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The shattering events of September 11
radically altered the world in which we live, compelling people in societies
throughout the world to reexamine their fundamental goals, priorities, and
assumptions. While we believe that the basic democratic goals that have guided
the National Endowment for Democracy since its inception remain every
bit as valid today, we also recognize the imperative of rethinking our priorities
and approaches in light of the transformed international landscape. The
Strategy Document approved by the NED Board in 1997 was, in any event,
due to be revised at this time, taking account of new developments during
the past five years that affect democracy and the NED’s role in promoting it.
The events of September 11 have turned this routine, albeit consequential,
exercise into an urgent necessity.
The 1997 Strategy Document was drafted at a time
of shrinking budgets and stipulated that the NED
could remain a dynamic and creative center for the
promotion of democracy only if it devised methods
to do more with less. It was hoped that
through the imaginative use of human resources,
the NED could enhance the impact of its grantmaking.
The methods proposed included expanding
cross-border assistance aid extended by
activists in new democracies to other democratic
struggles in neighboring countries; encouraging
the creation of NED-like institutions in established
and new democracies; using the NED’s growing
research capability to strengthen intellectual
exchange and deepen the understanding of democratic
development; and adapting to the new era of
economic and technological globalization by fostering
the globalization of the democracy movement.
The NED fulfilled this last objective by
launching the World Movement for Democracy, a
proactive network of practitioners and thinkers
committed to strengthening collaboration among
democratic forces around the world.
The 1997 Strategy Document saw a special role
for the NED in the era of globalization, a phenomenon
that was understood to involve far
more than simply removing barriers to trade. Two
of the principal engines of globalization, the communications
revolution and the greater ease of
movement, also made possible the more rapid
spread of ideas and information, together with
the possibility of building stronger human networks.
With its independence and operational
flexibility, and especially with its global and
multi-sectoral approach and focus on values and
ideas, the NED was in a position to take advantage
of the technological revolution to strengthen
international solidarity among people from
diverse political systems, sectors of work, and
societies around shared democratic principles.
But the 1997 Strategy Document also called
attention to some of the dangers accompanying
globalization, especially the growth of intra-state
problems such as ethnic hatred, social breakdown,
and nationalist and religious extremism
whose consequences could be felt far beyond the
borders of the countries in which these problems
originate, whether with respect to refugees, terrorism,
crime and drugs, or weapons proliferation.
The lowering of national barriers meant that
destructive transnational forces could threaten
democracy and peace, even turning weak, failed
states into a base for far-flung terrorist or criminal
operations. In the aftermath of September 11,
these aspects of globalization suddenly appear
more menacing than almost anyone could have
imagined when the Strategy Document was drafted
five years ago.
The response to the terrorists must obviously
begin by dismantling their networks, ending the
support they receive from states, and strengthening
domestic and international defense capabilities.
But in addition to responding to the
immediate security threat, it is also necessary to
help democracy take root in those countries of
the Middle East, Africa, South and Central Asia,
and other regions that now breed or support terrorists.
It is in these Muslim countries or regions,
more than anywhere else, that terrorism feeds off
tyranny, finding recruits among the politically
repressed and sanctuary from states that use terror
against their own people. Building effective
political institutions is the surest way to sever the
link between terror and tyranny and to advance
the values of democracy, individual rights, and
cultural pluralism in the Middle East and elsewhere
in the Muslim world.
Promoting democratic institutions and values in
the Muslim world is thus one of the most urgent
challenges now facing the NED. But it is not the
only one. While the attacks of September 11 riveted
the focus of international attention on the
threat of terrorism, they did not sweep away or
resolve the problems of dictatorship, semi-authoritarianism,
corruption, back-sliding, and ethnic
conflict that existed before September 11 in Latin
America, East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Central
Europe, and the NIS. If anything, the attacks
aggravated these problems by accelerating the
downturn in the world economy that was already
underway, and by heightening security concerns
that dictators often use to rationalize and tighten
their controls. Although there is no evidence yet
of a new wave of democratic setbacks, the gains of
the past decade are today more tenuous than they
were before September 11, and democratic
progress may be more difficult to achieve in the
new international environment.
