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Brian Joseph, Program Officer for Asia, National Endowment for Democracy May 13, 2004

Congressional Human Rights Caucus Pakistan: A Human Rights Update May 13, 2004 INTRODUCTION I want to thank Congressmen Tancredo, Lantos and Wolf for inviting me to testify today on this timely, sensitive and important issue. My name is Brian Joseph and I am a program officer for Asia at the National Endowment for Democracy where I manage our Burma, Tibet and South Asia projects. I recently returned from a three-week trip to Pakistan where I had the opportunity to travel widely and meet with a wide range of academics, activists, labor and business leaders, and political party members involved in efforts to promote democracy and human rights. The development of a strong human rights framework and independent democratic institutions, including strong political parties, in Pakistan is not only of foremost concern to Pakistanis but is a matter of US national interest as well. The challenges are great, but so are the opportunities. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a nonprofit, bipartisan grant-making organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. With its annual Congressional appropriation, the Endowment makes hundreds of grants each year to support pro-democracy groups in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Latin America. Endowment programs in the areas of labor, free-market and political party development are conducted by the NED's four core institutes: The American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). In addition to these areas, the NED has a discretionary grants program that assists pro-democracy organizations abroad doing work in areas such as human rights, independent media and free flow of information, civic education, and political participation. POLITICAL SITUATION Over the past 50 years, Pakistan has experienced few periods of extended democratic rule. In fact, no democratically elected government in Pakistan has been allowed to complete its full term. Even during the periods when democratic, civilian administrations govern, the military continues to play a powerful, behind-the-scenes role, asserting its power whenever it determines it is in Pakistan's national interest. When Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999, it was the fourth time in Pakistan's history that the military assumed power. General Musharraf designated himself Chief Executive and suspended the Constitution, the Parliament and the provincial assemblies. On May 12, 2000, the Supreme Court, which had previously demonstrated a degree of autonomy, validated the October 1999 coup and granted General Musharraf executive and legislative authority with the caveat that national-level elections be held by October 2002. Although many Pakistanis initially welcomed Musharraf and applauded his call to clean up Pakistani politics, his efforts to create a system of "controlled" democracy that would allow the military to continue to hold state power has quickly eroded that support. The government has restricted freedom of assembly, suppressed political activity, and placed limits on freedom of expression. On April 30, 2002, a country-wide referendum, which was widely recognized as unconstitutional, was held to determine whether or not Musharraf should stay in power as President for another five years. According to the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the conduct of the April 30 referendum, where only five percent of the electorate turned out to vote, exposed serious problems in the electoral system and raised doubts about whether the upcoming general elections in October would be free and fair. Not unexpectedly, General Musharraf won overwhelming approval to extend his rule for five more years. In October, 2002, Pakistan held general elections which, according to Human Rights Watch, were deeply flawed. In the absence of both Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League leader Nawaz Sharif, both of whom were forbidden from standing for election, no one party garnered a majority of votes. Mir Zafrullah Khan Jamali, a 58-year-old politician from the pro-military PML-Q who had pledged to support President Musharraf, was elected prime minister by a one-vote margin in the parliament. The election also saw the rise of a six-party alliance of Islamist parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) or United Action Forum. THE PROTAGONISTS: THE MILITARY, THE MAINSTREAM POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE ISLAMISTS The challenges to democracy in Pakistan are tremendous. Not only must Pakistan address the institutional and political challenges of building democracy in a state with a strong and dominant military, it must deal with a rapidly growing population (150,000,000, with a growth rate of 2.4 percent), grinding poverty (a full one-third of the population lives below the poverty line), a shortage of clean drinking water, pervasive illiteracy (55 percent), ongoing tension with India over the status of Kashmir, and sectarian violence. Moreover, since General Zia ul Haq introduced a broad-ranging Islamization program in the late 70s and early 80s, military governments in Pakistan have routinely nurtured and used the religious right to pursue their own agenda, adding yet another potentially problematic ingredient to the mix. On a related note, the state has also failed to provide basic educational opportunities for its citizens, leaving a vacuum that is increasingly filled by madrassas, or Islamic boarding schools. While religious extremists and Islamist political parties do not pose an immediate and direct threat to the state today, their increasing political and social influence does pose a serious threat to the development of a liberal democratic order in Pakistan. I would like to draw your attention to a number of excellent recent reports by the International Crisis Group that document some of these developments in detail, in particular their reports on madrassas and extremism. The Military Today, the military poses the greatest obstacle to institutionalizing democracy in Pakistan. Not only