Agenda

Background

French/United States Cooperation on the Promotion of Democracy in Africa

Human Rights, Democracy, and Good Governance

Donor Strategies to Assist Democratization

How to Structure International Assistance

Conclusion and Follow-Up

Both France and the United States support democracy, human rights, and good governance as cornerstones of their policies toward Africa. However, prior to the conference on June 3-4, 1998, neither country was well informed about the other’s efforts to promote this goal, even though France and the U.S. are two of the most important international actors on the continent. In addition, many Africans still view the actions and programs of these great powers with suspicion, believing that America and France often undermined or neglected democracy and human rights in Africa in the past. Yet French and American policies toward Africa have undergone significant shifts in recent years. Both countries have moved to orient their programs toward, and condition their aid on, concern for democracy and good governance. In addition, the French government has reorganized its Foreign Affairs Ministry to better incorporate Africa into French global policy on a par with other regions of the world. In addition, shortly after this conference, French President Chirac undertook an historic trip to South Africa. For its part, the United States has signaled greater attention towards Africa in its foreign policy through President Clinton’s extensive trip through Africa in March 1998. The Clinton Administration has also supported the introduction in Congress of a comprehensive trade and investment bill for Africa.

Mutual understanding of these shifts in policy would itself have provided good reason for holding the conference, but the work of private and semi-private organizations (such as NED) had also gone unexamined, and the efforts of a vast number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were not well understood in France and the United States. Virtually no public dialogue had occurred in the United States, for instance, to compare and assess the two countries’ respective programs, nor had there been an effort to elicit in a systematic way comparative African perspectives on such programs. It was for this reason that NED sought to convene practitioners from France, the United States, and Africa, as well as representatives of NGOs working on democracy and human rights programs, for a day-and-a-half of presentations and discussion.

French/United States Cooperation on the Promotion of Democracy in Africa

The conference served to highlight general areas of interest to the French and American governments and the African, French, and American practitioners in the field of human rights and democratic governance. Broadly speaking, these broke down into two categories: The issue of U.S./French bilateral cooperation and the status of international support for human rights protection and democratization in Africa.

Concerning U.S./French cooperation, participants in the conference at the governmental policy level agreed that there was a need for greater cooperation and that the two governments should work towards “a new multinational partnership.” It was accepted that French and U.S. policy makers had not always seen “eye-to-eye,” but that they now need to redouble their efforts to coordinate policy and actions in the areas of human rights and democracy. As an official of the French government put it, the U.S. and France should seek not necessarily “joint action . . . but concerted action” in trying to meet their mutual goals of promoting democratization in Africa.

Current areas of policy coordination between the two powers were enumerated, to include crisis response and conflict resolution in the Central African Republic through the United Nations Mission, the Great Lakes Region, and the development of Senegalese peace keeping forces, where joint training exercises were underway. Direct French and U.S. cooperation were cited in terms of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, and Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivôire were praised as “strong economic reformers” under the HIPC.

Some from Africa, while welcoming heightened international interest in and support to Africa, reminded listeners that in their view American and French interests have not always been benevolent and that any new involvement must “leave behind the horse-and-rider partnership” of the past. A concern was also expressed about post-Cold War French and U.S. rivalries being played out in trade and investment competitions without the big powers having appropriate concern for the human rights and democracy credentials of the African countries in which they are interested. One official participant involved in negotiations in the Great Lakes Region cited the recent private visit of controversial Burundi President Pierre Buyoya to Paris as an example of the negative impact these perceptions can have. He said that some African observers had assumed the visit implied French support for Buyoya even though the participant knew that the visit was private. This prompted a call for a single international message and voice on conflict situations in Africa to avoid these misperceptions.

In response to doubts about French motives in Africa in connection with these newly expressed desires for partnerships, a French official stated that “partnership” within Africa has taken on a new meaning in recent months. “Partnership may mean something today,” he said, “that it could not yesterday.” Africans are now full partners in their own destiny, with incumbent responsibility as well as expectations of a full contribution to their countries’ stability and development. On France’s behalf, the official stated that France will not intervene in African politics and that establishing new special security relations were no longer the basis of French policy. He also cautioned that French policy will, in the future, be more closely linked to European Union cooperation policy, which will have a political rationale, character, and objective that is European. The franc of the African Financial Community (CFA) will be linked to the Euro, which will further stabilize currency in Francophone, CFA zone countries.