Meeting the challenge of democratization in the
Muslim world thus does not warrant a retreat
from the Endowment’s global approach, which is
rooted in the worldwide interests and moral concerns
of the United States. On the contrary, it
constitutes a powerful new argument for maintaining
and strengthening this approach. The fact
that NED already has a track record in the Middle
East and a network of grantees and contacts upon
which to build an expanded program there and
in other Muslim regions is due entirely to its
global approach, which assumes that no region
where democrats are asking for help should be
disregarded, no matter how difficult the challenges
there might be. Moreover, as September 11
made clear, any seam of dysfunction in the international
system, however marginal to the main
centers of political and economic interest, can
become a source of exposure and threat. In a
globalized world, the cancer of breakdown in any
country can metastasize to other parts of the
global body politic and thus constitutes a danger
to international peace and security. In promoting
the antidote of democratic institution-building,
therefore, it is unwise to write off any country as
insignificant or beyond hope. The sorry history of
Afghanistan’s neglect after the Soviet occupation
ended is a cautionary precedent.
Finally, the global defense of democracy is the
appropriate and most effective response to the
threat posed by Islamic extremists. As has already
been suggested, these extremists do not represent a
religion or a civilization — which is why the conflict
with them cannot be understood as a clash of
civilizations — but espouse an ideology of hatred
and violence as their means to power. Though it is
a particularist and corrupted Islamic ideology, to
its zealous adherents it is a universal system of
truth and thus a fitting rival to democratic civilization,
which they falsely describe as decadent and
narrowly Western. Since democracy is a genuinely
universal value based on the belief that people
everywhere, regardless of their religion or culture,
can achieve self-government under the rule of law,
it is the natural organizing principle in the struggle
to defeat terrorism and to create a stable and
peaceful world. That doesn’t mean the struggle
cannot be won until all people achieve democracy.
But the universal aspiration for democracy is the
banner under which this battle for the defense of
our national interest can most effectively be waged,
and it is also the banner under which the NED has
always proudly marched.
The challenge facing the Endowment, therefore, is
to maintain its global grants program, even as it
focuses increased resources and attention on
strengthening democracy in the Muslim regions of
the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central
Asia, where repression and political failure have
spawned Islamic extremism. Fortunately, the
NED’s core budget has grown modestly in the last
two years and is now supplemented by special
funds for a number of regions or countries to
which the Congress or the Administration attaches
particular importance. Nonetheless, the resources
available to the Endowment cannot be expected to
equal the magnitude of the new tasks it will face
in the period ahead. As it has done before, the
Endowment will seek to close the gap between
resources and objectives by taking full advantage
of its multi-sectoral structure and the programmatic
capabilities of its four core institutes the
American Center for International Labor Solidarity
(ACILS), the Center for International Private
Enterprise (CIPE), the International Republican
Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic
Institute (NDI); by leveraging small grants to
indigenous groups whose spirit and motivation
enable them to provide leadership in grassroots
democratic pursuits; and by networking such
groups to enhance their strength and impact. We
will do this on the broadest possible basis so that
groups of democratic activists struggling in all
regions will feel a sense of support by the NED
and other democracy-promotion organizations
and networks and be encouraged in their efforts.
It will also be necessary for the NED to develop
to the maximum extent possible its ability to act
as a catalytic center of ideas and action for
democracy groups around the world. Much has
already been accomplished along these lines
through the International Forum for Democratic
Studies and the World Movement for Democracy,
and through the growing use of the Internet as a
medium for developing support networks among
democratic groups. These capabilities will have to
be expanded significantly if the Endowment is to
meet the challenge of building a stronger, more
collaborative international response to the major
challenges of democratization.
Long before September 11, it had become clear
that the forward momentum associated with the
third wave of democratization that swept over
large parts of the world in the preceding decades
had slowed throughout the world and even
stalled in some regions. While important gains
have been made in recent years in Nigeria,
Indonesia, Mexico, Senegal, and Ghana, and
while only one major country Pakistan has slid
backwards to military rule, the barriers to democratic
progress loom larger today than at any time
since the third wave began more than a quarter of
a century ago.
