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Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe

“Ukraine’s Future and United States Interests”


May 12, 2004

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to be here today to comment on the topic of the hearing “Ukraine’s Future and United States Interests.” And I would also like to thank you Mr. Chairman and all of the members of the Committee for your continuing support for the National Endowment for Democracy over the years.

I would like to focus on the main event that looms in Ukraine’s immediate future, and which the entire international community will be watching—the election for the post of President of Ukraine scheduled for October 2004. Concerns about the conduct of these elections are very well expressed in the concurrent resolutions recently introduced in the House and Senate under the title “Urging the Government of Ukraine to Ensure a Democratic, Transparent, and Fair Election Process for the Presidential Election on October 31, 2004.”

The upcoming elections have already determined much of what has happened in Ukraine over the past year, as the state authorities and the opposition and pro-democratic forces engage in an ongoing struggle in the political sphere, media, business and civil society as a whole. The elections are the tip of an iceberg, which represents a huge systemic problem: Ukraine’s ruling elite is still largely made up of the same people who ran Ukraine under the Communist system. They were able to transform themselves into the leading politicians of the newly independent state, and have managed to hang onto that power until now. Access to the instruments of power has made many of these people very rich and in some cases crimes both large and small that would be investigated and prosecuted if rule of law existed, have been covered up. Ukraine’s record has not been all bad, particularly in the pro-western foreign policy orientation pursued in the 1990s; in the mid-1990s Ukraine’s media was relatively free if somewhat unsophisticated, and it should be remembered that Ukraine was the first post-Soviet state where there was a peaceful transfer of power from one president to another in 1994. But the major problem today is that this group does not want to give up its control over government and Ukraine’s resources. It does not want to submit to an open and fair process that would allow the citizens of Ukraine to express their will as to who should represent them in government.

Distilled down to the basics, the struggle between the ruling elite and its supporters and those who seek to challenge the old order with a new vision for Ukraine will be played out in the candidacies of the current Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych, who has been nominated as presidential candidate by the pro-presidential side and the acclaimed leader of the opposition, Viktor Yushchenko, leader of a coalition of democratic political parties “Our Ukraine.” There are of course many shades of grey in between these two positions and there will be other candidates, but according to the last independent opinion polls, if the presidential election were to have taken place one month ago, the result in the second round run-off would have been a Yushchenko victory with 36.4 percent with Yanukovych at 32.8 percent.


Current political developments in Ukraine

Ukraine today is a country whose future is hanging in the balance between east and west, between democracy and authoritarianism, and where the country is deeply divided between a political culture which is increasingly polarized and a civil society that is moving forward and has made significant advances in the past few years in its level of sophistication and readiness to act as a counterweight and check on the exercise of executive power. It is a society hovering on the edge of a deep crisis, where the next few months promise to show us a pitched battle between the authorities who are determined to crush all efforts to have free and fair elections and those within civil society who share the profound aspiration that Ukraine should finally join the democratic community of nations, but who are at a huge disadvantage in terms of resources and support.

This struggle began in earnest at the time of the March 2002 parliamentary elections, when some 75 percent of Ukraine’s electorate voted against the parties allied with the president. Although, the opposition was outmaneuvered when it came to the distribution of functions within the parliament, it was clear that manipulating future elections was not going to be easy. In the wake of this revelation several initiatives were launched, emanating mainly from the president’s allies in parliament, to explore the redistribution of executive power. The main elements of the proposed political reform –or so-called politreforma --were 1) to shift power, particularly authority over the power-ministries, that is the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Finance and Industry from the presidency to the Prime Minister and his cabinet, 2) to do away with direct election of the president and go to a parliamentary-presidential system where the parliament elects the head of state, and 3) to change the election of members of parliament to a completely proportional, party-list system, from the current mixed system.

Such fundamental changes to the distribution of power in Ukraine can be accomplished only through a change in the constitution, which requires the agreement of the Constitutional Court, passage through parliament and a two-thirds majority vote. Several politicians have introduced a number of different bills over the past six months, which include these and other changes. Some of these bills have contradicted the Ukrainian Constitution according to Western experts who have examined them, but the main effect on the population of Ukraine has been to create a great deal of confusion as who supports which bill and why, and what the ultimate result of the reform might be. The entire debate on changing the constitution and system of government has been conducted in the absence of objective reporting in much of the media, which has represented mainly the one-sided arguments of the government authorities. In fact, public opinion polls show that 18.3 percent of Ukraine’s adult population believes that “the topic of reforms was constantly in the news, but there was absolutely no discussion with concrete arguments for and against.”

