Edited by Ariane Gottlieb
In August, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a long-anticipated report which concluded that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) human rights violations against Uyghurs in China and elsewhere “may constitute . . . crimes against humanity.” While the substance of the report represents a strong rebuke of China’s repression, its release twelve minutes before High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet’s departure from the role highlights the type of discourse control that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to leverage over international narratives about its human rights abuses. Consistent with the OHCHR’s findings, the CCP has imprisoned over one million Uyghur civilians in concentration camps. Eleven million more live under tight surveillance and must bear witness to a campaign of cultural erasure. Even those who live overseas struggle to escape the long arm of China’s transnational repression and censorship.
In this context, the International Forum for Democratic Studies asked six leading experts the following question: How has Beijing sought to suppress and influence responses from the international community to its continued repression of Uyghurs in China and abroad?
This publication is based off a public discussion hosted by the Forum with Nury Turkel (Hudson Institute), “No Escape: The True Story of China’s Genocide of the Uyghurs,” centered around his book and China’s campaign of transnational repression and discourse control against the Uyghur community and those who hold China accountable for its abuses. A recording and summary of the event are available here.
Nury Turkel, Hudson Institute
The Uyghur community’s message to the world is simple: The damage has been done. In fact, for the Uyghur people, it is hard to see a path forward.
The U.S. government and several others around the world have rightfully recognized the atrocities carried out by the CCP against the Uyghur people as genocide and crimes against humanity. Yet, U.S. corporations act in contradiction not only to American values but to those of humanity through their economic ties with Xinjiang-based entities and reliance on goods produced by forced labor. While simultaneously touting progressive causes and utilizing catchphrases that an American consumer demographic is accustomed to hearing, these companies have concealed their complicity in genocide and modern-day slavery.
The present aggression, repression, and malign tactics utilized by the CCP should have come as no surprise to the international community. For decades, we have been asleep at the wheel, feeding the monstrous regime that now attempts to devour us. The United Nations, and in particular the Human Rights Council, have been crippled in responding to Beijing’s crimes due to the perpetrators’ participation within these institutions.
The Uyghur genocide remains a glaring, contemporary example of how Chinese influence operations work and how far they have infiltrated free, democratic societies. Cutting-edge surveillance technology underpins these atrocities, and much of that same technology is actively exported not only to Western countries but to other authoritarian regimes, equipping them with the tools and means to surveil and suppress dissenting voices.
Our call is this: if you believe in human dignity, democratic values, a better world for future generations, and the value of your fellow man, this threat must be addressed. If not for us, then for yourselves.
By prioritizing cooperation with a genocidal government over human rights, we have sent a signal to the CCP and other hostile state actors that such crimes can be carried out with impunity. As such, transnational repression is an increasingly concerning trend in open societies. We must stop this genocide and hold perpetrators to account to ensure “Never Again” actually means something.
The crisis of violence against Uyghurs has been a top-down issue, in that governments have raised the alarm and sought to address it legislatively before most of civil society has become aware. Yet, grassroots campaigns, particularly those pushing for divestment and corporate accountability, are vital to sustaining any momentum. While the United States, in particular, has taken significant policy steps to address the ongoing genocide as it reaches its sixth year, little has changed for the Uyghur people who remain hostages of the CCP.
Our call is this: if you believe in human dignity, democratic values, a better world for future generations, and the value of your fellow man, this threat must be addressed. If not for us, then for yourselves.
Nury A. Turkel is an attorney, foreign policy expert, and rights advocate. He currently serves as chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Turkel is also a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, working on U.S. foreign policy and national security issues. He is also co-founder and chair of the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Turkel is the author of No Escape: True Story of China’s Genocide of the Uyghurs. Follow him on Twitter (@nuryturkel), Facebook, and Instagram.
