Edited by Nick Nunez and Kevin Sheives
The International Forum for Democratic Studies asked four leading Latin American experts across civil society to consider the following question: Outside of the government realm, how are the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda and media channels leveraging influential figures across Latin America’s media, academic, and political spaces to promote authoritarian narratives and models of governance?
This Big Question builds on insights from a report coauthored by Mariví Marín Vásquez (ProBox) and Iria Puyosa (DFRLab) that highlighted ways in which Latin America’s autocratic governments and influencers in more open societies have collaborated with China, Russia, and others to promote authoritarian narratives. The report highlighted how “authoritarians are working to degrade a rules-based international order in favor of a world where the cost of amassing power through undemocratic means and violating people’s fundamental rights is negligible.” Under Xi Jinping’s direction, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is undertaking a “sharp power” campaign to export authoritarian tools and erode civil society and the nongovernmental sector in Latin America. Many autocrats in the region have enthusiastically adopted Xi’s playbook and now employ such tools domestically to suppress opposition movements and their civil society partners. By mobilizing resources, expertise, and collective action, civil society can strengthen liberal democracy’s defenses against manipulative information campaigns and uphold the integrity of democratic institutions worldwide.
Sascha Hannig Nunez, CAD Chile
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) exerts its influence in Latin America through individuals who have connections with or benefit from Beijing’s interests in the region. Many of these elites—businesspeople, academics, and social media influencers, among others—avoid discussing sensitive issues concerning the region’s ties to China because of these relationships.
For instance, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda department and state-affiliated media outlets produce paid media inserts where relevant elites are interviewed about their country’s relations with China. These individuals often lobby or enter business relationships with Chinese state-run companies, which shapes the discourse around the PRC’s economic engagement in Latin America. Consequently, these institutions promote alternative narratives that are favorable to the Party-state’s worldview.
Chilean businessman Andrónico Luksic, for example, has strong business ties to China, and his philanthropic efforts reflect this relationship. Not only did the Luksic Scholars Foundation offer scholarships for an undergraduate exchange program in China, but he also was instrumental in the installation of the Latin American Studies Tsinghua faculty in Santiago, closely affiliated with China’s Tsinghua faculty. Such elite opinions are then amplified by traditional Chilean media outlets or cited by academics in their research, further perpetuating these positive narratives about the PRC.
In Latin American academia, Confucius Institutes have signed partnerships in around ten countries. Despite their connections to the CCP, they remain a crucial source of funding for Chinese affairs and language study in Latin America. They also attract researchers and teachers, placing indirect pressure on them to support official CCP narratives on sensitive topics.
The COVID-19 pandemic marked a pivotal point for Beijing’s efforts. The CCP-supported China Media Group (CMG) increased its efforts in changing local audiences’ perception of China’s role in the international crisis. In our recent study, “China Media Group (CMG) en Español: Analyzing Chinese State media’s presence on Spanish-speaking YouTube,” we measured how Chinese, state-run YouTube channels promoted these narratives in the region. CMG channels disseminated content across Latin America that aligned with PRC narratives about COVID-19 and parroted other state media channels like Russia’s RT and Venezuela’s TeleSur. Since there are only a handful of “China-content influencers” in Latin America, official channels are often the predominant window into Chinese culture, language, and politics. Moreover, those few individual influencers who cater to Spanish-speaking audiences about China are seldom critical of the CCP. They mostly claim they had positive experiences in the PRC that they share openly, even if that is not the focus of their channels.
The COVID-19 pandemic marked a pivotal point for Beijing’s efforts. The CCP-supported China Media Group (CMG) increased its efforts in changing local audiences’ perception of China’s role in the international crisis.
There is no proof so far that the CMG or any Chinese institution pays these few influencers, but evidence in the English-speaking world shows that wielding the influence of online public figures to promote preferred narratives is not an uncommon strategy for the PRC to pursue, meriting further research within the Latin American context. Still, the lack of a consistent alternative and more impartial discourse makes the Spanish-speaking internet generally unaware of negative news related to China, with few exceptions.
