Democratic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Moving Forward or Backwards?

Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' Subcommittee on African Affairs

It is a great honor for me to testify this morning before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs concerning the topic of Democratic Development in Africa. In the long and medium term I can state unequivocally that Africa's democratic development continues to move forward. When I began work at the NED almost 20 years ago there were just a handful of small countries that could lay some claim to being democratic: Botswana, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritius, and ironically, Sudan. These were all essentially liberal, one-party dominant regimes, with the exception of Sudan, which then had a multi-party system struggling to end a civil war. But since the Republic of Benin's historic sovereign national conference in 1990, the continent has been transformed. All of Southern Africa with the exception of Zimbabwe; and most of West Africa, with just a few exceptions, now enjoys democratic, if often imperfect, government. In Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo achieved its first democratic elections last year; and in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania may now be considered full-fledged democracies. Even in those African countries that remain dictatorships or semi-authoritarian regimes, most have much greater pluralism, press freedom, opposition political activity, and respect for human rights than was the case just two decades ago. And I am confident the trend will continue.

But in the short term there have been some disappointments recently, and throughout the continent, democratic development must be considered a work in progress. It was suggested that I focus my comments this morning on three country case studies, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, with particular emphasis on the role of civil society and the media in the run-up to national elections and their immediate aftermath, as well as the more general contribution of these organizations and key individuals in advancing governance and democracy objectives. It was suggested that I provide a brief analysis of how NED and other organizations that receive U.S. Government funding seek to support and empower local civil society and what lessons could be drawn from our experience. Last year, with a budget for the continent of some $7 million, NED made grants to more than 200 African civil society organizations, many of which are at the forefront of the democracy movement in their respective countries. I was also asked to highlight the problem of the conflict between democracy assistance and national sovereignty. This has long been an issue with which NED and our partners have had to contend.

A few months ago, I toured West Africa, assessing the democratic progress that has been made and the role of our civil society partners. After years of devastating civil war, I can report that Sierra Leone and Liberia have both made tremendous strides, and despite the challenges of weak governance and continuing economic hardship, both countries are at peace, and their citizens are enjoying open and democratic government. I'm proud to say that NED's partners in the human rights movement and the media, such as the National Accountability Group and the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Sierra Leone and the Press Union, National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections, and Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy in Liberia, as well as more than 20 other indigenous partners have made important contributions to the popular awareness and respect for democracy and human rights in these two countries in the run-up and aftermath of elections.

My next stop was Ghana, which has made remarkable political, as well as economic, progress in recent years. Working with local partners such as the Institute for Economic Affairs, NED's Center for International Private Enterprise has made a tangible difference in improving governance in Ghana, and I would also commend the assistance IFES provided there to help build a model electoral system. I strongly endorse the Millennium Challenge Corporation's compact with Ghana. In addition, when I was in the region, I heard about Mauritania's first successful democratic elections, which received critical assistance from NDI; and I learned about the potential breakthrough parliamentary elections soon to be held in Togo, where NED is supporting a handful of domestic observer groups. Benin, Mali and Senegal recently held free elections, and I would consider them robust democracies. Even in troubled Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, one can find cause for optimism. NED partners are making real headway in these countries. I was beginning to feel as if all of West Africa had become a democratic bastion.

Then I arrived in Nigeria, where I observed the Lagos state elections with one of NED's domestic partners, the Transition Monitoring Group, and the national elections with the NDI team. I had observed the 1999 and 2003 elections, which left a lot to be desired, but the April 2007 elections were by far the worst yet. Despite the heroic efforts of Nigerian civil society, including more than 30 non-governmental organizations supported by NED, despite the millions of dollars contributed by the U.S. and other international donors, despite all of Nigeria's oil wealth that was invested into the effort, despite the country's enormous human resources and talent, despite all the warnings and studies and diplomatic demarches, despite the clear desire of Nigerian voters to participate--we saw massive disorganization and incompetence, blatant corruption and rigging, state-sanctioned repression and violence, chaos, and in the end, a huge blow to the democratic aspirations of Nigerian citizens. All the domestic and international reports were unanimous: the elections were a shambles. In response to all the criticism, the Nigerian Electoral Commissioner, Maurice Iwu, simply denounced the observers as "conspirators, they do not mean well for us;" and insisted that the elections were fine. The new government of Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was installed, at least, and as usual, Nigeria seems to be muddling through.

