Getting Real About Sudan: The Role of NED

The National Endowment for Democracy has been supporting Sudanese civil society groups for nearly 20 years, and has steadily expanded its program over the past ten years so that we now have 24 active partners working throughout the country, including Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Juba and other parts of the south, but most groups are based in Khartoum. With US taxpayers money, NED is supporting civil society groups monitoring and promoting human rights, providing legal aid, conducting democracy education and training, non-violence and conflict resolution training, women's rights and political participation, youth awareness, democratic research and policy, democratic culture, and independent press.

I will not be so presumptuous this afternoon as to offer solutions to any of Sudan's myriad problems, but I would like to underscore that Sudan's predicament is far from hopeless, and that there are in fact many ways that the United States can be helpful in encouraging democratic change.

A few objective facts are worth noting.

First, Sudan's economy is expanding rapidly. Having traveled in and out of Sudan on many occasions since 1984, I can attest that Khartoum is booming and almost unrecognizable from the way it used to be not so long ago. The oil money and other forms of investment from China, Malaysia, the Arabian peninsula, and Europe are transforming the city and the society. In Juba, although there are still no paved roads to speak of, nor clean running water, nor electricity, yet we could observe that roads were at least being built, electricity poles were going up, and the entire city was under construction, by both public and private initiative. Juba is like a gold rush town, many expatriates are living in expensive tents, and offices are also quite expensive, but the oil revenues are clearly beginning to have an impact, despite distressing tales of corruption. This gives Sudan some significant resources to work with, and a major incentive for peace and stability, which might best be achieved democratically. On the downside, it can lead to factional competition, corruption, and a lack of accountability to the citizenry, as has happened in Nigeria and Angola. Civil servants need training and support, and corruption must be discouraged and squashed before it gets any worse.

Second, there is a surprising amount of political space in Sudan, despite some harassment of opposition groups and the violence in Darfur and other parts of the country. Although much of the media is controlled by the government or its sympathizers, there is undeniably an independent press in Sudan, and one is able to keep up with even the latest denunciations of the government by Eric Reeves in the local papers. Political parties are active, but need training. Civil society is vibrant, but could also be strengthened. The government of national unity is a rather dysfunctional system, a kind of two-headed beast that nevertheless deserves nurturing, for it is the only viable mechanism for implementing the CPA. Despite the horrific violence in Darfur and the need to maintain pressure on this to cease, the CPA remains a huge achievement, in which the US and Sudanese have invested a great deal, and it cannot be allowed to falter or die. If this were to happen, the results could well be an unwinnable civil war that would make the slaughter of Darfur and the previous 50 years of civil war seem like a mere prelude to the ultimate holocaust, and the implications would be profound not just for Sudan, but the entire international community. The recent violence in Malakal is just the most recent indication of how volatile the situation in the south remains.

A simple suggestion by Joseph Lagu made a lot of sense to us: Salva Kiir and President Bashir must start making more public appearances together, the government of national unity must become a working reality, and the Sudanese population needs to perceive this. Both sides have much to gain by the CPA, although spoilers abound in both camps. Obviously, many southerners would prefer to wait out the present until the referendum for self-determination allows them to go their own way, and many northerners may feel this would be good riddance. But this outcome would be very problematic, and even if it is virtually inevitable, a maximum level of stability and adherence to the CPA will be necessary for self-determination to occur in a reasonably peaceful way. Some have suggested that the violence in Darfur is spreading, and that this is a deliberate effort to sabotage the CPA and eliminate the possibility of elections or the referendum. One southerner suggested to us that if it is incumbent upon the north to make unity attractive, it is also necessary for advocates of independence to make self-determination attractive, since corruption and poor governance have not been confined to the north. There must be much more support for conflict resolution and negotiations training, there should be more north-south dialogue, not only within the government but at the local level. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue lacks credibility, but a similar, more extensive and long-term process could contribute to peace. Such processes across the entire scope of Sudanese society should be promoted. Sudan's many marginalized communities, including even the janjaweed, must be genuinely engaged.