On the U.S. side, questions about policy on Nigeria under the brutal Abacha regime prompted a response from the U.S. government spokesperson, who said that “the process of transition in Nigeria is seriously flawed and going off the rails.” Prior to any normalization of relations, the U.S. insists that all political parties must nominate their own candidates; freedom of the press must be insured; political prisoners must be released; and there must be a “level playing field” for all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Although an embargo was not currently in place, the U.S. has sanctions, to include no air traffic rights, restrictions on travel, no military sales, and a decertification of Nigeria as an aid recipient. The U.S. official stated that the U.S. will increase the existing sanctions if the Nigerian government does not meet the above criteria for a democratic transition.

Discussion then turned to one of the central aspects of the conference, the differences in U.S. and French approaches to human rights and democracy assistance in Africa. In terms of style, several participants stated that the U.S. government tends to work through NGOs to implement assistance, whereas the French tend to work more directly with African governments and state institutions. In response, French participants stated that the main focus of organizations like the Agence de la Francophonie, which is a multigovernmental structure, is to work with NGOs and non-executive institutions like parliaments and judiciaries. These multilateral programs include supplying publications, helping to publish newspapers and journals, and providing computers. A French Senator expressed a strong opinion that French and U.S. interests are not at the same level. The French, he said, have very important historical and personal linkages to Africa and Africans in a way that Americans normally do not, particularly through French legislators and government officials, many of whom have lived and worked for years in Africa. This reflects, he felt, the French policy of decentralization, where village-to-village and person-to-person relations are encouraged and a history of cross cultural contact is built up. The connection, he said, was “human, not colonial.” It was also pointed out that political party foundations and non-partisan private-sector foundations like NED did not exist, for the most part, in France, with the exception of the Jean-Jaures Foundation, as they do in the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany. A worthwhile goal would be to expand their number and thereby expand the use of NGOs by official development assistance agencies.

Participants agreed that cooperation between France and the United States and coordination with African parties, both governmental and nongovernmental, should be strengthened in the arena of human rights, democracy, and governance promotion. As one participant put it, “democracy is a joint task. . . . Democracies must help each other.”

Human Rights, Democracy, and Good Governance

Participants agreed that a primary focus on human rights, democracy, and good governance is essential to the final attainment of stable societies in Africa capable of sustaining development. No hope exists for a conducive environment for trade, investment, and growth unless people feel secure. Despite the fact that democracy is by no means guaranteed nor is yet considered a national or individual right in many African countries, participants shared a sense that democratization is “irreversible” and that the public demand for democratic rights will continue to grow. The linkage of democratization and development was also recognized. In fact, one discussant considered “development and democracy as a single process,” a view that was echoed repeatedly during the conference. Not only was this premise widely agreed upon—to use another participant quote, “democracy is the key to the door of development”—it was also emphasized that the application of human rights and democratic values must be consistent: “Assure human rights for all human beings, and measure human rights by one yardstick.”

There was one point of departure among participants concerning the nature of “democratic culture” in Africa and how that has impacted on current democratization tendencies. While all agreed that an understanding of democracy was not yet ingrained or anchored in the governance of the continent as a whole, there were differing opinions as to whether this was inherent in African societies or only a product of the destructive years of colonial rule and Cold War rivalries that dissipated the continent’s resources and underpinned non-democratic regimes. While one participant argued that democratization must be a slow process due to the lack of democratic culture in Africa, others pointed out that democracy, particularly at local and village levels, far predated colonialism and had been undercut by colonial and autocratic post-colonial governments. Even illiteracy, an issue that everyone agreed posed a challenge to civic education and understanding of democratic responsibilities, was arguably a result of colonialism and the denial of full human and civil rights. One participant brought a more global perspective to the argument and stated that “there are no democracies (in the world), only democratizing countries. All nations are in transition. All democracies are imperfect and in danger.” A senior African presenter agreed, saying that African leadership too often had undermined democratic values in recent years, but, still, he said, “citizens should not have to riot to get change.” Another African, currently living and teaching in the U.S., cautioned the assembly about placing too much emphasis on “democratic culture” and told a story of a USAID study, based on a questionnaire that was circulated in Zambia, that concluded that democratic culture was very weak there. The study had asked about the roles of a parliament and of elected officials, but using the same questionnaire with American students, the speaker found a similar result.