Why, after all the impressive progress in most of the rest of West Africa, did Nigeria, with all its assets and advantages, fail? A consortium of Washington-based think tanks held an excellent series of events before and after the Nigerian elections that have sought to address this question. I would also recommend an article that will appear in the forthcoming issue of NED's Journal of Democracy by Rotimi Suberu that provides a more thorough analysis of the problem than I can do justice to in the few minutes I have this morning. Nigerian oil, and its corrupting influence in the country, was certainly a significant contributing factor. Few of my Nigerian friends were particularly surprised by the elections; they had been predicting the outcome for some time. They knew the personalities, the inadequacy of preparations, the competing interests, the way that things work in Nigeria. Obviously, there are limitations to the impact that international assistance can have, and perhaps the bigger the country, the more limited the impact.

Yet, like my Nigerian friends, I can also recognize the progress that is still being made, such as the greater independence of both the judiciary and the legislature, the growing awareness among the grassroots, and the increasing capacity of civil society and the media. NED has been supporting indigenous human rights, democracy, and media organizations in Nigeria for almost 20 years, and especially during the dictatorship of Sani Abacha, the repression was intense, many of our partners were in jail, and the situation seemed pretty hopeless to many on the outside. Today, very few Nigerians want a return to military dictatorship, and almost everyone appreciates the greater political space the country now enjoys. So, in the case of Nigeria at least, one might even say that the country is not necessarily moving backwards; it is just moving forward much more slowly than it should be.

Ethiopia is another story. Democratic development there has definitely slipped backwards. Less than two years ago, the country seemed to be on the verge of a democratic breakthrough, when opposition political parties made dramatic gains in national elections. But in the run-up to the 2005 elections, as I testified before the House Africa Subcommittee at the time, both of NED's affiliated party institutes, NDI and IRI, were expelled from the country. Afterwards, when opposition protests became threatening to the government, a brutal crackdown ensued. NED has supported the Ethiopian Human Rights Council since 1994, and due to its human rights monitoring and advocacy, the group has intermittently been harassed, including having its bank account frozen. But in the wake of the current crackdown, most of the leadership is either in prison or exile, and its operations have been largely stifled, despite our best efforts to help them. Few other civil society organizations or media have been able to find much space to work with in Ethiopia, and as a result, although the country remains a priority target for NED, we have found it difficult to find good programs to support.

The Ethiopian government has emerged as a strategic partner of the U.S., but I would urge greater attention to the domestic political environment. Too often in Africa, our relationships have been based on the personalities of individual leaders, rather than the nations they govern. It is the Endowment's special role to promote democracy around the world, cultivating the respect and goodwill of Africans as something that is in the long-term interests of the United States, rather than being concerned only with maintaining friendly relations with the regime of the day. The Ethiopian political environment is extremely complex, and I would not be so presumptuous as to claim that NED has all the answers to the problem of democratic development there. What is clear is that in the last elections the great majority of Ethiopians expressed their desire for greater freedom, and that this should be respected.

In the case of Zimbabwe, a government which has much worse relations with the U.S. than Ethiopia, NED has been much more successful in building a strong and vital program of support to civil society, including the media, political parties and trade unions. But there have also been difficult challenges, such as legal restrictions on NGOs and Zimbabwe's monumental inflation. In addition, the question of national sovereignty is perhaps most acute here. It is not NED's mission to promote "regime change." As distasteful as governments such as that of ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe may be to some, our program is committed to democratic reform, no matter who is in power. Nor is NED exporting some secret, American imperialist agenda, as is sometimes alleged. NED is strictly committed to peaceful, open and transparent methods of political engagement. We are guided by our partners on the ground. Every one of our grants, including each recipient and the funding amounts, can be found in our annual report and on-line. Another key aspect of the Endowment is our independence. Thus, through the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, NED is assisting the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), arguably the leading institution of civil society in Zimbabwe. Yet the ZCTU has been careful to remain non-partisan, and has also avoided direct assistance from the U.S. government.

NED's local grantees, such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Media Institute, and the Crisis Coalition, among others, also appreciate our willingness to support vital core costs, such as salaries, rent, and equipment, which allow groups to survive despite hardship, and enable them greater freedom to identify other sources of funding and support. These groups have been able to continue to monitor elections and human rights abuses, advocate for constitutional reform and press freedom, and keep the hope for democracy in Zimbabwe alive. Perhaps Zimbabwe has reached the low-point of its democratic development, but I would echo the opinion of the recently departed American Ambassador, Christopher Dell, "things will change soon." The Zimbabwean government has complained about American interference in the country's political affairs, has passed legislation intended to restrict the activities of human rights and democracy organizations, has beaten up and imprisoned activists, has effectively prevented the operations of NDI and IRI within Zimbabwe, and has steadily decreased the political space of Zimbabwean citizens. Yet NED has demonstrated that it is still welcome in the country, that civil society activists are still doing courageous work against the odds, and that they need and deserve our support.

Once again, I thank the Committee for this opportunity to testify, and look forward to answering any questions you might have.