A bill that would have eliminated the direct vote for the president met with a turbulent passage through the parliament, which included tragi-comic scenes played out in the parliament in December 2003 such as the sabotage of the automated voting system and many extra-procedural moves by the parliament’s leadership. It was finally defeated on April 8, 2004 by six votes, when some key pro-presidential supporters failed to show up to support the bill. In amongst all of the turmoil of the political reform, President Kuchma has also managed to get the Constitutional Court to approve his own candidacy for a third term, thus adding another unpredictable element into the presidential election mix.

A number of other issues should be highlighted as important in the current political situation.

The media in Ukraine continues to come under pressure to conform to the message coming from the President’s Administration. All three of the national TV channels—UT-1, Channel One Plus One, and Inter, reflect only the political line of the President’s Administration. Some of the other smaller stations ICTV, STB, and Novyi Kanal, because they are owned by a more broadminded segment of the political elite have recently started to broadcast a somewhat wider range of opinions and political views, while Channel 5, owned by a supporter of Viktor Yushchenko continues a valiant struggle to remain on the air even though its broadcasts are not particularly in support of the opposition but offer an objective perspective from many points of view.

The truly independent broadcast voices, which provided Ukrainian citizens with unbiased reporting and balanced debate, have now been silenced: the Ukrainian service of Radio Liberty, which has for the past decade been broadcast over AM radio to a growing Ukrainian audience, was taken off the air, so that the political debates on issues in the run up to the presidential election will no longer be heard, nor, for that matter, the excellent Radio Liberty reports on the trial of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko for laundering millions of dollars of stolen money through US bank accounts, which began its deliberations in San Francisco just at the time when Radio Liberty was pulled off the air. When Tom Dine, the Director of Radio Liberty came to Kyiv last month, President Kuchma declined to meet with him. Another major independent broadcaster, who has suffered much harassment in the past few years, Radio Kontynent, was closed and its assets seized, with its owner fleeing Ukraine in fear of his life.

There have been attempts to close Sil’s’ki visti, the newspaper of the Socialist Party, which has generally been in opposition to the president. And now the flagship of independent Internet publishers, Ukrains’ka Pravda, whose founder and editor-in-chief Heorhiy Gongadze, was found decapitated in November 2000, is once again under pressure from a court case emanating from the President’s Administration. The system of controlling the media through temnyky or theme directives issued from the President’s Administration continues. They are issued daily and explain to the press how they are to report and spin the news. For the most part, lately they have instructed that any critical statements coming from the US State Department, from the EU, or Council of Europe are to be simply ignored.

Another incident that exemplifies the weird world that Ukraine is becoming, was the visit of George Soros at the end of March. In addition to having a major conference derailed by local officials in Crimea and then given permission from Kyiv to go ahead, he was also pelted in a most undignified manner, with mayonnaise, flour and glue at a meeting in Kyiv, by thugs considered by most observers to be in the pay of the authorities.

Intimidation of the opposition continues: One notable incident was the severe beating of the son of one of Ukraine’s foremost independent trade unionists, Mykhailo Volynets, who is the President of the 124,000-strong Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine, which includes miners, steelworkers, railroad engineers, metro workers, dock workers and others. Mr Volynets is also a supporter of Yulia Tymoshenko. This was a change of tactic, since Volynets himself, a former coalminer, has undergone many repressions, but an attack against a member of his family was designed purposely to unnerve and intimidate him.

The most bizarre and troubling events in the current political situation have occurred around the elections for the mayor of the Western Ukrainian city of Mukachevo, which took place on April 18, 2004. Independent exit polling and also according to copies of the protocols which were secured by observers from the opposition “Our Ukraine” group indicated that the Our Ukraine candidate Viktor Baloha had won with 57 percent over the candidate of the presidentially allied SDPUo candidate Ernest Nusser, who received 40 percent. The election commission announced Nusser the official winner. Even though around fifty parliamentary deputies from the Our Ukraine faction traveled to Mukachevo to monitor these elections the violations were outlandish in the extreme: skin-head thugs roughed up a number of the deputies and smashed up some of the polling stations, legitimate domestic observers were thrown out of polling stations, individuals working the exit poll were threatened and harassed, and in the end, the ballot papers were stolen after the close of voting. These incidents took place in full view of the international observers present. This was all in addition to the usual violations which have now become standard in Ukraine, where the opposition candidate is not allowed air time or coverage in the press, where his representatives are prevented from participating in the election commissions even though this is mandated by law, and where the head of the electoral commission often tries to keep both the list of voters and the final protocol away from the scrutiny of independent observers.

