Defending Democratic Norms in Global Tech Governance

In the UN system and beyond, authoritarian maneuvers and democratic disillusionment are fundamentally challenging the participatory, multistakeholder models that have so far prevailed in governing digital technologies. For human rights activists, independent journalists, political dissenters, and others who depend on digital privacy and an open internet to speak freely, the stakes are high. In September 2024, the International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Center for International Media Assistance held a private, hybrid workshop to better understand the shifting global tech governance landscape and identify response strategies. Leading civil society practitioners, technologists, journalists, and researchers discussed the authoritarian threat to digital governance bodies, especially the threat to multistakeholderism; crucial international frameworks that may challenge democratic norms; and tactics to more effectively defend democratic digital principles and procedures.

The Global Challenge to Democratic Technology Norms

• Autocratic actors—with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the vanguard—seek to undermine rights-respecting digital frameworks and assert their ideological dominance within governance and standard-setting institutions.
  • While the PRC has long sought to reshape what it sees as a U.S.-dominated digital governance ecosystem—reflected in multistakeholder bodies such as the California-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)—Beijing is now more effectively coordinating autocratic nations and forming coalitions, especially within the UN system. These efforts have bolstered anti-democratic digital governance projects and secured influential positions for PRC-aligned candidates in bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). One participant spoke of a strategically directed “Beijing effect,” in contrast to the “Brussels effect.”
  • Authoritarians have also developed parallel bodies and fora to more effectively assert their vision for digital governance, such as the PRC’s World Internet Conference (whose influence was felt to be on the wane) or recent AI governance initiatives.
  • An initial focus on building market power has now positioned Beijing to more impactfully influence digital norms. For example, the proliferation of PRC “safe city” digital surveillance packages provides multiple levers for Beijing to influence digital governance in recipient countries, as well as win their support in global fora.
• A contest over global digital frameworks runs in parallel to acute on-the-ground threats from unchecked digital surveillance, “fake news” laws, and other oppressive ICT regulations in authoritarian states and backsliding democracies.
  • There are lingering concerns over whether the UNESCO Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms (2023) will be abused to justify draconian speech controls (such as the content regulation bodies recently on the rise in Asia) and further incentivize platform compliance with authoritarian demands at odds with free expression.
  • Normative clashes also emerged in connection with the UN Convention Against Cybercrime—the outgrowth of a Russian-led initiative—whose provisions on electronic surveillance and cross-border data sharing by law enforcement have prompted grave concern from rights advocates. In addition to lending a UN stamp of approval to existing domestic abuses, the treaty’s data-sharing provisions could make it easier for autocrats to target dissenting voices outside of their traditional jurisdictions.
• Emerging digital technologies are opening new spheres of contestation for democratic norms.
  • The recently adopted Global Digital Compact (GDC) invokes digital public infrastructure (the interlinked stacks of digital IDs, payment systems, and public services closely associated with India’s digital governance model), which promises public-sector efficiency gains but also presents heightened risks to privacy and equality.
  • In the ITU, democrats and autocrats have debated the rules for low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites, whose potential to break through terrestrial internet controls is prompting pushback from the likes of Russia, Iran, and the PRC.
  • The most attention has gone to AI governance, with governments of all political stripes positioning themselves as AI norm-setters. Global Partners Digital mapped 50 different initiatives in this space. Some participants felt that a “moral panic” over AI is leading to excessive focus on this issue—and amplifying the voice of the companies driving AI development. Participants stressed the need for civil society to prioritize AI discussions with the most potential impact, and avoid those which amount to a distraction.

The Threat to Multistakeholderism as a Foundational Principle

• The GDC negotiations have been a pivotal point for multistakeholderism, with many internet freedom advocates concerned that the UN-led processes would override other processes—such as the upcoming World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) +20 review or the annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF)—that enshrine more of a role for nongovernmental stakeholders. Participants expressed frustration with opacity and a lack of civil society engagement during the GDC process, as well as with an outcome document that concentrates power in the UN’s New York office (specifically, with the Secretary General’s Tech Envoy).
  • Historically, internet governance has lent itself to a robust form of multistakeholderism. With many governments using their power at home to restrict internet access and penalize online speech, a shift toward “joint government control” could threaten the internet’s decentralization, user privacy, and ultimately even the global network’s interoperability. Such developments present acute risks for civil society and independent media—particularly those in exile—who depend heavily on digital communications.
• In responding to authoritarian pressures toward multilateralism, it is crucial to recognize the legitimate frustrations of less powerful democratic actors, especially in the global majority.
  • The private sector predominates in some multistakeholder processes, particularly in the technical standard-setting ecosystem, and can tend to sideline ethical issues (such as privacy or AI bias) in favor of emphasizing market viability. Civil society participants, in turn, may take a dim view of multistakeholder fora because they see private companies as playing an obstructing role on issues they prioritize.
  • A lack of global-majority representation in global digital governance undermines democratic principles and leads to disillusionment with multistakeholder fora. For instance, the UN’s High-Level Advisory Body found that 118 countries are completely absent from a series of “global” AI initiatives. In this context, one participant felt that the UN had to step up due to global North actors “leaving the rest of the world behind.” The PRC capitalizes on these frustrations, framing the multistakeholder system as a way for Western governments and corporate allies to preserve power imbalances.
• Fora dominated by governments or companies may be “multistakeholder in name only.”
  • Civil society participants still struggle to participate due to funding issues, harassment, lack of access to information, visa barriers, and gaps in accessibility support. Particularly in the complex standard-setting ecosystem, a lack of familiarity with specific issues and processes—the formal and informal rules of the game—can also make it hard for civil society to engage effectively even when they are “in the room.”
  • Authoritarians may also actively subvert multistakeholder participation. One recent tactic has been bidding to host traditionally civil society–friendly fora (such as the IGF, slated to take place this year in Saudi Arabia), which forces civil society to choose between boycotting—lending support to authoritarian efforts to downgrade these fora—or traveling to a potentially unsafe setting and helping the hosts to whitewash their global image. Authoritarian regimes may also send government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) to join fora in lieu of genuinely independent civil society.
  • Technical community representatives may lack awareness of authoritarian risks, “thinking like techies” and failing to consider the political role of PRC companies that increasingly influence digital governance spaces. Multistakeholder institutions can also be unsupportive of critiques by independent civil society from closed settings.
• Despite these challenges, one organization leader expressed confidence that complex and interconnected global challenges will drive a continued trend toward multistakeholderism in global governance, evidenced by emerging domains such as “business and human rights.”