Sascha Hannig is an international analyst with experience in Latin America and as a financial reporter, currently serving as an executive assistant with the Centro de Análisis para la Democracia, Chile (CAD Chile) and as a research assistant at Global Governance Research with Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. X: @SaschaHannig
While Beijing’s strategy to tout the superiority of its development model utilizes a communications and diplomatic offensive, it also promotes preferred narratives through academic institutions and universities. In Latin America—as in the West—the academic community has an important impact on the education of political leaders, officials, journalists, and social activists. For Beijing, indoctrination and malign influence operations emanate from state- and Party-run institutions and penetrate Latin American academia to change perceptions of the PRC around the world, deepen the acceptance of Beijing’s preferred narratives, convert these narratives into politically actionable agendas, and ultimately garner popular support for Latin America’s political and social activist leaders.
In Latin America—as in the West—the academic community has an important impact on the education of political leaders, officials, journalists, and social activists. For Beijing, indoctrination and malign influence operations emanate from state- and Party-run institutions and penetrate Latin American academia.
Two major regional entities exist for the production and dissemination of ideas within Latin American academia. One such organization, the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), is an international, nongovernmental social sciences institution with one of the largest networks of social science centers in Latin America. Another, the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), is an autonomous, graduate-only university and intergovernmental organization, with many chapters endorsed by UNESCO. Two recent CLACSO and FLACSO publications reproduced official CCP positions on the country’s history that legitimize the PRC’s top-down economic model and their autocratic approach to human rights as an alternative to democratic models. CLACSO, supported by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and ultimately the PRC State Council, also echoed and promoted Beijing’s “success story” narrative on China’s economy that the Party-state has touted since 1949. The FLACSO publication even included a contribution from Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and former PRC State Councilor. These examples illustrate how some intellectuals have parroted well-known CCP talking points and called for China’s “different type of democracy”—in opposition to liberal understandings of democracy—to be implemented in Latin America.
Illiberal elites and some parties across the political spectrum have increasingly become disseminators of such narratives that are favorable to the CCP’s worldview. Their twisted adoption of multipolar rhetoric converges with Beijing’s interests in challenging the international order and amplifying positive narratives about authoritarian governance models. These linkages, previously limited to technological and commercial exchanges, have now leapt into the political arena. For example, some socialist-leaning political leaders have “legitimized and amplified Russian fascist discourse” by supporting Russia’s supposed casus belli on Ukraine as an anti-imperialist struggle against U.S.-led imperialism.
As Latin America seeks an independent way to represent its interests on the world stage, China can provide economic benefits without becoming a political model. Yet, forging this path would necessitate abandoning the narratives that replicate autocratic views that run contrary to Latin America’s democratic history and political traditions.
Armando Chaguaceda is a researcher in government and political analysis and is currently serving as a researcher with Gobierno y Analisis Politico AC (GAPAC). X: @DMando21
Julio Martínez Ellsburg, Expediente Abierto
The CCP “sharp power” in key Latin American nongovernmental sectors has grown steadily over the past few decades. At Expediente Abierto, we have monitored this work closely through our journalistic efforts and scholarly publications produced by the Observatory on China in Central America and as local partners for the China Index, analyzing developments in El Salvador, Argentina, and Uruguay.
The PRC has worked extensively to gain favor within Central American media and academia. These efforts include paid trips for tours, political conferences, academic partnerships, and scholarships to China. Even in a small country like El Salvador, over one hundred journalists traveled to China to participate in media tours since the two countries established relations in 2018, and at least 29 journalists from Honduras have traveled to China in the year after ties were established. These trips, with all expenses covered by Beijing, included journalists from television, print outlets, and radio. Schedules are usually tightly controlled, and participants engage with diplomatic and commercial representatives. These officials outline the Party-state’s official stance by, for example, advocating the PRC as a superior geopolitical partner, as opposed to Taiwan. Meanwhile, PRC state-affiliated firms also regularly buy advertisements in local media, sometimes causing journalists to think twice before publishing reports that criticize China.
