- Twitter layoffs extend to the platform’s global content moderation capacity and ability to protect human rights defenders.
- Iran and some Latin American countries are the latest to utilize digital authoritarian tactics and equipment from Beijing and elsewhere, but collaborative civil society and government partnerships have improved internet freedom in some countries.
- Countering China’s global media and propaganda apparatus will require a more networked response that goes beyond fact-checking and stronger competition from independent media.
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Why Independent Media and Fact-Checking China’s Propaganda Are Not Enough // November 17
by Kevin Sheives, Deputy Director, International Forum for Democratic Studies, @KSheives
For many in the democracy community and others concerned about the “information disorder” that has upended discourse in our societies, the response often boils down to the need to tell the truth better. Naturally, this leads to calls for more support to independent media and fact-checking of false information. While these approaches are important components of a whole-of-society response, a broader set of responses is needed that addresses the full scope of the global information disorder rather than simply competing better for attention with disinformation, propaganda, and hate speech. While not the only troubling source of false or harmful content, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) expanding state-affiliated media footprint around the world could serve as a useful lens to examine the extraordinary responses that are key components of a comprehensive, networked response to disinformation.
In certain media markets, the line between independent media and state-affiliated media isn’t necessarily clear cut; the two are increasingly intertwined. In order to effectively cover China, many media outlets enter into cooperative agreements with PRC-affiliated media companies. Freedom House, in its 2022 report on this topic, found that in 12 of the 30 countries it studied, local outlets had entered into coproduction arrangements with such companies. These partnerships provided PRC technical support or resources to aid local outlets in their reporting in or on China, in exchange for a degree of PRC editorial control over the finished product. Furthermore, in 18 of those same 30 countries, local media partners amplified the narratives of China’s state-backed media giants. Additional measures by tech platforms and news outlets can help disentangle the relationship between China’s state-affiliated media entities and independent outlets. These steps could include consistent labeling of PRC (and other) state-affiliated content on social media even when that content eventually appears in independent news outlets; transparency about content-sharing and licensing arrangements for foreign news reporting and business deals between local and PRC outlets; or choosing to reject paid advertising inserts by PRC-affiliated media in other print and online publications.
China’s overt, international propaganda apparatus doesn’t operate solely in open and competitive media markets. It is increasingly bolstered by a variety of sophisticated, covert activities such as paying influencers on platforms like YouTube, amplifying official state media and PRC diplomats through fake social media accounts, and censoring foreign researchers and journalists through cyberbullying or denying safe access to China as leverage. Tracking, analyzing, and publicizing these covert campaigns can help blunt the impact of state-based propaganda and build resilience among the public to foreign influence operations. Exposing efforts by the PRC to censor journalists abroad can be a powerful signal to local audiences concerned about the openness and integrity of their information spaces, particularly as it pertains to political discourse. To address the pressure some journalists have felt from PRC embassies and entities, among other objectives, one Philippine journalist association developed a special code of ethics for reporting on China.
News organizations in democratic societies are at a disadvantage in covering China affairs. The PRC is simultaneously a global power with influence across many sectors of societies around the globe and, at the same time, resistant to traditional means of investigative journalism due its tightly-controlled information ecosystem. Most news organizations are aware of and able to report on China’s influence in their countries, but these organizations do not necessarily fully understand the source of that influence back in China. Journalists covering China’s influence need specialized training. Chinese-language training outside of the PRC and a better understanding of the dominant role of the Chinese Communist Party across the Chinese Party-state apparatus are crucial to understanding China. Close partnerships with China researchers could strengthen their reporting. Journalists should also take advantage of open source investigative courses on China, such as one offered at the Center for Advanced China Research.
The solution to information disorder must go above and beyond offering a more competitive alternative through journalism and fact-checking initiatives. If the emerging responses to China’s state media influence serve as an instructive case study, democracies’ responses to all threats to the information space must be truly comprehensive. |
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Countering Russian Disinformation
The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked an escalation in Russian information activities around the globe, according to a recent OECD report. Deploying disinformation on Telegram, for example, has helped state-affiliated media amplify misleading narratives and avoid detection. According to disinformation expert Jakub Kalenský in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, democracies must ignore Russia’s recycled narratives and the “empty threats” that have paralyzed them in the past if they are to counter future authoritarian information activities. |
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In a new Forum Power 3.0 blog post, “Bridging the Gap Between the Digital and Human Rights Communities,” Eduardo Ferreyra of Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, a civil society organization based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, considers obstacles preventing traditional civil society organizations from addressing digital threats to democracy and opportunities to bridge the divide between digital activists and the broader human rights community.
Emerging technologies offer authoritarian states new ways of surveilling citizens. In a conversation on the Forum’s Power 3.0 podcast, Article 19’s Vidushi Marda explores how unregulated AI surveillance technologies threaten the rule of law and deepen authoritarian control.
In October, the Center for International Media Assistance released “Media Reform Amid Political Upheaval,” a multi-essay report examining the role of independent media during democratic openings. The report features five case studies examining past and current democratic openings: Burma, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Ukraine.
Earlier this year, the Center for International Media Assistance organized a panel to debate Big Tech policy interventions that could fund independent media. Communications and Program Assistant Sasha Schroeder authored a follow-on blog post that considers existing attempts to rebalance the information ecosystem and the importance of donor support for independent media. |
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