has moved closer to Taiwan, in part because of the increased U.S. affinity with a democratic Taiwan. Japan has reacted with apprehension to China's bullying of Taiwan, but Japan's role is circumscribed by its history of colonization of China and Taiwan. Countries across Southeast Asia show restraint rooted in a need to placate China. It is impossible to predict Taiwan's future, but it is possible to identify five sets of variables that are certain to affect it. 1) What will President Lee do with his unprecedented electoral victory? Will he focus on restoring dialogue with the mainland? Will he continue to pursue "pragmatic diplomacy"? If the latter, will Lee use the same approach or will he adopt a new, less provocative approach? 2) Will Taiwan's foreign-affairs apparatus be more restrained in its efforts to gain the support of U.S. political leaders and policy makers, which so far have been vigorous and highly successful? 3) How will the identity issue play out on Taiwan? Will the Taiwanese continue to grow apart from the mainland to the point where the notion of a single entity is difficult to sustain? 4) What will happen in China? Some trends and prospects are promising, but others are worrisome: increasingly virulent nationalism, uncertainty over succession, the disturbing handling of Hong Kong, and strained relations with the United States. 5) What will be the degree and nature of U.S. engagement in Asia? Although the U.S. government has expressed its commitment to remain constructively engaged in Asia, many Asians are less confident of continued U.S. involvement in the region. Discussion A participant commented that it is important to recognize that Taiwan has changed, but that U.S. policy has not kept pace with this change. Specifically, America's "one-China" policy, which dates back to the 1972 Shanghai Communique, has not changed. At the time that the Shanghai Communique was signed, both Taiwan and the mainland were authoritarian, and both claimed to represent all of China. Now only the authoritarian government on the mainland claims to be the legal government of China and Taiwan. The government on Taiwan, which is now elected democratically, does not claim sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, the United States continues to acknowledge Beijing's claim that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part. This produces dissonance in U.S. policy, particularly between the administration and Congress. The United States must recognize the change in reality; otherwise, the dissonance will continue. A presenter responded that U.S. policy has not evolved as much as has Taiwan's political system, but it has evolved nonetheless. Moreover, the mainland and the rest of East Asia have evolved almost as much as Taiwan. Washington therefore cannot assume that the rest of East Asia will follow U.S. policy on China. The United States must be careful not to diverge too much from policies that Japan and South Korea will support. A participant suggested that there are two scenarios regarding Taiwan-mainland relations. The first is that Beijing will become even more assertive because of rising Chinese nationalism. (Another participant pointed out that Beijing is likely to be less tolerant of Taiwan once the government of Hong Kong reverts to the mainland.) In this case, no concessions short of reunification will satisfy China. Considering that 75 percent of Taiwan's voters (the combined vote for Lee and Peng) do not want to see a major concession to China, such concessions by Taiwan are unlikely. In the second scenario, the PRC will shift from its reliance on coercion to peaceful negotiation. But China's leaders have accused Lee Teng-hui of being a criminal who should be thrown into the "garbage dump" of history. This rhetoric makes it very difficult for the mainland to accept Lee as a legitimate leader and negotiating partner. A presenter observed that both Taiwan and the mainland have been engaged in a certain amount of posturing. Both are mindful of the looming negotiations on direct shipping and air links between Taiwan and the mainland after Hong Kong reverts to China on 1 July 1997. Both recognize the importance of the United States to their negotiating positions. Lee Teng-hui embraced the United States and demonstrated his willingness to stand up to Beijing. Although it did so in a blundering way, the PRC demonstrated to Washington (and Taipei) its power and resolve. A participant questioned the extent of the PRC's control over Taiwan's future direction. He suggested that Beijing's influence on developments in Taiwan appears limited. China cannot use much more military force than it has used already. It can try to influence Taiwan's domestic politics by offering plums to different parties or to factions within parties, and it can help limit Taiwan's role in international organizations, but this does not amount to a high degree of influence. If Beijing's options remain limited, the Chinese leadership might become frustrated and strike out at Taiwan. He urged the United States to recapture its policy and not let it be driven by the Taiwanese. At the same time, the United States must engage the PRC on the Taiwan issue. Another participant observed that the present generation of leadership in Beijing is more nationalistic regarding Taiwan than was Mao's generation. For Mao, Taiwan was primarily a political issue having more to do with the continued presence of the rival KMT than with the status of Taiwan. As long as the KMT was not a serious threat, Mao could let the Taiwan issue slide. For today's leaders, however, Taiwan is a much more passionate issue. It is interesting to note, however, that while China's saber-rattling is popular in Beijing, it is less popular in Shanghai and unpopular in Guangdong. Finally, a participant suggested that there is a danger that the rest of Asia will regard China's ascension as inevitable and will accept that "Taiwan is in China's bathtub." He concluded that there is no alternative to broad constructive engagement with China and that, in fashioning and carrying out its China policy, the United States cannot go it alone. The participants were impressed by the remarkable rapidity and success of Taiwan's transition to democracy, as symbolized