The countries where these barriers are greatest,
and where the NED will concentrate most of its
resources, fall into two broad categories: dictatorships
and semi-authoritarian systems. The problems
and program needs differ from one category
to the other, and there is also great variation within
these categories. Dictatorships include both
totalitarian and authoritarian systems, and semiauthoritarianism
includes countries that are moving
toward or away from full democracy, or are
not moving perceptibly in either direction. In
addition, there are also two other categories where
the NED will concentrate lesser resources: transitional
countries where there has been significant
progress in democratization, but where democratic
institutions remain weak; and war-torn or failed
states that lack virtually any institutions of governance,
democratic or otherwise.
Opening dictatorial systems: The
NED has always placed special emphasis on opening
closed dictatorial systems, because the needs
are so great and the courage of the pro-democracy
activists is so admirable. Moreover, these countries
tend to be ignored by most democracy-assistance
institutions, which require an in-country presence
(and thus the permission of the host government)
before they will conduct programs or provide support.
The NED’s policy of making direct grants to
indigenous groups as well as to groups based in
exile has enabled it to play an effective role in
these difficult situations, often at a relatively low
financial cost. The objective is to create internal
and external pressures for liberalization by aiding
internal pockets of activity and linking them to
like-minded groups in other countries, thereby
strengthening their resolve and impact and also
their international support.
NED programs in dictatorial countries place special
emphasis on the defense of human rights and
the provision of access to independent information,
activities that are necessary first steps in
opening closed societies. The principle governing
such programs is feasibility. The NED presses the
limits of what is possible — aiding groups working
to create new openings, to defend democracy
activists, to develop alternative channels for the
flow of information, and to promote capacity
development and democratic education within
the democracy movement itself as well as the
wider society. If space opens up to make it possible
to conduct democracy programs inside dictatorial
countries with the acquiescence of the
government, NED readily takes advantage of this
opportunity, in accordance with its pragmatic
approach. If access to the Internet is available,
even if it is highly restricted, the Endowment will
seek to take advantage of that channel, too. The
NED and its institutes also seek to build international
pressure for democratic openings, as in the
case of Burma, where American labor has defended
the rights of Burmese workers in the
International Labor Organization, and NDI has
recruited more than 3,000 parliamentarians in a
campaign of international solidarity.
NED programs in dictatorial countries thus vary
along a spectrum of possibility. For example, in
North Korea, which is the most closed country,
the NED has provided support to groups in South
Korea that document the repressive conditions in
North Korea and are working to build an international
campaign for the defense of human rights
there. In Burma, it has supported cross-border
efforts that provide training, education, and information
to Burmese groups to help them develop
their institutional capacity and their ability to
communicate internally and with the international
community. In Cuba, where it has become possible
to support internal democratic groups, the
NED has provided assistance to journalists, independent
workers organizations, and cooperatives,
all the while maintaining exile-based programs
that defend human rights, provide uncensored
information, and encourage dialogue within Cuba
and in the diaspora about the political future of
the country. And in China the NED has conducted
an even more diversified effort, aiding both
internal programs to promote democratization,
worker rights, and market reform; and external
programs that defend human rights and provide
access to independent ideas and information.
In these and other dictatorial countries, the NED
should continue to take advantage of any opening,
however limited it may be, and to find ways
to strengthen independent enclaves of democratic
thought and activity. The cause of democracy in
such countries and the quality of NED programs
there are so compelling that Congress has begun
to provide special funding to the Endowment to
expand its programs in Burma, North Korea, and
China, including programs that support the rights
of Tibetans and dialogue about Tibet’s political
future. As NED does so, it should fully utilize its
unique capacity to pursue an integrated approach
that is multi-sectoral, involves both internal and
external programs, and builds international solidarity
networks and campaigns.
Democratizing semi-authoritarian countries:
By far the largest and most
diverse group of countries comprises the second
category, semi-authoritarianism. This is one of
many terms (including pseudo-democracy, hybrid
regimes, and competitive authoritarianism) used
to describe regimes that fall somewhere between
dictatorship and the genuine political openness
and competition of electoral democracy. A factor
common to all such regimes is that the elections
are not free and fair, because they are constrained
and controlled by the ruling party or otherwise
distorted by fraud and manipulation. In addition,
such regimes tend to have an overwhelmingly
dominant executive; formal democratic structures
but authoritarian political culture and practices;
serious human rights violations; residual authoritarian
laws even where there is a new democratic
constitution; and a very high level of corruption
and inequality. The rule of law is extremely weak,
as are the institutions of the state that are supposed
to provide security and look after the social
and economic needs of the people.