Donor Strategies to Assist Democratization

There also was wide agreement that all international assistance provided for the promotion of human rights and democracy should be effected through indigenous institutions. Capacity building and the instilling of democratic culture were marshaled as examples in support of this view. Both French and American government representatives as well as NGO and donor spokepersons agreed that Africans and African leadership had to be at the center of all donor strategies. As one U.S. government representative said, programs must be “based on African realities and informed by African perspectives.”

This sparked considerable dialogue on the international reaction to non-democratic regimes in Africa and the need to be discriminating in setting priorities for assisting the democratization process. It also spurred comment, particularly from African participants, on international motives and commitment.

In the first instance, discussion ensued on individual country situations like those of Nigeria or the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire. Opinions differed as to the desirability of focusing on the “problem” regimes or “big countries” to the relative neglect of smaller, less important, but more democratically successful countries such as Benin or Mali. One widely held proposition was that the large countries, like Nigeria, have such an immense regional impact due to their economic and political hegemony that instability due to conflict or human rights violations within them tends to destabilize the entire region. Thus, for instance, democracy in Benin, according to this argument, will always be tenuous as long as Nigeria is non-democratic. The same situation would prevail in the nine countries bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Therefore, according to this view, international donor strategies should focus on the big countries first. A counter argument was made that the world should not neglect the small countries struggling in the shadows of their regional giants in their search for democratic governance. Examples of success, no matter how small, become role models for those individuals and organizations mirroring the struggle within those brutal and autocratic giants. Those who argued for a focus on the “big” countries also believed that the big, non-democratic regimes presented major obstacles because of the need to deal with such intransigent governments. This leads to a moral dilemma as well as the wasting of resources.

The question of international motives and commitment sparked recurring debate. The long French colonial history and the involvement of the United States in the slave trade, along with both of their roles throughout the Cold War years to support ideologically palatable regimes, led many Africans to doubt their motives and look for hidden agendas when talk of human rights support ensued. While both U.S. and French officials responded with reference to a “new day” in African policy, discussion concerning Western commitment to African human rights and democratic governance continued. “Ambiguity” was one modifier that frequently arose in describing U.S. and French policy. Comparisons were drawn between the Western reactions to the emergence of “democratic forces” in the former Soviet states in Eastern and Central Europe and those that arose in Africa. Lech Walesa of Poland was a hero to Western observers and everyone supported his trade union, yet no such recognition or support came to African democrats, such as those who convened the Sovereign National Conference in Zaire. Immediate and massive support flowed to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, while African democratic movements struggled for attention and support. As one African presenter said, this happened despite the fact that Eastern European countries, with one or two possible exceptions, had never known democratic rule or established “democratic cultures.” The African perspective was that the West does not take seriously African efforts at democracy, often citing the lack of independent media, jailed opposition leaders, or boycotted elections as proof. These leaders and media are the very ones that need assistance. The political stability that the West often seems to want as a precursor to assistance is really only the status quo in African eyes.

The issue of race also arose with respect to Western commitment and democracy assistance. Several presenters held the view that historically the U.S. and Europe reacted slowly to human rights crises or threats to democratization efforts when the people at risk were of color. Mention was made of the woefully inadequate response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Both French and American presenters, public- and private- sector, admitted mistakes but, with humility, it was believed that a new way forward must be sought in which the overall objective of democracy does not become the victim of race or economic politics. As one American speaker put it, the world should “make a cost benefit analysis, not a race analysis. . . . Africa brings its own weight to the table.” He added: “If French people were seized by some despotic regime, we would fight for prodemocracy forces to prevail in France. I would hope France would do the same for America. I would hope we all) would do the same for Africa.”

