STRONGER TOGETHER by Tim Niven, Research Lead at Doublethink Lab

Adapted from Tim Niven’s recently published Forum report Stronger Together: Coalitions as a Catalyst for Information Integrity. Read the report or watch the launch event.

Authoritarian powers such as Russia, China, and Iran are evolving their efforts to weaken democratic values and models by exploiting open information environments. The growing ease and cheapness of executing malign information campaigns has increased the speed and scale of anti-democratic messaging, while more frequent coordination between authoritarian actors has amplified the reach of anti-democratic information campaigns.

Faced with the scale and growing impact of authoritarian information manipulation, democracies require greater coordination at national, regional, and international levels to compete in an information space that increasingly marginalizes prodemocracy voices. One noteworthy trend that is helping democracies shift their efforts from reactive to proactive footing is the growth and development of localized coalitions in support of information integrity.

Coalitions bring together diverse skillsets to catalyze the work of prodemocracy voices; they reduce overlapping costs, pool resources, and prevent the duplication of efforts—a critical challenge in today’s information integrity community. They can also facilitate information sharing and elevate proactive messaging, helping journalists, fact checkers, narrative researchers, and strategic communicators compete more effectively with better-resourced authoritarians.

Whereas collaboration can be opportunistic and fleeting, coalitions for information integrity must be informed by a unified strategic vision to build the mechanisms needed to counter the challenge of information manipulation by authoritarians. Experience from Taiwan’s recent elections has shown that information integrity coalitions offer many advantages, including strengthening the foundation of monitor-and-report efforts; creating efficiencies; enabling rapid learning across actors; and synergizing diverse perspectives and skillsets.

Taiwanese civil society saw firsthand how building coalitions for information integrity can strengthen societal resilience against information manipulation. Six months prior to Taiwan’s January 2024 election, Doublethink Lab organized a coalition to counter foreign information manipulation & interference (FIMI) targeting the public. This coalition brought together fact checkers, FIMI investigators, cybersecurity experts, and academics, functioning mainly as an information-sharing mechanism. Due to proactive information-sharing within the coalition, at least one covert campaign was identified in which malign actors attempted to exploit cultural tensions and target Indian migrant workers in Taiwan. The coalition was able to catch this campaign before it broke out of echo chambers in either country. The coalition also quickly spread awareness about it within Taiwan, while a media partner issued a pre-bunk to make the Indian public aware of the campaign.

The Taiwanese experience—and lessons from other contexts—suggests that coalitions for information integrity can be powerful tools for countering FIMI when they:

• Focus on shared goals to overcome challenges to collective action;
• Organize organically and rely on bottom-up guidance from civil society to increase credibility and reach;
• Leverage synergies from diverse perspectives (fact checkers, journalists, and strategic communicators) to achieve broad engagement;
• Evolve to keep up with the pace of authoritarian learning;
• And are remit-bound, which minimizes redundancy.

Coalitions that hew to these principles will make far more efficient use of limited resources and prove more effective in the fight against authoritarian information campaigns.

NSO, Not Government Clients, Operates its Spyware

The Guardian reports that the Israeli cyberweapons maker, NSO Group—not its government clients—directly operates its Pegasus spyware, contradicting past claims the company has made. This troubling disclosure about the sometimes unchecked power of intrusive tech companies and their products emerged in a WhatsApp lawsuit, which alleges that NSO targeted 1,400 users with its spyware over a two-week period. NSO faces other challenges over similar alleged abuses against journalists and human rights activists. Read the full article here.

Persuasive Technologies Development in the PRC

A report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute explores China’s development of advanced persuasive technologies—spanning generative AI, neurotechnology, and AR/VR systems—which could be used to deepen repression and further manipulate the information space. For example, one leading PRC company has developed neurotech tools that can detect emotions, potentially creating new modes of state surveillance that erode mental privacy. The report calls for proactive policy responses that center user autonomy and privacy. Read the full report here.

The Weaponization of Gender for Transnational Repression

A new report from the Citizen Lab explores the unique risks transnational repression poses for women human rights defenders. The study outlines how state actors use social media surveillance, hacking, and online harassment to discredit women activists. States capitalize on existing misogyny to silence women, which can lead to mental health and personal security challenges. The report lays out various recommendations for civil society organizations, including informing policymakers on gender-based transnational repression; facilitating community support networks; delivering counseling services; and providing legal aid. Read the full report here.

How Russia-Backed Influencers Meddled in Romania’s Elections

Documents declassified by the Romanian interior and intelligence ministries outline Russia’s highly coordinated, expansive information operation to support presidential candidate Călin Georgescu. According to the documents, over 100 paid influencers with a total following of eight million boosted Georgescu’s profile across social media platforms. Two weeks before the first-round vote, Georgescu became the ninth most trending topic on TikTok globally, despite the lack of attention his campaign generated in earlier stages of the race. The information operation mirrors other Russian-backed efforts uncovered during recent elections across Europe. Read the full article here.

Building a Response-Impact Framework for FIMI

EU DisinfoLab proposes a “response-impact” framework to map and help determine appropriate responses to foreign information manipulation & interference (FIMI) campaigns. Using the Doppelganger campaign as a case study, researchers mapped responses and analyzed the cost-effectiveness of each response. They then built the framework, which has five key indicators: the impact of responses using criteria such as increased situational awareness; impact on threat actor capabilities; capacity to trigger new responses; increased opportunities for attribution; and deterrence. Read the report here.  

FIMI-ISAC Collective Findings

The Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference Information Sharing & Analysis Center (FIMI-ISAC) provides a comprehensive overview of FIMI around the recent European Union elections. ISAC’s innovative approach helps organizations reduce duplicative work and identify FIMI campaigns more rapidly by facilitating data sharing across borders and regions. This collaborative, streamlined strategy creates crucial efficiencies by collating partner insights into easily digestible products, for example by consolidating 20 individual reports into one. Read the full report here.

Russia’s Information Offensive in the Sahel

This investigation by Forbidden Stories details Russia’s efforts to shape the media landscape in the Sahel. Following coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Russia has helped local leaders muzzle critical voices and flooded the information space with pro-Russian and “anti-imperialist” content. Russia has built up an infrastructure of voices, outlets, and channels in the Sahel to support its influence operations, relying on strategies like setting up journalism schools; signing contracts with local influencers; launching covert information operations; and opening new media outlets. Read the full article here.