Ironically, these problems are the product of the
democratic revolution of the past decades or to
be more precise, the unfinished democratic revolution.
The fall of authoritarian regimes in Latin
America, the Soviet bloc, and large parts of Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa triggered major efforts to
foster democratic transitions in scores of countries,
involving the promotion of free elections,
economic reform, civil society, good governance,
and the rule of law. In Central Europe and the
Baltic countries, as well as in parts of Latin
America and East Asia, these efforts produced significant
results. But in the large majority of cases
they came up against ingrained legacies of
authoritarian culture and practice. As many transitions
stalled, hopes for an inexorable forward
movement toward democracy gave way to the
realization that democratization is a slow and
arduous process, subject to reversals, and that
some variation of semi-authoritarianism, more or
less harsh, is likely to persist in many former dictatorships
for some time to come.
The NED must stay engaged in semi-authoritarian
countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kenya,
Venezuela, and Morocco, whose success or failure
will significantly affect the prospect for democratic
development in their respective regions. Moreover,
since semi-authoritarianism involves shortcomings
in so many different sectors, the NED, with its
multi-sectoral structure, has a special role to play in
crafting a comprehensive response. It should thus
take full advantage of its ability to work simultaneously
in different areas, strengthening not just civil
society and independent media, but also political
parties that can build effective governing coalitions,
and business associations, trade unions, and policy
institutes that can mediate between the state and
the market and effect real economic reform.
In working to promote democratization in semiauthoritarian
countries, it is important that the
NED and its institutes:
- Assist efforts to establish more neutral, independent,
and effective election administration
and to assist civil society organizations and
the mass media in monitoring the conduct of
elections.
- Work to expand the constitutional, legal, and
political space for civil society, NGOs, and
opposition political party development.
- Establish linkages between civil society and
political parties, and also promote collaboration
between them and independent media,
trade unions, business associations, and the
grassroots informal sector.
- Develop practical strategies with feasible
objectives, focusing on building up subcultures
of democratic activism that try to
achieve incremental gains, but that can also
provide leadership if and when opportunities
arise for more substantial breakthroughs.
- Encourage cross-border assistance within
regions as a way of strengthening democratic
cooperation and solidarity, sharing relevant
experiences, building on local
momentum for change, and promoting
regional integration and the gradual enlargement
of democratic practice.
Consolidating new democracies:
In many countries, democratic institutions have
been established only recently and are still very
weak, and there is broad support within and outside
the government in favor of deepening democratic
consolidation. In such emerging
democracies as Thailand, Mexico, Bulgaria,
Ghana, or Bangladesh, democracy cannot be
taken for granted and back-sliding is an everpresent
possibility. (One need only remember the
complacency about Venezuelan democracy just a
decade ago.) The Endowment should continue to
reserve some resources for programs in such
countries, even as it concentrates most of its
resources and energies on countries where
democracy is less advanced. In doing so, the
NED should pay close attention to the problems
of governance, working to make governments
more accountable and transparent in their functioning;
generating, supporting, and sharing
innovative solutions to problems of consolidation;
increasing broad-based participation in the political
process; and strengthening the capacity and
transparency of political parties.
The consolidation of these emerging and vulnerable
democracies is especially important at a time
when progress has stalled on so many other
fronts. Not only do models of successful transition
help lift the spirits of those trying to break
out of semi-authoritarianism. They also offer
practical lessons in how to overcome the obstacles
to making democratic institutions effective.
No one is more capable of transmitting these lessons
than the activists from newly consolidated
democracies. Their contribution to those still
struggling against the legacies of authoritarianism
is one of the less appreciated by-products of successful
transitions.
Healing war-torn societies: In many
regions, the political uncertainties unleashed by
the end of the Cold War and the pressures of globalization
have led to the breakdown of old political
structures and to heightened religious and ethnic
conflict. While the wars in the Balkan region have
attracted the most attention, many conflicts in
such countries as Somalia, Sudan, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Afghanistan have been
even more devastating.
Efforts by the international community to negotiate
solutions to such conflicts are generally limited
to holding talks among leaders of different
ethnic, religious, or tribal factions. But peace
agreements will not last unless civil society is
brought into the process and becomes invested in
negotiated solutions through an inclusive democratic
process. Including civil society groups also
has the effect of diluting the influence of some
non-democratic people who control armed factions
and thus must be part of the talks.