has the military effectively marginalized the two mainstream political parties while simultaneously giving a green light to emergent Islamist parties, but it has also introduced a range of measures to guarantee the military a leading role in government. By constitutional design, Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy where the Prime Minister is the head of government and the President the head of State. In August 2002, President Musharraf introduced a package of constitutional amendments known as the Legal Framework Order (LFO) which, among other things, transferred considerable powers from the Prime Minister to the previously weak office of the President, allow the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the Parliament, and introduced a new college degree requirement for all candidates for Parliament. Interestingly, graduates of madrassas are exempted from the college degree requirement on the grounds that a degree from a madrassa is equivalent to a bachelor's. Moreover, just last month, after less than four minutes of debate, the National Assembly passed the National Security Council Bill, a bill which previous military governments had tried to pass without success and which guarantees the military a decisive role in all national security and defense matters. The 13-member NSC includes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commission, the chiefs of the Army, Air Force and Navy, the Prime Minister, the four provincial chief ministers, the Speaker of the Parliament, the leader of the opposition and the Chairman of the Senate. As Chairperson of the NSC and Chief of Army Staff, Musharraf effectively will run the NSC. As part of a political deal cut with the MMA to back the current government, Musharraf agreed to include a provision in the 17th constitutional amendment to separate the office of the President and the Chief of the Army Staff by the end of 2004. But Musharraf is reportedly under pressure from some cabinet members who believe that it is too soon for him to relinquish either of his roles to disregard the amendment and retain both titles. And, as Musharraf recently told the BBC, he was as yet undecided whether or not he will take off his uniform by the end of the year. A number of analysts have speculated that he might elevate himself to the office of "Field Marshal" to circumvent this provision. Political Parties It is relatively safe to say that political parties in Pakistan are not held in the highest regard. They are regularly accused of being corrupt, indifferent, ineffective, patronage-driven, and feudal. That said it is important to note that the parties operate in a hostile political environment that stunts their development and reinforces undemocratic behavior. Yet, political parties, the PPP and PML/N in particular, remain popular amongst sizeable urban and rural constituencies and are the only national-level representative organizations. Civil society organizations play an important role, but should not be seen as surrogates for political parties. Based on focus group research and surveys carried out in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute identified a number of key shortcomings in political parties. Among these were an inability to be more responsive to and representative of their constituents, a lack of effective outreach mechanisms, and a tendency to engage citizens at the local level only as elections approached. Consequently, rank-and-file members feel isolated and marginalized from provincial and national party leaders, and unable to communicate their interests to those in positions of authority. Moreover, many participants felt that party platforms were vaguely defined and lacked serious issue-based proposals. Even though the October 2002 elections put the PPP and the PML at a serious disadvantage, the PPP still managed to win a greater percentage of the popular vote than any other party. And, as seen by the government's treatment of Shabhaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif's younger brother, on his attempted return from exile in Saudi Arabia earlier this week, the military clearly still sees the PML under the leadership of the Sharif family as a serious political threat. Moreover, on April 12, the Pakistani courts sentenced Javed Hashmi, acting president of the PML and head of the opposition alliance, the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, to 23 years in prison for defamation of the military. Rise of Islamist Parties Despite being nearly wiped out in the previous two national-level elections in 1993 and 1997, the Islamist party coalition, the MMA, received roughly 11 percent of the vote in the October 2002 election, including enough seats to be able to form a government in the North West Frontier Province and to form a coalition government with the pro-military PML-Q in Balochistan. The MMA's electoral success derived in part from its strong anti-American position during the war in Afghanistan. And, as Aqil Shah and Alfred Stepan argue in a recent article in The Washington Post, "there is strong evidence that Musharraf and the Pakistani military contributed to this result… Musharraf and the military correctly viewed these two parties [PPP and PML/N] -- and especially their leaders -- as the most powerful challengers to his claim to rule in the 'supreme national interest,' and they have kept the two former premiers virtually in exile…The military regularly used force to curtail the freedom of the two moderate parties in the 2002 elections. Meanwhile, it gave the Islamists free rein to hold rallies." Propelled to electoral victory in part by playing to anti-Americanism and the weakened state of its two main political competitors, and given a virtual green light to organize, the MMA is well-positioned to build on its success. However, if history alone were a guide to electoral returns, liberals in Pakistan could rest assured that the MMA, although a serious nuisance factor, would not present a direct challenge to the state. But, are Musharraf and the military playing with fire? Politically, how will Musharraf, who has sided closely with the US on the war in Afghanistan and the war on terror, or any