Alexander Dukalskis, University College Dublin
China’s government pays a great deal of attention to how its system is perceived by foreign audiences. Over the years, it has invested billions of dollars into the expansion of its external propaganda system through platforms such as Xinhua, China Daily, and CGTN. Attempting to build sway on Western social media platforms, PRC propaganda outlets, pro-CCP “influencers,” and most famously many of its diplomats, took to Twitter with gusto. But external propaganda is not the only tool in Beijing’s box. It also cultivates friendly foreign elites—sometimes with flattery, the illusion of access, or material rewards—who can speak positively about the CCP’s policies on its behalf. At its most repressive and sinister, Chinese authorities coerce into silence—sometimes violently—exiles who might speak out against the party’s policies or personnel.
When it comes to the ongoing crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and other minorities, the full authoritarian image management playbook is evident. On the “softer” side, Beijing’s propaganda streams feature misleading content about how CCP rule in Xinjiang brings development and ethnic harmony to the region, of course leaving out any inconvenient details about ongoing abuses. Alternatively, they distract viewers from Beijing’s own repressive policies by pointing to human rights violations in the United States or Europe. Foreign (sometimes paid) social media and YouTube “influencers” go on tours of Xinjiang that look authentic (but are really supported by propaganda authorities) to portray an upbeat version of events.
When it comes to the ongoing crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and other minorities, the full authoritarian image management playbook is evident.
These measures are built upon asymmetric access to information. The CCP prevents scrutiny of its narratives on Xinjiang by blocking legitimate foreign journalists and academics from reporting independently in the region. Beijing’s messages can circulate abroad, but major foreign news outlets and information platforms are often censored in China itself.
On the coercive end of the authoritarian image management spectrum, it is well documented that security personnel have reached beyond China’s borders to intimidate and silence Uyghurs abroad. Even Uyghur students or workers who were abroad for non-political reasons when the current crackdown started have become targets for transnational repression.
Combined, the ultimate goals of these tactics are to deflect criticism, marginalize critics, and amplify pro-CCP viewpoints.
Combined, the ultimate goals of these tactics are to deflect criticism, marginalize critics, and amplify pro-CCP viewpoints.
Alexander Dukalskis is an associate professor at University College Dublin in the School of Politics and International Relations. His work has been published in leading academic journals, and his most recent book Making the World Safe for Dictatorship was published by Oxford University Press in 2021. Follow him on Twitter @AlexDukalskis.
Xiao Qiang, University of California Berkeley School of Information
The PRC mainly responds to criticism from the international community through its “great external propaganda” apparatus. Beijing uses technology, social media, and disinformation to promote news that is favorable to its policies, thereby influencing governments and the global public’s perception of the situation in Xinjiang.
In addition to using diplomatic channels and official media resources, China’s government has also expanded its public diplomacy operations and disseminated false information on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media platforms. The CCP and its propaganda apparatus offer financial support to third parties that create large numbers of fake accounts which advance the party line. Behind this “cognitive warfare” is also global outreach carried out by the government’s propaganda and security services. For example, in 2021, local students in Yili, Xinjiang were asked to go to the village committee to record videos praising the “beauty of life” in the region. The government propaganda agency then posted these videos on overseas websites, although the students themselves did not know that their efforts would be used for this purpose of “outreach.”
Countless members of the Uyghur diaspora have also experienced the long reach of the CCP’s authoritarian state in the form of relentless harassment, intimidation, and coercion. This type of transnational repression has dramatically increased since 2017.
Through political and economic influence, propaganda, and covert coercive tactics, Beijing has largely silenced governments, international businesses, and civil society organizations on human rights issues and prevented them from criticizing the CCP’s horrific campaign of violence against Uyghur Muslims.
Nevertheless, the PRC’s considerable political and economic influence around the world constitutes the primary reason that its external propaganda holds sway in the international community. In the Middle East and Africa, for example, among the 57 member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, only Albania and Turkey have condemned the CCP’s policies in Xinjiang. China’s existing political and economic ties with these countries were key to persuading these government officials. Through political and economic influence, propaganda, and covert coercive tactics, Beijing has largely silenced governments, international businesses, and civil society organizations on human rights issues and prevented them from criticizing the CCP’s horrific campaign of violence against Uyghur Muslims.
Xiao Qiang is a research scientist at the University of California Berkeley School of Information and the founder and editor-in-chief of China Digital Times, a bilingual Chinese news website. His research focuses on state censorship, propaganda and disinformation, and emerging AI-driven mass surveillance and social control in China. Follow him on Twitter @rockngo.