In many of these situations, the NED has been able
to provide critically-needed support to groups in
civil society that defend human rights, educate
about democracy, and provide training in conflict
resolution. Often they use innovative techniques,
including popular theater and concerts as well as
traditional media, to build trust and nurture a culture
of tolerance. In effect they establish enclaves of
democratic values and inter-ethnic dialogue and
become centers of grassroots pressure for peace and
reconciliation. They also help marshal international
support for democracy assistance and the defense
of human rights. If negotiations are started, they
can then give voice and representation to civil society
in the process of establishing peace. In a postwar
setting, they can also help the process of
healing and offer an alternative model and vision of
democratic social and political organization.
In divided societies, the NED should continue to
emphasize programs that build a culture of peace as
a necessary foundation for democratic development.
The Muslim world is a vast region that consists of
more than one billion people and stretches some
10,000 miles from Morocco to Indonesia. It is an
immensely diverse region politically, composed of
countries that fall into all of the categories listed
above from dictatorships such as Iraq, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkmenistan; to semi-authoritarian
countries like Pakistan, Egypt or Tunisia; to electoral
or emerging democracies such as Turkey, Mali,
Indonesia, and Bangladesh; to war-torn countries
like Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Fully
one-eighth of the world’s Muslim population lives
as a minority in democratic India.
While recognizing this diversity, there are three
principal reasons for highlighting the importance
of aiding democracy in the Muslim world. First,
there is a significant democracy gap between the
Muslim world as a whole and the rest of the
world. Only 11 of the 47 countries with a
Muslim majority (23 percent) have democratically
elected governments, as compared with 110 of
the 145 non-Muslim countries (76 percent); and
none of the 16 Arab states is an electoral democracy.
1 Second, it is also within the Muslim world
that democracy is under political and ideological
challenge from Islamic movements that preach
intolerance and hatred. Such movements may not
be broadly representative of the population in the
countries where they exist, but their influence is
considerable. Finally, since such movements often
resort to violence to achieve their ends, it is within
the Muslim world where the absence of
democracy has provided fertile soil for the growth
of terrorism that targets the world’s democracies.
The crisis precipitated by the attacks of September
11 and the new war on terrorism have placed the
issue of democracy in the Middle East and in
other non-democratic parts of the Muslim world
on the agenda of the international community.
Before the present crisis, democracy was often
viewed as a Western system incompatible with
Islamic culture and doctrine. The fear that Islamic
fundamentalists might take advantage of democratic
elections to impose a theocratic system, and
the absence in the Middle East of discernible prodemocracy
movements, discouraged efforts to
support democratic development in authoritarian
Muslim countries, especially those ruled by
regimes ostensibly committed to protecting significant
Western security and economic interests.
Not surprisingly, political repression has helped
inflame religious extremism by forcing dissent into
the mosque. The rise of terrorism and the widespread
realization that such extremism is connected
to the failure of political institutions in many
Muslim countries have led to a growing recognition
that efforts must be made to encourage political
and economic modernization in the Arab
Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world
where it is lagging. Accompanying this new attitude
is a sharpened clash within Muslim countries
themselves between Islamic fundamentalists and
moderate elements, both secular and religious,
which are prepared to challenge the attempt by
extremists to seize control of Muslim society and
Islamic faith. For these moderates, democratization
has become a matter of sheer survival.
They face four inter-related challenges. The first is
to liberalize the political system, ending repression
and human rights violations, permitting freedom
of expression and association, and introducing
genuine party contestation. The second is to modernize
the state and the economy, so that meaningful
steps can be taken to reduce poverty,
ignorance, and inequality and to provide young
people with opportunity and hope. The third is to
control corruption and establish a genuine rule of
law. And the fourth is to end the political abuse of
religion and to reconcile Islam the framework in
much of the Muslim world for political and social
activism — with modern concepts of pluralism,
citizenship, and individual rights.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the
precondition for progress on any of these fronts is
a new birth of will and determination within the
Middle East and other non-democratic parts of
the Muslim world to strive for human rights, free
institutions, and responsible, elected government.