Third, and most important of all, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement includes provisions for elections in less than two years. There seem to be five main power blocks in Sudan that will be contesting. The ruling National Congress Party is campaigning as the guarantor of the CPA, and the provider of economic prosperity and good governance. The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, the NCP's governing partner, still enjoys the overwhelming support of southerners, despite some concerns about the slowness in implementation of the CPA, some authoritarian tendencies, and charges of corruption. The two traditional parties, Umma and the DUP, must still be taken seriously, and retain a significant level of support, although they lack the resources of the NCP and SPLM and have splintered into various factions. The fifth block would include all the other southern and northern parties, such as the SANU, SSDF, USAP, the Communists, the Baathists, and Turabi's Popular Congress.

In the event of elections, I find it difficult to imagine that any single block would gain a majority. One person suggested to us that if the SPLM and the other southern parties and progressive northerners joined together to back the SPLM general secretary, Pagan Amum, that he might stand a chance of winning the presidency and thereby holding the country together in the referendum for self-determination of the south that will follow. Another suggested that Ahmad Diraige, a secular leader of the Fur, might be more successful in garnering both northern and southern support. Electoral coalitions could thus be formed before the elections, but otherwise, one could conjecture virtually any other alignment of political blocks in the aftermath of elections. If the SPLM were not included, however, this would spell the end of any hopes for a united Sudan. The imperative of such political coalition-building could be a moderating force in Sudan's political development, but it is currently not too apparent. Almost none of Sudan's political parties have paid more than lip-service to the conflict in Darfur. The dispute over Abyei is also a critically explosive issue. Another idea that has been gaining ground is a national conference of civil society, or political parties, or both, that could address such issues. The Umma party would like to re-open the CPA, which the SPLM adamantly opposes doing, while the NCP is simply dissembling.

Free and fair elections in Sudan might seem far-fetched, and the government has yet to pass an electoral code or establish an electoral commission, as mandated by the CPA. A national census is just getting off the ground. We saw little evidence of other preparations, but the NCP is reportedly busy organizing its cadres, which would suggest that it, at least, is serious about going into elections, if necessary. International election observers are provided for in the CPA as well, and although Sudan's 1997 elections had observers, they were not credible. Thus, it will be important to confirm the participation of a large, reputable international observation mission, as well as a massive domestic observer contingent. Because there are so many strong, contending parties, it should be possible to minimize electoral fraud. To the extent that both the NCP and the SPLM seem to believe that they enjoy great popular support, they should accept credible elections as being in their own best interests. There must be much more concerted international support for Sudan's elections, and many of the Endowment's Sudanese partners, in both the north and south, are already focusing on them. Women's political participation could be especially helpful, as the Initiative for Inclusive Security has ably pointed out, and the Endowment is already involved in supporting such activities. Darfur must also be able to participate freely in these elections, even if voters must cast their ballots in the IDP camps. Sudan has had some experience with elections, and the challenge should certainly not be so formidable as those in the DRC or some other countries.

What does all this mean for Darfur? I am convinced that greater engagement in Sudan's political processes, including the CPA and the DPA can lead to a sustainable resolution of the conflict. The Darfurians we spoke to made it clear that they want justice, a return to their homes, compensation for their losses, and greater participation in government; but they also expressed a willingness to reconcile and rebuild. One of our interlocutors described the current government as a "securocracy," perhaps something like what we used to call a police state. As in many other countries, there are elites who control most of the power and resources, and who can be ruthless in holding on to them. They may allow considerable freedom for opposition groups to voice dissent, but will subtly manage and manipulate the system as it suits their needs. Only when their power is threatened too seriously, will they take action. Many terrible crimes have been committed in Sudan, and people must be held accountable for them. The Truth and Reconciliation process has many models throughout Africa and the world. But there is also a great deal of murkiness and rumor, chaos and downright anarchy in Sudan. Cool heads and statesmanlike behavior will need to prevail, and have not been in abundant supply thus far. Yet there are many talented Sudanese throughout the country who continue to demonstrate great courage and resourcefulness in extricating Sudan from its predicament. Sudan must get a lot of tough love, and although the stakes are extremely high, the odds are not impossible, and the US has a lot riding on its success.