Refining the Democratic Offer for Technological Governance

• Compared to the CCP’s appeals to security, control, and order, democratic norms such as multistakeholderism can seem abstract or hollow to the public and policymakers. Established democratic governments and prodemocracy groups need to think more strategically to highlight the benefits of a democratic vision for technology’s future.
  • Civil society organizations and other democratic actors should communicate that multistakeholderism is essential for good policymaking. As one governmental participant emphasized, civil society can be a critically useful partner for democratic governments in formulating responses to complex, highly technical issues, where government institutions themselves do not always have the needed expertise.
  • Clarity around the concept of multistakeholderism may also be helpful, as the term can connote different types of formal and informal arrangements, and understandings of the concept differ even within prodemocratic civil society.
• One participant noted that “today, we can’t afford not to be tech optimists.” People around the world are seeking tech-based solutions to real-world problems, and the best way to address these concerns is to craft human-centric, evidence-based policies that advance a democratic vision for tech governance and development. Democracy advocates should seek alignment with the development community and promote a “positive vision for innovation” that emphasizes protecting rights and improving living standards, not just supporting the growth of corporations.
• The democratic community must offer an inclusive vision that incorporates the views and voices of currently excluded communities, especially the global majority. One participant emphasized the idea of data solidarity–which emphasizes collaboration, community control, and equity–as an example of a more inclusive, compelling program for democratic tech governance.
• Prodemocracy advocates active in global digital governance should stress the concrete human rights impacts of a shift towards authoritarian digital norms. Firsthand testimony from those at risk can be important in moving the needle on agreements like the cybercrime convention, which jeopardize the real-world safety of dissidents and activists facing transnational repression.

Strengthening Coordination and Capacity Building

• Civil society groups are spread thin across digital governance fora. To address this challenge, broaden representation, and enable agile and effective responses to authoritarian projects, civil society working at different national and global levels should forge new collaborations.
  • Only a few civil society groups have the knowledge and resources to consistently participate in multistakeholder processes. Under these suboptimal conditions, the groups that do participate should seek to gather more diverse inputs that reflect the concerns of those not in the room, including by engaging local communities.
  • Cross-sectoral connections can help advance a positive vision for digital governance. One participant shared that when Brazil was debating its data protection law, labor movements were essential to crafting the final output. More work is needed to build out cooperation between the digital rights sector and groups not generally classified this way (such as media freedom groups or professional communities, e.g., lawyers).
  • Civil society networking during discussions on the cybercrime convention were a bright spot, with national, regional, and international organizations coordinating closely, sharing talking points, and publishing joint statements, in some cases together with industry. Although the treaty is likely to pass its upcoming vote in the General Assembly, there is still room for robust collective efforts to thwart passage, advocate against individual state ratification, or press for global or national safeguards against abuses of cybercrime laws.
• Engagement by democratic governments is not a guarantee of protection for human rights.
  • Governments may send unbalanced delegations, such as trade experts, as opposed to people who know international law; in the case of the cybercrime treaty, delegations skewed toward prosecutors. Since such delegates may not naturally focus on human rights, civil society should not assume that someone else will raise these issues.
  • Little-noticed bureaucratic politics can have an outsized impact on digital norms. Several participants pointed to efforts by the UN’s New York office to increase its power vis-a-vis Geneva as a driving factor behind the GDC, in turn presenting an opening for China and Saudi Arabia. Civil society should be attentive to such dynamics.
  • Democratic governments also need to build capacity at the civil service level to engage more effectively in digital governance. Civil society participants with technical expertise can leverage this to find entry points, whether by supporting governments in their digital engagement or through advisor roles in organizations like the ITU.
• Civil society should work to develop targeted relationships with technical standards bodies—such as ISO, IETF, and IEEE—as well as to help standards organizations better understand their role in the larger human rights space. Standards bodies function out of the spotlight, but have important implications for people’s ability to freely communicate.
  • Article 19 and the DNS Research Federation have compiled helpful references for groups seeking to explore the standards domain. To help civil society groups understand their prospects for participation as well as to incentivize positive change, one participant suggested creating a Ranking Digital Rights–style scorecard that would assess the openness and accessibility of different digital governance fora.
• Different types of donor support and coordination are needed to enable effective participation in digital governance fora that are open to civil society, but involve protracted time and travel costs that are difficult to reconcile with program-specific funding cycles.