Concerning motives, there was some criticism of the ends that were being sought by Western donors. One African participant stated that there is a perception that the reason behind support for African civil society organizations is to create surrogates for the donor’s policy objectives. People who promote human rights and democracy goals in Africa, this speaker said, “are accused of being Trojan horses for foreign interests.” Both U.S. and French officials assured the conference that this was not the case, aside from a shared interest in seeing democratic transitions succeed in Africa.

In the same vein, a debate arose concerning the use of Western role models in African democratization. This was tied into the conditionality of aid, on the basis of which support is denied if certain criteria of democratization are not met. While specific incidents were not elaborated or detailed, it was apparent that a suspicion existed among the African participants of a linkage of aid to democracy criteria. The focus was on how to judge those criteria and on what models to use. In the face of the African caution about the Westernizing effects upon their institutions, participants from the U.S. and France spoke to the universality of democratic values. Nevertheless, everyone agreed that neither systems nor methodology should be imposed from the outside. Whatever was of value from the Western experience should and would be absorbed by African democrats, but African leadership, initiative, and experience is the key to a democratic future for the continent.

At least three other issues were touched upon concerning donor strategies for assisting human rights and democratization in Africa. The first emerged in the form of a critique, both of donors and recipient African-based organizations. It came from an African participant who said that the relationships between the nongovernmental groups receiving outside support tended to be more often “vertical” than “horizontal.” In other words, their ties tended to be to the international donor community and not to sister organizations doing similar work within their country or region. Whereas the outside connection was imperative, the focus should be on inter- and intra-African cooperation to have maximum impact and to create sustainable capacity in human rights and democracy arenas.

This discussion led directly into a second issue concerning cross-country and cross-cultural efforts. One French participant elaborated on a program for jurists that was specifically designed to bring Anglophone and Francophone Africans together to share experiences and cut across the linguistic and cultural divides. All work in human rights and democracy issues, this participant emphasized, could only be strengthened by this shared approach. Also, as an African participant pointed out, this would help demystify and debunk the suspicions that grow up about the motives and objectives of Western involvement, as discussed above. It was suggested that projects could be structured to take into account language and cultural barriers wherever possible. The French government spokesman stated that that is exactly how French policy in this area is being defined now, with outreach efforts extending beyond the group of its traditional partners, mostly Francophone. Finally, an American field practitioner with years of experience in East and Central Africa suggested that the model followed there, of forming donor coordinating groups in advance of undertaking specific democratization projects, ought to be followed in West and Southern Africa.

How To Structure International Assistance

Discussion also focused on how best to effect international assistance in human rights, democracy, and governance work. Specifically, civic education, training, elections, and infrastructural support for indigenous groups of civil society were identified as important areas. A threshold question, already alluded to above, was whether such support should be given government-to-government or should flow to or through NGO s. Obviously, there was a difference in practice between the U.S. and French governments on this issue. A U.S. government spokesperson stated that 40 percent of the $85 million committed annually to Africa for democracy and governance work goes to state institutions. The remainder, presumably, is given to NGOs or “civil society.” The rationale offered was that the state is necessary for development and the question is how the African state can reform itself to promote democracy. Of course, state institutions include legislatures, local governments, and judicial systems, which also may provide counterweights to executive power.

French NGO representatives, in fact, while verifying that institutions of state were the common target of democracy assistance, believed strongly that the rule of law, to include the strengthening of judiciaries and legislatures, particularly through the Agence de la Francophonie, is essential to attaining the shared goal of democratic governance. This view met with wide agreement among American and African participants. A catalog of existing outreach efforts to African parliaments was reviewed, including seminars and training for parliamentarians, exchange programs, and provision of documents. Still, it was agreed that much more should be done to help shore up the legal and judicial frameworks within which African democrats must operate.

The following were other targets agreed upon by the conference for international support:

1. Civic education: While issues such as the depth of democratic culture were debated and some objections were raised to Western models, there was universal agreement on the need for civic education. As one African participant put it, many people don’t even know that they have the right to ask, “Do you have a search warrant?” when being searched. This was best summed up in an eloquent appeal from a senior African presenter, who said: “Whether it takes two years, five years, ten years, or twenty-five years, . . . (whether) it is those in power or out of power, civil society or political parties, . . . it is evident that amongst the many indispensable things needed for democracy, be it elections or democratic institutions, the key to it all is the human being, his or her education, and adherence to a new culture, the culture of democracy.”