Nate Schenkkan, Freedom House
Beijing’s primary tool in its global campaign of transnational repression is bilateral pressure. But in confronting the CCP-led pursuit of Uyghurs and others around the world, some democracies are hamstringing themselves by undermining the right to seek asylum.
Transnational repression against Uyghurs as a community is well known and well documented by numerous groups, including the Uyghur Human Rights Project, Safeguard Defenders, and Freedom House. Since 1997—long before the more recent, comprehensive crackdown—hundreds of Uyghurs have been involuntarily repatriated to China, while many others have faced physical assaults, surveillance, online harassment, and sophisticated cyberattacks.
Yet, Uyghurs continue to face intense threats abroad. This includes mechanisms known to be open to abuse like manipulated Interpol notices and the cooptation of foreign security and migration services, which CCP authorities pressure into helping return Uyghurs and others under the guise of fighting crime, terrorism, or illegal immigration. Bilateral cooperation on these issues is usually paired with a quid pro quo, where China offers opportunities for greater economic returns—or their withdrawal.
In confronting the CCP-led pursuit of Uyghurs and others around the world, some democracies are hamstringing themselves by undermining the right to seek asylum. . . Since 1997—long before the more recent, comprehensive crackdown—hundreds of Uyghurs have been involuntarily repatriated to China, while many others have faced physical assaults, surveillance, online harassment, and sophisticated cyberattacks.
In doing so, China exploits the fact that, in almost any relationship, it is the more powerful country. Turkey is a good example. As President Erdoğan has sought to shift Turkey away from dependence on Western investment and security, he has dropped his condemnation of China’s repression of the Uyghurs—which he once called a “genocide”—and pursued rapprochement with Beijing. With this shift has come increased detentions and even expulsions for Uyghurs who had fled to Turkey, once considered a safe haven. In democracies as well, the PRC has bargained for such extradition agreements, which in some cases allow PRC law enforcement to “negotiate” with individuals about their return to China.
The ability of democracies to protect Uyghurs is hampered by attacks on the right to seek asylum. For example, despite bipartisan political support for Uyghurs in the United States over the last two years, Washington, D.C. has not accepted any Uyghurs through its refugee resettlement program. In the European Union, the practical ability to seek asylum has been attenuated by ever-widening restrictions intended to cut off irregular migration. This has made it harder for Uyghurs—as well as others—to find protections in democracies, which can help safeguard against the PRC’s transnational repression campaigns. Providing mechanisms for Uyghurs to gain access to resettlement and other forms of protection is crucial to curtailing transnational repression against them.
Nate Schenkkan is senior director of research for Freedom House’s work on countering authoritarianism. In this role, he works on Freedom House’s integrated strategy for pushing back against authoritarianism around the world. Follow him on Twitter @nateschenkkan.
Greg Walton, SecDev Group
For over two decades, the Uyghur diaspora has been targeted in, and through, cyberspace by the CCP, a persistent and determined adversary with effectively unlimited resources. The Uyghur and Tibetan diaspora communities were among the first digital networks to be targeted by PRC state hackers as early as 2002—long before the CCP’s mass internment program began around 2017.
Initially, China’s global cyber espionage apparatus most likely grew out of the ruling party’s own perceived internal security needs, as FireEye reported. Nearly two decades before Human Rights Watch’s groundbreaking 2019 report forensically exposed algorithmic surveillance targeting his people, Nury Turkel testified that the Uyghur community’s existence and way of life was threatened by an emerging system of digital repression that amounted to precursors of a cultural genocide. Over the next two decades, China’s espionage grew in scale and sophistication focusing on corporate targets and civil society networks alike. This had a chilling effect on members of the Uyghur diaspora, censoring critical voices. These espionage efforts also resulted in the acquisition of potentially trillions of dollars of Western intellectual property.
The Uyghur diaspora has been targeted in, and through, cyberspace by the CCP, a persistent and determined adversary with effectively unlimited resources.
