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IV. A Strategy of Comparative Advantage
There are three institutional features of the Endowment that give it a distinct comparative advantage: its nature, its structure, and its mission.
- As a non-governmental organization, the Endowment can provide political assistance to democratic forces in repressive or other sensitive situations where U.S. government support, even if channeled through intermediary non-governmental organizations, would risk serious diplomatic complications. In addition, democratic groups abroad often have a strong preference for receiving assistance from a non-governmental source, believing that their credibility or even their independence would be compromised by accepting funds from a U.S. government agency. Assistance through non-governmental channels is also more cost-effective than government-to-government aid. Finally, the Endowment s autonomy gives it the flexibility to respond quickly to changes taking place in countries around the world.
- The Endowment's unique structure, which includes its four constituent institutes in the fields of labor, business and party development as well as discretionary grantees active in other sectors, enables it to respond comprehensively to democratic needs. The Endowment's structure reflects an understanding that the establishment of democracy is not limited to the successful conduct of elections but involves, as already noted the strengthening of civil society, democratic political institutions and democratic culture. Moreover, the Endowment's multi-sectoral structure enables it to provide a "full package" response to the complex needs of emerging democracies especially important in light of the close relationship between political and economic reform as well as targeted assistance to movements struggling to defend democratic values in closed societies.
- The fact that the Endowment's sole mission is the promotion of democracy accounts for its ability over the past eight years to reach out to and work with democratic activists around the world in an authentic and unambiguous manner and on the basis of common values and a shared vision. Unencumbered by other considerations, the Endowment has been able to act upon a coherent set of principles and goals, including consistency in applying its purposes to diverse political situations and movements and responsiveness to the pressing needs of democratic forces. The compromise of any of these principles would have jeopardized the strong international reputation the Endowment has enjoyed and the relationships of trust and solidarity it has established with democratic activists in many complex and dangerous situations.
The institutional features that give the Endowment these comparative advantages have important strategic implications:
First, the fact that the Endowment is a non-governmental institution suggests that it should position itself at the "cutting edge" of democratic advance, where historically it has been most effective. In this context, it will be recalled that the Endowment's 1991 Priorities Document, as well as the Statement of Principles and Objectives, lists four broad categories of countries, corresponding to their state of democratic development. The first two "post-breakthrough" categories include emerging democracies, i.e., countries that have achieved democratic breakthroughs but not yet consolidated democratic institutions, and transitional countries where repressive political authority is collapsing and democratic groups committed to peaceful transition and the establishment of alternative structures exist and need support. The other two "pre-breakthrough" categories include closed societies that repress all institutions independent of the state, and authoritarian systems that tolerate the elements of civil society but where democratic development can only be viewed as a long-term prospect*.
Despite the dramatic breakthroughs of the past over half of the world's population continues to live under authoritarian rule, Non-democratic regimes are concentrated in Africa, the Islamic World and East Asia. A "cutting edge" strategy would seek to place greater emphasis on these countries, where there is significant resistance to democratic political change from government authorities and powerful entrenched interests. To reinforce the relatively weak and often inexperienced democratic movements in these countries, the Endowment would provide "venture capital" to help them overcome the many social, cultural, political and historical obstacles they face. This is particularly important in light of the fact that alternative funding for these countries is usually limited, and in addition, it is awkward for a U.S. government agency to provide such assistance.
A heightened emphasis on the "pre-breakthrough" categories would not and should not preclude continuing engagement in the "post-breakthrough" emerging and transitional democracies. These constitute such a large and important group of countries, reaching now into all the major regions of the world, that a policy of abstention would effectively mean the abandonment of the Endowment's global mission.
The process of consolidation in these new democracies will be long and difficult; there are important and sensitive sectors in these countries where alternative funding may not be available, and where Endowment support to independent, politically active organizations can playa vital role. Given the concentration of most of the new democracy donors on technical assistance in developing efficient market economies and proficient government institutions, there is still a need for Endowment support for groups working to help achieve democratic transitions, as well as selective assistance to cultural, civic, and political groups working to broaden democratic participation, to strengthen the values of pluralism and tolerance, and to enliven the spirit and understanding of democracy.
Second, the Endowment's multi-sectoral structure, in particular its relationship to its four core institutes (CIPE, FTUI, NDI and IRI), must adapt to the new circumstance created by the existence of alternative funding from A.I.D. by increasing the degree of program coordination with the institutes. In the case of labor and the two party institutes, direct funding from A.I.D. is now beginning to exceed the resources received out of the Endowment's core USIA appropriation, though that funding is targeted at specific countries and programs of priority to the U.S. Government. (So far, CIPE is an exception, though it, too, may soon be receiving large A.I.D. grants.)
The additional funding being received by the institutes is a further reflection of the Endowment's success. NED funding helped launch the institutes and has positioned them to playa pivotal role in a period when the goal of democracy promotion has gained increased acceptance. The Endowment welcomes the fact that the institutes have been able to expand their work with alternative funding, especially since it frees NED funding for other activities. Moreover, it remains a strategic priority for the Endowment to continue to provide the institutes with a secure infrastructure and sufficient flexibility in programming to enable them to procure maximum funds from sources other than our own. At the same time, the availability of alternative funding for the institutes complicates NED planning procedures at the very moment we are being asked by the GAG to develop a more systematic process for overall program planning, evaluation and setting priorities.
Clearly, Endowment procedures that were developed in an earlier period when NED was the sole or principal funding agency need to be reexamined in light of these new circumstances. For example, in planning programs and allocating resources, the Endowment may choose to de, emphasize a strategically important country if the institutes are carrying out (or planning to carry out) significant programs there using non-Endowment funds. The Endowment will also have to balance its desire to allow the institutes sufficient programming flexibility with the kind of program specificity and prioritizing needed to fulfill its evaluation responsibilities. As part of its planning responsibilities, the Endowment will also have to insure that the institutes' programs are consistent with the priorities of the NED Board as discussed in Section V below.
Most importantly, the Endowment can only maximize its comparative advantage as a multi-sectoral institution if the expanded alternative funding is complemented by enhanced program coordination between the Endowment and the institutes. Effective program coordination should extend to non-NED resources that are being provided to the institutes and other Endowment grantees in countries of priority. Joint meetings held on a more frequent basis will offer increased opportunities to share information about specific countries and to coordinate joint activities where possible. Periodic strategic regional review sessions led by regional experts will also provide opportunities to discuss and identify specific projects on which the institutes can coordinate. More regular coordination will enhance the overall contribution made in particular countries beyond the sum of the individual programs involved. In this way, the availability of alternative funding will strengthen, not weaken, the Endowment's ability to respond coherently and comprehensively to democratic needs throughout the world.
Third, the availability of non-Endowment resources for democracy promotion puts a new premium on that aspect of the Endowment's work that complements its grant-making program; namely, its ability as an institution whose sole mission is the advance of democracy to be a vital center of democratic thought and action. The Endowment has already taken significant steps in this direction by launching the Journal of Democracy and sponsoring a number of conferences and seminars where the increasingly complex issues related to the democratic prospect in the world are discussed and debated. The further development of this work is considered in Section VII below.
*In Fiscal Year 1991, NED devoted approximately 80% of all obligated program funds to projects in the "post-breakthrough" category and 20% to the "pre-breakthrough" category.
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