The reason for going into all of this detail, and there is much more, is to demonstrate that the political environment in the run up to the presidential elections is already prejudicing the vote from being free and fair, and to show the circumstances in which the election campaign will be conducted.


Assessment of Ukraine’s Democratic Credentials

Despite the actions of the government authorities, of all of the post-Soviet states, (with the exception of the Baltic states and now Georgia) Ukraine is a country where there are realistic prospects for the development of democracy: there is a real political struggle, the fledgling institutions of civil society are evolving and the population constantly expresses its discontent with the current situation and desire for better and more open governance. There are numerous institutions of civil society that continue to operate independently in support of a more open and accountable system and to promote participation of the citizenry in Ukraine’s political and social life. The U.S policy expressed toward Ukraine last year, specifying that Ukraine’s leadership should be regarded separately from the nation as a whole, was a good and sound approach that is well-justified by the situation on the ground.

The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, of all of the parliaments in the region, is unique in being a forum where different points of view are discussed and real political struggles are fought out. Ukraine’s political parties, while still a long way from being of the Western-type that represent a particular constituency and set of policies, are distinct and independent, and some enjoy considerable support among the population. There are thousands of non-governmental organizations in Ukraine, which work on a whole variety of social, humanitarian and also political issues. Ukraine’s think tanks and analytical centers are among the most advanced in the region and have helped to create the backbone of the emerging civil society. Many of these NGOs worked with great effect during the March 2002 parliamentary elections in getting out the vote, monitoring and observing, conducting opinion polling and providing voter education and information where the government controlled media failed.

Ukraine’s third sector is largely independent and beyond the control of the government and its allies. This contrasts positively with Russia, where the government has exerted great pressure to bring Russia’s independent NGOs under the control of the Kremlin especially through events like the Civic Forum convened in the fall of 2001.

Ukraine’s fledgling civil society and particularly the NGO sector are rising to the challenge of preparing for the October elections. For example, a broad group of over 100 non-governmental organizations has come together under the umbrella of the Civic Coalition “New Choice 2004” with the purpose of working for free and fair elections, with new member organizations joining every week. Its members have analyzed the methods used to manipulate previous elections and for the upcoming elections they will be working for equal opportunities for all candidates and to ensure that voters have adequate information to cast an informed vote. They will monitor the mass media; watch the legislative framework; advise voters on their rights; provide polling information; publicize the abuse of administrative resources and campaign finances; and investigate many other instances where electoral fraud might take place. This is a nation-wide effort with member organizations operating in over 150 different locations to date.


The National Endowment for Democracy in Ukraine

The National Endowment for Democracy and its institutes are fully engaged in working with the pro-democratic forces in Ukraine to strengthen the institutions that support democracy. In fact, NED support has been going to Ukraine since 1988, when the community of dissidents and former political prisoners were preparing the ground work for launching a mass movement for democracy and independence within what was then the Soviet Union. The Endowment continues to support a broad range of democracy programs including youth initiatives, think tanks and programs in support of the free media. Over the past ten years, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute have worked with all of the major pro-democratic political parties to help them become more professional, responsive to their constituents and to enable them to consolidate their political skills. The Center for International Private Enterprise has worked closely for many years with a community of think tanks and associations of small and medium entrepreneurs to improve the conditions for developing a free market economy. The American Center for International Labor Solidarity, formerly known as the Free Trade Union Institute, has worked with Ukraine’s independent trade unions since the early 1990s.

In its annual review of priorities, the NED and its institutes came to the conclusion last August, that Ukraine should be a priority for our work this year, as the place where our concerted efforts could have the greatest effect in terms of promoting democracy, and where the political situation is most conducive to our assistance. The presidential elections in Ukraine were also the subject of a meeting of donors and implementers convened by the NED in January this year, when we provided a forum for both private and USG funded organizations to share information, coordinate activities and determine priorities.

Significance of the Upcoming Presidential Elections

The stakes are high for the upcoming Presidential elections: the outcome could determine Ukraine’s future for many years to come. As well as the significance for the internal developments in the country, one area where the election will have a great impact will be in Ukraine’s international relationships, in determining whether Ukraine faces east or west. Unable to respond to or to accommodate the requirements of the European Union, we see that President Kuchma has recently been backtracking on the commitment to pursue European Union membership. On April 20, 2004, the pro-presidential majority in the Ukrainian parliament ratified agreements on the Single Economic Space signed by President Kuchma earlier in the year. This set of agreements initiates the creation of a common tax code and a customs union ending trade tariffs among the four signatories—Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Some members of the opposition have gone as far as condemning this as the attempt to recreate Russian control over Ukraine. Others have just stated the obvious; this set of alliances is contradictory and incompatible with Ukraine’s declared intention to comply with requirements to bring it in line with EU membership. President Kuchma has just recently gone on the record as saying that Ukraine doesn’t need to hurry towards Europe.