by the free and popular presidential elections of March 1996. They recognized, however, that consolidating democratic institutions would be a much more difficult task. Among the key obstacles that must be overcome if Taiwan is to become a mature and stable democracy are the influence of corruption and "money politics," the diminishing but still significant ties to the state apparatus that make the KMT more than just a typical democratic ruling party, and subethnic tensions between native Taiwanese and mainlanders. Nonetheless, the prevailing view inclined toward optimism with respect to these essentially internal problems. Much more difficult and threatening to the future of democracy in Taiwan are the highly complex dilemmas of security and identity posed by its relationship with the PRC. It was widely agreed that the triangular relationship between the United States, Taiwan, and China will play a critical role in determining the fate of Taiwanese democracy. Participants Richard V. Allen is Chairman of AEA International Trade and Management Consultants, an international consulting firm with offices in Washington, D.C., and Seoul, Korea. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and Chairman of its Asian Studies Center. He is also a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. His career in government service includes positions as National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan (1981) and Deputy Assistant to President Richard Nixon and Deputy Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (1971-72). Paul Balaran is Vice-President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this capacity he assists the President in the management of the Endowment's activities and operations and in shaping a number of special projects being developed by the Endowment. Previously, he served at the Ford Foundation's International Affairs Program and directed program development and grant-making. Dr. Balaran is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Editors of Orbis, and the Board of Trustees of the Japan-America Society of Washington, D.C. Ambassador Nat H. Bellocchi is President of Bellocchi & Co. Mr. Bellocchi was previously Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (1990-95) and also served as the International Affairs Advisor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1988-90), U.S. Ambassador to Botswana (1985-88), and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1981-85). He entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1955 and spent most of his career in Asia. Tun-jen Cheng is Associate Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary. He has published extensively on political economy and democratic change in newly industrializing countries in East Asia. Professor Cheng has been a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the coeditor of Political Change in Taiwan (with Stephan Haggard) and Inherited Rivalry: Conflicts Across the Taiwan Straits (with Chi Huang and Samuel Wu). Yun-han Chu is the Director of Programs at the Institute for National Policy Research, Taiwan, and Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. His research interests include the political economy of the East Asian NICs, international political economy, methodology and quantitative methods, and comparative mass political behavior. Dr. Chu serves as an editorial columnist for the China Times, coordinates the political science section of the National Science Council, and is an affiliated faculty member with the Research Program on Democratization at the University of California, Irvine. Warren I. Cohen is Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Maryland and Consulting Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. He serves on the Advisory Board for the Cold War International History Project at the Wilson Center for International Scholars. Professor Cohen has been editor of the journal Diplomatic History and was the Director of the Michigan China and Japan Councils. His recent publications include America in the Age of Soviet Power: 1945-1991 and America's Response to China. Catharin Dalpino is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, with particular responsibilities for democracy promotion. Prior to joining the State Department, she was a career officer with the Asia Foundation. Ms. Dalpino has been a Resident Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1990-91) and a Policy Analyst at the World Bank (1981-82). She has published several articles and op-ed pieces on democracy building and political development, with particular emphasis on East and Southeast Asia. Larry Diamond is Codirector of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, Coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, and Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has written extensively on democratization and the problems and conditions of democracy in the developing world, especially Africa. His books include the series on Democracy in Developing Countries (coedited with Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset). Bruce Dickson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Washington University. His research interests include political reform in communist and authoritarian countries, and institutional and cultural influences on political behavior. He is the coeditor of two books dealing with the Asia Pacific region and the author of A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China: 1949-1986 and of articles in China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, and Pacific Affairs. Paula J. Dobriansky is Vice-Chairman of the Board of the National Endowment for Democracy and Senior International Affairs and Trade Advisor at Hunton & Williams law firm. She is also the host of Freedom's Challenge on National Empowerment Television and an Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute. She has served as Associate Director for Policy and Programs at the U.S. Information Agency, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council. Ambassador Harvey J. Feldman is a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer who served as the State Department's Country Director for the Republic of China. He was Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and to the Solomon Islands (1979-81), and Alternate U.S. Representative to the U.N. Ambassador Feldman has published several articles and books, including Taiwan in a Time of Transition and Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China. He also writes a regular column of commentary on international affairs for The China Times. Karl Fields is Associate Professor of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington. He is a Member of American Association for Chinese Studies and the Japan Political Research Institute. Professor Fields is the author of Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (1995) and many articles and reviews on the economy of East Asia. Edward Friedman is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. During 1993-94, he served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Professor Friedman is the author of numerous books including, most recently, National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (1995) and The Politics of Democratization (forthcoming). His book Chinese Village, Socialist State China (1991) won the Association for Asian Studies' Prize for Best Book on Modern China. Carl Gershman is President of the National Endowment for Democracy. From 1981 to 1984, he was Senior Counselor to the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He has written articles on foreign policy issues for such publications as the New Republic, Commentary, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times Magazine, and the Journal of Democracy. Huang-hsiung Huang is currently a Visiting Scholar at the John K. Fairbank Center at Harvard University. He was recently elected to serve as a Deputy of the National Assembly in Taiwan. Mr. Huang was a founding member of the Democratic Progressive Party Constitution Drafting Committee in 1992-93. He is a veteran Member of the Legislative Yuan, having been elected to serve three terms in the legislature. Within the DPP caucus, he was considered a leading member on defense and national security issues. Hwei-chen Huang is the Executive Director of the Institute for National Policy Research, Taiwan, which, since its founding in 1989, has brought together scholars and intellectuals dedicated to public policy research. Prior to joining the INPR in 1992, Mr. Huang was a Senior Journalist and former Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the China Times, the largest newspaper in Taiwan. His research interests include domestic policy, political development, and cross-straits relations. Vance Hyndman is Director of Washington Programs of The Asia Foundation. Previously, he served with the Peace Corps as Country Director in Hungary from 1990 to 1992 and in Thailand from 1987 to 1990. He was Professional Staff Member with the House Foreign Affairs Committee from 1976 to 1987, where he had responsibility for Asia. Mr. Hyndman has presented numerous lectures and seminars on Asian issues. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick is Senior Fellow and Counselor to the President for Foreign Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, and a syndicated columnist for the Los Angeles Times. From 1981-85, she served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and as Member of the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and the National Security Planning Board. Ambassador Kirkpatrick has received numerous honors and grants, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1985). She is the author of numerous books and articles, including The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State and Other Surprises (1990). Howard H. Lange is Director of the Taiwan Coordination Staff in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau of the U.S. Department of State, where he also has been Director of the Office of Intellectual Property and Competition. Previously, Mr. Lange served as Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. Embassy in Malta (1989-92) and as Economic Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw (1986-89). From 1983 to 1985, he was in charge of economic matters on the China Desk in Washington. David N. Laux is President of the USA-ROC Economic Council. Previously, he served as Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, as Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council in the White House (1982-86), and as Director of the Office of China and Hong Kong Affairs at the Department of Commerce. Mr. Laux is Vice-President of the Foreign Policy Discussion Group in Washington, D.C. Bih-jaw Lin is the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council (Taiwan), which is comprised of cabinet-level officials who advise the President on security issues. Prior to joining the Council, Dr. Lin served as a Professor and Director of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University. He also served as the Dean of the Graduate Institute of Diplomacy at the same institution. His research interests include international politics, East Asian international relations, and international security issues. Cheng-yi Lin is the Deputy Director of the Institute of European and American Studies at the Academica Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan. Prior to assuming this post, Dr. Lin was a Research Fellow at the same institute. His many publications include "Principles and Means in China's Third World Policy," in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), American Moral Political Leadership in the Third World and "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis and U.S. Leadership," in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), U.S. Leadership in Asia and the Middle East. Bruce Malkin is Human Rights, Labor, and United Nations Advisor in the East Asian and Pacific Bureau of the U.S. Department of State. He served as Economic Advisor to the U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States (1981-88), and has held positions in the State Department dealing with global and East Asia trade policies. Recently, he has specialized in human rights, democracy, labor, and United Nations issues affecting U.S. relations with the countries in East Asia and the Pacific. Michel Oksenberg is a Senior Fellow