2. Training: There was similar agreement on the need for training to build the capacity of Africans to address their own challenges, whether through the conduct of elections, the management of nongovernmental organizations, or the restructuring of judicial codes and constitutional law. As stated above, it was in this latter area of legal and judicial systems and the rule of law that the conference seemed to put the most emphasis concerning outside assistance. Also, the training of civil servants, such as that being done currently by the Institut international d’Administration publique, is highly important.

3. Elections: There was some difference of opinion, rather passionate on both sides, concerning the importance of elections. Some African participants considered elections of secondary importance, believing that they are often rigged and seldom reflect the popular will. They view them as too often being rubber stamps for the status quo, a reflection of autocratic regimes attempting to legitimize themselves through the election process. Criticism also focused on the use of international funding for election monitoring that seldom leads to any international response. As one African presenter put it: “Why keep spending money to monitor elections (only) to conclude that the election was rigged and things keep being the same?” A former U.S. government official agreed that one past failure on which the U.S. and France can work together would be to set criteria for judging a good election. Another African stated that the very need for funding elections from outside is “an insult” to Africa. Still, there was a strong sense from all quarters of the importance of elections and international support for them. One African stated that elections are the “most public interaction of a citizen and government, the very definition of political participation.” He concluded that elections need to be protected: “How can a citizen worry about corruption, human rights abuses, or anything if he has no faith in elections?” Monitoring is key to establishing this faith, he said. But everyone agreed that “the instruments” of support to democracy must be re-thought, consultation with Africans increased, timetables established, and careful assessments made of what the role of monitors should be and how elections should be supported. Special note was made of the need to espouse and support independent electoral commissions for the administration of elections.

4. Infrastructural support: Specific mention was made of the need to strengthen the organizations of civil society that are on the front line of human rights and democracy work in Africa. Resources are key, and these must continue to flow. Technical assistance is also very important, as is organizational development, including administration, management, accountability, expanding membership bases, fundraising, media and public relations, and the development of democratic leadership and internal decision-making. This capacity building should be the first priority of international intervention. As one practitioner based in the U.S. put it, “We need to work ourselves out of jobs.”

5. Decentralization: Decentralization was a major theme for several participants who viewed it as possibly the best approach for encouraging African states to be responsive to the needs of citizens. A U.S. government spokesperson said decentralization had been a focus of U.S. assistance for decades. A key lesson learned from this involvement is that “real authority (resides). . . at the local level. . . . Even in the most advanced democracy, national-level government seems abstract and removed from the everyday lives of most citizens. We feel we can hold local government representatives accountable more easily, and they seem to be more in tune with local needs.” An African democracy activist agreed, saying that government abuses of power happen more often at the central or national level, not at the local, and decentralization thus needs to be supported.

6. Corruption: Several speakers raised the growing problem of corruption as one in which the international donor community should take greater interest. The reason is twofold. First, the economic costs of the continued diversion of public funds to personal use can be serious, undermining a country’s stability, much as Mobutu had done in Zaire to the point where democratization became impossible. Second, corruption undermines the legitimacy and integrity of newly democratized systems and impedes the progress of countries in transition. Public faith is lost. Unfortunately, corrupt practices are easy. African governments are highly centralized and opportunity is plentiful. There are weak institutional safeguards and ineffective legal systems. Corruption can have a very “African character,” as one presenter from the continent said. Following an election, nepotism is almost expected; the family and village of the newly elected are expected to profit from the elected’s good fortune. These are very difficult expectations to balance with one’s public duties. Participants believed that adequate financial accounting systems are important, but also that the incentives for bribery and embezzlement must be countered and alternatives sought.