But having said that, it is also true that international
support can make a crucial difference. It is
needed from a practical standpoint, and it also
sends the message that democratic activists in
Muslim countries are not alone.
The NED, with its multi-sectoral structure and
the emphasis it has always placed on encouraging
democratic values and ideas, has the capacity to
provide help in all four areas. For example, NDI
and IRI, the NED’s party institutes, can expand
their work with moderate political leaders, legislators,
and parties in Muslim countries, seeking
new openings to improve party communications
and outreach, to encourage women’s participation
in politics, and to promote contacts and exchange
among Muslim parties and between them and the
major international bodies representing parties
from around the world. CIPE, the NED’s business
institute, can promote good governance and economic
reform by strengthening private voluntary
business associations and think tanks as advocates
of open markets, legal and regulatory
reform, transparency, sound corporate governance,
and a stronger role for women in the
economy. NED can also build upon the support it
already gives to a wide array of grassroots organizations
in the Middle East that defend human
rights, train women to become leaders in politics
and civil society, and promote civic education and
women’s rights in the context of Islamic texts and
traditions. ACILS, the NED’s labor institute, can
also expand its efforts to train union organizers to
defend the rights of workers and the poor.
It is especially important that NED and its core
institutes try to involve in their programs liberal
Muslims individuals who work within the Islamic
tradition and who are also in favor of liberal
democracy as a way of strengthening these elements
and countering the political abuse of religion.
Many NED country programs already
involve liberal Muslims, as do regional and subregional
programs. Such programs can be expanded
in the Middle East and, where appropriate, in
parts of Asia and Africa to strengthen existing networks
of liberal Islamic thinkers and activists and
develop new ones; to promote a public discourse
on Islam and democratic politics; and to develop
civic education programs that provide a modernist
treatment of the role of Islam in public life.
It is also important that more focus be given to
the dissemination of first-hand accounts and systematic
analyses of life in Iran, Sudan, and
Afghanistan under the Taliban, the three contemporary
examples of theocratic dictatorships.
Conversely, there are positive lessons to be
learned from the experiences of Turkey,
Bangladesh, Mali, Senegal, Bahrain and other
contemporary examples of Muslim countries
where democratization has progressed. Where
appropriate, efforts should be made to include in
these networks and discussions Muslims living in
Western Europe and North America, whose experience
of democracy may significantly influence
Islamic political thought.
Expanding women’s leadership training programs
is critically important for the promotion of
democracy in Muslim countries. Empowering
women at the grassroots level and promoting
their enhanced participation in the political and
cultural life of Muslim societies are preconditions
for democratic progress. Programs already underway
to develop women’s leadership capabilities
should be expanded in the Arab Middle East,
Africa, and Central Asia and, when feasible, in
Iran and Afghanistan as well. Various types of
media can be employed to reach larger numbers
of women in Muslim countries
Since the Middle East is the region of greatest
need and priority in the Muslim world, the NED
should look to expand its grants program there,
building on the projects, relationships, and experience
it has already developed. South and
Central Asia should also be the focus of increased
attention and programming. Where possible, the
NED should seek to apply its experience in crossborder
democracy assistance to these regions,
developing initiatives that enlist the cooperation
of democracy groups in countries such as Turkey
and Bangladesh in the overall effort.
There has not been a time since the NED was
established nearly two decades ago when the
importance of its mission was more widely appreciated
and understood than it is today.
Nonetheless, a word of caution is in order.
Though NED’s budget is no longer shrinking, its
goals far outstrip the available resources. And
while the sense of urgency brought on by the
attacks of September 11 has made Americans
acutely aware of the need for engagement in a
very dangerous world, it remains necessary to
make the case for the importance of promoting
and strengthening democracy. The over-riding priority
of the United States today is defending the
nation against the threat of terrorism. Immediate
security interests must take precedence over all
other concerns. A powerful case can be made, of
course, that the promotion of democracy serves
these interests, but the case must be made. It is
not self-evident. The argument that only through
democracy can genuine peace be achieved is one
that we will have to make repeatedly and forcefully,
especially if the United States is successful in
the new war, as we expect and pray it will be, and
the sense of urgency subsides.