of the other secular political parties, be able to compete with political forces like the MMA that push an extremist agenda that taps into a growing distrust of America? Can Musharraf continue the difficult balancing act of allying itself closely with the Bush administration by participating in the war on terror while simultaneously working with the parties most strongly opposed to the war, and marginalizing the moderate secular parties? In the current climate in Pakistan, where 60 percent of Pakistanis oppose America's war on terrorism, where only six percent trust the US motives for the war on terrorism, and where 65 percent of Pakistanis regard Osama bin Laden favorably (Pew Research Center for People and the Press, March 2004, www.publicdiplomacy.org), there is room for concern. There are an equal number of indicators that Pakistanis in general are not driven by an extremist political agenda, but on purely political grounds, it is important to note how perceptions such as those identified in the Pew poll have been and can be used for political advantage. Before moving on, I want to clarify one thing about the use of the term "anti-American." Based on dozens of meetings and discussions in Pakistan over a three-week period in April 2004, almost everyone I met had a profound disagreement with American foreign policy but this did not translate into a broader anti-Americanism. Their hostility towards the US was a reflection of their disagreement with specific US policies, not a general dislike for America or what it represented. In fact, I think the opposite is more likely to be true. On a societal level, there are many connections between Pakistanis and Americans and everyone I spoke with wants to strengthen these nongovernmental connections. However, many of these same individuals did express the concern that if left unchecked, growth of such strong anti-US policy sentiment could easily turn into anti-Americanism, where anything and everything associated with America was rejected simply as a result of being American. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY The Endowment's program in Pakistan focuses on three areas: trade unions and worker rights, political party development and government accountability, and human rights and democracy education. National Democratic Institute The NDI works with young, reform-minded party members who are committed to accountable and transparent political processes and who can help parties renew their leadership. NDI's programs focus on developing a comprehensive party reform program that focuses on institutionalizing democratic governing structures and processes within parties; promoting democratic internal elections and promotions for officer positions that are based on merit rather than on wealth or patronage; increasing the participation of women in parties; assisting parties to develop the capacity to conduct research on citizens' views and concerns; and improving communication between national, provincial and local party branches so that the party leadership has access to information from local party members and can more effectively incorporate their constituents' interests into the development of party platforms. American Center for International Labor Solidarity The Solidarity Center's Pakistan program works to improve understanding and acceptance of worker rights and enforcement of labor standards, and the development of new and effective means to address labor issues through information gathering, education, advocacy, capacity building, and networking. Working with Pakistani NGOs and labor unions, the Solidarity Center supports free legal counseling services and advocacy programs that empower and strengthen women workers, training programs that focus on trade union capacity strengthening and civic education, and efforts to highlight the plight of working children and promote the rights of children. Human Rights, Minority Rights, and Democracy Education The Endowment's work in Pakistan also includes support for a number of inspiring initiatives that work to promote human rights, including women's and children's rights, at the grassroots, and to introduce the concepts of secular democracy, religious freedom, peaceful nonviolent political discourse, and global engagement. These efforts are targeted both at rural communities as well as activists in urban centers. CONCLUSION According to a leading Pakistani analyst, "Uncritical Western support for Musharraf is driven mainly by fear of the alternative. Western officials regularly warn that the military government could be overthrown by angry Islamic extremists, while others point to cleavages between the military and the powerful Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to explain away the military's support for Islamic radicals. Still others justify the military's control of the government as an antidote to corrupt and ineffective secular politicians. For the West, Pakistan's military government is thus seen as a bulwark against a tide of chaos and religious extremism. "Pakistan's history shows that periods of representative rule have strengthened democratic forces against their religious counterparts while military-dominated governments have time and again entered into alliances of expediency with Islamic extremists." (Samina Ahmed and John Norris, Observer Online - observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,676170,00.html) In sum, the answer to rising intolerance and extremism is not more military, but less. The long-term imperative in Pakistan necessitates a commitment to support and work with liberal voices, not only in the NGO community, but equally importantly in the political parties. Civil society is an essential and important part of the effort to build democracy, but without strong, transparent, idea-based political parties and strong, independent political institutions, Pakistan will continue to be ripe for military interventions. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify here today about this important topic and for your ongoing support of the work the NED does to promote democracy in Pakistan and around the world.

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