7. Conflict Prevention/Role of the Military: As mentioned above, the need for peace and stability in society is essential for a democratic culture to grow and for human rights adherence to be assured. Therefore, conference participants repeatedly came back to the issue of conflict prevention and mediation as additional dimensions of democratization on which international donors should work closely with their African partners. In fact, mediation efforts were cited in the cases of the Niger and Congo (Brazzaville). Access to key players, historical grasp, local knowledge, and shared language and cultural roots often give indigenous democratic organizations a vast advantage over international conflict negotiators. Yet they are often overlooked when the donor community gears up for intervention and resolution in a specific conflict area. One American official engaged in conflict negotiations stated that the U.S. approach was too often “ahistorical” and uninformed by regional histories and current events. Here, too, it was mentioned that shared experiences in negotiations, conflict resolution, and governance, could be very useful. This would include looking across cultural and linguistic divisions, as mentioned above, and, for instance, engaging South Africans in dialogue on transition problems in countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Nigeria. Finally, some African participants cautioned that the military should always be included in outreach and dialogue as essential players in the democratization process.

Conclusion and Follow-Up

The conference provided an extraordinary opportunity to air, possibly for the first time in such a forum, the views of French, Africans, and Americans on human rights and democracy in Africa and to correct misunderstandings. The exchange throughout was friendly and frank. The recognition of mistakes and strategic errors of the past was important to the openness and transparency of the conference. The discussants took note of new French and American policies on Africa and the emergence of changing or developing African perspectives on democracy. Participants identified and assessed, from different cultural or historical perspectives, approaches to democratization in Africa and the enunciation of cooperative strategies for the future. Examination of Western motives and commitment was highly evident, with many African participants seriously questioning the sincerity of donor nations. There was full discussion of appropriate strategies and methods for assisting African democrats, as well as an airing of African frustrations with past policies. Ultimately, however, the participants agreed that U.S. and French cooperation is essential to ensuring the success of transitions to democracy now underway in Africa. The kind of dialogue that took place at the conference, including self-examination and assessment of ongoing programs and policies of assistance, is necessary as well. The conference participants encouraged the U.S. and France to develop cooperative strategies bilaterally, but emphasized that such strategies could only be attained by working with and through indigenous organizations.

Practical suggestions were made on ways in which French, African, and American organizations and individuals, governmental and nongovernmental, can initiate and sustain common programs and monitor and assess progress in promoting democracy in Africa. Four broad areas of follow-up were defined: conferences, training, communications, and assessment. The seven target areas for international support enumerated above helped to inform the following specific categories of follow-up as defined by the participants:

1. Conferences: There was strong agreement that subsequent conferences should focus on specific issues, such as the rule of law, the conduct of elections, or the role of donors. Conferences that would bring a similar set of key players together to look at situations in important regional powers like Nigeria or the Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) might have significant impact on donor strategies and the success of democratization initiatives. These conferences should involve practitioners and donors and should be structured to yield specific results. The need to span the cultural and linguistic divisions between Francophone and Anglophone Africa, and to seek a cross fertilization of views from different perspectives, must be a part of all such initiatives. While specific suggestions were made of conferences to further democracy and human rights in Africa, the driving motivation was to replicate the kind of frank and open dialogue exhibited in the conference on June 3-4 and to bring together a similar mix of practitioners, donors, and policy makers from Africa, France and the U.S.

2. Training: The conference participants agreed that the promotion of civic education and training, particularly in the areas of judicial systems and the rule of law, are priorities. Conflict prevention and negotiation were also identified as primary areas of concern. The objective, once again, of bridging the cultural and linguistic divide, should also be inherent in any training activities, bringing to bear the different experiences and histories of Anglophone and Francophone countries. U.S. and French official development policies should be informed by these priorities and the international donor community and NGO practitioners should cooperate in targeting them in full consultation with African partners. The conference participants were informed that USAID had just held a workshop in Mali in which such donor cooperation had been discussed. This was applauded. It was suggested that donors and Africans should get together to select a leading project for cooperation in the field of training.

3. Communications: It was agreed that a regular form of information exchange be instituted, including the creation of a database of democracy-promotion projects, a newsletter, and other publications, all of which should be made available via the Internet. The idea would be a jointly arranged Website that would be generally accessible and to which African human rights and democracy organizations could contribute. In addition to the projects database, newsletter, and other publications, the site would provide news updates and analyses of needs and donor responses.

4. Assessment: The idea was proposed of forming a small working group to meet periodically to assess the progress made in French/African/American cooperation, to identify challenges, to suggest new ways forward, and to set new goals. The National Endowment for Democracy has undertaken to follow up with a number of participants to form such a group.