This is the just the latest in a series of flip-flops of orientation from west to east that are characteristic of the Kuchma presidency. Not only do they sew confusion among Ukraine’s Western neighbors and allies, but they also confirm the impression that Ukraine’s foreign policy is not based on a well thought out and systematic strategy that takes Ukraine’s best interests into account or on the consensus of views of the citizenry, but rather are the outcome of infighting within a narrow circle of insiders around the President.

What about accession to NATO? Major public pronouncements on this issue ceased after the President was snubbed by western leaders at the Prague summit in November 2002. Despite the existence of a detailed Action Plan for Ukraine, which clearly outlines steps Ukraine needs to undertake in terms of strengthening democracy in as far as NATO is a community of nations based on shared democratic values, the Ukrainian leadership has not done much to put this plan into action.

While it is true that Ukraine’s troops are the fourth largest contingent in the coalition forces in Iraq at the moment, this decision was also the result of faction fighting at the top and was never open to public debate. Ukraine’s leadership has benefited from the prestige value of participating in the coalition because it is helping to erase the memory of all the unresolved issues that created impediments to smooth US-Ukraine relations such as the approval to sell Kolchugas, the still unsolved Gongadze murder and the broken promise not to sell arms to Macedonia during a civil war. Ukraine’s population, however, is in the dark about why Ukrainian troops are in Iraq. There have been no major speeches from the leadership outlining Ukraine’s purpose or its solidarity with a community of values in support of the toppling of a dictator and liberating an enslaved Arab nation. A glimpse of what might lie in the future was revealed in a statement by Prime Minister Yanukovych, however, when he indicated a few days ago that if Ukraine is not allowed to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq, consideration should be given to withdrawing its troops.


Conclusions and Recommendations

Ukraine’s leaders need to regain the confidence not only of the international community but most importantly the confidence of their own people. In public opinion polls conducted in April 2004, 60.4 percent stated that they believe Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction, and 70.4 percent believe that there will not be equal opportunities for candidates campaigning in the election. Only 25.5 percent believe that there is a truly secret ballot.

Ukraine’s elections have become the focus of attention for the United States, the European Union, Council of Europe as well as international bodies such as the OSCE—all of which have put forward sound recommendations that will keep up the pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to ensure that the upcoming elections are free and fair. These are recommendations that have appeared elsewhere, but they are worth repeating:

  • With regard to the media: all candidates should be given access to the national TV channels and debates should be encouraged and fully covered. Radio Liberty should be allowed to negotiate contracts for rebroadcast without its Ukrainian partners suffering intimidation;

  • With regard to the electoral law: all violations should be swiftly adjudicated in a fair manner and where guilt is determined, prosecutions should be seen to ensue. Ukraine has effective legal procedures on paper, but few are ever carried through to create a better electoral environment.

  • With regard to the electoral commissions: all efforts should be made to make sure that the candidates’ representatives are able to participate in the commission, with an equitable distribution of the heads of commissions according to party affiliation.

  • With regard to observers and monitors: the work of the OSCE and international observers should be welcomed and provision made for the participation of domestic observers. Unfortunately, during the week that Deputy Secretary Armitage was visiting Ukraine and engaging in discussions on the importance of the elections, a provision to guarantee the participation of domestic NGOs as official observers was left out of the legislation.

  • The government of Ukraine should pledge to guarantee the physical safety of observers, poll watchers and officials engaged in ensuring a free and fair election.

  • Serious thought should be given to exploring Madelaine Albright’s recommendation in a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times suggesting to Ukraine’s leaders that their entry into Western institutions will slow and that their own bank accounts and visa privileges will be jeopardized if the elections are fraudulent.
Just a couple of final thoughts:
There has been a lot of discussion and soul searching in Washington and throughout this country over the past few months about "values," "the values of democracy" "American values" and the values of simple human decency. My hope is that while continuing to stress that "the process is important," which is always the official US message at the time of an election, we also expend more effort on all levels with the Ukrainians to emphasize the importance of values, and to evaluate the main players accordingly.

Those of us who watch Ukraine closely are often told that there are "good" forces and "bad" forces around President Kuchma and that he is not always free to act the way he would like to. These protestations are all very well and good, but it is time for all right thinking citizens of Ukraine to realize the tremendous responsibility each has for the future of their country in the next few months. We all wish for the best.