at the Asia/Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he is also a Professor of Political Science. From 1977 to 1980, he served as Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council with special responsibility for China and Indochina. Professor Oksenberg was President of the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii (1992-95). He is the author of many books including An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence (1994). Marc F. Plattner is Codirector of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, Coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, and Counselor at the National Endowment for Democracy. He has served as a Fellow at the National Humanities Center and an Advisor on Economic and Social Affairs at the United States Mission to the United Nations. Dr. Plattner is Coeditor with Larry Diamond of a number of books, most recently, Economic Reform and Democracy (1995). Thomas Robinson is President of American Asian Research Enterprises. From 1988-93, he was Director of the China Studies Program at the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Robinson has been a Professor of China Studies, Government, and National Security at Georgetown University since 1982. He also has been Asian and China Studies Course Chairperson with the Foreign Service Institute since 1983. Ambassador Peter R. Rosenblatt is founding partner of Heller & Rosenblatt. From 1977-81, he was Ambassador to Micronesia and President Carter's Personal Representative to the Negotiations on the Future Political Status of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Ambassador Rosenblatt served as Foreign Policy Advisor on the Clinton Presidential Campaign (1991-92). Chyuan-Jenq Shiau is the Director of Research at the Institute for National Policy Research, Taiwan, the first non-profit, and nonpartisan public policy research organization dedicated to contributing to the public dialogue on domestic policy issues and international affairs in Taiwan. Dr. Shiau is also a Professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University. His research interests include political economy, the relationships between business and government, and the political-economic transformation of authoritarianism in Taiwan. Ambassador David Jameison Smith is President of Global Horizons, Inc., consulting on overseas business development, defense, and international affairs. Ambassador Smith was appointed by President George Bush to be Chief Negotiator for the U.S.-Soviet Defense and Space Talks from 1989-1991. He also served from 1987-89 as Assistant to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole for Strategic Policy and Arms Control. In 1985-86, he was Professional Staff Member at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Scott Snyder is a Program Officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, where he conducts research and organizes study projects on Asian security issues. Previously he was Acting Director of the Contemporary Affairs Department at the Asia Society, where he supervised the development and implementation of numerous public symposia and private policy dialogues on U.S.-Asia relations. Mr. Snyder is the author of numerous articles on Korean Affairs. The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz is Senior Counselor at APCO Associates Inc. Previously, he served in the House of Representatives for nine terms and was Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on Africa. Since leaving Congress, he has been Visiting Professor of International Relations at George Washington University, and President of Solarz Associates. He is a Member of the Board of the National Endowment for Democracy. Mr. Solarz is the author of numerous articles for publications such as Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, and the Washington Post. Hung-mao Tien is the President of the Institute for National Policy Research, Taiwan. He is also a member of the National Unification Research Council, which advises President Lee Teng-hui on Taiwan-Mainland relations. Prior to joining the Institute, Dr. Tien was a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His publications include Government and Politics in Kuomintang China 1927-1937 (1972), The Great Transition, Social and Political Change in the Republic of China (1989), and Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (1995). David G. Timberman (rapporteur) is a consultant and writer specializing in Southeast Asian affairs and democratic development in Asia. He is currently a consultant with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the Asia Society in New York. Mr. Timberman observed the March 23 elections in Taiwan as a member of a small delegation of Americans hosted by the Institute of International Relations in Taipei. He is the author of Making Every Vote Count: Domestic Election Monitoring in Asia and A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. She is an American diplomatic historian who specializes in American-East Asian relations, particularly U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations. Previously, she served in the Office of Chinese Affairs in the U.S. Department of State and at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1986 to 1987. Professor Tucker is the author of various books and articles including Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendship and Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1940-1950. Eric Tong-Sheng Wu was recently elected to serve as a Kuomintang Member of Taiwan's National Assembly, which approves presidential appointments to the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Authority, as well as approving Constitutional changes. Dr. Wu also serves as the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Cultural Association, an organization headed by the President of the Republic of China, which is devoted to cultural development. A former Kuomintang Member of Parliament from Hsinchu County, Dr. Wu has held several key leadership positions within the Legislative Yuan in addition to authoring two book-length essays on policy issues in Taiwan, The Birth of a New Society: Taiwan in Transformation and The Driving Forces in Taiwan's Society.