These sharp power tools are also used during critical political moments for the CCP regime. For instance, influence campaigns have been deployed in the region to defend Beijing’s stance on its human rights abuses in Xinjiang or to present it as a global leader in the fight against coronavirus. Support for these campaigns spread in Latin America with the help of local influencers, politicians, and news sources. These campaigns have also spread positive messages about autocrats in the region, such as Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Unfortunately, it is seldom understood by Latin American audiences that these outlets with regional channels, such as CGTN news or Xinhua, are controlled directly by the main propaganda body of the CCP (known as the Publicity Department) rather than being independent news sources. It is especially worrying when these CCP-linked news sources coordinate with other authoritarian-linked media outlets, such as RT or Telesur.
Unfortunately, it is seldom understood by Latin American audiences that these outlets with regional channels, such as CGTN news or Xinhua, are controlled directly by the main propaganda body of the CCP (known as the Publicity Department) rather than being independent news sources.
As popular support for democracy continues to decline in the region, it is essential to understand how the CCP’s narratives continue to gain traction among autocratic allies in Latin America to the detriment of anti-autocratic voices.
Julio Martínez Ellsburg is the head of programs at Expediente Abierto and a consultant on international development issues. X: @martinezjuliod
In the 1990s, the prevailing depiction of the PRC in media and among business elites across Latin America was as an ideal export and investment market ripe for exploiting China’s labor and other resources. Yet, this perspective overlooked the country’s potential purchasing power, and the notion of exporting goods to China has gradually lost its luster since the PRC emerged as a major producer and exporter in its own right.
While the PRC may have initially engaged with Latin America primarily on commercial grounds, this stance appears to have evolved. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a new narrative that CCP authorities could exploit and propagate in Latin America—the broad promotion of its role as a benevolent, peace-seeking actor on the global stage. Even as the PRC’s economic growth has begun to slow down, Xi Jinping now presents his nation as an alternative global power—one characterized by “peace, environmental consciousness, and a commitment to multilateralism.” Disavowing hegemonic ambitions, the Party-state portrays itself as a collaborative participant in shaping a better world.
Interviews with journalists, academics, and activists in Latin America have revealed widespread incredulity at the notion of the PRC exporting its political model or Latin American governments adopting “Chinese style democracy.” “The Chinese only look for business,” they would say. However, these new PRC narratives suggest otherwise, particularly when one sees the historical support among Evo Morales (Bolivia), Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro (Venezuela), Rafael Corea (Ecuador), Raúl Castro (Cuba), or Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua) and the PRC. Shouldn’t Latin American elites now ponder what the PRC truly offers? Is it wise to embrace an authoritarian regime that stifles individual freedoms, imprisons artists, and suppresses dissenting voices and diverse religious beliefs? It’s high time for Latin American media, journalists, academics, and elites to cast aside partial truths propagated by the CCP and embrace a more comprehensive perspective on China’s emergence and influence in Latin America. Only by doing so can the region make informed decisions about its future trajectory and resist the allure of authoritarian narratives.
It’s high time for Latin American media, journalists, academics, and elites to cast aside partial truths propagated by the CCP and embrace a more comprehensive perspective on China’s emergence and influence in Latin America. Only by doing so can the region make informed decisions about its future trajectory and resist the allure of authoritarian narratives.
Hernán Alberro is an international affairs and human rights consultant and is currently serving as an associate fellow with Forum 2000 International in Madrid. X: @halberro, LinkedIn.
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Respondents’ answers have been edited for length and clarity, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Endowment for Democracy. Image Credit: Shutterstock/ Takamex