The tasks that NED confronts are formidable in
their scope, complexity, and difficulty. Any one of
them — strengthening enclaves of independent
activity in dictatorial systems, democratizing
semi-authoritarian countries, consolidating new
democracies, healing war-torn societies, and placing
a heightened emphasis on addressing these
challenges in the Muslim world would provide
steady work for the NED or any other democracy-
promotion institution far into the future. But it
is NED’s mission to address all of these tasks, and
to nurture democratic values and culture in every
country where it works.
The NED seeks to accomplish these objectives
through its grants program, which provides concrete
assistance to democratic practitioners
throughout the world. Increasingly, it has sought to
re-enforce this support through activities that
strengthen collaboration among democratic forces
within entire regions, across different regions, and
among democracy groups active in different sectors
of democracy work. The NED should seek to further
develop these activities in three major areas:
Strengthening solidarity networks among democratic
activists and thinkers: Since its founding,
the NED has developed a number of activities
that supplement and bolster its grants
program by making it possible to build partnerships
and support networks among democrats
throughout the world. These activities include the
International Forum for Democratic Studies,
which conducts a program of research and conferences
and houses the Journal of Democracy,
the leading voice in discussions of the problems
and prospects of democracy around the world.
The Forum also oversees the Democracy
Resource Center, which facilitates a worldwide
flow of information on democracy, and maintains
a Democracy Fellows Program for both scholars
and democratic activists.
The 1997 Strategy Document called upon the
NED to expand these activities by creating a
worldwide community of democrats, committed
to building proactive networks of democrats and
fostering collaboration and solidarity among
democratic forces around the world. Charged
with this responsibility, the NED convened the
Founding Assembly of the World Movement for
Democracy in New Delhi, India, in February
1999, bringing together democrats from more
than 80 countries. It organized the Second
Assembly the following year in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
The World Movement is a genuine network of
networks, consisting of broad-based regional networks
and others covering such functional areas
of activity as civic education, democracy research,
local government, and women’s empowerment. It
also makes possible cross-fertilization among the
different regions and functional areas by focusing
on issues of common concern, such as aiding
democrats in closed societies and semi-authoritarian
countries. The World Movement has placed
special emphasis on developing the Internet as a
tool of democracy promotion, helping networks
to create and link their websites, and assisting
NGOs in overcoming the chief obstacles to effective
technology use.
Now that the World Movement is a reality, the
challenge is to institutionalize the various networks
that have been established and to help
them become self-reliant by developing their own
sources of operation and support.
Enlisting the support of other
democracies: During the past decade, the
NED has encouraged other democracies, especially
those recently consolidated, to create their own
democracy foundations; and it has supported
cooperation among these institutions in pursuit
of common objectives. In addition, in cooperation
with private groups in South Korea and
India, it has created joint initiatives that engage
these important countries in the promotion of
democracy in their respective regions. The concept
underlying all of these efforts is to support
the expansion of democratic communities of
countries in Europe, East and South Asia, and the
Western Hemisphere. The outward enlargement
of democracy from its major regional centers
complements efforts to promote democracy at the
periphery, where it is often weakest.
Fashioning a global response to
the challenges of democratization:
During the past decade, the field of
democracy-promotion has grown dramatically
and now comprises, in addition to many quasigovernmental
democracy foundations like the
NED, private foundations, government agencies,
and multi-lateral agencies such as the United
Nations, the Council of Europe, and the
Organization of American States. With the events
of September 11, it has become more necessary
than ever before for such institutions to develop
new forms of collaboration. The NED should
look for opportunities for example, the non-governmental
forum of the inter-governmental
Community of Democracies to organize a common
discussion among these institutions, which
should also include democracy activists and
thinkers from countries where democracy needs
support. The purpose would be to strengthen
international democratic cooperation and to
encourage and help formulate a global response
to the challenges of democratization.
Taken together, the goals set forth in this Strategy
Document constitute an ambitious agenda, one
that calls for maintaining a far-reaching global
grants program and for integrating into it a new
focus on aiding democracy in the Muslim world.
It also calls for mobilizing a broader international
response to the critical challenges of democratic
development. In carrying out this agenda, it is
essential that the NED continue to give practical
help where it is most needed; to give moral support
to all those who are fighting for democracy,
especially those who are the most isolated and
face the most difficult challenges; and to build a
new momentum for democratic progress. It is in
that spirit of solidarity and hope that we put
forth this strategic plan.
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