Exiled Uyghurs have long had to defend their networks with severely constrained resources. A number of researchers (including some commenting in this publication) highlighted China’s “Advanced Persistent Threat” campaigns targeting Uyghurs and Tibetans in 2002. These attacks—and the asymmetric dynamics between the heavily resourced CCP and exiled dissident, research, and ethnic communities—continue to this day. Research and advocacy groups including Citizen Lab, Volexity, and TibCERT in Dharamsala have recently documented this large-scale digital surveillance of the Uyghur diaspora.
Digital transnational repression targeting the Uyghur diaspora serves as a “canary in the digital coalmine” for democracies. Some analysts anticipated this two-decade trajectory in their earlier work, but early warning capacity built into the Uyghur digital diaspora could have surfaced these threats and led to a coordinated response in the West much sooner. Reports by Tibetan and Uyghur sources detailing digital threats from Beijing predated by several years Western intelligence’s warnings of China’s cyber espionage targeting the private sector.
These tactics against ethnic targets evolved directly into Beijing’s cyberespionage apparatus targeting companies and governments. . . If the past is precedent, democracies ignore the current experiences of the Uyghurs at their future peril.
There are few more telling examples of where human rights concerns and traditional strategic priorities align than in the digital repression of Uyghur and Tibetan exiles. These tactics against ethnic targets evolved directly into Beijing’s cyberespionage apparatus targeting companies and governments. Similarly, a new model in China of digital surveillance-based urban governance is emerging to challenge systems of democracy elsewhere, its dark side manifested in the open-air digital prison in Xinjiang. If the past is precedent, democracies ignore the current experiences of the Uyghurs at their future peril.
Greg Walton is senior research associate for cyber security, smart cities, and data analytics at the SecDev Group. Follow him on Twitter @meta_lab.
Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch
The PRC’s initial response to international reports of mass arbitrary detentions in Xinjiang was quite typical of its past handling of human rights abuses: it flatly denied that the “political education camps” existed. But when international attention escalated, Beijing mounted an unprecedented and wide-ranging response.
The PRC falsely claimed that these camps were “vocational training” facilities. It detained and harassed journalists who travelled to Xinjiang and did not give unfettered access to UN investigators for on-the-ground verification. Meanwhile, it gave tightly controlled tours to select journalists and diplomats, especially those from the Global South. As the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the world, Beijing threatened to withhold vaccines from Ukraine to pressure its government to withdraw support from a joint statement by more than forty countries condemning Beijing’s abuses in Xinjiang.
The PRC tried to influence the UN—with a combination of pressure and promises of cooperation—into not releasing the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on violations in Xinjiang (ultimately released at the eleventh hour upon the Commissioner’s departure).
Notably, the Chinese government has become increasingly skilled at exploiting global social media to spread its propaganda—including by publishing videos of Uyghurs who filmed themselves making identical statements denying Xinjiang’s abuses on YouTube and Twitter. It tried to influence the UN—with a combination of pressure and promises of cooperation—into not releasing the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on violations in Xinjiang (ultimately released at the eleventh hour upon the Commissioner’s departure). It smeared researchers documenting abuses, even spreading rumors about the private life of a female researcher to cast doubt on the veracity of her investigative work.
Beijing’s efforts paid off with many governments, especially in Muslim-majority countries expected to sympathize with the Uyghurs’ plight. Although civil society groups and the public in some of these countries have expressed concerns about Xinjiang, some of those governments, mindful of the China’s economic strength, have supported Beijing’s view. With other governments, Beijing has been far less successful: Many have spoken out against abuses in Xinjiang, and the U.S. and European Union have also sanctioned top Xinjiang officials.
More governments need to press for accountability for Xinjiang residents who suffered grave abuses. They should seize the momentum of the UN report—which came out despite considerable Chinese government pressure—and take further action, including by establishing investigative mechanisms at the UN Human Rights Council to gather evidence, interview victims and survivors, and identify perpetrators, even if barred from the country.
Maya Wang is a senior China researcher for Human Rights Watch. Follow her on Twitter @wang_maya.
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Respondents’ answers have been edited for length and clarity, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Endowment for Democracy. Image Credit: Shutterstock / SkazovD