Table 1
Partisan Distribution of Seats and Votes in the
December 1992 and December 1995 Legislative Elections in Taiwan
International Forum for Democratic Studies The International Forum for Democratic Studies was established in 1994 by the National Endowment for Democracy to respond to the need for sustained and serious study of democracy's problems and prospects throughout the world. The Forum serves as a clearinghouse for information on the varied activities and experiences of groups working to achieve and maintain democracy. It has initiated four interrelated programs: the Research and Conferences Program, the Democracy Resource Center (consisting of a library and archives, an electronic database, and a World Wide Web site on the Internet), a Visiting Fellows Program, and the Journal of Democracy (a quarterly published for the National Endowment for Democracy by the Johns Hopkins University Press). Many of the Forum's activities are funded by private contributions. The National Endowment for Democracy is a nonprofit, nongovernmental, bipartisan, grant-making organization created in 1983 to help strengthen democratic institutions around the world. Funded by an annual Congressional appropriation, the Endowment's grants program assists organizations abroad working for democratic goals. The Endowment's programs encourage democratic political development, primarily in three major functional areas pluralism; democratic governance; and education, culture, and communications. In the last year, Endowment grants supported programs in some 84 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Institute for National Policy Research (Taiwan) The Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) was established by the Chang Yung-fa Foundation in 1989 for the purpose of contributing to the public dialogue on domestic policy issues and international affairs. It was the first private, nonprofit, and nonpartisan public policy research organization of its kind in Taiwan and has become the leader in the expanding community of privately supported research bodies concerned with public policies. The INPR sponsors a wide range of programs disseminating policy information and suggestions to leaders in the government, business, academic, and media communities through conferences, seminars, training sessions, and publications. The INPR library boasts a collection of over 28,000 books in Chinese, Japanese, and Western languages. The backbone of the collection is a database on Taiwan's trade and public policy, and on economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Among INPR's major publications is the Think Tank series, which includes books in English and Chinese on national development, Taiwan's constitutional reform, Taiwan-mainland relations, science and technology policy, and the foreign policy of the Republic of China. The INPR also publishes the biweekly National Policy Dynamic Analysis. The Chang Yung-fa Foundation was established in 1986 by the Chairman of the Evergreen Corporation, Chang Yung-fa. Chairman Chang strongly believes that industry cannot stand alone and must integrate with the heart of society; what industry takes, it must give back to society. On that principle, he set up a nonprofit organization that contributes to various social and academic programs, including aid to needy families for medical and funeral bills; scholarships for students of indigent families; grants and subsidies to nursing homes and orphanages; grants to programs for the mentally and physically challenged; scholarships for gifted students in the fine arts and music; and grants to educational programs for maritime education and ocean navigation. In 1989, the Chang Yung-fa Foundation established the INPR as a fully funded subsidiary. Publication of this report was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to the International Forum for Democratic Studies. The Corporation does not take responsibility for any statements or views expressed in this document. This report was produced by Debra Liang-Fenton, Conferences & Publications Coordinator of the International Forum. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent those of the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Forum for Democratic Studies, or the Institute for National Policy Research. Photocopies may be made. When using any part of this document, please cite the International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Institute for National Policy Research. |
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